Power Shifts, Strategy and War

Declining States and International Conflict

Dong Sun Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9780415773386
• eBook ISBN: 9781135978198
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Marked changes in the balance of power between states in the international system are generally seen by IR scholars as among the most common causes of war. This book explains why such power shifts lead to war breaking out in some cases, but not in others.

In contrast to existing approaches, this book argues that the military strategy of declining states is the key determinant of whether power shifts result in war or pass peacefully. More specifically, Dong Sun Lee argues that the probability of war is primarily a function of whether a declining state possesses a 'manoeuvre strategy' or an 'attrition strategy'. The argument is developed through the investigation of fourteen power shifts among great powers over the past two centuries.

Shifts in the balance of power and the attendant risks of war remain an enduring feature of international politics. This book argues that policymakers need to understand the factors influencing the risk of war as a result of these changes, in particular the contemporary shifts in power resulting from the rise of China and from the growth of nuclear proliferation.

1
Introduction

The question

“What made war inevitable,” observed Thucydides in the fifth century B.C. about the Peloponnesian War, “was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”¹ Many modern international relations scholars have agreed with Thucydides, arguing that marked changes in the balance of power between states are among the most common causes of war. A prominent contemporary historian notes that even today, “The causes of war remain rooted, as much as they were in the pre-industrial age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own.”² While there is no question that shifts in power have sometimes caused great-power war in the past, these shifts have also passed peacefully on other occasions. For example, power decline caused Imperial Germany to wage war against Russia in 1914. In contrast, the Soviet Union responded to economic decline vis-à-vis the United States in the 1980s in a peaceful manner. My goal in this book is to explain why power shifts lead to war in some cases but not in others.³

Finding a good answer to this question is presently important, since the next few decades will likely see uneven rates of economic growth and shifts in the balance of power among major states. The relative rise of China is the most outstanding case in point. China’s economy has expanded at an annual rate of two to three times those of other major states since the 1980s. If this rapid pace of economic growth continues, the world’s most populous nation will surpass its neighbors including Japan and Russia and even catch up with the United States in the foreseeable future.⁴ Consequently, China may be able to construct military power that can challenge US dominance. This prospect has already begun to cause security concerns in the United States. The 2002 National Security Strategy, for instance, warned that “in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path.”⁵ Foreign policy experts are having a heated debate on whether China can rise peacefully. The political outcome of China’s rise will probably shape not only the future of Asia but also the world in a crucial way. As its shares of global wealth and power increase, Asia is becoming a region of critical importance to international security; China is leading the ascendance of the region.

Nuclear weapons proliferation also threatens to alter the balance of power in critical regions. With the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, pro-liferators can boost their military capability markedly. Therefore, the prospect of an emerging nuclear power can provide other nations with a powerful incentive for military response as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrates.⁶ To take another example, as North Korea has moved closer to deploying an operational nuclear force, the United States and Japan have perceived a grave threat and considered a range of countermeasures, including a preventive attack. This is not a trivial matter: according to one estimate, an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula can claim as high as one million casualties and one trillion dollars, not counting the costs on the North Korean side. Iran is another candidate that potentially threatens to upset the power balance in the Middle East and set off a dangerous armed conflict. The United States and its allies including European states and especially Israel are concerned that Teheran may have a nuclear program with military purposes and will some day use nuclear weapons against them – most likely against Israel – directly or indirectly. It is reported that the fearful Israelis have actually planned for a preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities; such an event has the potential to escalate into a larger conflict in the combustible region. Whether these proliferations of nuclear weapons will lead to wars is a critical issue with important economic and security implications, given the important roles these regions play in global commerce, finance, and/or oil supply.

In short, shifts in the balance of power and the attendant risks of war remain an enduring feature of international politics and pose a great potential threat to international security in the twenty-first century. A solid analysis of this subject, therefore, is essential to understanding the direction in which the contemporary world is heading and preparing for dangers lying ahead. Also, it can contribute significantly to effective management, and possible elimination, of these critical risks by advancing our knowledge on the issue. If policy-makers understand what factors crucially shape the risk of war in the presence of power shifts and how, then they might be able to manipulate those factors and thereby prevent, for instance, China’s ascendance from leading to a major war. This significant achievement would be able to save numerous precious lives and resources for some better uses of improving the well-being of mankind. The question that this book seeks to answer has such profound practical importance.

The argument

This book argues that military strategy is the key determinant of whether power shifts result in war or pass peacefully. Specifically, the probability of war is primarily a function of whether the declining state possesses a maneuver strategy or an attrition strategy. States can adopt one of two military strategies: maneuver or attrition. An attrition strategy aims to destroy the opposing army by applying brute force. The attacker fights a series of set-piece battles with the enemy’s main force and usually relies on frontal assaults. A maneuver strategy aims to exploit the weaknesses in the adversary’s war plan and force the opposing army into a strategic paralysis. To do so, the attacker either outflanks or penetrates the line of defense and disrupts the opponent’s command and control systems. The possession of a maneuver strategy increases the prospect of war by enhancing the declining state’s confidence in its military capability, accentuating its fear of losing a military opportunity, and reducing its chance of acquiring sufficient compensation from the rising state.⁷ If the declining state only has an attrition strategy available to it, on the other hand, war is less likely: the state has little confidence in its chance of victory and is more likely to reach a satisfactory settlement.

