Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy

David J. Lonsdale

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2007
• eBook ISBN: 9781134244829
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

This book offers a strategic analysis of one of the most outstanding military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the campaigns of Alexander the Great.

David Lonsdale argues that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of historical examples have value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Furthermore, as strategy is so complex and challenging, the remarkable career of Alexander provides the ideal opportunity to understand best practice in strategy, as he achieved outstanding and continuous success across the spectrum of warfare, in a variety of circumstances and environments. This book presents the thirteen most pertinent lessons that can be learned from his campaigns, dividing them into three categories: grand strategy, military operations, and use of force. Each of these categories provides lessons pertinent to the modern strategic environment. Ultimately, however, the book argues that the dominant factor in his success was Alexander himself, and that it was his own characteristics as a strategist that allowed him to overcome the complexities of strategy and achieve his expansive goals.

1 The art of strategy

Introduction

Individuals such as Alexander are so conspicuous in strategic history because they excel in the art of strategy. This is a noteworthy attribute since strategy is such a complex and challenging activity. The complexity of strategy is such that achieving a satisfactory end state at reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time-frame, is often elusive. Strategy is here defined as an art, not a science. This is done to reflect the fact that there are no formulas for strategic success. Every strategic context is unique, and therefore requires its own unique mixture and application of strategic assets. In order fully to appreciate the challenges faced by those practising strategy, and to provide a common set of definitions and concepts, this chapter seeks to dissect the art of strategy. In undertaking this task, the work is by default asking the question: ‘why is strategy so difficult?’¹ Having initially defined strategy and its various levels, the chapter will then explore the various characteristics of strategy that make it difficult. This will include an analysis of its multidimensional nature,² the nature of war,³ the paradoxical logic of strategy,⁴ war’s polymorphous character, and the Clausewitzian concept of ‘friction’.⁵ From here, the chapter will examine the various ways in which military force can be utilised in the pursuit of policy. This will entail an analysis of defence, deterrence, compellence, posturing, offence, and the miscellaneous uses of force. Finally, it will conclude with an analysis of the key Clausewitzian concepts of ‘centres of gravity’ and ‘military genius’. These two concepts represent analytical tools by which we can understand best practice in strategy. In addition, both concepts are extremely useful analytical tools when evaluating strategic performance. With these definitions and concepts under our belt, we can then begin an examination of Alexander’s campaigns with a common and appropriate analytical framework.

The levels of strategy

A reader of strategic literature will find various definitions of strategy available.⁶ Colin S. Gray defines strategy as ‘the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’.⁷ Similarly, strategy is defined by Carl von Clausewitz as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’.⁸ André Beaufre, in his definition of strategy, focuses attention on the interaction between belligerents: ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’.⁹ An alternative definition that draws its inspiration from those of Clausewitz, Gray and Beaufre may describe strategy as the art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s) towards the attainment of policy objectives.

The key relationship within strategy is that between military force and the policy objective. This relationship is a complex one. Gray describes this relationship as a bridge that links the military and political worlds.¹⁰ Alternatively, Eliot Cohen best described this relationship as an unequal dialogue.¹¹ Whilst military force must serve policy, it is not simply a case of the political leadership demanding whatever it desires from their military commanders. Indeed, Clausewitz notes that although policy must remain the supreme consideration in the conduct of war, ‘[t]hat, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means . . .’¹² Instead, both the military and political leaderships must discuss what is required, and, just as importantly, what is possible. This is why the dialogue aspect is so important. However, the dialogue lacks equity because the military instrument must ultimately serve the policy goals. This relationship is at its most complex in a modern democratic state. In such circumstances the political leadership may have little understanding of the military instrument and may be more concerned with the domestic political environment. Likewise, the military may have little understanding of the political world. For rulers like Alexander the Great or Napoleon the situation was, on the surface, much simpler. The roles of both the political and military leaderships were joined together within the individual. However, this unification of the two roles did create its own dangers. Without an external dialogue assessing the strategic rationale of decisions there is not such an effective check on the strategic efficacy of certain actions. In the case of Alexander, the significance of this becomes evident during the later campaigns, especially in India where he lost strategic focus and subtlety.

