The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union

Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson, Thomas Persson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• eBook ISBN: 9781135220587
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines accountability in the EU from different perspectives and considers whether EU citizens have real opportunities for holding decision-makers accountable. This book critically analyses five arguments which claim there are sufficient means for holding decision-makers to account in the Union. The authors examine:

• The argument that we should rethink the meaning of accountability in the EU context

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• The claim that there is no accountability deficit in the EU because member states have the power to retrieve all delegated competencies

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• The assertion that EU citizens have effective mechanisms for holding those responsible for legislative decision-making to account

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• The contention that the arrangements that obtain at present for holding the executive power in the EU to account are acceptable

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• The belief that the involvement of organised civil society can work as an alternative to traditional forms of accountability

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The main conclusion is that the current institutional set-up and practice of decision-making in the EU is one that merely creates an illusion of accountability.

Using a strict framework focusing on the difference between formal mechanisms and actual opportunities for accountability, this highly coherent volume will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, especially those interested in the democratic foundations of the European political system.

1
Examining the illusion of accountability

Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson and Thomas Persson

Accountability features as an important – perhaps the most important –theme in the ongoing debate on the EU’s democratic deficit (Curtin and Wille 2008). This seems only natural, since accountability is necessary if representative democracy is to work. Representatives must, if they are to fulfil their duties in an effective manner, be accorded independent powers to act. On the other hand, they must not forget those whom they represent.

With the use of open mandates, there will always be a need for institutional arrangements which force representatives to be responsive to the wishes of those they represent (Pitkin 1967: 233). Representative democracy is about the controlled transmission of power (Sartori 1987: 232–4). If there is to be any guarantee that representatives actually work to promote the interests of citizens, the latter must be able to hold the former accountable for their actions. Thus, representative political systems which lack mechanisms for holding decision-makers effectively accountable are seriously flawed from a democratic standpoint.

Do EU citizens have real opportunities to hold decision-makers accountable, or does the current institutional set-up in the Union merely create an illusion of accountability? That is the central question of this volume. There are widespread and growing concerns that the political system of the EU does not, in fact, afford citizens appropriate mechanisms of accountability (Schmitter 2000; Harlow 2002; Arnull and Wincott 2002; Fischer 2004; Bovens 2007a). The aim of the current study is to ascertain whether such concerns are warranted.

We thereby connect up with the ongoing debate on the EU’s democratic deficit, which has been with us for almost two decades now. Concerns over accountability are an integral part of this overarching discussion on the Union’s democratic credentials. Is a democratisation of the EU necessary? Is it desirable? Is there, in fact, any problem that really needs addressing here? And if there is, can it be remedied? As we understand it, there are three main positions in this huge debate:

According to the first, there is no democratic problem at the European level (Moravcsik 2002, 2008; Majone 2005). The EU works wonderfully, and the only problem is the tendency of European intellectuals and even some politicians to fuel the notion that the EU is plagued by a democratic deficit.

Proponents of the second position argue that there is indeed a democratic problem, and that it can and should be addressed. The solution is to introduce more political competition at the European level, thus establishing ‘limited democratic politics’ in the European Union (Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008).

Advocates of the third position concede there is a democratic deficit, but they believe we should proceed with extreme care when deciding how or whether to address it. They warn us that the cure may turn out to be worse than the disease (Bartolini 2006, 2008; Scharpf 2008, 2009).

Taking a step back, we might ask why questions of democracy and accountability are relevant in the context of the European Union. Is not the EU, after all, just an international organisation among others, to which member states have delegated tasks which they believe are more efficiently handled at the international level? Why is there so much fuss about the EU’s democratic deficit? True enough, scholars are now beginning to analyse and question the democratic status not only of the EU but of other international organisations as well (e.g. Zweifel 2006). However, the demands placed on the EU when it comes to meeting democratic criteria are far heavier than on any other international organisation. How come?

We believe that the EU (and its member states) has partly itself to blame that the debate over its democratic shortcomings has become so heated. While formally an international organisation, namely, the EU has gradually acquired an institutional structure and set of competencies that had previously been reserved for nation-states. In its current form, the EU is an extremely influential organisation, with the power to make collective decisions which are binding on all residents of its member states. When a decision-making body is that powerful, concerns over democracy and legitimacy are only natural and appropriate.

