Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama

Constructing crises, fast and slow

Wesley Widmaier

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138790902
• eBook ISBN: 9781317650065
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Over the past century, presidential constructions of crises have spurred recurring redefinitions of U.S. interests, as crusading advance has alternated with realist retrenchment. For example, Harry Truman and George W. Bush constructed crises that justified liberal crusades in the Cold War and War on Terror. In turn, each was followed by realist successors, as Dwight Eisenhower and Barack Obama limited U.S. commitments, but then struggled to maintain popular support.

To make sense of such dynamics, this book synthesizes constructivist and historical institutionalist insights regarding the ideational overreactions that spur shifts across crusading excesses and realist counter-reactions. Widmaier juxtaposes what Daniel Kahneman terms the initial "fast thinking" popular constructions of crises that justify liberal crusades, the "slow thinking" intellectual conversion of such views in realist adjustments, and the tensions that can lead to renewed crises. This book also traces these dynamics historically across five periods – as Wilson's overreach limited Franklin Roosevelt to a reactive pragmatism, as Truman's Cold War crusading incited Eisenhower's restraint, as Kennedy-Johnson Vietnam-era crusading led to Nixon's revived realism, as Reagan's idealism yielded to a Bush-Clinton pragmatism, and as George W. Bush's crusading was followed by Obama's restraint. Widmaier concludes by addressing theoretical debates over punctuated change, historical debates over the scope for consensus, and policy debates over populist or intellectual excesses.

This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of U.S. Foreign Policy

1 Introduction: From fast crusading to slow balancing and credibility gaps

DOI: 10.4324/9781315763033-1

Over the past century, presidential constructions of foreign policy crises have legitimated recurring transformations of U.S. national interests.¹ Perhaps most prominently, Presidents Harry Truman and George W. Bush constructed crises that justified liberal crusades in the Cold War and War on Terror. In a March 1947 national broadcast, Truman overcame isolationist resistance by warning that the U.S. faced a struggle “between alternative ways of life,” with one “based upon the will of the majority” and the other upon the “will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.” Similarly, decades later, Bush affirmed: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Urging U.S. action to eliminate a potential Iraqi threat, Bush warned that “we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Yet, even as Truman and Bush advanced crusading values, their successors moved back toward realist restraint: Following Truman, Dwight Eisenhower warned against overreactions to crises. Conceding that “[c]rises…will continue,” Eisenhower cautioned against “a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution,” urging instead a “need to maintain balance.” Similarly, Barack Obama later acknowledged a U.S. tendency to overreaction, noting that “there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain,” but also warning that “we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things” and “make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.”²

To explain such patterns of change, scholars from realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives have stressed the role of crises, defined as “exogenous shocks” to the material or ideational bases of state interests. Yet, even as they differ over the material or social sources of crises and interests, such approaches share “rationalist” presumptions that agents use information efficiently in reacting to such events.³ In this light, these rationalist approaches also have merit—but they also have shared limitations, as they blind scholars to the inefficiencies that can mount over time and cause crises. For example, in U.S. foreign policy contexts, just as initial constructions of interests are often marked by crusading overreactions that fuel policy excesses, realist counter-reactions can usher in periods of technocratic rigidity, impeding policy responsiveness in ways that fuel instability, crisis, and change. Consider in this light that even as the crusading of Truman and Bush led to the realist reactions of Eisenhower and Obama, these realist corrections heightened tensions of their own. Regarding the former, even as Eisenhower sought to extricate the U.S. from Korea and stabilize relations with the Soviets, he was criticized for having failed to prevent Soviet advances in Sputnik and the emergence of purported “missile gaps,” criticisms which laid the groundwork for revived Kennedy–Johnson crusading. Regarding the latter, while Obama sought to extricate the U.S. from Iraq and Afghanistan and rebalance policy toward the Asia–Pacific region, he was faulted for “leading from behind,” as crises pertaining to Libya, Syria, and the Ukraine were cast by critics as justifying a more forceful foreign policy.