Declining states hold the key to whether power shifts result in war or pass quietly: power shifts provide decliners with a preventive motive for war.⁸ As their power position deteriorates, declining states fear that they will be compelled to fight a war under worse conditions or to bargain from a position of increased weakness in the future.⁹ Therefore, these states have powerful incentives to stop power shifts from undermining their military capability and are inclined to seek compensation from rising competitors. Such compensation can include changes in the terms of trade, territorial concessions, transfers of technology, or arms limitation agreements. Rising states may also be asked to help decliners compete against third parties. Unless sufficient compensation is forthcoming, however, decliners may be willing to fight an early war while they stand a good chance of winning. The opposite is true for rising states: power shifts enable them to fight wars under relatively favorable conditions or to bargain from strength in the future.¹⁰ Therefore, they have incentives to delay conflict and are willing to make concessions for that purpose. Therefore, if one is to answer when power shifts lead to war, then one needs to understand the conditions under which declining states fight preventive wars.

Declining states are likely to fight preventive wars under three conditions. First, the power shift must significantly undermine their military capability.¹¹ If power decline has a major impact on their military capability, decliners will be inclined to fight an early war for fear that inaction will compromise their security interests in the long run. If declining states can maintain their military capability despite their power decline, on the other hand, there will be little reason to consider the preventive use of force. Second, declining states must have a good chance of winning a war with a rising state at an acceptable cost. For this matter, it is essential that the declining state anticipate a quick and decisive victory. Third, diplomacy must fail to yield sufficient concessions from rising competitors.¹² Talking generally costs less than fighting, and therefore decliners want to avoid war if diplomacy can mitigate power decline or its strategic consequences. War is likely when states in relative decline find it too difficult to acquire adequate compensation through negotiation.

Declining states’ military strategy shapes these respective conditions and thereby determines the probability of war. For this matter, it is most important whether they have a maneuver or an attrition strategy. In a nutshell, a maneuver strategy makes the war-promoting conditions abundant, whereas an attrition strategy renders them scarce. Declining states with a maneuver strategy tend to lose a large amount of military capability, because power shift frequently destroys this superior strategy’s chance of success. In contrast, decliners with an attrition strategy suffer no such loss since their strategy is not vulnerable to power decline. Therefore, only a severe decline in power can significantly undermine their military capability, while even small shifts in power can markedly reduce military capability when a maneuver strategy is employed. A maneuver strategy also presents a favorable opportunity to win a quick and decisive victory, whereas an attrition strategy often leads to long and costly wars. Finally, when decliners have a deceptive maneuver strategy, risers tend to underestimate their declining rivals’ military capability and offer insufficient compensation. In contrast, an attrition strategy facilitates the rising power’s accurate assessment of the declining power’s military strength, thereby presenting a favorable opportunity to reach a bargain.

This argument makes important conceptual contributions to the scholarship of power shifts and war. The extant literature largely overlooks the role of military strategy and focuses primarily on material factors such as power and technology. While international relations scholars pay increasing attention to military strategy’s impacts on the initiation, conduct, and outcome of war, the study of power shifts has yet to incorporate their significant insights. This volume is a first such attempt. However, it is not a mere intellectual arbitrage – transferring insights from a field to another. It offers innovative arguments that will move forward a larger theoretical debate on the consequences and determinants of military strategy.

For example, in exploring negotiations between decliners and risers, I present a novel argument that a maneuver strategy causes divergent understandings of military capability and thereby leads to the breakdown of diplomacy. No study has explored how maneuver and attrition strategies shape the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The existing literature focuses mostly on their effects on deterrence – that is, military opportunity. My argument here is distinct from the popular claim that an offensive strategy creates a first-mover advantage and deprives diplomats of time to resolve crises. This common view relates to how strategy affects crisis stability, while I investigate how a particular type of strategy exacerbates the problems of asymmetric information and capability miscalculation. Thus, my analysis adds a novel perspective and moves forward theoretical understandings of the consequences of military strategy. By highlighting the diplomatic implications of military strategy, this book illuminates the understudied diplomatic dimension of the politics of preventive war. I explore the possibility that decliners extort compensation from risers, thereby mitigating their decline and avoiding war, and specify the conditions under which such an effort succeeds or fails. This approach is an improvement upon extant major works which do not account for the workings of diplomacy in the presence of power shifts.

Also new to international relations scholarship is my analysis of how power shifts affect military strategies. I argue that power decline can destroy a maneuver strategy’s chance of success; therefore, a decliner possessing the strategy will likely expect to lose its superior strategy and have strong incentives for preventive action. In contrast, an attrition strategy is invulnerable – albeit sensitive – to declines in power, and therefore declining states possessing the strategy are unlikely to anticipate a huge loss of military capability and have a strong preventive motive. This analysis on interactions between power shifts and military strategy reveals a significant yet heretofore unexplored risk associated with power shifts, thereby opening up a new avenue of research.

I also offer a fresh perspective on the origins of military strategy, in addition to its consequences, by bringing military leadership back into the study of strategy. My core argument on the sources of military strategy is that strategy is a function of military leadership’s attributes: the creation of a viable maneuver strategy requires superior intelligence and acumen. This novel claim challenges the conventional wisdom that strategy can be reduced to material factors such as power, technology, and geography as well as another popular view that political motive determines military strategy. In so doing, I establish that military strategy is an intellectual creation with important, independent effects. Although classical works on strategy widely accept this intuitively plausible view, modern war studies – in their overzealous pursuit of science – all too often reduce military strategy to more measurable material and political factors. My analysis on the determinants of strategy helps correct this common mistake.

The alternative arguments

My central argument challenges three prominent theories of power shifts and war.¹³ Power transition theory offers the first systematic explanation for the outcome of power shifts. According to this theory, power shifts provide rising states with motive and opportunity for war. As their relative power grows, risers find that the status qu...

Table of contents

• Routledge global security studies
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A strategic theory of preventive war
• 3 The Russo-German rapprochement, 1870–90
• 4 The Schlieffen Plan and World War I
• 5 Pearl Harbor attack plan and the Pacific War
• 6 Conclusion
• Appendix
• Notes
• Selected bibliography
• Index