Social Democracy and European Integration

The politics of preference formation

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781136926518
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What kind of Europe do social democratic parties prefer? What is the origin of their preferences? Are they shaped by interests, institutions or ideas? If so, how? Why do social democratic political parties respond differently to the crucial question of the future of the European Union? While many social democratic parties initially opposed European integration either in principle or because of the form it took, gradually they came to lend their full, though often critical, support to it. Despite this evolution, important differences between them have remained.

This book examines the preferences of social democratic parties in Germany, France, the UK, Sweden and Greece towards European integration, in comparative perspective. Using a variety of sources, including interviews with key party officials, the contributors explore what kind of Europe these parties want, and seek to explain the formation and evolution of these preferences over time. They examine the interplay of national peculiarities and cross-national factors and their impact on preferences on European integration. In addition to highlighting the role of party leaders, they reveal that, far from being united on European integration, these parties disagree with each other in part because they have retreated – to varying degrees – from key social democratic principles.

Making an important contribution to the scholarship on preference formation and the research that links the European Union with the nation state, it will be of interest to students and scholars of the EU, comparative politics and political parties.

1
Introduction

Social democracy, European integration and preference formation

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos

Die einzige Form, in der Europa als politisch handlungsfähige Einheit entstehen kann, ist die soziale Demokratie.

(Glotz 1985, 50)

The decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it rests on the perception of interests and on the articulation of specific values on the part of existing political actors.

(Haas [1958] 2003, 13)

Introduction¹

The social democrats’ relationship with, and involvement in, European integration has been turbulent over the years (Newman 1983; Featherstone 1988; Griffiths 1993; Haahr 1993; Delwit 1995).² Although several social democratic parties have in the past opposed either the principle or the individual manifestations of European integration, they have (over time) come to lend their – often critical – support to it (Marks and Wilson 2000). However, acknowledging this basic fact tells only part of the ‘story’ of this major political family’s stance on a singularly important political and economic phenomenon in post-war Europe. Their declarations of support for European integration does not necessarily reflect a single set of motives, nor does it automatically indicate that they hold the same views with regard to the future of the EU. Indeed, even a cursory reading of the proposals that social democrats submitted to the Convention on the Future of Europe indicates significant differences between them. For example, although they are members of the same political family, some espouse the notion of a ‘federal Europe’, while others oppose it. Some support the enhancement of the EU’s redistributive capacity, whereas others object to it. Some want the EU to counterbalance US hegemony, while others oppose this idea. Equally telling was their disarray ahead of the 2009 European elections, i.e. the first EU-wide electoral contest since the onset of a financial and economic crisis that vindicated those among them who opposed (instead of embracing) neo-liberalism. This begs the basic question that this project seeks to answer: what accounts for social democratic party preferences on European integration?

There are additional reasons why it is worth exploring the origin of preferences of social democratic parties – i.e. mass (rather than class) parties with a strong working-class anchoring (in terms of membership and electorate), a ‘governmental vocation’, close relationships with centralised and representative trade union organisations, an ‘inter-classist’ (in terms of their sociological and electoral basis) and national profile, a dominant position on the left of the political spectrum, and support for parliamentary democracy and the mixed economy (Marlière 1999, 4–5) – with regard to the development of European integration. European integration was, to a large extent, the product of their domestic political rivals.³ It relied on instruments (markets) that they distrusted. It begun to materialise at a time when social democrats were redefining their ideological basis and it challenged many of their concrete achievements, or at least a particular understanding of them. It seemed – at least initially, to favour groups (such as industrialists and farmers) who were not particularly (or at least not necessarily) well disposed towards the social democratic project.⁴ Although many opposed its specific form or even rejected it in toto, social democratic parties subsequently came to support it.⁵ Despite this evolution, important differences between them have remained (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–8). Both their content and, more importantly, their origins deserve to be analysed in a comparative perspective.

Market-making was the primary focus of European integration from the 1950s to the 1970s. Although the partial reconciliation with the market was a central theme in the redefinition of social democracy after 1945,⁶ some of these parties often reacted in a reserved or even hostile manner to European integration, precisely because of its reliance on market-making. Instead, they highlighted the need to build the ‘Europe of peoples’. Moreover, cardinal and more traditional aspects of their standard ideological platform – including internationalism, solidarity and the ‘democratisation of the economy’ – remained intact and legitimised sustained criticisms of European integration.

After having fought for the democratisation of national political systems, social democrats had, after World War II, the opportunity to engage more vigorously in the pursuit of socio-economic objectives, but these remained focused on the national level (Eley 2002; Judt 1996, 32).⁷ Although inter-nationalism and solidarity remained central features of the social democrats’ ideological basis, in reality integration often appeared to some of them (at least initially) to amount to an assault on their concrete national achievements. How did they seek to reconcile the two, and, more importantly, what accounts for the differences between them?

Many social democratic parties discovered that European integration, far from being simply a constraint, represented a new means for the pursuit of their reformist agenda. This seems to have affected their decision – in principle – to support it, but it also meant that they had to design and then pursue a ‘social democratic Europe’.