In this volume, I seek to provide a theoretical analysis of this interplay of crusading, rebalancing, and the tensions between them. To do so, I integrate constructivist insights regarding the social bases of state interests with historical institutionalist emphases on the sequential—principled and ideational inefficiencies—that vary across time.⁴ First, in theoretical terms, I distinguish two types of socially constructed influences on state interests, as principled and causal beliefs alternate in influence over time.⁵ In terms of implications for U.S. foreign policy, I posit that an American principled exceptionalism exists in tension with more cognitively based realist definitions of interests in terms of power.⁶ Second, to identify the conditions which can fuel excesses in either direction, I develop historical institutionalist insights regarding sequential dynamics by drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s distinction between “fast-thinking” emotional reactions and “slow-thinking” cognitive adjustments. In U.S. foreign policy terms, I suggest that these dynamics spark shifts from crises which spur crusading overreactions, to realist counter-reactions in which intellectual excesses can undermine efficiency and consensus, engendering tensions which then spur renewed crises.⁷ To the extent that such dynamics can be offset at any point, I stress the importance of agency in leadership, and particularly the scope for a constructive ambiguity in sustaining flexibility and consensus.

In five historical chapters, I then trace these dynamics over the past century of U.S. foreign policy development, as crusading advance has conflicted with realist counter-reactions. First, I highlight the Wilson-era crusading which promoted a Versailles-driven backlash that fueled an interwar isolationism—one that in turn limited Franklin Roosevelt to a reactive realism through the onset of World War II. Second, I argue that Truman’s efforts to overcome isolationist resistance by constructing the Cold War as a liberal crusade led Eisenhower to rein in such excesses, extricating the U.S. from Korea, and urging balanced responses in the face of constructions of Sputnik and ostensible “missile gaps.” Third, I argue that a revived Kennedy–Johnson crusading would incite realist counter-reaction in Nixon’s efforts to extricate the U.S. from Vietnam and rebalance relations with the Soviets and China, Fourth, while revived Reagan-era crusading combined with antinuclear sentiments to presage the end of the Cold War, I argue that the resulting policy vacuum left the Bush and Clinton administrations to pursue a reactive pragmatism across recurring crises. Finally, I argue that George W. Bush-era constructions of the September 11, 2001, attacks as a liberal crusade yielded to Obama-era pragmatism, as he sought to extricate the U.S. from Iraq and Afghanistan but also struggled to articulate policy rationales across crises in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine.

In the remainder of this chapter, I develop this theoretical synthesis and its implications for U.S. foreign policy shifts from crusading advance to realist restraint. In the first section, in an overview of the prevailing literature, I argue that rationalist assumptions limit the scope of realist, liberal, and constructivist analyses, leading them to overrate the efficiency with which agents use information and to obscure the inefficiencies that cause instability and crisis over time.⁸ In the second section, developing an alternative approach, I integrate constructivist and historical institutionalist insights in a theory that juxtaposes “fast-thinking” constructions of crises marked by emotional overreactions, their “slow-thinking” conversion into intellectual frameworks. In the third section, I characterize historical interpretations of American liberal values and interests, distinguishing more principled isolationist and crusading stances from intellectually refined realist beliefs. In the final section, I address methodological and case selection issues, provide an overview of these empirical claims, and foreshadow key theoretical, historical, and policy implications.

Theoretical alternatives: Exogenous shocks and punctuated change

In addressing the sources of state interests, U.S. Foreign Policy debates have in recent decades concerned the merit of contending realist, liberal, or constructivist paradigms. Yet, even as these perspectives differ over the importance of the balance of power, coalitional, or ideational incentives in shaping state interests, they share rationalist assumptions that agents use information efficiently in interpreting these varied incentives. To be sure, such rationalist assumptions have merit. However, they also have limitations: In particular, they can lead scholars both to overrate the efficiency with which agents define interests and to obscure the inefficiencies which can cause instability and crises. In recent debates, to redress these oversights, historical institutionalist perspectives have emerged to stress the overlooked inefficiencies that vary across time. Yet, historical institutionalists also differ among themselves regarding the sources and evolution of inefficiencies: Some cast inefficiencies as diminishing over time, as “power distributional” struggles see ambiguous principles converted into more refined cognitive or causal ideas and interests.⁹ In contrast, I stress the ways in which inefficiencies can increase over time, as “value distributional” struggles over the scope for principle or expertise in shaping policy see efforts to reduce principled beliefs to causal models in ways that undermine policy flexibility and limit consensus. More formally, I argue that an aversion to principled ambiguity can engender instability, as leaders overrate their scope for control, fueling overconfidence and crises. Following an overview of these approaches, I offer a framework which juxtaposes tendencies to principled and intellectual excesses.

