Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century

Putin, Medvedev and Beyond

Marcel De Haas

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415477307
• eBook ISBN: 9781136990328
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Historia militar y marítima

This book examines Russia's external security policy under the presidencies of Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and beyond.The Russian Federation has developed from a neglected regional power into a self-declared resurgent superpower. Russia's background in the former Soviet Union as well as close ties with the upcoming new powers of China and India served as spring-boards towards regaining an influential status in the world. Simultaneously, Moscow developed an assertive policy towards the West and unwilling neighbours, culminating in August 2008 in an armed conflict with Georgia. Reviewing this decade of Russian international security policy, this work analyses security documents, military reforms and policy actions towards friends and foes, such as the USA and NATO, to provide an assessment of the future security stance of the Kremlin.

This book will be of much interest to students of Russian politics and foreign policy, European politics and Security Studies and IR in general.

1
Structure of Putin’s foreign security policy (2000–2008)

President Vladimir Putin released new editions of the three key security documents in the beginning of his first term in office. In later years more security papers and statements were to follow. In addition to security documents, Putin’s initiatives on military reforms and their consequences for the status of the Russian armed forces complete the picture of the theoretic configuration of his foreign security policy.

Security policy documents

In 2000 Putin started his first term in office as President by signing new editions of Russia’s major security documents, i.e. the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept. In 2003 the Russian Ministry of Defence published a defence white paper. Only late in Putin’s second presidential term were new security policy documents published. However, just as the defence white paper of 2003, these were not adapted issues of the three aforementioned major security documents, but an overview of foreign policy (2007) and a strategy for the development of Russia towards 2020 (2008) (see: Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Chronology of Putin’s major security documents and statements (2000–2008)

The 2000 editions of the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept

Shortly after the publication of the National Security Concept (NSC) in January 2000, the subordinate major security documents, i.e. the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), were also revisited. The order of publication and the generally similar points of view of the different concepts gave proof of a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach to the foreign and security policies. Hence, 2000 could be considered as the year of completion of the process towards an integrated and comprehensive Russian security policy, after the ‘roaring’ 1990s.

National Security Concept

The NSC was produced by the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF )—Russia’s highest security policy organ—and provided an overall view of Russian security policy, applying all means available to the state. With respect to threats, the 1997 NSC had expressed a generally positive view on international developments and perceived internal problems as the most important threat for Russia’s national security. Within two years this perspective changed radically. In the 1999 draft NSC, a rise in military threats was displayed. The 1999 edition of the NSC clearly illustrated a turning point in threat perception. Externally, Moscow had now changed its objectives from stress on international cooperation at the global level, to emphasis on cooperation and integration within the CIS. This review in policy was the result of disappointment with the cooperation with the West but also of the new impetus for regaining Russia’s superpower status, which could best be achieved starting from the CIS. Russia’s rebuffing attitude towards NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 1999 and to its military intervention in Kosovo of the same year, meant that Western security policy was now considered to be a threat, resulting in statements in the security documents expressing these anti-Western sentiments. By ratifying the final draft of the new NSC on 10 January 2000, President Putin authorized this revised view of Russian security policy (SCRF 2000a).

Military Doctrine

The Military Doctrine was drafted by the MOD and deals with the military means of the state. The revised Military Doctrine, signed by President Putin in April 2000, contained positions against the West and consequences of the second Chechen conflict (SCRF 2000b). New entries regarding the President and Belarus were included. Taking into account his policy of centralization of power, it was not surprising that the position of the President in the chain of command was strengthened. As a result of the Union Treaty of December 1999, Russia and Belarus had intensified their cooperation. The military aspects of the deepened relations were now stated in the doctrine. The SCRF, probably by instigation of the military, was left out of this chain in the (draft) doctrine of 1999/2000. However, in the course of 2000 Putin made it clear that he intended to strengthen the position of the Security Council at the expense of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff (IISS 2000a: 109).

Foreign Policy Concept

The Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, MID), and discussed the political and diplomatic means of Russia. More than seven years after the first FPC of 1993, on 28 June 2000 President Putin signed a revised version of the FPC (SCRF 2000c). The introduction of the new document stated that certain tendencies in international politics compelled Moscow to review its foreign and security policies. These negative tendencies were in contrast with the expectation, listed in the 1993 FPC, that multilateral cooperation would further intensify. The 2000 edition of the FPC mentioned as basic principles of Russian foreign policy, that the RF was a great power, that Russia’s influence in international politics was to be strengthened and that political, military and economic cooperation and integration within the CIS had a high priority. Furthermore, the FPC contained expressions of aversion to Western security policies.

