Social Capital, Trust and the Industrial Revolution

1780-1880

David Sunderland

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2007
• eBook ISBN: 9781134116447
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

The first text to examine the concept of trust and the role that it played on the Industrial Revolution, this book is a key resource for students studying nineteenth century British history as well as historically minded sociologists.Analytical in style and comprehensive in approach, Social Capital, Trust and the Industrial Revolution covers a ran

1 Middle-class trust

The various building blocks of middle-class trust are considered throughout the book. The formal networks in which the class spent so much of their free time are discussed in general terms in Chapter 3, their involvement in philanthropy, the church and political networks in Chapters 4 and 6, and the confidence they generated in their professional lives is investigated in Chapters 9 and 10. This introductory chapter concentrates on a number of basic methods of raising trust that were adopted in all spheres of their lives, though the enthusiasm with which they were taken up was dependent on status and income. The first section examines how trust was signalled to others through etiquette, the mores of respectability, language, facial features, and household objects, and examines how the transmission of fraudulent information was prevented. The second section then discusses three other ways in which confidence was raised – the provision of gifts, the establishment of a good name, and attendance at a range of informal social gatherings held in the domestic sphere and at places of entertainment and culture. The middle class, of course, was not a homogeneous mass. It comprised numerous sub-groups, which had distinctive political and religious beliefs. Such differences inevitably led to disagreements and distrust, and the final section briefly discusses these divisions and seeks to understand why they became less important as time passed.

Trust signals

Etiquette

The code of etiquette promoted trust in a variety of ways. It firstly identified followers of its strictures as members of the middle class and thus engendered ascribed trust. Second, it involved the reciprocal exchange of gifts of regard, which facilitated the growth of loyalties and attachments. Although the gift of ‘graceful behaviour towards others’ had no monetary value, it nevertheless ‘pleas[ed] others because it indicat[ed] respect for their personality’. The code also advocated honesty in every aspect of life, and may have increased selfesteem, Samuel Smiles famously claiming that politeness ‘gives tenfold more pleasure to ourselves’ than to others.¹

Etiquette broadly covered three types of signal – conduct, appearance and language. Conduct or outward behaviour involved acting at all times in a manner that was compatible with one’s rank in society and incorporated honesty as its highest ideal. ‘The true gentleman’, as Smiles reminded his readers ‘has a keen sense of honour – scrupulously avoiding mean actions. His standard of probity in word and action is high. He does not shuffle nor prevaricate, dodge nor skulk; but is honest, upright and straightforward.’ Practitioners were to adopt this behaviour in all their dealings whether ‘in the cottage, in the court [or] in the daily and hourly performance of social services’ and with superiors, equals or inferiors. Such sincerity was particularly important in contacts with the poor, as ‘if you take pains to mortify [them] . . . it is an insult that will not readily be forgiven’.²

As regards their actual actions, to ensure that their gifts of regard appeared authentic, students of etiquette were advised to behave naturally and unselfconsciously with ease and spontaneity. They were also to act simply in a conservative, restrained and down to earth manner, since ‘men . . . distrust the showy extravagance which is meant to dazzle, but seldom deceives and never increases social respect’. Emotion was to be concealed. There was a danger that it would display an individual’s actual beliefs and lay him open to exploitation, for, having discovered someone’s true feelings, a dishonest man ‘has the springs of the affections at his command and may wind them up or let them down at pleasure’. Equally, there was a temptation for people to use the expression of emotion for their own advantage, for instance to obtain concessions that would otherwise not be given. Emotional people, furthermore, were generally distrusted, as they were thought more likely to make irrational decisions than phlegmatics, and shows of emotion could give offence. ‘To live pleasantly with each other’ people must ‘at least appear to be kind, friendly, disinterested, obliging’ and have ‘the command of [their] tempers and countenances’, even in the most extreme circumstances. ‘On receiving an affront’, for example, a person, if he ‘could not be justified in knocking the offender down . . . must not notice the offence’.³

