ETA's Terrorist Campaign

From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015

Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, Diego Muro, Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, Diego Muro

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138100145
• eBook ISBN: 9781317329145
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Nationalism & Patriotism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyses the rise and decline of the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom). ETA declared a unilateral ceasefire in November 2011, bringing to a close a campaign of political violence that started in the late 1960s. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the overwhelming majority of secession supporters agreed that an independent Basque homeland would be realised through 'ballots' and not 'bullets'.

Providing an inter-disciplinary overview of radical Basque nationalism that pays special attention to the drivers for ETA's decline, defeat and disbandment, this book includes chapters by historians, political scientists and sociologists who offer three important theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on nationhood and security studies. Firstly the book re-assesses the military conflict that opposed ETA and the Spanish state, by paying special attention to tactical and strategic considerations as well as the counter-terrorist policy itself. Secondly it provides an original interpretation of the politics of fear which surrounded the process of victimization, as well as assessing the extent to which the issue of violence led to the polarisation of citizens. Thirdly the authors examine the historical narratives and rituals that contributed to the production and reproduction of identity binaries and memories of war.

Arguing that the defeat of ETA must be contextualised within the strategic evolution of Basque nationalism, the declining resonance of the radical message and the effectiveness of the Spanish counter-terrorist effort, this book is essential reading for students and scholars working in the areas of European politics, nationalism and terrorism studies.

Part I ETA and the Spanish state

1 The origins of ETA Between Francoism and democracy, 1958–1981

Gaizka Fernández

DOI: 10.4324/9781315657806-1

Introduction

The civil milieu of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basque Country and Freedom) usually explains the origins of this terrorist organisation by appealing to the supposed existence of a secular, ethnic conflict between Basques and Spaniards, of which ETA would be the most recent expression. According to this point of view, an originally independent Basque nation was at some time in its history conquered by Spain, which converted it into a type of colony (Fernández 2015). Over the centuries the Basques supposedly resisted the oppression of the invaders, resorting to arms on occasion, as occurred during the two Carlist Wars (1833–1840 and 1872–1876), the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the period of ETA’s activity (1958–2011).

In fact, that secular, ethnic conflict never existed. It is no more than an ‘imaginary war’ (Elorza 1995, 49), on which ETA and its milieu, the so-called patriotic left (izquierda abertzale), have built their cosmovision. It is their particular version of the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric (Levinger and Lytle 2001), which in this case derives from a combination of the tendentious view of history of Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco – PNV), the influence of the Third World national liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s, and the dictatorial context of Francoism from which ETA initially developed.

Another commonly used explanation for the birth of this organisation is the alleged ‘genocide’ that the Basque people suffered following the Spanish Civil War. There is no question that the victors carried out a harsh repression against the vanquished, but they did so throughout Spain and not only in the Basque Country. In total, the Francoist repression is calculated to have resulted in the killing of around 130,000 Spanish republicans after the conflict. There were between 1,600 and 1,800 victims in the Basque Country (the provinces of Biscay, Gipuzkoa and Araba) and between 2,200 and 2,500 in Navarre. This was a huge number of murders, but it was lower than those recorded in the provinces of Málaga (7,471), Badajoz (8,914) or Seville (12,507), where no terrorist groups on ETA’s scale emerged. On the other hand, the absolute majority of mortal victims of the Francoist repression in the Basque Country and Navarre were singled out because they were militants of non-nationalist, left-wing parties and trade unions. For example, only 12 of the 194 people murdered in Araba were affiliated to the PNV. The rest were leftists (Gómez 2014).

Nor was the Franco dictatorship alien to the Basque Country and Navarre, since both regions contributed many volunteers who fought on the Francoist side in the Civil War. Repression was subsequently one of the regime’s foundations, but it did not rest solely on that. It could also count on the blessing of a large part of the Catholic Church, the support of a high percentage of the bourgeoisie and the popular classes, and the backing of the right wing (including non-nationalist Basques). To this support must be added the passivity of the majority of society, which in the 1960s began to enjoy a certain degree of economic prosperity. In the words of the first military leader of ETA Xabier Zumalde (alias El Cabra) (2004, 423),

[T]he people, with the exception of a few romantics, knew nothing – or did not want to know anything – about the so-called ‘Basque problem’. They were more interested in buying a car SEAT 600, or at least a television, than getting into trouble.

