International Relations Theory and European Security

We Thought We Knew

Lorenzo Cladi, Andrea Locatelli

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138893542
• eBook ISBN: 9781317534877
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book engages with key contemporary European security issues from a variety of different theoretical standpoints, in an attempt to uncover the drivers of foreign policy and defence integration in the EU.

Although European foreign policy has been attracting an ever-increasing number of International Relations (IR) scholars since the end of the Cold War, consensus on what drives European foreign policy integration has not yet emerged. This book seeks to encourage debate on this issue by examining a wide range of high-profile security issues which have roused significant interest from policy makers, academics and the public in recent years. The volume discusses, amongst other issues, the strategic posture of the European Union as a security actor, the troubled relationship with Russia, the debate regarding France's relations with the US following France's rapprochement with NATO and the EU's influence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The collective intent of the contributors to highlight the drivers of EU foreign policy and defence integration ties together the wide variety of topics covered in this volume, forming it into a comprehensive overview of this issue. By paying considerable attention not just to the internal drivers of EU cooperation, but also to the critical role played by the US as an incentive or obstacle to European security, this book presents a unique contribution to this field of debate.

This book will be of much interest to students of European security, IR theory, Transatlantic Relations, European politics and EU foreign policy.

Part I

Do IR theories have something to say about CSDP?

1 Structural Realism

Balancing, bandwagoning or what?

Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli

Introduction

Realism has traditionally been left out of the debate regarding European foreign policy, especially with reference to the EU’s international outlook towards the US in the post-Cold War period. For instance, Realist scholars have mistakenly labelled European attempts to create a common defence policy as evidence of the EU balancing the US. Based on this assumption, in our article ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism’, we advanced two key arguments: first, that Realism can still shed light on the dynamics of European defence policy and, second, that Realists ought to refine their balancing concept in favour of bandwagoning. With our key assertion that European security and defence policy represents an instance of bandwagoning with US power, we rejected the alternative Realist soft balancing and balancing for autonomy explanations but we still placed ourselves within the Realist camp. A more articulate explanation of bandwagoning aimed at intra-alliance behaviour rather than alliance-formation is therefore in order here, because we believe that it offers a powerful tool to explain European security policy in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section reviews Realist explanations that have sought to move beyond Waltz’s balance of power theory to account for European security policy. We identify three different explanations here. The explanations all use different case studies and methodologies. What they have in common, however, is the insistence on the concept of balancing to explain European security policy. First, we tackle Sebastian Rosato’s explanation of the creation of the European Community (EC). Then we move on to review the soft balancing and balancing for autonomy explanations. The second section is about the concept of bandwagoning. We find that there is consensus among scholars on what bandwagoning entails – i.e. siding with the stronger. However, on the issue of why and with whom states tend to bandwagon, scholars are split. In particular, we isolate the explanation of Randall Schweller, who theorised bandwagoning as a strategy states employ for profit rather than survival, and we use it as a foundation for our understanding of bandwagoning as intra-alliance behaviour. In the third section, we illustrate how bandwagoning as intra-alliance behaviour can be applied to European security policy and reply to our early critics. The final section summarises our main findings and suggests future avenues of research.

Balancing, again

While Realist thinkers have developed different explanations to account for the European cooperation in foreign and defence issues, scholars who have employed the structural approach have usually focussed on the distribution of power at the systemic level as a main source of integration.¹ Put simply, in this view European integration is seen as the result of external pressures – a system-induced behaviour. Relying on Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) theory, integration as experienced in Europe has been considered either as an exception (Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994), or as a form of balancing vis-à-vis an external power (Andreatta, 2011, pp. 28–9). In the first case, the utility of Realism is admittedly limited. Thus, it is not surprising that leading scholars – Waltz (2000) included – turned to the second option.

Balance of power theory is at the heart of Structural Realism – and of course it is also embedded in the Realist tradition (Little, 2007; Paul et al., 2004). It should also be stressed that, contrary to other strands of Realism, the systemic approach does not see it as a voluntary behaviour as was the case with early Realists such as Morgenthau (1948; 1959). On the contrary, it makes of it an automatic, system-level, response to power imbalances. Put differently, no matter what states actually want, they will either opt for balancing, or pay a price for failing to do so (Feaver et al., 2000). Moreover, balancing would regularly take place independently from the configuration of the system (multipolar or bipolar). The only difference would be the mechanism at play: while the bipolar system would rely on only two competing alliances (each run by a superpower), the multipolar configuration would promote a web of multiple, flexible, alliances. As a result, cooperation in foreign and security policy would find a very simple explanation – namely, the need to aggregate capabilities to oppose an external enemy.

