European Union Negotiations

Processes, Networks and Institutions

Ole Elgström, Christer Jönsson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134296200
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Relaciones internacionales

The EU policy process is dependent on negotiations as a mode of reaching agreements on, and implementing, common policies. The EU negotiations differ from traditional international negotiations in several respects and this book presents a detailed analysis of the processes while examining their distinguishing features. The authors explore the variety of negotiation processes, the continuity and institutionalization of negotiation processes as well as the involvement of a variety of actors besides governments, often linked in informal networks. Going beyond the common distinctions based on issue-areas or the EU as negotiation arena as opposed to negotiating actor externally, the authors explore the impact of different stages in the policy process and the nature of the external negotiating partner.

1 Introduction

Christer Jönsson and Ole Elgström

The European Union has been described as a ‘negotiated order’ (Smith 1996), a ‘permanent negotiation institute’ (Bal 1995: 1) and a ‘negotiation marathon’ (Kohler-Koch 1996: 367). The EU policy process is dependent on negotiations as a mode of reaching agreements on, and implementing, common policies. This volume represents an effort to characterize these negotiation processes. EU negotiations differ from traditional international negotiations in several respects. At the same time, they are not immediately comparable to negotiations taking place within states. What, then, are the distinguishing features of these ‘hybrid’ EU negotiations? This is the first overarching question addressed in the volume. The continuity and institutionalization of negotiation processes as well as the involvement of a variety of actors besides governments, often linked in informal networks, are illuminated in the contributions.

A second pervasive theme concerns the variety of negotiations in the European Union. All negotiation processes do not look alike. What, then, are the determinants of this variety? First, the European Union remains a constantly changing phenomenon and should be understood as a process rather than a frozen organization. The policy process thus looks different depending on when you look at it. Another common notion in the EU literature is that the policy process varies with issue-areas. The European Union has been characterized as a ‘prismatic political system’, in which rays of activity and authority are scattered or focused differently in various policy areas (Laffan et al. 2000: 199). Moreover, a distinction must be made between negotiations among various actors within the European Union and negotiations where the European Union figures as a negotiating party externally. The contributions to this volume allude to, yet go beyond, these common distinctions based on time, issue-areas or the European Union as negotiation arena as opposed to negotiating actor. For instance, the authors explore the impact of different stages in the policy process, distributive as compared to norm negotiations and the nature of the external negotiating partner.

Negotiations, networks and institutions are the key concepts around which this volume is organized. Negotiation can be regarded as one identifiable mode of joint decision making, to be distinguished from coalition, when the choice is made by numerical aggregation (such as voting), and adjudication, when the choice is made hierarchically by a judge who aggregates conflicting values and interests into a single decision. In negotiations the parties are left to themselves to combine their conflicting points of view into a single decision (Zartman 1977: 621–3). To be sure, the European Union, to a greater extent than any other international organization, allows for decision making by qualified majority and endows the European Court of Justice with considerable supranational authority. Yet, regardless of formal decision rule, an element of negotiation usually precedes social decisions in general, and EU decisions in particular. Voting and court processes tend to be the ultima ratio in EU policy processes; hence, negotiations are often conducted in the shadow of the vote or in the shadow of the court.

Any bargaining situation is characterized by the coincidence of cooperative and conflictual elements as well as interdependent decisions. ‘Without common interest there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict nothing to negotiate about’ (Iklé 1964: 2). Interdependence entails the need for mutual rather than unilateral action and renders the best course of action by individual actors dependent on the behaviour of others. Far from all bargaining situations, thus understood, lead to negotiations. The parties may exchange non-verbal signals, ‘each aware that his own actions are being interpreted and anticipated, each acting with a view to the expectations that he creates’ (Schelling 1960: 21). When negotiations do occur, they may, in concordance with the definition of bargaining situations, be understood as ‘a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present’ (Iklé 1964: 3–4). The most general lesson from the rich negotiation literature is that process matters. Outcomes are not only determined by the character of the issues or the attributes or power of the actors, but are affected by the nature of the negotiation process.