The image of an unvanquished Basque Country standing up to Franco does not correspond to reality.

The purpose of this chapter is to go over the first stage of ETA’s history. On the one hand, the organisation’s origins are examined. These are situated in the context of Francoism, and the chapter analyses the extent to which the dictatorship had an influence on ETA’s appearance. In addition, the causes that led this organisation to opt for terrorist violence are analysed. On the other hand, the chapter studies the different branches of ETA that emerged during the transition to democracy in Spain, a period when there were many more mortal victims than under the dictatorship itself.

The new generation of Basque nationalists

ETA above all resulted from a generational clash between the old nationalists in exile and the youths who had not fought in the Civil War but who wished to continue it in some way. The PNV and the Basque leftists had nourished the hope that the victory of Great Britain and the USA in the Second World War would result in the fall of Franco’s dictatorship, and the alliance between Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. In order to incite the intervention of the Western democracies, the Basque government-in-exile of President José Antonio Aguirre and the trade unions organised general strikes in 1947 and 1951. In spite of substantial support for the strikes the final goal was not achieved. The Cold War saved the regime: in 1953 Franco signed an international agreement with the USA and a Concordat with the Vatican; two years later Spain was admitted to the United Nations. In 1960 Aguirre died and was replaced by Jesús María Leizaola, also from the PNV. From then onward the Basque government-in-exile played a merely token role. The new generation of nationalists began to accuse the older generation of apathy and ineffectiveness (De Pablo et al. 2001).

Inside the Basque Country, nationalism had been transmitted intergenerationally through channels like the clandestine press, propaganda, literature, music, ritual celebrations and places of memory. It was also transmitted orally in social networks like the family, circles of friends and their leisure-time rituals, associative life, the Basque-language cultural milieu and the Church (Pérez-Agote 1987; Gurrutxaga 1990). By such means and in a conjuncture that gave them credibility – the dictatorship – young people received the dogmas of Sabino Arana (racism, irredentism, independentism, hatred for anything that seemed Spanish, etc.), including the narrative of a secular, ethnic conflict (Jáuregui 1985). On the one hand, Francoism appeared to be consolidating itself; it maintained its centralism and prevented any traces of dissidence. Nationalist symbols were also prohibited. On the other hand, the Basque language, although not officially banned, continued to be marginalised and was in decline. Finally, during the 1950s and 1960s, Spain underwent a new process of industrialisation that resulted in the relocation of a significant section of the rural population to the big industrial centres (Madrid, Barcelona, etc.). Thousands of immigrants from the other parts of Spain arrived in the Basque Country in search of work. The population virtually tripled in three decades. This resulted in the re-emergence of a xenophobic rejection of immigrants, who were perceived as ‘colonists’ by some nationalists (Fernández and López 2012, 49–54).

In 1952 a small group of nationalist university students, some of whom had been militants in student organisations of the PNV, founded a magazine called Ekin (To Do), the name by which the group was subsequently known. The following year, during the foundational meeting of the new group, these young nationalists sealed their commitment to the homeland by solemnly swearing on an issue of the magazine Gudari (Warrior, Soldier), published by the nationalist battalions during the Civil War. This was more than a symbol: in the words of one of its leaders José Luis Álvarez Enparantza (Txillardegi) (1997, 177), the members of Ekin considered themselves ‘to be soldiers and that organization, which did not even have a name, saw itself as the continuation of the Basque Army’. In spite of that combative spirit, their efforts were only dedicated to studying. Through their readings they managed to rediscover Basque nationalism. When the members of Ekin began to impart educational courses, they came into contact with the PNV’s youth organisation, Eusko Gaztedi of the Interior (EGI – Basque Youth Force). In 1956, due to the ideological affinity between the two groups, Ekin became integrated into EGI. However, mutual suspicions, attempts by the PNV leadership to control the militants proceeding from Ekin and the party’s internal problems resulted in a rapid deterioration in relations between the two, especially in Biscay. In 1958 the former members of Ekin broke with the PNV (Jáuregui 1985, 75–83).

