The European Defence Agency

Arming Europe

Nikolaos Karampekios, Iraklis Oikonomou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138729346
• eBook ISBN: 9781317628088
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'Europe

This volume provides a comprehensive understanding of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the leading EU armaments policy institution.

Despite its critical role in European strategic and military affairs as the key hub of European policy-making in the field of armaments, the Agency has hitherto received very little attention by the academic and research community around Europe. To fill this gap in the literature, the book covers a multitude of inter-related themes and topics. Not only does it provide a detailed analysis and assessment of the Agency's record as the first institution dealing solely with EU armaments policy, but it also links these findings to international relations and European integration theory. Thematically, the contributions go beyond the mere description of achievements, gaps and risks, elaborating on novel themes such as space, offsets, pooling and sharing, and transatlantic armaments relations. The book combines an interdisciplinary approach to the study of European defence with theoretical and ontological pluralism, and seeks to unveil the strategic, industrial, institutional and ideational sources of armaments collaboration and capability development under the aegis of the EDA.

The multi-faceted orientation of the book will be of much interest to students of European security, EU institutions, defence studies, arms control and international relations in general.

Part I

Theorising the EDA

1 Institutionalist approaches to agency establishment

Helena Ekelund

Introduction

Whilst the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a unique body, in terms of function and configuration, it is part of a wider trend of institutional reform and changes to public management organisation: agencification. This chapter aims to shed light on how the establishment of the EDA can be understood within this context. The chapter builds on the new institutionalist assumption that the form and functioning of institutions ‘depend on the conditions under which they emerge’ (Przeworski 2004: 527). As different strands of new institutionalism emphasise different aspects of institutional development (Kato 1996), they are not mutually exclusive but can contribute with different insights to institutional analysis. To take advantage of this, the chapter seeks to reach a broad understanding of agency establishment by adopting an eclectic approach to new institutionalist theory. It sets out to fulfil two objectives. First, it provides an overview of the phenomenon of European agencies, and new institutionalist perspectives on agency establishment. Second, it analyses how the creation of the EDA can be understood by using the three main strands of new institutionalism as conceptual lenses.

The term ‘agencification’ refers to the creation of semi-autonomous bodies that perform public functions at arm’s length from central government. The trend to establish agencies is visible in a range of political settings (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), and can be seen as a part of a wider shift in public management practices, which has been termed New Public Management (NPM). An increased use of private-sector management tools and principles in public services and an emphasis on results over process are characteristic features of NPM, which seeks to increase efficiency in the delivery of public services. The delegation of functions to agencies is perceived to contribute to efficiency improvements and better results in two main ways. First, by delegating responsibilities to an agency, central government can focus on its core tasks. Second, as expertise is gathered within the agency, the latter can assist with specialised knowledge, thereby contributing to the formulation of better informed policies. The European Commission (2008) has embraced this line of thought and presents very similar arguments for the creation of agencies at the European level.

The first two European-level agencies, (1) the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training and (2) the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, were established in 1975, but the agencification process really took off in the 1990s, coinciding with the NPM wave in public administration. The trend that started with the Commission seeking opportunities to focus on its key responsibilities by delegating implementation functions to agencies within the former first pillar, spread to the other executive actor, the Council of the European Union, which then began delegating to second and third pillar agencies (Busuioc 2013: 3). The EDA was established in 2004 within the second pillar as a Council agency operating within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

This chapter is structured as follows. First, it will provide an overview of the phenomenon of European agencies. Following this, it will zoom in on the debate on agency establishment and outline how new institutionalist perspectives can be used as conceptual lenses to help us understand three aspects of agency creation: timing, delegated functions and institutional set-up. These lenses are then used to make sense of the empirical findings on the establishment of the EDA. The empirical examination builds on the analysis of documents related to the process and reviews of secondary literature in the form of contemporary commentaries and previous research.

The phenomenon of European Agencies

Currently, there are around 30 European agencies. Several attempts to classify agencies have been made by public administration scholars in general and scholars working on European agencies in particular (see Ekelund 2012; Groenleer 2009; Thatcher 2011). This literature has shown that agencies come in different shapes and sizes, and fulfil a range of functions. There is no universal definition of the term ‘agency’, and there is no single classification of agencies (Andoura and Timmerman 2008). A reason for this is that different scholars are driven by different purposes and devise frameworks and classifications that capture the agencies’ aspects of interest for the study in question (Hardiman and Scott 2009).

Nevertheless, there are some core features that, most scholars agree, need to be in place for an organisation to be labelled an agency. It should be at arm’s length from central government, have a constitution in the form of legislation or formal framework document, be staffed by civil servants rather than elected politicians, and be subjected to performance contracting (Talbot 2004). This means that its performance is measured against set targets, monitored and reported.

There is no single universally endorsed definition of the term ‘European agency’. Yet, scholars agree on what they are. As Busuioc (2013: 21) writes, they are ‘specialized, non-majoritarian bodies, established by secondary legislation, which exercise public authority and are institutionally separate from the EU institutions and are endowed with legal personality’. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, a distinction was made between ‘Community Agencies’, i.e. first pillar agencies, on the one hand, and the intergovernmental second and third pillar agencies on the other. The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the pillar structure and changes to agencies’ legal acts have brought these agencies closer together (Busuioc 2013). Yet, when studying agency establishment, it is important to bear this distinction in mind, as agencies within different pillars were set up according to different procedures. As all of these agencies have their own individual founding legislation and were set up to have a degree of independence from the core executive institutions, they can be distinguished from the EU-level temporary bodies called ‘executive agencies’, which are set up for a limited time at the discretion of the Commission to manage specific programmes.