Furthermore, the EU has partly responded to the demands for democratisation that have been placed upon it. Through a series of treaty reforms over time, it has developed an institutional set-up bearing a reasonable resemblance to a democratic political system. At the international level, that makes the EU unique, as the only site today of governance beyond the nation-state where ‘the incipient institutions of a “democratic” transnational political community are faintly visible’ (Dahl 1994: 32). This has served to encourage the idea that a ‘third transformation’ (Dahl 1989: 309–21) in the history of democratic practice may be possible.

A third transformation?

Towards the end of Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl raises the question of whether the scale of politics can remain coterminous over the long term with the scale of economics, law, and culture. Thus far we have witnessed two democratic transformations: The first took place in ancient Greece, and led to the establishment of the democratic city-state. Government by the few was replaced by government by the many. The second transformation involved the replacement of direct forms of democracy with representative forms. The democratic process could then be applied at the level of the nation-state, rather than being reserved for political systems the size of a city-state. The question now is whether a third transformation, establishing democratic governance beyond the nation-state, is in the cards (Dahl 1989: 312).

Dahl’s own answer to this question is to urge his readers to be cautious. In his earlier work, Dahl seemed fairly optimistic about the possibilities for a third transformation, pointing out the EU as the most likely contender to meet the challenge of establishing democratic governance at the international level (Dahl 1989: 320). More recently, however, he seems to have become more sceptical of the possibility of democratising international organisations and achieving a third transformation (Dahl 1998: 117; Dahl 1999: 32–4).

At a more general level, furthermore, Dahl reminds us of the obstacles we always face when we try to translate visions into practice. He urges us to hold on to our sound practical judgement, and to recall the discrepancy between the ideal and the real.

Measured against its exacting ideal, the imperfections of any actual democracy are so obvious and so enourmous that the palpable discrepancy between ideal and reality constantly stimulates unbounded hopes that the ideal may somehow be made real. But feasible solutions often prove elusive, and those who so easily construct an ideal democracy in their imaginations soon discover that it is far harder, or even impossible, to construct that ideal in the real world.

(Dahl 1989: 312)

In the case of the EU, the discrepancy between democratic ideals and practices has been quite apparent, and it has given rise – as Dahl predicted – to numerous proposals on how to address the democratic shortcomings of that body (e.g. Abromeit 1998; Eriksen 2000; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Schmalz-Bruns 2007; Hix 2008). It is also possible to point to a number of reforms – the introduction and gradual extension of co-decision, the adoption of regulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents, and the increased role of the EP in the appointment of a new Commission – that have served to close, at least in some degree, the gap between the ideal and the real, moving EU governance in a more democratic direction (Karlsson 2001: 44–103).

How should these attempts at remedying the democratic deficiencies of the EU be understood? Has the EU succeeded with the third transformation, at least in part? Or have these reforms only created a false image of a democratic political system in which citizens are able to hold decision-makers to account?

We would not, of course, expect the EU to meet the criteria of an ideal democracy fully. For the story of democracy’s transformations – as Norberto Bobbio reminds us in The Future of Democracy – shows that there will always be a gap between the ideal and the real, ‘between what was promised and what has actually come about’ (Bobbio 1987: 27). According to Bobbio, real-world democracies have failed to keep the promises inherent in democratic ideals. But the reason, he argues, why these broken promises (Bobbio 1987: 27–39) were not kept is that ‘the project of political democracy was conceived for a society much less complex than the one that exists today’ (Bobbio 1987: 37). It is therefore impossible for real-world democracies to meet their ideals fully. The question we should rather ask ourselves, as we set out to examine existing political systems, is to what degree they manage to meet the criteria of a fully democratic process.

An illusion of accountability?

We make no attempt, in the current study, to accomplish the monumental task of assessing whether the EU meets all of the criteria that constitute the democratic ideal. Instead, we focus exclusively on what opportunities citizens have for holding decision-makers accountable.

We believe the topic selected for this volume is a timely one, in view of the increased interest in questions of accountability in an EU context. Our choice is also justified by the fact that accountability, as argued above, is of vital importance for any representative political system that aspires to be even minimally democratic.

By accountability, we have in mind a relationship between two actors (X and Y) wherein X has the right to: (1) monitor the actions of Y, (2) evaluate the actions of Y, and (3) impose sanctions on Y (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005: 29; Bovens 2007a: 450–1).

Our concern here is with what is sometimes called ‘internal accountability’:i.e. a relationship whereby X has delegated authority to Y (who may in turn have delegated authority to Z). Some scholars also speak of ‘external accountability’, whereby actors are held to account by all those who are affected by their actions, rather than by those who have delegated power to them (cf. Keohane’s contribution in this volume). Our understanding of accountability, however, presupposes an act of delegation. An accountability relationship between two actors can therefore be described in principal-agent terms (Strøm et al. 2004).