Appearance largely involved dress, from which it was thought one ‘may form some opinion of a man’s sense and character’. Although, for women, cosmetics were also an issue. A painted face signalled a propensity towards concealment and hid that most accurate indicator of female purity and modesty, the blush. As with conduct, the most important aspect of attire was uniformity. To signal membership of the middle class and generate ascribed trust, women had to follow a strict dress code and choose clothes that were suitable to the occasion, the time of day, the season and where they were to be worn, whether in the town or country and inside or in the open air. They thus had to possess a relatively large wardrobe and be able to devote a great deal of time to their appearance, requirements that further signalled wealth. Men followed a similar, though far less complex, code. Formal dress was the black suit or tails, which was de rigueur when visiting a person of rank and at formal events. On other occasions, a frock coat was worn, the tails of which indicated the wearer’s age, gravity and social position via their length. Generally, fashion and frivolous and gaudy ornaments were to be avoided. The latter indicated a desire to disguise one’s true self, and ‘in a man of business’ suggested extravagance, ‘which never fails to be attended by ruin’, and ‘levity of mind and effeminity of manners’. Individual items of clothing had to blend and thus signal a rational and ordered mind, not be too ‘beggarly’, which would indicate poverty, and be clean. ‘He who is not thoroughly clean in person will be offensive to all he converses with’ and would particularly displease women ‘tacitly accusing them of vanity and declaring that . . . [he] thought them not worth that respect which everybody else [pays them]’.⁴

Language, whether used verbally or in its written form had to be straightforward and simple. Students of etiquette were advised to state exactly what they were thinking and feeling, provided that their words would not damage the other’s regard. They should therefore ‘never say an ill-natured thing nor be witty at the expense of anyone present’ and ‘agree to differ and when . . . [men] do differ, bear and forbear . . . [as] there are circumstances in which words are blows and inflict wounds far less easy to heal’. Nor, on the other hand, were they to flatter. ‘A young lady, however beautiful she may be, is in society never referred to as more than “nice” . . . a steak cut from the most tender cut of beef and broiled in its juices is found “nice’’. No one describes someone as “excellent”.’ Hyperbole led to suspicions of hypocrisy and was found ‘disturbing, because it forces others either to voice the same high-toned sentiment or else to make obvious the gulf that exists between them and the enthusiast’. Accent was similarly important. Dialect-free speech generated ascribed trust among other members of the middling classes, especially those from the South-East, and was acquired through interaction with those who spoke ‘better english’ and the employment of elocution teachers.⁵

The vocabulary adopted had to be plain and unpretentious. Words were chosen for their simplicity. So, for example, ‘buy’ was better than ‘purchase’, ‘rich and poor’ superior to ‘those of large and small means’, and ‘begin’ preferable to ‘commence’. Foreign and Latin phrases and business terms were to be avoided. All suggested a desire for obfuscation. Foreign words brought to mind the distrusted foreigner and commercial language evoked the dishonesty of the counting house. An ‘elegant’ manner of speech was also to be adopted; ‘gracefulness of speaking [was] . . . as essential as gracefulness of person, . . . [as] nobody can attend with pleasure to a bad speaker’. It was thus recommended that people speak ‘deliberately and distinctly’, constantly vary the tone of their voice and use language in a grammatical manner. ‘Course and vulgar language’, which generated ‘hate and revengeful feelings’, was to be especially avoided, as was the temptation to hog the conversation, for ‘those that talk much cannot always talk well and may oftener incur censure than praise [since] few people care to be eclipsed’.⁶

A drawback of the use of politeness as a trust signal was that it was subject to hypocrisy. To generate trust, the honest had to pretend ’to feel what . . . [they did] not feel, to believe what . . . [they did] not believe, to practice what . . . [they did] not practice’. The dishonest, meanwhile, could easily fake the signals, concealing ‘their true intent under a specious show of sincerity and serpent-like glide into men’s confidence only to dart their venom with greater certainty’. Such hypocrisy was a natural part of Victorian life. The German V.A Huber found England to be thoroughly imbued with double standards, and the Revd Lamb believed that cant ‘penetrat[ed] and permeat[ed] everywhere like the air we breathe’.⁷

Several attempts were made to act against this deceitfulness. In the mideighteenth century, there developed the ethos of sensibility, which sought to reconnect manners with moral virtue and urged its followers to empathise with others and possess at all times ‘sympathetic and generous feelings of the heart’. Such sympathy was to be demonstrated through expressive actions, such as sighing and weeping, and the provision of practical help. The creed evolved from the writings of the Scottish moral philosophers and the new theories of physiology and was spread via the periodical and the novel.⁸ As with politeness, however, the doctrine was corruptible. Adherents adopted its strictures for their own self-advancement, and when, in the 1780s, its leading supporters were revealed to be duplicitous, its popularity began to decline.