Preferences, preference formation and the study of European integration

How do political actors come to know what they want? How are their preferences⁸ formed? How do they reach decisions about the ranking of possible futures? Why do they give priority to some political outcomes over others (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 2; Frieden 1999, 41; Lake and Powell 1999, 9; Moravcsik 1997, 513)? As Aaron Wildavsky reminds us, ‘although it is eminently reasonable to study … how people try to get what they want through political activity, it is also unreasonable to neglect the study of why people want what they want’ (Wildavsky 1987, 3, emphasis in the original). This statement applies to many sub-fields of political science, but it is particularly relevant to the study of European integration, of which this project is part. Indeed, the origin of preferences of political actors with regard to European integration has remained remarkably under-researched. Political scientists have focused on either the operation of the EU and its predecessors or their development over time. In that context, intellectual effort has been invested overwhelmingly in the analysis of the way in which political actors interact with each other in an effort to achieve their objectives, both in ‘normal’ EU policy-making and the intergovernmental conferences that reform the EU treaties.

This emphasis is unsurprising. It can be construed as a reflection of the corresponding political debate pitching the supporters of ‘more Europe’ against their opponents. ‘Building Europe’ was a key political target, and the question of having more or less of it (i.e. more or less integration) was at the heart of the debate on the post-World War II development of the continent. Although the objective of European integration had a key political component, the gradual construction and subsequent operation of the European Communities and the European Union relied on technocracy, depoliticisation and the quest for the ‘common European interest’.⁹ The importance of key value judgements was more often than not obscured or downplayed.¹⁰ The emphasis on the ‘common European interest’ was, in part, due to the need to defeat narrowly defined egotistical attitudes nourished by each country’s history. That the EU has become a successful example of regional integration is, to a large extent, the result of this political strategy.

However, Joschka Fischer’s famous speech at Humboldt University in May 2000 crystallised the new focus of the political debate on European integration against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and the prospect (and now reality) of enlargement to the East: what kind of Europe do we want (Fischer 2000)? The exigencies of the choice between ‘Europe as an area’ and ‘Europe as an actor’ go well beyond the EU’s embedded emphasis on technocratic (and seemingly ‘neutral’) arrangements. The new debate calls for explicit value judgements.¹¹ More importantly, citizens do not appear willing to grant their leaders the degree of autonomy afforded to them during the post-war ‘permissive consensus’, as politicians are coming to realise. The value-laden debates regarding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in several member states demonstrated the increased relevance of domestic perceptions and realities, on the one hand, and the distinction between the political Left and Right on the other. Although, in terms of political practice, this distinction often seems to be blurred or even irrelevant, it remains germane for two reasons. First, it reflects real differences of political principles. Second, it is at the heart of the citizens’ référentiel and often informs their understanding of the current shape and practice of the EU, as well as the implications of future alternatives (Gabel and Anderson 2004, 30–1). Exploring the historical origins of the preferences of key actors is a conditio sine qua non, both for under standing their current views and for assessing how far they are prepared to go in terms of the reform of the EU.

In the context of the study of European integration, Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998) was the first scholar to problematise preferences and preference formation. Inspired by a rationalist account of the formation and operation of international regimes, he put forward a model of preference formation that focuses on governments.¹² This model of preference formation has been criticised on conceptual and empirical grounds, with scholars illustrating the importance of ideological as well as institutional factors in preference formation (Aspinwall 2000; 2002; Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2004b; 2004c). Moreover, comparativists have argued that the EU political space is defined on the basis of two dimensions, namely more versus less integration, and Left versus Right (Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 1999). Given its focus, Moravcsik’s model is understandably not useful for the analysis of the origin of party preferences,¹³ but it raises – albeit indirectly – a question of cardinal importance. If, as he argues, the main objective of politicians is to maintain (or gain) power, elections are crucial. They are the mechanism by which voters choose the party (or parties) that will govern. This begs the question as to how competing political parties define their preferences in the run-up to electoral contests and beyond (e.g. when they are in power). Voters are asked to choose between competing political platforms, but how are these platforms con structed? What do we know about the origin of party preferences in general, and the preferences of social democratic parties on European integration in particular?

Competing rationalities and the impact of membership

The literature on the origin of party preferences (and change therein) reflects broader trends in the analysis of political phenomena in that it is couched in two kinds of rationality. On the one hand, the Downsian perspective stresses the importance of vote maximisation: “politicians … are motivated by the desire for power, prestige and income … their primary objective is to be elected. This in turn implies that each party seeks to receive more votes than any other” (Downs 1957, 30–1). This line of reasoning has been further elaborated. ‘Hard decisions’ have been ascribed to ofIfce-seeking (aimed at increasing the party’s control of executive ofIfce benefits), policy-seeking (the effort to maximise the impact on public policy) and vote-seeking¹⁴ (Strøm and Müller 1999, 5–9). As democracy is, ultimately, a competitive game, electoral considerations can be deemed to affect party preferences as well as strategies (see infra).

Despite their importance, electoral considerations are not the only factor accounting for party preferences and change therein (Harmel et al. 1995). At the other extreme of the continuum, a different kind of rationality has been utilised. Ideational accounts of politics stress the importance of the...

Table of contents

• Routledge Advances in European Politics
• Contents
• Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The SPD’s preferences on European integration
• 3 The French Socialist Party and European integration
• 4 The Labour Party and European integration
• 5 The Panhellenic Socialist Movement and European integration
• 6 Swedish social democracy and European integration
• 7 Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index