International Cooperation and Arctic Governance

Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building

Olav Schram Stokke, Geir Hønneland

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN: 9780415399340
• eBook ISBN: 9781134149278
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Environment & Energy Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A new exploration of the impacts of Arctic regimes in such vital areas as pollution, biodiversity, indigenous affairs, health and climate change.

The post-Cold War era has seen an upsurge in interest in Arctic affairs. With new international regimes targeting Arctic issues at both the global and regional levels, the Northern areas seem set to play an increasingly prominent role in the domestic and foreign policies of the Arctic states and actors – not least Russia, the USA and the EU.

This volume clearly distinguishes between three key kinds of impact:

• effectiveness, defined as mitigation or removal of specific problems addressed by a regime
• political mobilization, highlighting changes in the pattern of involvement and influence in decision making on Arctic affairs
• region building, understood as contributions by Arctic institutions to denser interactive or discursive connectedness among the inhabitants of the region.

Empirically, the main focus is on three institutions: the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

International Cooperation and Arctic Governance is essential reading for all students with an interest in Arctic affairs and their impact on global society.

1
Introduction

Geir Hønneland and Olav Schram Stokke

The post-Cold War era has seen an upsurge of interest in Arctic affairs.¹ This applies to international as well as national politics, and is seen in practical politics as well as in the academic literature. With new international regimes targeting Arctic issues at both the global and regional levels, the northern areas seem set to play an increasingly prominent role in the domestic and foreign policies of the Arctic states and actors – not least Russia, the USA and the EU.

This book is essentially about international governance – or the creation and operation of rules of conduct that define practices, assign roles and guide interaction for dealing with collective problems (Young 1994:3, 15). For most of the post-war period, institutional means for circumpolar or sub-regional governance across the East–West divide were few and far between, owing to the strategic rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This situation changed markedly in the late 1980s, when a series of initiatives were taken for broader cooperation in the Arctic in such vital areas as indigenous issues, communicable disease control, pollution control and biodiversity conservation, climate politics, and environmental concerns in petroleum activities.

Empirically, our main focus here is on three institutions: the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Council of the Baltic Sea States; the latter is included because salient parts of its Russia-oriented programme activities concern the Arctic oblasts of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. These relatively recent institutions are functionally broad and address a range of issue areas, often including environmental protection, commerce and industry, health, education and cultural affairs. By contrast, earlier Arctic institutions set up across the East–West divide tended to concentrate on carefully circumscribed issues, such as management of certain shared fish stocks or wildlife populations.²

Our focus is on the impact of these new Arctic institutions. Their formation and early development have been covered by others.³ We will pay attention more explicitly to the difference that these institutions might have made. Also, this is a study of impact in quite broad terms. We distinguish between three categories of impact flowing from those institutions: (1) effectiveness, defined as mitigation or removal of specific problems addressed by a regime; (2) political mobilization, highlighting changes in the pattern of involvement and influence in decision making on Arctic affairs; and (3) region building, understood as contributions by Arctic institutions to more dense interactive or discursive connectedness among the inhabitants of the region. These concepts will be further explained in Chapter 2.

The case studies cover some of the many priority areas that the relatively new Arctic institutions have defined for themselves. Especially the sub-regional Barents and Baltic Sea initiatives have placed great emphasis on developing stronger economic ties among the northern territories of the states involved. Programmes under those institutions have aimed at improving physical, financial and administrative infrastructures for commercial and regional business development in areas ranging from fisheries and forestry to maritime transport and telecommunication services. These areas are not covered in this book, or only tangentially.

In terms of theory, the primary challenge is to establish causal substantiation between the operation of Arctic institutions and changes in problem solving, political mobilization or region building. Here it is important to examine whether Arctic institutions succeed in carving out distinctive ‘niches’ for themselves, as seen in the context of broader international cooperation. While initiatives to Arctic collaboration have often come from the smaller northern states, progress has inevitably depended on support from the ‘great powers’ in international Arctic politics – Russia, the USA and the EU – whether in political or financial terms.

