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1 Introduction
Cuba can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which cannot cast her off from its bosom.
John Quincy Adams1
The bitter rivalry between the United States and Cuba has occupied a position as one of the principal political disputes in the Western hemisphere for the past several decades. Since the rise of Fidel Castro, the governments of these two countries have placed themselves on opposite sides of almost every major regional and global issue. They have long held vastly different ideas about what constitutes a good and just government, about what kind of international behavior is legitimate, and about the ends that foreign policy should serve. Moreover, they have not only harbored political differences, but maintained a very intense dislike of one another. The US has attempted to sustain a picture of Cuba as an international outlaw, the source of much turmoil, crisis and mischief in the world. Adding a personal dimension to the attacks, officials in Washington also have sought to demonize Castro, creating and continually advancing an image of him as the embodiment of evil. Although personal assaults are not often a predominant feature of Cuban accusations, due to the succession of American presidents, the image of the US depicted in Cuba is one of an imperialist giant, abusing its power, creating injustice, inequality and misery throughout the world. In sum, the relationship has been one of mutual hostility and contempt, fueled by the combination of differences in ideology, interests, culture and power, in tandem with their close proximity and contact.
Since the end of the Cold War, the antagonism directed toward Cuba and Castro from the United States government has in some ways intensified, resulting in further attempts to tighten the US embargo and isolate the island diplomatically. Such a heightened degree of hostility is not uncommon. The US-Cuban relationship has not been static throughout the decades. Rather, there have been periods of greater and lesser tensions. What is unusual is that an escalation in anti-Cuban sentiment and policy intensified with the end of the Cold War. The Cuban-Soviet connection, from its inception, was always identified in the US as the primary concern of American policymakers, the most important factor influencing Washington’s stance toward the Cuban government. The close relationship between the two communist countries was regarded as a serious threat to American security, as it gave the Soviets a base of operations in the Western Hemisphere where they could advance their political and military objectives. Moreover, as a loyal ally of the USSR, Cuba used Soviet aid to advance the export of revolution, train and arm leftist guerrillas, deploy its own troops to prop up friendly regimes, and provide non-military aid in the form of doctors, technicians, construction workers, teachers and athletic trainers to a host of countries. While there were sometimes disagreements in the US over the extent of Soviet involvement in Castro’s exploits, it was nonetheless widely agreed that the moral, material and human support by Cuba of guerrilla forces and established radical governments around the world was a threat to American global interests. (The disagreements existed generally in academics and journalism. The official US interpretation found in presidential speeches, congressional testimony, and State Department publications, emphasizing close cooperation between the two countries in the export of revolution, remained consistent over the years, with little attention devoted to ideological and policy differences that periodically marked Soviet-Cuban relations.) Even if Castro’s efforts were not always conceived in the Soviet Union, and even if the Soviets only seemed to tolerate them at times, the two countries remained strong allies, sharing broad common goals and interests.
The Problem
In consideration of all vast changes in the international system over the past 20 years – the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and their disastrous effects upon Cuba, as well as the establishment of democratically elected governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, many of whom are increasingly critical of Cuba, the United States seems to be in the highly unusual position of having obtained exactly what it has long said it wanted. The Cuban revolution, by contrast, was significantly weakened since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has remained so since this time, even though it has managed to avoid the same fate as befell the communist governments of Eastern Europe. The Cuban government suffers from economic hardship, the loss of its allies and trading partners, the end of its global projection of power in support of revolutionary movements, and the possibility – with the retirement of Fidel Castro and the uncertainty it brings for the future – that socialism at it has been practiced may not survive much longer on the island.
Yet American policy toward Cuba continues to follow the same path it has for decades, as if there had been no significant changes in the region or in the world. The arrival of Barack Obama in the White House has led to expectations (and concerns) that US policy could soon change. In April of 2009, soon after his inauguration, President Obama stated at a Summit of the Americas meeting that the United States sought a new beginning with Cuba, and that he was willing to have his administration engage the Cuban government on a wide array of issues. The President did initiate a change, lifting restrictions on family visits and remittances sent to the island. He also permitted investments there by US telecommunications companies, and resumed talks on migration that the Bush administration halted in 2003. He has, however, held off on more far reaching measures, insisting that Cuba first take steps to improve its human rights record and move toward democracy.
These conditions have long been central to US policy, and have been its stated goals. With great consistency to date, the United States has pursued a policy of isolating Havana internationally, increasing political and especially economic pressure, and encouraging the collapse of the government. Before President Obama relaxed some of the restrictions applied to US companies and Cuban Americans, the trend since the end of the Cold War had been toward greater pressure. President George W. Bush implemented a variety of changes over the last several years dealing with limited travel and cash transfers, and broadcasting into Cuba. These had followed The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, (more commonly known as Helms-Burton, after its congressional sponsors), which itself followed The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, all of which have attempted to impose costs on Cuba but have ultimately failed to achieve the desired results. Each effort has represented an attempt to strengthen the US embargo against Cuba in an effort to “squeeze” or “strangle” Castro and bring about his hastened demise. The 1992 act sought to forbid subsidiaries of American companies in third countries from doing business in Cuba. However, Havana has for years been eagerly seeking foreign investment, which has been forthcoming to a great degree. Helms-Burton enacted a secondary boycott, seeking to force US policy onto other countries by making foreign companies choose between either the American market or the Cuban market. Revisions to US policy by the George W. Bush administration were also characterized as applying pressure to Cuba, even though their targeted audience seemed often to be only a domestic one. The ultimate goal and hope has been to drive business out of Cuba, increasing the pressure on the regime and on the population who, according to the plan, would remove Castro from power. In spite of such goals, American policy has usually only managed to placate anti-Castro voters and anger US allies.