This view has been recently articulated by Sebastian Rosato (2011, 2011a). In his work on the origins of the EC, he argues that the main driver of integration was represented by the superior power of the Soviet Union (USSR). In particular, he finds that, since the mid-1940s, the power imbalance on the continent was so remarkable that a simple coalition of European states would not suffice to balance Moscow. In order to be effective, European states had to go beyond simple power aggregation, as an alliance or coalition would allow. In Rosato’s own words,

This relative weakness leads groups of minor powers confronting a great power to place a premium on organizing their coalitions as efficiently as possible. Because they are inferior to their adversary, even in combination, they understand that even a slight increase in its power could leave them at its mercy…. So they turn to improving their organization, fearing that poor organization could be the difference between life and death.

(Rosato, 2011a, p. 51)

In the European experience, then, the exceptional form of cooperation that resulted in economic integration and limited handing over of sovereignty came as a consequence of an external and threatening power. Following this argument, it goes without saying that with the demise of the USSR and the lack of a direct threat to Europe, no real motive for further integration has been in place since the early 1990s. Borrowing again Rosato’s words (2011a, p. 68), ‘since the end of the Cold War, they [the Europeans] have made no real effort to construct a political or military community, and their economic community has slowly started to fray’.

Rosato’s argument sparked a lively debate. Some scholars took issue with his methodology (Moravcsik 2013; Parsons, 2013), challenging both his geopolitical mono-causal explanation and his empirical analysis. Others took issue with his (allegedly narrow) Realist approach (Krotz et al., 2012, pp. 182–5), and even more the marginal attention devoted to the US (Krotz et al., 2012, pp. 186–7, 189–90). Since most of these charges have been addressed (Rosato 2013; Krotz et al., 2012, pp. 192–9), we will not discuss them at greater length. However, for our purposes, two points need to be stressed. The first one concerns Rosato’s characterisation of the European military initiatives of the past fifteen years (on similar lines, see also Krotz et al., 2012, pp. 180–1). He may even be right in claiming that these initiatives were far from successful, but at least some of them are examples of cooperation, and to some extent even integration, as they give EU institutions (admittedly small) prerogatives. This is the case with the European Defence Agency (EDA), but the twenty-five or so missions that have been launched under the framework nation principle are also witnesses to it. Therefore, empirical evidence shows that, even after the demise of the USSR, integration has been moving on. Or, following Seth Jones’s argument (2007), it has even increased, as witnessed not only by the expansion of EU institutions, but also by the growing use of economic sanctions, cooperation in the arms industry and the establishment of military forces.

Second, Rosato’s view of power raises another problem. If one had to focus on military might and power projection as a source of integration, he/she could note that the Soviet threat varied over time, even during the Cold War. Consequently, we should also witness a variation in the incentive to integrate – something that Rosato finds only once in history, with the fall of the USSR. Or, by the same token, following his definition of power, we could infer that the US in the past twenty years represented a superior power, one that the European states could well decide to balance. So, it is up to Rosato to explain why balancing did not take place on this occasion. It is one of the two: either balancing the USSR is an ad-hoc explanation, or other variables should be added to explain why the US is not a source of balancing.

Departing from these considerations, a different strand of Realist thinkers tried to amend the balancing hypothesis. Contrary to Rosato, they turned their back on Moscow and looked toward Washington: for a number of reasons, they saw the US as the real target of European balancing. In particular, as we discussed elsewhere (Cladi and Locatelli, 2012), authors as varied as Christopher Layne, Robert Pape, Barry Posen and T. V. Paul can be grouped around two main versions of balancing: the soft balancing and balancing for autonomy hypotheses. Apart from the focus on the US, they all agree that an exclusive concern for power alone is not sufficient to develop a sound explanation of EU cooperation in security and defence issues. Where they seem to differ the most is on how to conceive of power as an explanatory variable.

As concerns proponents of soft balancing, they all agree that what ignites balancing is not the sheer power of the US, but its policies. Put simply, the more assertive US foreign policy becomes, the stronger the European need to water down the American influence (Oswald, 2006). Not surprisingly, this body of literature emerged mostly in the wake of the controversial unilateral turn in US foreign policy under the first Bush administration (see in particular Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005).

In Stephen Walt’s wording, soft balancing can be termed as ‘conscious coordination of diplomatic friction in order to obtain outcomes contrary to American preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support’ (Walt, 2005, p. 126). In the case of European states, as Robert Art (2004) argues, this is precisely the rationale driving their efforts to forge a common security and defence policy – namely, to pursue interests that may be otherwise frustrated by the US. More generally, in its simplest form, soft balancing is the rational response of second-tier states willing to limit the actual capacity of the dominant state to fully grasp its potential. Contrary to the classical version, then, this new form of balancing does not require a shift in alignments, but just the concerted use by a group of states of their own diplomatic instruments. This is admittedly a defensive and moderate policy, as its goal is just to curb US influence, not to alter the power asymmetry (in traditional jargon, it could not be considered as a revisionist policy). Likewise, its means are also limited, as the use of military capabilities is explicitly ruled out (not least, for its patent ineffectiveness).

