Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9781134521609
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: International Business
• Index: Business

This book presents an analysis of the transnational social forces in the making of a new European socio-economic order that emerged out of the European integration process during the 1980s and 1990s. Arguing that the political economy of European integration must be put within the context of a changing global capitalism, Van Apeldoorn examines how European change is linked to global change and how transnational actors mediate these changes.

1 Theoretical perspective
Social forces and the struggle over European order

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this book. Whilst developing a critique of established approaches to European integration, I outline an alternative approach grounded in a historical materialism that emphasises the role of transnational social forces in the construction of European socio-economic order. I will call this alternative approach ‘neo-Gramscian transnationalism’, as it builds upon the so-called neo-Gramscian perspective within International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE), which takes the transnational nature of world politics – as embedded in the social relations of global capitalism – as its point of departure.¹ This then implies a fundamental break with the state-centrism that still dominates IR, not just in the guise of the long-predominant neo-realist theory (Waltz 1979) – which sees world politics as pure inter-state politics in which states compete (in a zero-sum game) for wealth and power within an anarchic system of self-help – but also in the form of many contemporary liberal theories, particularly what has been called neo-liberalism (Keohane 1984a, 1989), and recently showing its tenacity in Alexander Wendt’s (1999) explicitly state-centric ‘social theory of international politics’.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first section proposes to redefine the problématique of the study of European integration, away from its traditional rather exclusive focus on the institutional form of the integration process towards one that also addresses the question of its socio-economic content. Then, taking the ‘constructivist critique’ of conventional IR as a point of departure, the next section develops the meta-theoretical premises of the alternative approach I propose. The third section then outlines the constituent elements of this alternative perspective. The final sections present a critique of established approaches to European integration and seek to apply neo-Gramscian transnationalism to the study of European order.

Redefining the problématique of European integration: the social purpose of European order

Conventional integration theory has for too long been focused on the question of sovereignty transfer from the nation-state to an emerging supranational level, whereby the different ‘schools’ essentially debated the question of to what extent this is happening, and who or what might be driving the process. Such a probléma-tique does not allow us to capture what John Ruggie has called the ‘generative grammar’ or ‘structure’ (Ruggie 1982: 382) underlying a particular international order, a structure that constitutes the ‘social purpose’ served by this order:

Whatever its institutional manifestations, political authority represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose. The prevailing interpretation of international authority focuses on power [that is, state power] only; it ignores the dimension of social purpose. The problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order, but not its content. (ibid., his emphasis)

The concept of social purpose may be applied to the national level as well as to the international (Ruggie 1982) or world order (Cox 1987) level. The starting point for the present study is that it may also be applied to the level of an emergent European order. That is to say, we can conceive of the process of European integration as the construction of a regional ‘international’, and partly ‘supranational’, order, serving a particular social purpose. At the same time, I would suggest that for the study of European integration, form and content are to a significant extent intertwined. Defining content as social purpose, or the socio-economic content of the internationalisation or supranationalisation of political authority, and form as the institutional shape this process takes, it can be argued that form sets limits to possible contents and vice versa (cf. Schmitter 1991; Traxler and Schmitter 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1999).

To the extent that social purpose is the outcome of political and social struggles, it may also be changed through such struggles. Within the development of capitalism we may in fact observe an alternation between rival ‘social purposes’. Karl Polanyi (1957) argued that in this respect we may distinguish between ‘embedded’ and ‘disembedded’ market economies. In the former, the economy is more organised around what Polanyi called the ‘principle of social protection’ (Polanyi 1957: 132), and the market is embedded in social and political institutions that discipline and constrain the private forces of the market in order to protect ‘society’, but, often, also particular sections of the capitalist class, against the destructive nature of those forces. In the latter, the economy is more organised around the ‘principle of economic liberalism’ and the market is disembedded from society: the economic is separated from the political and the market is represented as self-regulating. In Polanyi’s view, however, the project of establishing a self-regulating market is in the end a utopia (Polanyi 1957: 3). Historically, the free market has always needed the state for both its emergence and its maintenance. In Polanyi’s political economy, the market is not a ‘spontaneous order’ (as Friedrich Hayek asserted), but rather a social and political construction, hence, in this sense, as is also stressed by the new institutionalism in economic sociology, the economy is always embedded in society (Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck 1994: 3). The separation of the political from the economic and the disembedding of the market which characterises liberal capitalism is therefore an ultimately untenable state of affairs. Hence, Polanyi’s notion of the ‘double movement’ (1957: 132): as the state retreats from its role in providing for social protection, the resulting social disruption will engender a counter-movement in which social forces will organise themselves around the principle of social protection, and the liberal market economy becomes ‘re-embedded’.