Rationalist oversights: Stable structures and exogenous shocks

In explaining U.S. interests, scholarly debates in recent decades over realist, liberal, or constructivist perspectives have been premised on a shared commitment to rationalist assumptions, which hold that agents make efficient use of information in reacting to incentives. Given these premises, even while these realists, liberals, and constructivists differ over the respective importance of systemic, coalitional, or ideational incentives, each agrees that agents are capable of interpreting such incentives efficiently—and so by necessity must leave crises to be treated as inexplicable “exogenous shocks.” In this light, despite their merit, rationalist approaches are limited where they obscure the inefficiencies which vary over time, to the point that they can culminate and provide endogenous explanations for ostensibly exogenous shocks.

First, at the most fundamental level, rationalist assumptions obscure structural constraints of uncertainty or ambiguity, which limit the ability of agents to make efficient use of information and stabilize ideas or interests. Such oversights take different forms in shaping more materialist or constructivist analyses. In terms of materialist perspectives, rationalist premises lead realists and liberals to overrate the ability of agents to form subjective probability estimates regarding events, and to treat the individual errors of rational agents as “cancelling out” over time. Yet, the maintenance of such efficiencies is precluded, as Mark Blyth has noted, where agents are constrained by a radical “uncertainty” regarding unknowable events like major wars or natural disasters.¹⁰ Given uncertainty, agents are limited in forming meaningful subjective probability estimates, and in turn form identifying stable “logics of consequences” to guide their interests. In terms of constructivist perspectives, rationalist premises lead scholars to overrate the ability of agents to authoritatively define shared “conventions” which stabilize expectations or “logics of appropriateness.” Paralleling Blyth’s arguments regarding the effects of uncertainty on subjective probability estimates, Jacqueline Best argued that any intersubjective consensus must be limited by an inherent “ambiguity,” reflecting the ability of agents to interpret material or social structures in a range of fashions.¹¹ Given ambiguity, even the most stable conventions may shift in unexpected, potentially self-reinforcing ways, thereby limiting the ability of agents to fix ideas or interests. Taken together, from either vantage, rationalist assumptions obscure the ways in which agents are limited in their abilities to identify enduring interests, whether defined with respect to relative power or standards of behavior.

Second, by obscuring the scope for such inefficiencies, rationalist assumptions overlook key implications for change, as the accumulation of inefficiencies can lead to ostensibly exogenous crises. Indeed, even as rationalists highlight the importance of large-scale crises as mechanisms of punctuated transformations, they lack endogenous explanations for such events—whether from materialist or constructivist perspectives. Instead, given the assumption that agents form expectations efficiently, these approaches must by necessity treat crises as exogenous shocks: Otherwise, if crises were products of endogenous systemic forces, rational agents would anticipate and negate them. Put differently, rationalist approaches cannot admit the accumulation of mounting inefficiencies and dysfunctional choices which might lead to crises. Perhaps, most clearly highlighting such overlooked dynamics, Hyman Minsky has argued that economic stability can over time engender increased risk taking and crisis—and so that stability causes instabil...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction: From fast crusading to slow balancing and credibility gaps
• 2 From progressive crusading to interwar isolation and FDR’s pragmatism
• 3 From Truman’s crusade to Eisenhower’s New Look
• 4 From a New Frontier to triangular diplomacy
• 5 From the Reagan liberalism to the Bush-Clinton pragmatism
• 6 From a freedom agenda to a reform agenda
• 7 Conclusions: Crusaders, balancers, and rethinking ambiguity
• Bibliography
• Index