Further attempts to link politeness with morality were made in novels and plays, which satirised the fop, a narcissistic and morally vapid male who was committed to fashionable manners, and, in the late eighteenth century, in conduct books. Unlike etiquette manuals, which became popular in the 1830s and initially were only concerned with protean identity, these taught manners within a fundamentally moral framework, stressing sincerity, character, that is inner qualities of morality, and the importance of emulating the behaviour of role models. Character also played an important part in the code of manliness, which became popular from the mid-nineteenth century. The doctrine emphasised manly vigour, frankness in both action and speech and the adoption of high personal moral norms, and was adopted by both the middle class and respectable workingmen, thus generating much inter-class trust.⁹

Not surprisingly none of these initiatives completely eradicated hypocrisy. Minor duplicity was generally tolerated. Such insincerity involved few costs, either for the victim or the dissembler. It was largely used ‘for the purpose of avoiding the suspicions or merited ill will of other men; sometimes for the purpose of obtaining the confidence of others, without any settled design to make it the means of committing any positive and particular injury’. In such cases, even if the victim suspected that the ‘untruths of expression or of action’ were ‘base coin’, he was unlikely to break up the relationship. He continued to receive its benefits, there was always a possibility that he had misinterpreted the suspect’s motives, a harsh reaction would discourage others from forming bonds of trust with him and would contravene the norms of etiquette, and the gifts of regard, though insincere, like ‘sugar candy to the coffee of life’, probably gave him pleasure. For the dissembler, meanwhile, failure to indulge in minor duplicity could lead to distrust. On a basic level, ‘if every man told his neighbour what he really thought of him, the world would soon be an arena of pretty general conflict’. A refusal to follow the hypocritical conventions of etiquette would also lead to ascribed distrust. As depicted by Walter Bagehot, there would be ‘a gentle murmur of “most unfortunate ideas”, “singular young man”, “well intentioned I dare say; but unsafe, sir, quite unsafe” ’.¹⁰

Hypocrisy that was used for ‘acts of gainful fraud’ was far less acceptable, and, from the 1840s, etiquette books began to warn against the misuse of their codes of politeness and to provide methods by which the dishonest dissembler could be identified. Readers, for example, were advised to distrust those who claimed friendship, particularly those who ‘profess the most . . . [and] if their advances are sudden, extraordinary or without plausible foundation’. Harmful immoral behaviour, however, was relatively rare, as the rewards were small and the potential costs could be high. Trust signals alone were used to determine trustworthiness only for ‘innocent frolics’. For ‘serious matters’, signals were augmented by other evidence of trustworthiness, including the views of others and personal experience. Costs included lost reputation and cognitive dissonance. Hypocrisy is easily spotted. To quote Nietzsche, ‘one can lie with the mouth, but with the accompanying grimace, one nevertheless tells the truth’. There was therefore a high chance that the dishonest would be found out – ‘something strikes someone; an unpleasant idea is somewhat reluctantly admitted; it is kept secret; but somebody else hinting something like it, it finds words, and, by and by, the thing is discovered to have a lodgement in many minds’. Depending on the nature of the act, the culprit would then be subject to the sanctions of gossip, insults or exclusion, and would lose his trust reputation, ‘suspicion will attach itself to [his] future conduct; truth will obtain for [him] no credit, no integrity, no confidence’.¹¹