The question of social purpose, or of socio-economic order, has recently also returned to the academic (and indeed political) limelight in the form of the notion of different forms of capitalism. Now that capitalism is the only major economic system left, academics and other observers have begun to rediscover the (institutional) diversity of capitalism itself (see, e.g., Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck (eds) 1994; Crouch and Streeck (eds) 1997; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1997; Hall and Soskice (eds) 2001). Moreover, some – in particular Michel Albert (1993) – have suggested that out of this diversity there has arisen a political, ideological and economic contest between rival models of capitalism. In this study I will suggest that this struggle of rival models of capitalism is also manifest at the transnational level, where different social forces pursue rival strategic projects for the construction of what we could identify as an emerging European (supranational) model of capitalism.

Social purpose changes over time. Within the history of the political economy of European integration we may thus also interpret different phases of the process of European integration as bound up with different social purposes. If we want to understand this changing social purpose, we have to examine the social underpinnings of European order. These social underpinnings remain hidden from the established perspectives on European integration precisely because their focus is exclusively on the question of power narrowly defined in terms of political authority of either states or supranational/international public bodies (cf. Ruggie 1982). In order to overcome this narrow focus, we should add a concept of social power – in both its material and ideological dimensions – that derives not from political authorities, or from the state in a narrow sense, but from the social forces that underpin state power. Traditional IR theory has always abstracted the state from its social base. In contrast, the neo-Gramscian approach adopted here, following Cox, ‘consider(s) the state–society complex as the basic entity of international relations’ (Cox, 1986: 205, my emphasis). This notion of state-society complexes here is broadened inasmuch as the transnationalisation of both state structures and social forces is taken into account.

Before outlining – in conjunction with a critique of established approaches – neo-Gramscian transnationalism as an approach to the study of European order and its underlying social purpose, I should first present the main (meta-)theoretical foundations and outline the central concepts of this alternative approach.

Meta-theoretical considerations: IR theory and the ‘constructivist’ critique

Neo-Gramscian transnationalism implies a fundamental critique of the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying orthodox IR/IPE. The way I formulate this critique here is in part inspired by what has been labelled the emerging constructivist perspective within the IR debate.² Constructivism as it is understood here explicitly challenges the individualist and rationalistic understanding of social action underlying mainstream IR theory, while at the same time rejecting the structuralist alternative in which there is no room left for human agency. As constructivism seeks to take agency seriously (in fact more seriously than rationalist approaches), it also draws our attention to the role of consciousness and ideas in social practice. It is important, however, to differentiate from the outset the critical constructivism advanced here, which is grounded in historical materialism, from liberal or idealist versions of constructivism (see in particular Wendt 1999).

Beyond individualism

Constructivism seeks to propose a meta-theoretical alternative to the methodological individualism underlying mainstream IR discourse as it developed in the 1980s (Wæver 1994; see also Ashley 1986; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992, 1999; cf. Keohane 1988). The liberal or later ‘neo-liberal’ perspective in IR is most explicitly premised on an individualist ontology as it stresses the rationalist logic of utility-maximising individuals, which, under the conditions of a liberal world market, is argued to lead to positive sum outcomes. It can be argued, however, that such an individualism equally underlies Waltzian neo-realism (in spite of Waltz’s claim that he is a structuralist), as – premised on assumptions from neo-classical microeconomics – states here are taken as rational actors with given interests competing in a state-system that is likened to a market (see Cox 1986; Ashley 1986; Wendt 1987, 1999; Dessler 1989). In what has been dubbed the ‘neo-neo synthesis’ of the IR mainstream (Wæver 1994), an orthodoxy only now being challenged by constructivism, world politics, then, is explained on the basis of an ‘atomistic’ model of social action in which there are only self-maximising individuals (states in neo-realism) and in which the ‘the social’ (or society) is nothing other than the aggregate of individual actions. In this individualist conception, agency is onto-logically prior, which means that agents and their identities and interests are taken as given.