Two criticisms are made regarding the logic of this conduct. The first is that American policies are counterproductive. The argument is that if the goals of the US with respect to Cuba are a peaceful transition to democracy and the institution of free market capitalism (the oft-stated aims of the Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations) then the last action to take would be what the US continues to do. Should American policy be successful, and bring about the “strangulation” of Castro, what are the possible results? More likely than not it would be social upheaval, something which both Raul and Fidel Castro, who have long advocated the use of violence to make and protect the revolution, and who have demonstrated little respect for human rights, might very well respond to with force, as opposed to quietly stepping down. The American government should be reminded that one of the cardinal rules of diplomacy is to allow one’s enemies a face-saving way to avoid confrontation, that sometimes more can be accomplished with an outstretched hand than a clenched fist. The Sandinistas held free and fair elections only after negotiations with the US produced a deal. During the contra war, this did not happen. Spain after World War II provides another example, according to Wayne Smith, of how engagement worked better than ostracism. “Spain’s major advances toward democracy came after the United States had normalized relations with it, signed an economic-military agreement with [it] in 1953, and allowed its admission into the United Nations in 1955.”2 Moreover, as the US maintains a policy whose success quite possibly leads to social violence and whose failure perpetuates economic difficulty, it fuels another undesirable outcome. In both cases, the embargo increases the potential for a large number of refugees to leave Cuba for South Florida, something that the Mariél episode and the refugee crisis of 1994 demonstrated is not in American interests, if it were not already apparent before. Nor, it is argued, do US actions advance the cause of human rights; they instead make it easier for Castro to crack down at home and justify repression. John Paul Sartre said that if the United States did not exist, Castro would have to invent it. However, such fabrication is not necessary because the US has helped provide Castro with sufficient cover to jail dissidents and squelch political opposition. Additionally, America’s efforts to tighten the embargo, which include (unenforced) punitive measures against foreign companies that do not comply with US law, have only provoked quarrels with America’s allies and major trading partners, rather than forcing the economic “strangulation” of Cuba. These outcomes, it is posited, are not what the US should want to encourage.
The second criticism directed at the logic of American policy is that the old threat to American security has vanished. If ever there was a need to guard against Cuba, that day is no longer. The Soviets, who represented the primary danger, are gone; Cold War is now an historical term. As the success of Castro’s internationally-oriented foreign policy depended upon financial, political and military backing from the Soviet Union, Cuba’s importance as a threat was only secondary. Cuba was rarely engaged by the US as an independent actor, but rather as a client or puppet state. Considering that Cuba is now poorer and weaker than it was when it had a patron, there is no reason for its significance to be elevated. Even if Castro posed a challenge to the US of his own accord, all of his global initiatives which the United States opposed have ended. Cuba is not a danger to the US. Thus any new expenditure by the US aimed at isolating or weakening the regime is a waste of time, money and effort, even if it might conceivably result in the downfall of the revolution.
Still, in spite of their debatable logic in the current setting, the policies begun during the Cold War remain. The question this book seeks to address is why this is so. What is it about the United States’ relationship with Cuba that provides for the continuation, and even intensification of a Cold War policy into the post-Cold War era?
The first answer given to this question in the wake of the Cold War is almost invariably: domestic politics. Cuban voters and interest groups in the United States are said to have taken over American policy toward Cuba in order to advance their own personal interests at the expense of a genuine national interest. This view posits that successful lobbying efforts by organizations such as the Cuban American National Foundation have resulted in the continuation of the embargo and attempts to economically and diplomatically isolate Cuba. The lack of a security threat from Cuba makes the “capture” of US policy by a domestic ethnic constituency all the more possible.
This assessment stands in marked contrast to many others that have been offered as explanations over the years. There are, first of all, traditional theories of international relations, which consider general structures and systems around the globe that delimit the parameters of international politics. Specifically, there are three approaches that eclipse most others. There is the Realist argument which posits that in the anarchic international realm, states act rationally on the basis of interest in order to a) safeguard their security and acquire and hold power, and b) balance against rival powers or threats.3 A Realist interpretation of US behavior toward Cuba would suggest that the United States would recognize the diminution of the danger, and without recourse to moral, ethical, legal or emotional considerations, devote little attention and fewer resources toward confrontation with Cuba. (These are, no doubt, oversimplifications. Realism does not represent a single, unified approach to analyzing international relations. Still, the differences within the group are not so great that they fundamentally question the general understandings of the exercise of power.) Looking strictly to the international setting of the Cuban problem, and not to domestic political concerns (elections, fundraising), the US would find no need for the continual attempts to isolate, contain, change and undermine Castro’s regime, and such efforts should cease. The US might not be expected to embrace Castro, but at least not to actively seek to undermine the regime. Yet this clearly has not been the case.