In the early days of studying European agencies, there was a focus on formal structures (see Chiti 2000; Vos 2000), but now more and more emphasis is given to studying actual practices. Some studies consider agencification in the wider context of a new emerging executive order (Curtin 2009; Curtin and Egeberg 2008). Other studies focus on specific aspects such as accountability of agencies (Busuioc 2013; Curtin 2007), actual level of autonomy (Groenleer 2009; Wonka and Rittberger 2010) and agencies’ role in implementation (Groenleer et al. 2010).

New institutionalist explanations of agency establishment

Agencification is an example of institution-building, but it is also a question of delegation. These phenomena have been investigated in a wide variety of contexts. Often, agency establishment is explained through an analysis of functional needs. However, scholars working on European agencies have started to look beyond these functional explanations emphasised by the NPM paradigm. They draw also on organisational theory, and emphasise the need to consider factors such as the wider political situation, contingent events and organisational ‘fashion’ (Busuioc et al. 2012; Ekelund 2010, 2014). This chapter follows in their footsteps by drawing on the three main strands of new institutionalism presented below. This eclectic approach to institutional analysis is selected on the understanding that different new institutionalist perspectives bring different insights. As the different strands focus on different aspects of agency creation, expectations derived from them are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As will be demonstrated, the explanatory power of each strand varies depending on what aspect of agency creation is under consideration.

Rather than being one coherent tradition, new institutionalism encompasses several strands (Hall and Taylor 1996; Kato 1996; Lowndes 1996). These strands share a belief that institutions are political actors in their own right with a degree of autonomy from social contexts and the motives of individuals. Expectations about the future are developed within institutions and, as information is filtered through these institutions, the institutions mediate political action (Cyert and March 1963; March and Olsen 1984; Simon 1978). Within the new institutionalist tradition, one can distinguish three main strands: (1) rational choice institutionalism, (2) sociological institutionalism and (3) historical institutionalism.

Explanations of agency establishment focusing on functional needs are associated with a rational choice institutionalist approach. This approach adopts an individualist ontology, and assumes economic rationality, i.e. that relevant actors seek to attain their fixed preferences through strategic interaction (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944; Kato 1996). March and Olsen (1998) have termed this ‘the logic of consequentialism’. Agency establishment is explained by a functional logic, i.e. the explanation for the agency is to be found in the functions it is set up to fulfil. This is analytically expressed through principal-agent models and analyses of transaction costs (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Tallberg 2002). The approach predicts that agencies (the agents) are established to lower political transaction costs, and delegation takes place when the benefits to the delegating party (the principals) exceed the costs. Costs of delegation are slippage and shirking (Pollack 2003). Benefits of delegation are gathering technical expertise, ensuring credible commitment – some authors speak more specifically of blame-shifting – and increasing efficiency.

Sociological institutionalism adopts a ‘holist and ideational ontology’ (Rittberger 2005: 17), and assumes that rationality is bounded, i.e. rather than assuming perfect objective rationality of humans, we need to understand that human cognitive powers may not be able to grasp all aspects of a situation. As Simon (1978: 8) states, ‘in complex situations there is likely to be a considerable gap between the real environment of a decision (the world as God or some other omniscient observer sees it) and the environment as the actors perceive it’. Sociological institutionalists argue that actors follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ which means that they ‘are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations’ (March and Olsen 1998: 151). These rules stem from ‘internalized norms and ideas’ about what is appropriate in a given situation (Rittberger 2005: 18). Thus, sociological institutionalism argues that agency establishment is a response to socially constructed preferences for this particular organisational form rather than the result of a utility-maximising calculation (McNamara 2002; Pollack 2005; Rittberger 2005). To understand where these socially constructed preferences come from, the wider socio-cultural context must be considered (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). Institutional forms are believed to spread through isomorphic processes that could be either voluntary or coerced (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).

Historical institutionalism holds that ‘political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time’, and ‘many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be formal rules, policy, structures, or norms’ (Pierson 1996: 126). Contingent events are emphasised over actor preferences. Thus, historical institutionalists go beyond rational calculations and argue that to understand institutional development one must consider the context in which it takes place (Thelen 1999). Importantly, there is a perception that the extent of various actors’ influence over the creation of new institutions is determined by power relations built into already existing institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954). From a historical institutionalist perspective institutional development could be explained through analyses of path dependency and ‘critical junctures’, i.e. ‘moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a “branching point” from which historical development moves onto a new path’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942).

New institutionalist predictions for the EDA establishment

Different strands of new institutionalism have different views on rationality and focus on somewhat different aspects of institution building. Thus, it is inadvisable to seek to synthesise them or, indeed, to pit them against each other using methods of hard theory testing (Ekelund 2014). A more fruitful approach involves using the three strands as conceptual lenses that draw attention to three different aspects of agency establishment: (1) timing of establishment, (2) functions delegated and (3) institutional set-up. Whereas these aspects are of course linked, it is useful to separate them for analytical purposes. Below, theoretical predictions derived from the three strands presented above, and evidence needed to corroborate or weaken them, are presented.

Timing of establishment

As rational choice institutionalism assumes fixed preferences, it cannot be used in isolation to explain the timing of agency establishment. As Hall and Taylor (1996: 953) assert, ‘it is not obvious why the actors would agree to a change in existing institutions’ given that ‘the star...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I Theorising the EDA
• PART II The EDA in action
• PART III The EDA, the nation-state and beyond
• PART IV Broadening the EU armaments policy agenda
• Conclusion: future trajectories and a new research agenda
• Index