As individualism holds that all properties of social systems can be reduced to the attributes of individual agents, it is thus denied that agents are embedded in social relations that actually shape their interests and identities. As Wendt puts it: ‘The consequence of making the individual ontologically primitive … is that the social relations in virtue of which that individual is a particular kind of agent with particular causal properties must remain forever opaque and untheorised’ (Wendt 1987: 343, my emphasis).

In this context, ‘constructivists’ as well as neo-Gramscians (see in particular Cox 1986, 1995) have drawn our attention to the intersubjective making of social reality, at which level we also find the role of ideas. Ideas can neither be simply reduced to interests nor (as in idealism) be reified as existing prior to practice. It is only in human activity that ideas are generated, and here given structural conditions (partly of a material nature) in which this activity takes place must also enter into the analysis.

Structure and agency

A constructivist understanding of the relationship between structure and agency is informed by Marx’s famous dictum that men make their own history, but not under the circumstance of their own choosing.³ Such an ontology refuses to make either agency or structure ontologically prior, but instead gives them equal weight (Wendt 1987: 339). It therefore attempts to transcend the dichotomy of voluntaristic individualism on the one hand, and deterministic structuralism on the other, acknowledging that social structures are constructed by real people – and mediated by their consciousness and praxis – but also that the exercise of such ‘autonomous’ agency is at the same time dependent upon prior social forms. This approach to the structure–agency problem has been articulated by different social theorists, above all by Roy Bhaskar in his ‘tranformational model of activity’ (Bhaskar 1979), and by Anthony Giddens in his structuration theory (Giddens 1979, 1985). Such a ‘structurationist’ or ‘transformational’ ontology, then, starts from the basic premise that structure and agency presuppose each other.

Agency presupposes structure because, as Bhaskar puts it, ‘all activity presupposes the prior existence of social forms … Speech requires language; making materials; actions conditions; agency resources; activity rules’ (Bhaskar 1979: 43). Hence, unequivocally rejecting individualism, the point of departure here is that there is no such thing as a pre-social actor; human agency is always embedded in pre-existing social relations that constitute that agent’s identity and interests. In fact, for the individual actor ‘social structure is always already made’ (ibid.: 42, his emphasis). Therefore, although the metaphor of ‘making’ remains often a useful one, it is in fact, on this view, not correct to say that people create society, rather they reproduce or transform it (ibid.). At the same time, society ‘would not exist unless they did so’ (ibid.: 45). The same ontological position is expressed in Giddens’ notion of the duality of structure, by which he means that ‘structured properties of social systems are simultaneously the medium and outcome of social acts’ (Giddens 1981: 19; see also Giddens 1979: 5, 69). Action always takes place through the medium of some preexisting social forms; structure must therefore be seen not only as constraining but also as enabling action (see, e.g., Giddens 1979: 51, 69–70; 1985: 169–80; see also Bhaskar 1979: 50).

Structure also presupposes agency as it only exists in virtue of intentional human action in which social structures are reproduced or transformed (Bhaskar 1979: 49). Giving pride and place to agency also allows us better to conceptualise historical change as the product of human practice (moving beyond the lack of historicity of IR theory). Moreover, constructivism takes agents as reflexive, knowledgeable and purposeful actors, and hence not as – as for instance in structuralist Marxism – mere ‘bearers’ of underlying structural forces, or indeed as simple utility-maximisers whose ‘rational choice’ involves a mere ‘automatic computing of expected utilities governed by given preferences’ (Hollis and Smith 1991: 409). The position adopted here posits not only that the existence of social structures is dependent upon their instantiation in social action, but also that they ‘do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity’ (Bhaskar 1979: 48–49).