At the same time, some hypocrites will have suffered psychological costs, which will have damaged their self-esteem. Many will have been haunted ‘by tormenting fears of exposure’ or suffered from cognitive dissonance, the disutility that arises when behaviour clashes with social and personal norms. Others, though, will have escaped such torments. Not all hypocrites will have believed in the moral codes of honesty and honour, and some no doubt circumvented dissonance through self-deception. Dissemblers will have rationalised their behaviour by changing their beliefs, trivialised or provided excuses for the actions, distorted the circumstances that led to the inconsistency, or misattributed the dissonance to something other than the moral discrepancy. Ironically, those who were most successful at such self-delusion will have been less likely to have been discovered acting hypocritically, as self-deception will have made it easier to deceive others.¹²

Although rare, immoral hypocrisy, nevertheless, did occur, but, as today, often failed to be punished by social sanctions. One reason could be that there was a fear that penalties against gross hypocrisy would lead to a fall in trust. Punishing dissemblers would merely cause fewer people to follow the ethical code and discourage others from advocating its tenets, reducing the numbers who would hear about and adopt them. A more likely explanation is that sanctions were only applied if the behaviour threatened the trust reputation or myth of the social group. If the actions were known or were likely to become so by others outside the social circle then they would be punished. If not, group members would turn a ‘blind eye’, aware that the very act of chastisement would draw others’ attention to the recaltricant behaviour. Such a response, itself hypocritical, would particularly occur if the immorality did not harm other members of the group and if the degenerate colleague possessed power or resources that could prove useful to the clique Also, turning a ‘blind eye’ constituted a gift and group members would expect reciprocation if they themselves broke the moral code.

Other trust signals

Etiquette was not the only indicator that signalled the possession of shared and confidence-raising characteristics. Respectability, facial features, household objects, language and other cues were also relied upon. Respectability, a close cousin of the code of manliness, involved sobriety, hard work, sexual continence, piousness and obedience of the law, and was signalled through regular church attendance, membership of societies that promoted respectable behaviour, and by verbally informing others of one’s beliefs and way of life. As with etiquette, however, the respectable were prone to hypocrisy, abandoning their supposedly strongly held views in private. Such disrespectable behaviour was particularly adopted by young unmarried men, who, not yet embarked on careers, had little need for repute, and by older men, who had well-established reputations that could withstand gossip, and, close to retirement, had relatively less to lose if their good names were tarnished. Those with occupations that took them away from their local environments, for example commercial travellers, were also prone to such behaviour, as their misdemeanours, committed far from home, were unlikely to have an impact on their reputations. The misconduct largely occurred in districts or towns some distance from the miscreant’s home, where he was unknown, or in voluntary associations, for example gentlemen’s clubs and freemasons’ lodges. Here, moral norms were relatively lax and the common breach of respectable codes reduced the likelihood that fellow members would reveal an individual’s activities to the outside world.¹³

As with etiquette, such behaviour generally went unpunished, provided that it did not become known to others outside the social circle to which the offender belonged. Many may also have believed that the transgressions had a beneficial effect on social trust. The misbehaviour provided a valuable release from respectability, reinvigorating individuals’ adoption of the respectable code in their everyday lives, and, as will be discussed later, played an important role in the generation of masculine and intra-associational trust.

The way in which the trustworthiness and other characteristics of individuals could be derived from a study of the human face and head was explained by the ‘sciences’ of physiognomy and phrenology. Physiognomy linked facial features with character traits. So, for example, the size and shape of the forehead was thought to indicate the intellectual capacities of an individual and the bottom half of his face his emotional nature. The science was popularised in the 1770s by John Casper Lavater, whose theories were developed by Alexander Walker in his 1834 book on the subject. Phrenology confined itself to the shape of the head and the indentations found on skulls, which again were related to character traits, including trustworthiness. Developed in the e...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Routledge explorations in economic history
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Middle-class trust
• 2 Working-class and inter-class trust
• 3 Formal networks
• 4 Philanthropic, religious and education networks
• 5 Informal networks and miscellaneous trust determinants
• 6 Governments and trust
• 7 The law and trust
• 8 Kin, geographic and masculine trust
• 9 Business trust
• 10 Employer–employee trust
• Conclusion
• Notes