Assessment of the 2000 security documents

Major points of view in the security documents of 2000 were an assertive attitude towards the West, strengthening Russia’s position both within the CIS and on a global level, as well as an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy (SCRF 2000a, b, c; Haas 2004b: 74–97). The 2000 security papers displayed a prominence of negative tendencies with reference to Western security policy. In particular NATO’s use of force in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a clear example of its policy of ignoring Russia, which claimed a decisive role in Europe, as well as of disregarding the UN and the standards of international law. Other concerns were NATO’s new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and its enlargement with new member states in the East, adjacent to Russia’s borders. With regard to external national interests the documents mentioned strengthening Russia’s international position as a great power and joint security action through the Collective Security Treaty (CST), particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism (see: Chapter 2, ‘Russia’s approach towards other international actors: friends’). Moscow felt threatened by attempts to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for international security, by economic and power domination of the United States and other Western states, as well as by ignoring Russian interests and influence in resolving international security problems. The parts in the 2000 security documents on ensuring Russia’s security portrayed the principles of foreign and security policies for the purpose of achieving the external objectives of Russia’s grand strategy. In ensuring security by foreign policy, priority was given to the UN(SC) as a mechanism of international security. With this entry Moscow clearly rejected a leading role in international politics of institutions other than the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This provision of course was related to the objective of strengthening Russia’s international position. In the UNSC Russia possessed the right of veto and was thus able to block undesirable resolutions. Therefore, the objective of reinforcing Russia’s international status could be promoted within the constellation of the UN. However, if NATO dominated international politics, the situation would be different. In such an arrangement of the international system, Russia, without a veto right, would be more or less ‘dependent’ on NATO’s policies. This explained the prominence of the UN and the UNSC especially in the relevant entries in the documents. Another entry in foreign policy principles of ensuring security dealt with advancing regional stability. In the practice of politics Russia’s standpoints on good neighbourhood (partnership) and on regional conflict resolution in the CIS became confused. On some occasions Russia had allegedly actively encouraged regional conflicts, for instance in Abkhazia, followed by an offer of conflict solution, thus making a CIS state, in this case Georgia, dependent on Russia for ensuring its security. Subsequently, this dependency in the field of security was aimed at enhancing Russian influence on this state, thus ‘ensuring’ good neighbourliness. A further priority in ensuring security was protecting Russians abroad. This had been a recurring theme in Russian foreign security policy. The NSC, as well as the FPC, in describing the location of Russians abroad, used the term za rubezhëm. This term pointed at states adjacent to Russia. The expression za rubezhëm has an emotional connotation: it refers to something familiar, which binds together.¹ As to ensuring military security the NSC and the Military Doctrine permitted the use of nuclear weapons to counter aggression.

Terrorist attacks affecting major security documents

In autumn 2002 Chechen terrorists carried out a voluminous hostage taking in Moscow. This attack had—at first sight—deep consequences for the internal but also for the external security thinking in Russia. After the violent ending of the hostage taking Putin gave orders to intensify the war in Chechnya, to reform military power and to make changes in current national security documents and legislation, in order to strengthen Russia’s fight against terrorism. In September 2004 Russia was shocked by another large-scale hostage taking, this time in the North Ossetian city of Beslan. In the aftermath of the Beslan hostage taking again changes in security policy (documents) were announced.

‘Nord-Ost’ hostage taking (2002)

From 23–26 October 2002 Chechen fighters carried out a hostage taking in a theatre in Moscow, in which the musical ‘Nord-Ost’ was performed. Special forces (spetsnaz) units of the power ministries violently put an end to this act of terror.² ‘Nord-Ost’ had brought the Chechen conflict into Russia’s capital. As a result there was a broad feeling amongst Russian military-political decision makers as well as in Russian society that this terrorist attack meant a turning point in Russian security policy, which was illustrated by the Russian press by describing ‘Nord-Ost’ as Russia’s ‘9/11’ (Solovyev 2002b). Shortly after ‘Nord-Ost’ parliamentarians and academic security specialists already declared in public that this hostage taking had demonstrated that the current legal system lacked a normative basis for an effective fight against acts of terror (Sokolov 2002a, b; Bogdanov 2002; ‘Orders revision’ 2002; Nikolayev 2002). The existing legal system did not live up to the demands of the necessary anti-terrorist operations. For that reason existing legislation, such as the Constitution, the NSC, the Military Doctrine, Laws on Anti-Terrorism, Defence as well as on State of Emergency, was to be revised (Bogdanov 2002). On 29 October 2002, President Putin affirmed this defining moment by ordering his security ministers and chiefs to draft a revision of the NSC. According to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov the adjustments of current legislation would include the following provisions: intensifying the involvement of the Russian armed forces in fighting terrorism, assessing the increased threats against national security and the readiness of Russia to act against terrorists but also against their sponsors abroad. After revising the NSC, the Military Doctrine was to be altered, followed by other security documents subordinated to the NSC (Solovyev 2002c).