This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the Arctic institutions that are in focus in this book. It elaborates on the role of great powers within them, and outlines the chapters that follow.

Cooperative Olympics in the Arctic

The ‘Gorbachev initiative’, launched by the Soviet leader in a speech in Murmansk in 1987, sparked off a truly hectic period for Arctic policy makers and bureaucrats.⁴ The signal that Soviet authorities would welcome more extensive cooperation with Western states on Arctic affairs was quickly heeded, and several scientific communities lost no time in reintroducing an earlier plan for a circumpolar body to foster greater cooperation among Arctic scientific organizations (Roots and Rogne 1987). One prime motivation for this initiative was the desire to obtain physical access for research in the entire circumpolar area. In 1990, these efforts were rewarded by the establishment of the non-governmental International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), an associate of the International Council of Scientific Unions. IASC members are research organizations from all eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA) and ten other states. This institution facilitates the development and funding of cooperative projects, in particular those with clear circumpolar relevance.⁵

In 1991, a Finnish initiative to set up a cooperative intergovernmental vehicle for protection of the Arctic environment produced the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which includes a string of permanent working groups tasked with various programme activities. The emphasis has been on environmental monitoring, mapping and harmonization of national and international conservation measures, and developing projects for the protection of the marine environment. The four original AEPS activity areas, each coordinated by a working group, have been maintained (now within the broader structure of the Arctic Council): the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).⁶ In 1998, the AEPS was incorporated in the Arctic Council, which had been created a few years earlier, following a Canadian initiative and a lengthy period of pushing and shoving.⁷ In addition to environmental protection, the Arctic Council addresses social, cultural and economic matters of particular concern to northern communities.⁸ Decisions of the Arctic Council are made by bi-annual ministerial meetings, in the format of non-binding declarations that give direction for future work under the Council. The chairmanship rotates among the countries, and the country in the chair is responsible for secretariat functions and driving the cooperation. Day-to-day operations of the Council are taken care of by the countries’ Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs), normally polar or Arctic ambassadors. The Arctic Council does not have its own budget or secretariat: work under the Council is dependent upon direct national financial contributions and willingness to act as lead country for projects.

Alongside the development of these circumpolar bodies, two sub-regional institutions have emerged as salient vehicles for cooperation in the European Arctic. A Danish–German initiative gave rise to the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992.⁹ Member states are the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and Russia, Poland and Germany. The objective of the CBSS is to enhance cooperation and coordination among the states of the region in order to contribute to economic and democratic development in the former Eastern Bloc countries. In addition to these broader goals, specific priority areas are civil security, the fight against organized crime, communicable disease control, environment, labour issues, nuclear safety and transport. Member states are represented by their ministers of foreign affairs. The CBSS takes overall political guidance from the Baltic Sea States Summits, which assemble the heads of government of member states and a member of the European Commission. Chairmanship rotates among the member states. A Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) serves as the body for intergovernmental cooperation among CBSS members between meetings of the Council itself. Decisions within the CBSS are taken by consensus. A permanent international secretariat has been set up in Stockholm.

One year after the founding of the CBSS, in 1993, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was established on Norwegian initiative. Within a unique two-tiered structure, the Barents Council involves representatives from the governments of Russia, the Nordic states and the EU,¹⁰ whereas its Regional Council involves counties and indigenous peoples in the region.¹¹ The BEAR facilitates collaboration among the regions of the member states in areas ranging from commerce and industry to culture and education. Its primary objective is to underpin stability and prosperity in the region. More specifically, it aims at reducing military tension, countering environmental threats and addressing the East–West gap in standards of living in the region. Key functional areas are the environment, regional infrastructure, economic cooperation, science and technology, culture, tourism, health care, and the concerns of the indigenous peoples of the region (mainly the Saami and Nenets). Original priority areas conce...

Table of contents

• Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Examining the consequences of Arctic institutions
• 3 Indigenous issues
• 4 Communicable disease control
• 5 Pollution and conservation
• 6 Climate change
• 7 Oil, gas and the environment
• 8 International institutions and Arctic governance
• Index