Successful strategic performance is not just the product of competence at the level of matching means to ends within the interaction between military force and politics. It also requires competence across all of the levels of strategy. The highest level in the taxonomy of strategy is policy. Policy is simply the overall objective that is sought. It is important to understand the policy objectives, because it is these that should determine the methods used in the campaigns. Once policy has been established the political leadership must then devise a grand strategy through which to pursue the objectives sought. Grand strategy encompasses all the instruments at the state’s disposal: diplomatic; intelligence assets; military and economic. As Basil H. Liddell Hart notes, ‘the role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy’.¹³ The key challenge in grand strategy is choosing the right instrument, or the right balance of instruments, necessary to fulfil the policy requirements. This decision will be influenced by a wide array of factors, including the policy itself, available resources, nature of potential enemies, strategic culture, and the geopolitical environment, to name just five.

One element of grand strategy is military strategy. Once a military strategy has been decided upon (i.e. a plan has been developed in which military force will be used to serve the ends of policy) it must be put into practice. This is achieved at the lowest level by tactics. Tactics simply refers to actions on the battlefield in the face of the enemy. So, for example, tactics is concerned with how forces are deployed, how they engage the enemy, and how the various units interact with one another. In this sense, tactics is very much about the details of combat. Each battle or contact with the enemy represents a tactical event that occurs in a distinct time and place. Of course, ideally one aims to be successful in every tactical event. However, to have a successful overall military strategy a commander must link his tactical engagements together, so that they serve the broader purpose. This is where the operational level comes into play. The operational level links tactical engagements with the overall military strategy. Or, as Edward Luttwak so aptly describes it: ‘this operational level governs the consequences of what is done and not done tactically’.¹⁴

The operational level can be thought of in both conceptual and material terms. Conceptually, it links tactical engagements together in the service of military strategy. Materially, we can think in terms of a geographic area of operations, within which the operational-level commander moves his forces from objective to objective. The operational level contains a whole range of factors essential to the success of a military campaign. Amongst the most important are logistics and lines of communication, movements of the enemy, and decisive points in the theatre of operations such as cities and key terrain features. The above linear description of the levels of strategy, although valid and useful, does little to reflect the complexity and nonlinear nature of strategy. Thus, the work will now analyse those features of strategy that make it so complex.

The complexity of strategy

The complexity of strategy can be explained by various means. The awkward relationship between policy and military force is but one. This factor alone would make strategy a difficult art to master. However, there are many other considerations, or dimensions if you will, that further complicate the job of the practitioner. Clausewitz identified five dimensions of strategy in his work: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical.¹⁵ Modern Strategic Studies is slowly developing a deeper understanding of the many varied relationships that occur within the strategic world. In this sense, the work of two authors stands out for particular praise. In a 1979 article, ‘The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy’, Michael Howard identified four dimensions to strategy. The four dimensions in Howard’s taxonomy are technological, operational, social and logistical. Howard argues that the relative dominance of each dimension is dependent upon circumstance.¹⁶ Twenty years after the publication of Howard’s article, Gray further the developed the concept of dimensions within strategy. For Gray, there are seventeen dimensions, which he organises into three categories: ‘People and Politics’, ‘Preparation for War’ and ‘War Proper’. Within these categories the dimensions include society, culture, economics and logistics, strategic theory and doctrine, command, and time, to name just six. As Gray himself notes: ‘the precise number [of dimensions] does not matter so long as everything of importance is properly corralled’.¹⁷ For our purposes, the significance of Gray’s analysis is the identification of the vast range of factors that must be considered and dealt with in the practice of strategy. Of course, what makes the task of the practitioner even more difficult is the fact that there are complex interactions amongst these dimensions. In addition, as Gray argues, the practitioner must achieve a reasonable degree of competence in each of them. The challenge of this objective is intensified by the fact that an enemy may have the advantage in a very significant dimension. For example, for any continental enemy wishing to invade the British Isles, the English Channel gives Britain a substantial advantage in the geographical dimension.¹⁸