Evaluating the policy decisions after ‘Nord-Ost’, the anticipated revision of security policy turned out to be ambivalent. On the one hand, recognizing the increased importance of internal threats and conflicts seemed to be a realistic approach by Putin. This replaced the focus on large-scale warfare, which conservative circles in the General Staff by emphasizing nuclear instead of conventional forces, still considered to be the primary conflict. If the repeated conflicts in Chechnya and Dagestan did not make this clear, then surely ‘Nord-Ost’ proved that the primary threats to Russia’s national security were of an internal nature. Therefore, it would make sense that the revised Military Doctrine as well as other security documents took account of the increased importance of non-nuclear military means, which would correspond with the actual threat perception. On the other hand, the ambivalence came to the fore with regard to the trend of the proposed revision in security policy, stressing military solutions and not social-economic ones. Another feature of ambivalence was the fact that Russian authorities repeatedly made it clear that Russia granted itself the right to attack terrorists abroad. This option to use force abroad was not to be conducted by an invasion of troops, but by employing precision guided munitions (PGMs) in operations against terrorist training camps or against other targets out of the country, which were related to international terrorism (‘Defence Minister says’ 2002). By doing so, Moscow permitted itself to violate norms of international law, such as the prohibition of using force and the non-intervention principle, as laid down in the UN Charter.

Beslan hostage taking (2004)

On 1 September 2004 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Chechen terrorists captured more than 1,000 teachers, parents and children at a school, during the festivities of the opening of the new educational year. On the morning of 3 September armed Ossetian civilians allegedly opened fire at the terrorists which set off fighting between hostage takers and Russian anti-terror units, who were unprepared for storming the building at that moment. As a result of the fighting 300 to 400 hostages and servicemen were killed. Just as in ‘Nord-Ost’, the anti-terror units Vympel and Alfa of the Federal Security Service (FSB) took the lead in bringing the hostage taking to an end (‘Russian elite’ 2004). ‘Beslan’ was not the only terror attack in this period; the week before suicide bomb attacks at a Moscow metro station and on board two Russian airliners killed some 100 people (‘War on terror’ 2004).

To a large extent the policy responses after Beslan were similar to those taken in the aftermath of ‘Nord-Ost’. In their statements the political and military leadership of the MOD repeated their views of 2002, maintaining that war had been declared against Russia and that, if necessary, (preventive) attacks by Russian forces against terrorists abroad would be carried out. Likewise, politicians such as State Duma Speaker and former Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Gryzlov stated that new legislative initiatives against terror attacks would be presented to the Duma in short order. A new and unusual step taken was that Russia asked for an extraordinary session of the UNSC, a request which was not made for previous terror attacks, such as ‘Nord-Ost’ (‘War on terror’ 2004). At the special session of the UNSC Russia asked for and received an unqualified condemnation of the hostage taking. This UNSC resolution provided Russia with the acknowledgement that the Chechen conflict was part of international terrorism, which would legitimize its actions in Chechnya. However, this international recognition did not mean that Russia allowed the international community to interfere in its internal conflict in Chechnya.

The 2003 Defence White Paper: the priority tasks of the development of the Russian armed forces

On 2 October 2003 Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, published ‘The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’, by its format—not only a doctrine explaining military operations but also describing military capabilities—and therefore here referred to as the Defence White Paper (DWP 2003) (Minoborony 2003). Warfare analysis of the characteristics of conflicts from the 1970s until 2003 led the Russian MOD to the following conclusions in the 2003 DWP:

• A significant part of all the conflicts had an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrated fierce fighting and in a number of cases resulted in total destruction of a state system.

• The outcome of conflicts is more and more determined in its initial phase. The party that takes the initiative has the advantage.

• Not only military forces but also political and military command and control systems, (economic) infrastructure as well as the population have b...

Table of contents

• Contemporary security studies
• Contents
• Maps
• Tables
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Structure of Putin’s foreign security policy (2000–2008)
• 2 Implementation of Putin’s foreign security policy
• 3 Structure of Medvedev’s foreign security policy (2008–2009)
• 4 Implementation of Medvedev’s foreign security policy
• 5 The Russian-Georgian armed conflict of August 2008
• 6 Assessment of Russia’s foreign security policy (2000–2009) and outlook beyond Medvedev
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index