Towards a critical theory of global transformation

Constructivism opens up the possibility of new and innovative forms of theorising going beyond the rationalistic mainstream, but it does not constitute a substantive theory: it does not tell us how to go about explaining social change. Here I start with the premise that such a theory has to be a critical theory and suggest that constructivism (as emerging within IR discourse) has as yet not fully developed its critical potential. My understanding of critical theory follows that of Robert Cox, who opposes it to (positivistic) ‘problem-solving theory’. The latter ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework of action’ (Cox 1986: 208). Taking the existing order as given, indeed treating it completely ahistorically, the ‘problem-solving’ research programme restricts itself to analyse (and propose solutions to) specific ‘operational’ problems of the present system. In contrast, critical theory:

stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory … does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework of action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. (Cox 1986: 208)

In my view such a critical perspective follows logically from the constructivist position adopted above. First, the notion that the existence of social structures is ultimately dependent upon and indeed constituted by human agency through a process of continuous reproduction and transformation of those structures implies the possibility of emancipatory practice. Second, and following from this, constructivism is critical because it historicises the present social structures. Structures are viewed as constructed through the social practice of human actors. They are necessarily historical products, and therefore transient and changeable, rather than transhistorical phenomena that would be amenable to the formulation of social scientific laws. Finally, as constructivism treats all forms of intersubjective knowledge as constituent elements of social reality, it sees as an inherent feature of social science that the theories of the social scientist feed back in to the (re-)constitution of the object she studies. As Giddens maintains, if we thus accept that scholarly practice in itself is part of the social world it seeks to explain, critical theory is no longer an option but becomes a necessity (Giddens 1985: xxxv). In my view such a ‘critical constructivism’ underlies the perspective here called neo-Gramscian transnationalism.

Neo-Gramscian transnationalism as a critical theory of global politics goes beyond traditional international relations theory in four interrelated respects. First, it brings society back in as capitalist society (and with that brings class analysis back in). Second, it brings ideas back in but avoiding idealism. Third, it brings transnational relations back in, and argues their rise to be bound up in particular with the global expansion of capital. Fourth, it brings the role of human agency back in (rather then merely human behaviour). Below, these points will be elaborated as the constituent elements of neo-Gramscian transnationalism, and I will attempt to show how they in fact come together in what is the central focus of this study, the transformative role of transnational class strategy.

Neo-Gramscian transnationalism

The critical constructivism underlying our alternative perspective differs from some other (liberal) forms of constructivism in adopting a historical materialist framework of interpretation. This ‘constructivist’ historical materialism is inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s attempt to reformulate historical materialism away from the economism and ‘scientific’ structuralism of orthodox Marxism, and to give due place to the role of consciousness, ideology and culture in the reproduction and transformation of social formations, and hence also to the role of collective (class) agency in producing these intersubjective forces.

Historical materialism

Whereas conventional IR theory – particularly in the neo-realist tradition – focuses on state power narrowly conceived as the accumulated material capabilities of the ‘state-as-actor’, historical materialism seeks to examine the social origins of that power. Historical materialism takes as its subject matter the ensemble of social relations in which actors are embedded and claims that at least one set of those social relations is rooted in the economy. Production – taking the form of a social interaction with nature – necessarily forms the material basis of all human life, and therefore of the very existence and reproduction of societies, including their political organisation. As Cox (1987: 1) writes, production is therefore also the necessary material precondition for the exercise of any form of power, including state power. The social origins of power are thus to be at least partly located in the social relations of production. It is in the study of capitalism that an understanding of these social relations of production, and the contradictions and conflicts they entail, becomes indispensable to our analysis. It is ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Routledge/RIPE Series in Global Political Economy
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Series editors’ preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1: Theoretical perspective: Social forces and the struggle over European order
• 2: Global restructuring, transnational capitalism and rival projects for European order
• 3: The European Roundtable: An elite forum of Europe’s emergent transnational capitalist class
• 4: The Roundtable’s changing strategic project and the transnational struggle over European order
• 5: Transnational class agency, the rise of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ and the evolving European order
• Notes
• References