The words bargaining and negotiation are frequently used interchangeably in the literature. To the extent that a distinction is made, it goes in either of two directions. On the one hand, bargaining can be seen as the broader concept, including the exchange of verbal as well as non-verbal communication, formal as well as informal exchanges. Negotiation, in this view, is a subclass of bargaining, referring to a formalized process relying on verbal communication. On the other hand, bargaining can be understood as bazaar-like haggling in contrast to joint problem solving. While both connotations can be found in the following chapters, the latter is most prominent, since the European Union is often adduced as an example of problem-solving negotiations as opposed to bargaining (cf. Elgström and Jönsson 2000).

While much of the theoretical literature on negotiations — especially that inspired by game theory — is premised on bilateral encounters, negotiations in the European Union are typically multilateral, raising the problem of managing complexity (Winham 1977a, 1977b) for practitioners and theorists alike. ‘The more the messier’ (Zartman 1994: 3) applies not only to the parties to multilateral negotiations, but to issues and roles as well. Methods to reduce complexity therefore become important in multilateral negotiations, not least in the EU. Such methods include coalition building, issue aggregation and disaggregation, and role differentiation. Coalitions reduce the number of negotiating actors to a manageable amount (see Dupont 1996). Two diametrically opposite techniques to handle the complexity following from a multitude of issues are issue disaggregation — also referred to as issue decomposition and sequencing (Hopmann 1996: 81; Hampson with Hart 1995: 45–7) — which involves negotiating each issue separately and sequentially; and issue aggregation or issue linkage, which involves combining sub-issues that would be non-negotiable if treated separately into package deals or tradeoffs (see, e.g., Hopmann 1996: 81–4). Multilateral negotiations involve not only many parties and many issues, but also have a multi-role character (Zartman 1994: 5). Mediator roles can be assumed by parties or groups of parties to multilateral negotiations. Leadership roles are considered especially significant in multilateral negotiation (see Underdal 1994; Malnes 1995; Sjöstedt 1999). The following chapters illustrate the various ways of reducing complexity in multilateral EU negotiations.

We tend to think of multilateral negotiations in the international arena as processes involving government representatives of a number of states — in the European Union the member states. Yet effective international cooperation often requires more than state-to-state interaction. And EU negotiations tend to be ‘polylateral’ in the sense that they involve interaction between official entities (such as a member states, the European Council, and the Commission) and unofficial, non-state entities, with reasonable expectations of systematic relationships (Wiseman 1999). This means that negotiations typically involve elements not only of intergovernmental relations but also transgovernmental relations — interactions between governmental sub-units across state boundaries — and transnational relations — interactions between non-state actors across state boundaries.

In the wake of formal structures — especially complex, ‘polylateral’ ones like the European Union — informal and less visible structures typically emerge, which are often labelled networks. Such informal networks provide access points for a variety of non-state actors. Network analysis replaces the traditional ‘closed-system’ view of self-contained organizational units with an ‘open-system’ perspective. Moreover, it directs our attention to data concerning relations rather than actor attributes: to contacts, ties and connections rather than attitudes, opinions and behaviour of individual actors. ‘Informal organization’ rather than formal relations of authority within and between units becomes the primary focus.

One of the main advantages of networks over formal organizations is that they allow informal interorganizational coordination, which avoids problems associated with hierarchy and representation, while facilitating the development of trust and frank exchanges of information (Chisholm 1989). The informality of networks rests on the personal relationships that develop as a result of frequent interaction. Networks imply personal contacts within the context of organizational contacts. As political scientists, the contributors to this volume are interested in ‘policy networks’. A distinction is often made between two types of policy networks. On the one hand, some networks display a high degree of commonality, consistency of values and permanence; students of national politics usually refer to these as ‘policy communities’, whereas students of international politics prefer the term ‘epistemic communities’. On the other hand, networks may be more temporary coalitions of heterogeneous actors around a specific issue; the term ‘issue networks’ is used domestically, ‘advocacy coalitions’ internationally. Both varieties can be found in EU negotiations.