There is the liberal internationalist perspective, which argues that states tend to evolve toward greater liberalism and democracy – and consequently to become more peaceful toward one another – when they become more economically developed, when they engage in global trade, when they open up to foreign investment, and when they are tied to international institutions that bind countries together through dense networks of associations, rules, laws, norms and practices.4 Such logic suggests that greater economic development, along with participation in global economic institutions, would encourage greater rule of law in Cuba, as well as greater government accountability to both the Cuban population and to other countries. This view, informed by these assumptions, would argue that the United States should be willing to engage Cuba, conduct trade relations with it, and encourage US companies to invest and own property in Cuba. The US might also be expected to welcome Cuba back into the Organization of American States, or to take the logic even further, support its membership in the World Trade Organization and maybe even North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA, along with a host of other global organizations devoted to economic development. Maintaining a policy similar to the one that the US has toward China would not be unreasonable according to this perspective. Yet none of these developments has yet occurred.
There are also a variety of economistic arguments that concern themselves with the logic of capital accumulation, investment, the acquisition of wealth, and the strength of the world capitalist system. Like the diversity in Realism, so too does this body of literature exhibit a multitude of variation.5 One could argue that attempts to bring down Castro through embargoes and diplomatic isolation, no matter how futile they may seem (as evidenced by The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 1996, which tried to force a secondary embargo against Cuba due to the fact that no other nation will join the US in its embargo) represent an attempt by the US to hold out for the possible reassertion of overwhelming hegemony in Cuba. A situation whereby the economic strangulation of Cuba led to the collapse of the regime would certainly encourage political instability. This could indeed create an ideal situation for the US to intervene (not necessarily militarily) and reestablish its dominance over the island, dominance that would be even more advantageous than limited investment under the watchful and weary eye of the Cuban government. However, according to this reading, those who would be in a position to gain from holding out for the ultimate reestablishment of hegemony over Cuba are not those who are calling for continued embargo and Castro’s removal. Rather, this capitalist class is calling for an opening to Cuba and opportunities to invest there, things denied by the US government, but paradoxically, welcomed by the Cuban government. (In addition to the agricultural sector, many US companies have been eager to do business in Cuba, including General Motors, Sears, ITT, Sheraton, Avis, Hyatt, and Gillette.)
In all three of these understandings, American policy toward Cuba represents an anomaly, running counter to what these approaches to the problem might expect. After all, not only has the Cuban threat to American security ceased, while most other countries besides the United States maintain diplomatic and economic ties to Cuba and welcome the country’s participation in a variety of international institutions, but it is also the case that the reintroduction of foreign investment capital to the island is proceeding apace without US participation.
In addition to the theoretical considerations, there is an extensive body of literature which directly addresses the longstanding confrontation between the US and Cuba. The arguments in this literature offer several major explanations as to the sources of American policy. The first has to do with the nature and prevalence of US imperialism in Latin America, claiming that the “colossus of the North” has historically flexed its muscles in the region in order to achieve its ends, with the Cuban case as only another example of such behavior. The second concerns the understanding of Castro and the Cuban revolution as illegitimate and threatening, and is usually accompanied by criticism of American policy for not being sufficiently vigilant in the pursuit of Castro’s ouster. The third addresses the array of historical issues and disputes regarding both countries which have been obstacles to normal relations. The fourth, already mentioned, consists of those who argue that American domestic politics are the primary impediment to a thaw in relations with Cuba.
The arguments that domestic American politics are the key to understanding its Cuba policy are notable at this time for their widespread acceptance. While there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth to this view, it only addresses the problem in part. It fails to explain why the US government, which has had a vigorous Cuban policy since the early 1800’s, which has sought to annex, control and/or influence Cuba since the same period, and which has never treated the fate of Cuba as an inconsequential issue, seems to have simply turned over its Cuba policy to less than one percent of the American voters. In other words, until the late 1980s votes and campaign contributions were not recognized as the major determinants of US policy toward Cuba. Did so much change over the course of a few years that there remains nothing more upon which the US can base its Cuba policy? To argue this is to marginalize not only the history of US relations with all of Latin America, and Cuba in particular, but also the continuities in the global dimensions of American foreign policy.
However, even if one were to answer in the affirmative and say that the US government has essentially turned over its Cuba policy to a well-financed and well-organized special interest group, one would still need to explain why such a development occurred. Political success for an interest group is not the result of money and organization alone. These things must be accompanied by a goal, a program, an idea, a promise, a principle. With respect to Cuba, these things are readily available in grand, incontestable terms, encompassing an ideology as big as the promise of America itself – democracy, freedom, liberty, anti-communism, the rights of the individual. Characterizing their efforts as a struggle for the realization of these ideals in Cuba, advocates of current US policy have linked their cause with the most exemplary attributes of American identity. At the same time, they have been equally ...
