Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001

Alone in the World

Thomas Juneau, Sam Razavi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135013882
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Examining Iranian foreign policy, with a focus on the years since 2001, this book analyses the defining feature of Iran's international and regional posture, its strategic loneliness, and the implications of this for the Islamic Republic's foreign policy.

Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001 offers an in-depth analysis of the key drivers behind Iran's foreign policy; power, strategic culture, and ideology. In addition, the authors examine Iran's relations with key countries and regions, including its often tenuous relations with China, Russia and America, as well as its bilateral relations with non-state actors such as Hezbollah. The common thread running throughout the volume is that Iran is alone in the world: regardless of its political manoeuvrings, the Islamic Republic's regional and international posture is largely one of strategic loneliness.

Assimilating contributions from the US, Canada, Europe and Iran, this book provides an international perspective, both at the theoretical and practical levels and is essential reading for those with an interest in Middle Eastern Politics, International Relations and Political Science more broadly.

1 Iran

Rising but unsustainable power, unfulfilled potential

Thomas Juneau

Iran's power significantly increased after 2001. This sudden power advantage was created by the unique convergence of a number of factors, chiefly the collapse of two neighbors, Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2001 and 2003 respectively, the rise of key allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the precipitous drop in regional US legitimacy, the rise in Iran's regional appeal, and the increase of international oil prices.

However, this sudden power advantage – a window of opportunity – suffers from critical flaws and is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term. This chapter will show that a significant proportion of the growth in Iranian power was accounted for by unconventional and intangible elements: asymmetric military capabilities, the regional attractiveness of Iran's rejectionist model and alliances with non-state actors. At the same time, “hard” aspects of Iran's power – wealth and conventional military capabilities – grew in absolute terms in some cases, but stagnated in relative terms. In addition, short-term gains were bought at the expense of longer-term costs, while many factors which caused the window of opportunity to open will evolve in a manner unlikely to continually be so advantageous to Iran. Moreover, the chapter will show that even though Iranian power did undeniably increase in the years following 2001, it also remains well below its potential. By dint of its geographic location, its large and well-educated population, and its abundant hydrocarbon resources, Iran can clearly aspire to an important regional role, yet this potential remains unfulfilled.

Power is defined here as those relative, usable assets that a state can bring to bear upon its foreign policy; carefully analyzing a state's power is therefore a crucial first step in understanding foreign policy. This definition has a number of implications. First, power matters in a relative context; state As assets impact its foreign policy to the extent that they are weighed against those of other states with which A interacts. Second, power refers to assets that are usable, or accessible – in this sense, it is distinct from what some refer to as “latent” or “potential” power. Third, power is defined in terms of the possession of specific assets, and not as A's ability, as Robert Dahl famously wrote, to “get B to do what B would otherwise not do”.¹ Fourth, power is viewed in multidimensional terms. It is not restricted to the possession of hard military assets and economic wealth, but also includes a wide range of assets, including intangible ones. The elements of power, in this view, are: geography, population, military assets, economic strength, popular mood, alliances, and regional appeal.

This chapter therefore asks three questions: How much power did Iran possess in the years following 2001? What was the nature of this power? What was the trend in Iranian power during this period?

Geography

Iran's geography – its location, which Geoffrey Kemp has referred to as “strategic real estate” and its position comparable to that of a mountain fortress – is an important dimension of its power.² The heart of Iran is a plateau surrounded by plains in the south-east and west and the waters of the Caspian Sea in the north and the Persian Gulf in the south. Towards the west, the Zagros mountain range constitutes a barrier against invasion and faces the vast and fertile plain of the Mesopotamian basin. Part of this plain extends into the south-western corner of Iran, the province of Khuzestan – the country's most vulnerable area, by dint of its exposition to the Mesopotamian plains, oil wealth, and Arab minority. Much of the central plateau consists of uninhabitable deserts, the Dasht-e Kavir and the Dasht-e Lut. This combination of size, mountains, and central wastelands makes it difficult to conquer Iran; only the Mongols led by Genghis Khan's grandson Hulagu and arriving from the northeast managed the feat, as did Alexander the Great and the Arab invaders, arriving from the west. On the other hand, armies descending from the Iranian plateau have conquered Mesopotamia at least seven times.³ This particular geography imposes challenges for Iranian power projection. For example, because its heart lies in its mountains and its ports on the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman are vulnerable, Iran is not and has never been a major maritime power.