Negotiations in the European Union are normally not occasional and brief encounters, but continuous processes among individuals who form part of informal networks. Moreover, these negotiations are embedded in an institutional framework. Whereas students of international institutions have paid little attention to negotiation processes, and students of international negotiations have largely ignored institutions, the contributors to this volume explore the role of institutions in EU negotiations. An institution can be understood broadly as a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with underlying norms and a set of rules or conventions defining appropriate behaviour for, and governing relations among, occupants of these roles (cf. Young 1989: 32; March and Olsen 1998: 948). These norms and rules ‘prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1988: 383). Institutions may or may not involve organizations, groups of individuals who pursue a set of collective purposes. Organizations are entities that normally possess physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment and budgets (Stone Sweet et al. 2001: 6; Young 1989: 32). According to this distinction, the market is an institution, the firm an organization. Marriage is an institution, the family its organizational manifestation. By the same token, the acquis communautaire can be said to represent the institutional heritage of the European Union, while the Council of Ministers and the Commission are organizations. This distinction is not always upheld, and the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organization’ are frequently used interchangeably. And when we speak of the European Union as an institution, we usually have both its ideational aspects and its organizational manifestations in mind. Yet the distinction between the two components should be kept in mind.

EU negotiations can be characterized as institutionalized, insofar as norms and rules impinge on the negotiations which involve EU organizational units and persisting negotiation patterns can be found over time. For example, protection of the minority is an EU norm, which is reflected, inter alia, in the voting rules of the Council of Ministers. The principle of juste retour governs EU negotiations to a considerable extent (cf. Peterson 1991: 283). Because this norm permeates negotiations, small states tend to have more influence than their size would indicate. Formal EU decision rules affect negotiation as well. For one thing, many issues can ultimately be decided by voting rather than by consensus, as in most other multilateral international settings. Negotiation theorists have coined the acronym BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). Negotiators are assumed to use the consequences of no agreement as the yardstick against which possible negotiation outcomes are evaluated: only if a negotiated solution is better than their BATNA will they agree (Fisher and Ury 1981; cf. Raiffa 1982). Applied to the European Union, for states and coalitions with great voting strength, majority decisions are always a feasible alternative to a negotiated agreement. This can be used as a tactical instrument, and anticipation of voting down the line may influence current negotiations. For states and coalitions with less voting strength, it means an imperative to negotiate seriously to modify the majority proposal, as it is better to agree to a proposal that is acceptable, but not ideal, than to be outvoted. Merely obstructing the majority proposal makes sense only if the ultimate decision rule is unanimity. Thus, ‘majority rule lowers the costs of cooperation which stem from the danger of non-decision’ (Kohler-Koch 1995: 176).

Institutions do not emerge full fledged and immutable but evolve through processes of institutionalization. This

involves the development of practices and rules in the context of using them and has earned a variety of labels, including structuration and routinization, which refer to the development of codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of acting on them.

(March and Olsen 1998: 948)

Institutionalization coordinates and patterns behaviour, channelling it in one among all possible directions. We may differentiate three levels of institutionalization: (1) a set of shared symbols and references, (2) a set of mutual expectations, agreed-upon rules, regulations and procedures, and (3) formal organizations (cf. Ruggie 1998: 55). EU negotiations, while being influenced by existing institutions, at the same time contribute to the institutionalization of European cooperation at these three levels.

The chapters of this book explore the distinguishing features and the variety of EU negotiations while paying attention to informal networks as well as institutions and institutionalization. The volume is divided into two parts. The first contains chapters dealing with the European Union as a negotiation arena. In other words, it focuses on the diversity of negotiations between member states and other actors within the European Union. The second part redirects the limelight to the European Union as an actor in international negotiations. A question asked both by its negotiating partners and by scholars is whether the European Union can be regarded as a credible unitary actor. The chapters in this part of the volume discuss the drawbacks and advantages of the European Union’s multi-state character and explore the diversity of EU behaviour in different bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Chapter 2, by Christer Jönsson and Maria Strömvik, outlines the background and characteristics of EU networks and addresses the questions of why informal networks are so preval...

Table of contents

• Cover
• European Union Negotiations
• Routledge Advances in European Politics
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• Illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Preface and acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• Part I The European Union as a negotiation arena
• Part II The European Union as an actor in international negotiations
• Index