In the context of the EU, it is the citizens of the Union who are the ultimate principals. It is they who have delegated power to parliaments and governments. The latter in turn have empowered EU institutions and civil servants to carry out the day-to-day business of EU affairs. A chain of delegation often has more than two links, with actors in the middle playing the role of both agent and principal. Member-state governments, for example, are the agents of EU citizens and act as their representatives in Brussels. Yet they are also principals, for they delegate their own authority to civil servants.

Principals may have a number of mechanisms at their disposal for ensuring that their agents act in accordance with the mandate given them. Such mechanisms operate in an ex post manner: they involve monitoring, evaluating, and sanctioning after the fact. However, the impact of accountability may also be apparent ex ante, ‘since the anticipation of sanctions may deter the powerful from abusing their positions in the first place’ (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30).

A number of different accountability mechanisms are available in different contexts, including electoral contests, legal requirements, and fiscal instruments. These various mechanisms can be placed on a continuum from weak to strong. At the weak end, we find tools that merely allow for monitoring an agent’s actions: e.g. the right to access documents. Then, moving along the continuum towards the other end, we find instruments that also permit principals to evaluate the actions of representatives: e.g. the right to call hearings. At the strong end of the spectrum, finally, we find mechanisms that make it possible to impose sanctions on the agent: e.g. the right of superiors to remove employees, of parliaments to call a vote of confidence, and of voters to change government on Election Day.

What sets the EU apart from other international organisations is that it offers an institutional setting that seems, on the surface, to allow the public actually to hold decision-makers accountable: indirectly through their national governments, and directly through the European Parliament. It is important to distinguish, however, between formal accountability mechanisms and any real opportunities principals may have to hold agents accountable. Consider direct accountability via the European Parliament. MEPs are directly elected by EU citizens, so there is a strong mechanism for accountability here: should EU citizens feel that ‘their’ MEPs have done a bad job, they can simply not vote for them at the next EP election. However, the real opportunities for citizens to hold MEPs accountable are sharply limited by the fact that EP elections are second-order national contests fought out on domestic rather than European issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix 2008). The absence of electoral contests fought on European issues undermines the ability of citizens to hold MEPs accountable for their actions, notwithstanding the existence of a strong accountability mechanism.

It is important to ascertain, then, whether the accountability mechanisms at the disposal of EU citizens are weak or strong. However, it is also necessary to know whether these powers are merely formal, or whether instead they provide real opportunities to hold decision-makers to account.

There are those, then, who are genuinely concerned that the political system of the EU does not afford citizens sufficient opportunities to hold decision-makers to account. But there are also those who deny there is any accountability deficit at all, or that the current system lacks adequate mechanisms for accountability (Moravscik 2002: 611–2). In the current debate on the democratic status of the EU, we can identify five arguments supporting the conclusion that there are indeed sufficient means for holding decision-makers to account in the Union. Taken together, these arguments paint a picture of the EU as a site for governance in which the third transformation (to democracy beyond the nation-state) has partly succeeded – at least when it comes to meeting reasonable criteria for accountability.

In this volume, we shall examine these five arguments in order to determine whether the image of the EU as offering sufficient accountability is justified, or whether the current institutional set-up and practice of decision-making is one that merely creates an illusion of accountability. It may well be that denials of an accountability deficit in the Union are based on a misapprehension of the true state of affairs.

Five arguments that EU accountability is sufficient

These five arguments, which claim there is no accountability deficit and that current arrangements are therefore satisfactory, will be examined under the following headings: ‘rethink the meaning of accountability’; ‘delegated...

Table of contents

• Routledge Advances in European Politics
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1 Examining the illusion of accountability
• 2 Accountability in world politics
• 3 Accountability and democracy
• 4 Putting limits on accountability avoidance
• 5 Irretrievable powers and democratic accountability
• 6 EU treaty reform and accountability
• 7 Delegation to the permanent representation and mechanisms of accountability
• 8 European intelligence cooperation and accountability
• 9 Executive power and accountability in the European Union
• 10 The European Central Bank – independent and accountable?
• 11 Civil society participation and accountability
• 12 Improving accountability in the European Union – the potential role of NGOs
• 13 Taking accountability seriously
• Bibliography
• Index