Following Paul’s analysis, for soft balancing to occur, three conditions need to be met (Paul, 2005, p. 59): first, power asymmetry must be perceived as a concern, but not up to the point of representing a real threat to ‘the sovereignty of second tier powers’; second, smaller powers must enjoy the benefits of public goods that only the superior power can produce and cannot simply replace them; finally, this form of balancing prevents the hegemon’s retaliation ‘either because the balancing efforts … are not overt or because they do not directly challenge its power position with military means’. It is therefore evident that, compared to classical balance of power theory, this hypothesis is closer to Walt’s balance of threat (Walt, 1987), as it relegates power asymmetry to the role of antecedent condition rather than independent variable.

Not surprisingly, soft balancing received widespread attention and generated a lively debate. However, especially as concerns the European experience, one can easily highlight logical inconsistencies and lack of sound empirical evidence. Starting from the former, the main weakness results from the secondary role played by power asymmetry, as we discussed above. The ultimate cause of balancing is a purportedly unilateral US foreign policy. Evidently, this is in stark contrast with the structural approach that informs balance of power theory, since the main explanatory variable for that is located at the domestic level (Cladi and Locatelli, 2012, p. 271). Moreover, soft balancers fail to provide adequate operationalisation of this variable: as we have seen, according to Paul, the dominant power must be perceived by second-tier states as a challenge to their interest, but not as an existential threat. At the same time, the dominant power must be benevolent enough to provide public goods. This is intuitive: benign hegemony does not spur balancing, while predatory hegemony triggers hard balancing. Between the two extremes, we could find countless intermediate positions. What foreign policy course is assertive enough to prompt balancing, but still avoid its hard form? As far as we know, the answer to this question is still wanting.

Second, as concerns empirical evidence, proponents of soft balancing rely almost exclusively on the European (mostly French) reactions to George W. Bush’s foreign policy. Not surprisingly, they find that the 2003 war in Iraq or other unilateral initiatives actually led most (but not all) European capitals to voice their dissent. But is diplomatic complaint enough to qualify as balancing (albeit in its soft version)? And, equally important, how can they account for the European efforts in the 1990s – i.e. before the Bush administration? Admittedly, the Transatlantic partnership had been occasionally put under stress even under the Clinton administration (Walt, 1998/99), but this hardly qualifies as soft balancing.

The limits of soft balancing lead us to turn to the balancing for autonomy hypothesis. In Barry Posen’s analysis, for example, systemic pressures provide the European states with a simple alternative: either balancing or bandwagoning. Unfortunately for Europe, according to this logic, the second option is not really feasible, as it is too risky (Posen, 2006, p. 157). As echoed by Christopher Layne (2006), bandwagoning is appealing only for smaller states, since they know that even aggregating power it would not be possible to effectively balance the US. They also rule out the possibility for bigger states to bandwagon with the US on the ground that such a policy would be detrimental to their own security. This is not to say, as Waltz (1979) once claimed, that siding with the stronger would eventually lead to subjugation; however, they argue that bandwagoning would lead to dependence on the US and this would subsequently entail the risk of entrapment or abandonment.

So, the hypothesis that follows is that, in order to maximise their own security, European states would try to maximise their own autonomy (Jones, 2007, p. 186). As a result, this form of balancing is not really an attempt to counterbalance the US, since Washington is not perceived as a threat. But still, it is motivated by the American role as a security provider. Thus, we might find that the logic of balancing is similar to the defection strategy in a prisoner’s dilemma. It is worth recalling that for players in a prisoner’s dilemma, defection is the dominant strategy because they are driven by positive and negative incentives: the first one is to maximise their payoff, the second is to avoid the risk of the worst outcome. Similarly for the EU, building an autonomous capacity follows a two-fold rationale: it provides the EU with security assets, and lowers the risk of being dependent on American preferences.

Like the other strands of balancing before, the balancing for autonomy hypothesis also shows methodological and epistemological flaws. As we have discussed elsewhere (Cladi and Locatelli, 2012, p. 270), we find that this explanation ascribes a disproportionate weight to intentions. Actually, intentions are key to test the validity of the argument. Since balancing, in this view, is motivated by the effort to gain autonomy, empirical evidence of balancing is not enough to confirm the theory. Borrowing Andrew Moravcsik’s words, ‘Demonstration of causality requires direct ev...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: on theories, paradigms and CSDP
• Part I Do IR theories have something to say about CSDP?
• Part II On the limits of IR theories for understanding the CSDP
• Conclusion We thought we knew
• Index