The breakaway militants formed a group called ETA. It made itself known publicly in 1959 through a manifesto with a moderate content. In it the members of ETA declared that they were heirs to the trajectory of the Basque government. ETA was defined as a patriotic, apolitical, secular and democratic organisation that defended the right to self-determination (De Pablo et al. 2001, 235). In spite of that declaration, ETA had adopted the most extremist version of Basque nationalism. In the words of Frederico Krutwig, who was later to become one of its most famous theoreticians, when he met them in person the first ETA members ‘seemed to us to represent a tendency that was more retrograde than the PNV…. They had gone back to the most retrograde Aranism’ (Muga 03/1980). However, ETA had made two significant changes to the principles of Sabino Arana. On the one hand, it declared itself to be secular; that is, it favoured a separation between religion and politics. On the other, although its militants did not abandon xenophobia, ETA distanced itself from the surname-based racism of Sabino Arana. The new criterion for ethnic exclusion was the language: a Basque was someone who spoke the Basque language. In fact only a minority of Basques did so, which is why an ideological criterion was later given preference: a Basque was a Basque nationalist (Fernández and López 2012, 54–73).

During the dictatorship the relationship between the PNV and ETA was a difficult one. The leaders of ETA accused the party of being an inefficient anachronism and later labelled it ‘bourgeois’, while the PNV responded by pointing to the ‘fascist’ or ‘communist’ character of the latter. According to Gurutz Jáuregui (1997, 75), ETA and the PNV were separated by ‘the dialectic between pragmatism and intransigence, their positions with respect to violence, and ETA’s inclination towards Marxism’. It should be added that the two groups were rivals competing to attract Basque nationalist supporters. In that sense, the PNV could only observe with concern how, as the 1960s progressed, ETA attracted a growing sector of Basque youth and, above all, how the organisation absorbed two splits from EGI in 1963 and 1972.

The evolution of the first ETA

Up until 1967 ETA was mainly involved in propaganda activities, but it was possible to discern a desire to go beyond this. From its foundation the organisation had a branch dedicated to action (later its military front). In December 1959 its activists planted explosives at the Civil Government of Araba, a police station in Bilbao and the newspaper Alerta in Santander. On 18 July 1961 the group burnt three Spanish flags in San Sebastián and tried to derail a train carrying Francoist veterans from Gipuzkoa, who were travelling to that city to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Francoist rebellion (Jáuregui 1985, 75–83).

As a consequence of its initial actions, ETA experienced its first arrests. Some of the organisation’s members escaped to France, where for decades, thanks to the unofficial tolerance of the government, ETA benefited from an authentic ‘sanctuary’ where its activists were barely troubled by the police. It was in the French Basque Country that its I Assembly was held in 1962, at which ETA defined itself as a Basque Revolutionary National Liberation Movement. Its goal was to create an independent nation-state, which would be monolingual (in Basque), secular and democratic. However, this was precisely when ETA started to undergo its ideological evolution (Jáuregui 1985, 139–147; Sullivan 1988, 47–48).

The first ETA had inherited from the PNV its rejection of Marxism in general and communism in particular. Nonetheless, the big workers’ strikes that took place in May 1962 impressed the leaders of the organisation, who proposed the need to link nationalism with the workers’ struggle. While for a large proportion of ETA members this approach was for instrumental reasons, others became passionately interested in labour issues. Outstanding among the latter, who were known as the labour current of ETA, was Patxi Iturrioz (Larrínaga). During the II Assembly, held in March 1963, ETA decided to participate in the workers’ movement (Garmendia 1996, 96–122 and 344).