Population

Population contributes significantly to Iranian power. With 75 million people in 2011, Iran was the seventeenth most populous country in the world. Its population is comparable to that of Egypt and Turkey, and exceeds the combined population of Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman). During the war with Iraq in the 1980s, 400,000 males reached the conscription age every year, more than double the number in Iraq. This played a major role in allowing the young Islamic Republic to withstand vicious assaults by the superior Iraqi military. Population trends also matter, as anticipations of population growth create expectations of growing power; by some accounts, Iran's population could reach 100 million by 2030.

Military

Iran's military power has increased since 2001. As with its overall power, however, this rise suffers from critical flaws. Primarily, Iran remains weak in conventional terms; it would be hard pressed to mount an invasion of even the weakest of its neighbors. Iran's military strengths instead lie in its important and growing unconventional capabilities which allow it to adopt policies of deterrence, denial, interdiction, and spoiling. Iran, in other words, does not possess and neither is it likely to acquire soon the military power befitting a regional power, while the particular nature of its military strength contributes to the brittle foundation and unsustainable nature of its overall power.

Iran's defence budget more than doubled between 2001 and 2010, reaching $10.564 billion (see Table 1.1). Looking at the regional context, however, presents a nuanced picture. Even though in proportional terms, the increase in Iranian defence spending has outpaced that of GCC countries (125 percent vs. 101 percent), collectively the latter spend almost seven times more on defence. This has been a longstanding trend; between 1993 and 2008, GCC states took delivery of $135 billion worth of arms, compared to $6 billion for Iran (in fact, Kuwait alone received almost twice as much as Iran).⁴

The fundamental principle underlying Iran's defence posture is the recognition that it is no match for US military power. Its strategy is primarily defensive, with the broader aim of opposing US regional influence. This has primarily been done by developing asymmetric and retaliatory capabilities that could raise the cost of a US or Israeli attack to a point where losses would exceed gains, an approach referred to in Iran as “passive defence”. This approach also seeks to convince US allies to limit their cooperation with

Table 1.1 Iran's defense budget in comparative perspective

	Defense budget ($ billion)
	2001	2010	% change
Iran	4,698	10,564	124.9
Iraq	4,373	4,848	10.9
GCC total	36,803	73,911	100.8
Saudi Arabia	24,266	45,170	86.1
Syria	1,884	2,296	21.9
Afghanistan	0,245	0,277	13.1
Turkey	7,219	17,445	141.7
Pakistan	2,395	5,599	133.8
Israel	10,375	14,043	35.4

Source: The Military Balance (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies; various years); defense budget figures do not use GDP values at purchasing power parity.
Note: Excludes paramilitary, police, and other law-enforcement forces.

Table 1.2 Iran's military manpower

	Manpower (regular forces)
	2001	2012	% change
Iran	520,000	523,000	0.6
Iraq	389,000	271,000	−30.3
GCC total	321,300	364,000	13.3
Saudi Arabia	199,500	234,000	17.3
Syria	319,000	295,000	−7.5
Afghanistan	50,000	171,000	242
Turkey	514,850	511,000	−0.7
Pakistan	620,000	642,000	3.5
Israel	161,500	177,000	9.6

Washington out of...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgments
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction: alone in the world
• 1 Iran: rising but unsustainable power, unfulfilled potential
• 2 Iran: foreign-policy strategic thinking in the twenty-first century
• 3 Iran's foreign policy and Islamic ideology
• 4 Iran's nuclear program and foreign policy
• 5 The shifting nature of Iranian influence in Iraq
• 6 Iran and its Persian Gulf neighbors
• 7 Iran's Levantine ambitions
• 8 Iranian relations with the South Caucasus
• 9 Iran and South Asia: dealing with a rising India
• 10 Iran and Russia
• 11 Iran-China relations and the emerging political map
• 12 US-Iran relations: mutually assured estrangement
• Conclusion: why “alone”?
• Select bibliography
• Index