Aside from having to achieve a degree of competence amongst the many dimensions of strategy, the practitioner must also seek to attain a degree of harmony amongst the levels of strategy. So, for example, actions taken at the tactical level must be in accordance with the objectives desired at the higher levels of strategy. This may sound like a rather simple task, but as Clausewitz reminds us: ‘Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy’.¹⁹ Indeed, far from being easy, the establishment of harmony is the exception rather than the norm. Edward Luttwak notes that the normal state of affairs is measured disharmony.²⁰ In his excellent study, Luttwak provides us with a number of examples to illustrate this point. An intriguing one is that of Japan at the beginning of the Second World War. Luttwak argues that, in terms of the grand strategic picture, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was too successful at the tactical and operational levels. The success of the attack compelled the United States into a policy of unconditional surrender. From this position it can be argued that Japan was always destined to lose the resulting war.²¹ Thus, failure to harmonise the levels of strategy can be the result of success, just as much as it can be the product of failure. In this sense, we can also look to the Second Punic War. Disharmony amongst the levels ultimately signalled the end of Hannibal’s objective of defeating the Roman Republic. Hannibal could not translate a series of spectacular tactical and operational successes, most notably the battles of Cannae and Transimene, into strategic victory. Hannibal chose not to attack Rome itself. Thus, in the face of over-whelming Roman manpower resources, Hannibal’s outstanding battlefield successes were out of kilter with the situation at the strategic and grand strategic levels. This disharmony was substantially magnified by Rome’s adoption of Fabius Maximus’ strategy of avoiding battle under anything but the most favourable circumstances. This Fabian strategy gave Rome the time it needed to mobilise its resources and regenerate its forces.²² This latter point illustrates Luttwak’s notion that the challenge of harmonising the levels of strategy is further complicated by the fact that the paradoxical logic of strategy operates in each level, so that a complex series of interactions is taking place within and amongst the levels of strategy.²³

In Luttwak’s insightful analysis, the paradoxical logic is pervasive in strategy and operates in many different ways. For example, its presence can be seen in the fact that a manoeuvre that takes the more difficult, less logical, path may be the most effective in war. This is because the enemy may be caught by surprise as a result. Alternatively, the paradoxical logic also operates in the sense that as a military operation becomes more successful it may begin to produce diminishing returns. This may occur simply because an advancing force moves further from its sources of supply. In addition, an enemy may adapt in such a way as to counter the effects of a successful course of action, as with the example of Fabius Maximus. Although Luttwak may somewhat overplay the pervasiveness of the paradoxical logic, his emphasis on the significance of competition with the enemy is worthy of continued attention. Perceptively, Luttwak notes:

Although each separate element in the conduct of warfare can be very simple . . . the totality of these simple things can become enormously difficult when there is a live enemy opposite, who reacts to undo everything being attempted, with his own moves and his own strength.²⁴

Or, as General George Pickett famously commented when asked why the Confederates lost at Gettysburg: ‘I think the Union Army had something to do with it’.²⁵ Another factor that those conducting strategy have to deal with is the nature of war. According to one dictionary definition, ‘nature’ refers to ‘a thing’s essential qualities’.²⁶ In this sense, the nature of war is different from its character. The character of war, or rather its style, is a constantly changing phenomenon; it is less absolute, whereas the nature of war is unchanging.²⁷ The nature of war is a complex beast, composed of elements that are always present but fluctuate in their relationships with one another. This complexity can be described in various ways. For Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz’s ‘fascinating trinity’ is the key to understanding the nature of war. Within this thesis the trinity is composed of rational and non-rational forces (policy, emotion, chance). In turn, these forces are represented by the following agents: ‘political leadership, popular base, and fighters’. The relative strength or influence of each of these forces varies with context. Thus, the nature of each particular war is unique and can be discovered floating somewhere between these forces. From this basis, Bassford concludes that the dynamics that occur within the trinity, and between the trinities of the various belligerents in a conflict, are the key to understanding the nature of war.²⁸ Another theorist who has focused upon the complexity of war is Alan Beyerchen. For Beyerchen, war can be best thought of as a nonlinear activity, where small fluctuations can have significant consequences. The roots of this nonlinearity are to be found in the many complex interactions that occur in war, as well as in the moral forces that inevitably infuse the whole activity.²⁹

In addition to the Clausewitzian trinity, the nature of war includes other aspects, which likewise are always present. Several words or phrases may be used to describe these elements, but they can be best described as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘violence’.³⁰ In addition, war is of course characterised by human participation, and the further complexities that this produces. All of the above are reflected in another Clausewitzian concept ‘the climate of war’, which the Prussian theorist describes as being composed of danger, exertion, unc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The art of strategy
• 2 Ancient Greek warfare
• 3 Lessons in strategy 1: Grand strategy
• 4 Lessons in strategy 2: Military operations
• 5 Lessons in strategy 3: Use of force
• 6 Lessons in strategy: Conclusions
• Notes
• References