Vasconia, written by Frederico Krutwig and first published in 1963, had a considerable influence in ETA. On the one hand, it softened the organisation’s distrust of Marxism. On the other, drawing inspiration from Mao Zedong and the national liberation movements of the Third World, Krutwig contributed the novel image of the Basque Country as a colony subjected to two imperialist powers: Spain and France. It was necessary to defeat these powers militarily through a national liberation war, in which the patriotic end justified the violent means (Krutwig 2006).

At ETA’s III Assembly, held between April and May 1964, a report entitled ‘The Insurrection in Euzkadi’, written by Julen Madariaga and inspired by Vasconia, was approved. It proposed starting a guerrilla war to defeat the occupying armies and seize power. It was an unviable plan. There was no similarity between the modern, industrialised and prosperous Basque Country and the colonies of the Third World. Besides, while ETA members possessed a few weapons, they did not know how to use them and they lacked ammunition. Nonetheless, it was proof that a Third World current had appeared within the organisation (Jáuregui 1985, 225–237).

Shortly afterwards, the founders of ETA were expelled from the French Basque Country and lost control of the group, which passed to José Luis Zalbide, a referential figure in the Third Worldist current, and Patxi Iturrioz, leader of the workerist faction. Their imprint became clear at the IV Assembly (1965), at which the organisational apparatus was restructured into sections and there was also far-reaching strategic and ideological change. After accepting that Madariaga’s project for guerrilla war was unviable, approval was given to a report by Zalbide which recognised ETA’s limitations and opted for a model of ‘revolutionary war’ based on the action–reaction–action spiral. According to this strategy the organisation’s violence would provoke police repression against the Basque population, which would result in the latter supporting the ‘revolutionary war’. There was an indispensable condition for this to work: ETA’s organisational structure would have to be capable of withstanding the reaction of the police (Hordago 1979, vol. III, 515). Xabier Zumalde was appointed head of the military front, which undertook the training of a group of youths.

A new political goal for ETA was also approved at the IV Assembly: building a socialist society. This marked the start of the stage of ‘the two-sided coin’, to use the expression by José María Garmendia (1996, 220–234), which involved ‘the attempt to combine national liberation and social liberation’. The organisation had thrown open its doors to the influence of the numerous currents of Marxism. As a result, Patxi Iturrioz’s workerist tendency sought to find a way of adapting nationalism to socialism (Sullivan 1988, 58–65).

One of the problems faced by the first ETA was lack of funds, which led the organisation to carry out a bank robbery in September 1965. It was a fiasco. José Luis Zalbide was arrested and other leaders had to flee from Spain. With the internal balance among the different tendencies upset, Iturrioz was left in charge of the Political Office, which was responsible for publishing Zutik (Arise), and he therefore became the chief leader of ETA. From this position he tried to force a workerist evolution onto the organisation. The coin had fallen with its Marxist face showing. On the ideological plane, Iturrioz attempted to replace ‘bourgeois nationalism’ with a ‘workers’ patriotism’ that would defend workers’ interests. It also rejected linguistically based ethno-nationalism, anti-Spanish sentiment and the supposed secular conflict between Basques and Spaniards contained in the nationalist narrative. Moreover, the workerists denounced xenophobic prejudices and proposed opening up the organisation to immigrants. On the strategic side, Iturrioz proposed subordinating the military front to the political leadership, the creation of a class front and giving the leading role to the workers’ movement. This turn to the left infuriated Xabier Zumalde’s military front, which split from ETA in 1966. On the other hand, the Third Worldist and ethno-nationalist currents, led by Txillardegi, orchestrated a campaign of defamation against Iturrioz and his supporters (Garmendia 1996, 259–310; Jáuregui 1985, 293–358).

The first...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of plates
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I ETA and the Spanish state
• PART II The politics of fear
• PART III Narratives and memory
• Conclusion
• Index