Chinese Just War Ethics

Origin, Development, and Dissent

Ping-Cheung Lo, Sumner B Twiss

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138824355
• eBook ISBN: 9781317580966
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Histoire de la Chine

This book offers the first comprehensive analysis of warfare ethics in early China as well as its subsequent development.

Chinese attitudes toward war are rich and nuanced, ranging across amoral realism, defensive just war, humanitarian intervention, and mournful skepticism. Covering the five major intellectual traditions in the "golden age" of Chinese civilization: Confucian, Daoist, Mohist, Legalist, and Military Strategy schools, the book's chapters immerse readers in the proper historical contexts, examine the moral concerns in the classical texts on their own terms, reframe those concerns in contemporary ethical idioms, and forge a critical dialogue between the past and the present. The volume develops fresh moral interpretations of classical texts such as The Art of War, Mencius, Xunzi, Mozi, and the Daodejing and discusses famous philosophers such as Han Fei and Wang Yang-ming, representing antithetical schools of thought about warfare. Attention is also given to the military ethics of the People's Liberation Army, examining its thinking against the backdrop of its own civilizational context.

This book will be of much interest to students of just war theory, Chinese politics, ethics, and philosophy, military studies, and International Relations in general.

1 Varieties of statecraft and warfare ethics in early China

An overview

Ping-cheung Lo

Ancient Greece and ancient China

It is often said that Ancient Greece, the Classical Period in particular (roughly the fifth and fourth century BCE), was the cradle of Western civilization. The same may be said of the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE) for Chinese civilization. Both were preceded by a long and ancient history, and in each case the hallmark of politics of the period was incessant warfare among independent states with a common culture. The contention for regional hegemony was fierce and ruthless. Such periods of upheaval were at the same time, however, golden ages of civilization. Original intellectual ideas emerged that proved to be pivotal for the subsequent development of civilization. Both periods ended in the emergence of a regional hegemon. Greek city-states were defeated, lost independence, and ruled by the foreign kingdom of Macedon and eventually by Rome,¹ whereas Chinese states were merged into a bigger political entity by force of one state: the Qin.

Although both periods were marked by incessant warfare, the intellectual responses were different. Ancient Greeks produced narratives of war: either poems (e.g., Homeric poems) or prose accounts commemorating particular battles (e.g., the works of Herodotus and Thucydides). “Both prose accounts and poems were intended to record and glorify events” (van Creveld 2005, 24). Philosophical discussions of war were remarkably rare, in spite of the achievements of classical Greek philosophy. “Plato … writes surprisingly little about war. Surprisingly, indeed, since the conversations and speeches of Socrates that Plato reports (or invents) are supposed to have taken place right before, during, or immediately after the Peloponnesian War … which shook the foundations of Greek culture in general and Athenian pride in particular” (Reichberg et al. 2006, 18). Aristotle, once tutor to Alexander the Great, did discuss war in his Politics, but his views were notoriously confused. On the one hand, he stipulated that war must be fought for the sake of peace. On the other hand, he argued that war for the cause of the acquisition of property, “natural slaves” in particular, is “just by nature.” Aristotle was explicit on this topic:

And so, from one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended to be governed, will not submit; for war of such kind is naturally just.

(Politics I, 3. 1256b23–27; qtd. from Reichberg et al. 2006, 40; cf. Regan 2013, 15)

In contrast, most major thinkers in the Warring States Period in China urgently engaged the topic of war. The cruel reality of unremitting wars was reflected in poems, recorded in historical writings, and, above all, intensely discussed and debated by the great thinkers of that age. Concomitant with the struggle for supremacy as well as for survival of the warring states, competing schools of thought, especially on statecraft, arose to meet the needs of the day. Because warcraft was a part of statecraft, the role of warfare was sharply debated, ranging from its aggressive use to its condemnation. Hence there were heated and extensive debates on the need to distinguish justified from unjustified wars in ancient China, as there were not in ancient Greece.

In this chapter I provide an overarching view of five major schools of thought on this subject matter, an endeavor that has not been attempted before in either Chinese or English. In particular, I try to articulate their warfare ethics in the context of statecraft. I first discuss the emergence of such thought during this pivotal period and then briefly examine its development when China became a unified and centralized empire. After briefly describing the historical background in the next section, I will begin the subsequent overview with the school that denies entirely the legitimacy or sensibleness of warfare ethics.

Background: the rise of various schools of thought

As the eminent Zhou Dynasty (1027–256 BCE) was on its downward path in the sixth century BCE, the feudal dukes seized the opportunity to turn the territories entrusted to them into de facto sovereign states and declare themselves kings. As there was no common agreement on territorial sovereignty, this development led to anarchy in interstate affairs. State boundaries were in flux and, as a result of a series of military conquests and occupations by the stronger states, the number of states in the region decreased sharply to seven, commonly known as the Seven Powers. This final round of fierce fighting and bloody warfare is now known as the Period of Warring States in Chinese history (475–221 BCE). This was a time of instability, as every state was vulnerable to attack and losing its independence and territorial control. This was also a time of ferocious fighting; killing fields were everywhere.² Hence this period was also a time of competition as well as reform. All state rulers looked for brilliant ideas on managing state affairs and war fighting-skills so that their own state could survive and emerge superior to others.³ Accordingly, this was also the golden period of creative and original thought in Chinese history. Many new schools of thought arose that were subsequently generalized as the “hundred schools of thought” in historical writings. The once shared values during the Zhou Dynasty gave way to pluralistic and conflicting ethical visions.⁴

In this context of competing schools of thought on statecraft, warcraft (the skill of employing the military) was also discussed. The biggest question in that age was “How to govern well so that one’s state can emerge as a great power?” Derivatively, the next big question was “How to conduct military affairs so that one’s army will emerge invincible?” Varieties of discussions on the proper use of military force grew out of this bigger debate.

Most of the major thinkers of this age were bothered by the killing fields and their carnage. As Mozi (c. 468–376 BCE) articulated it in the famous third chapter on “Condemn Aggression”:

Today, kings, dukes, great men and the lords of the various states of the world do not act like this…. As soon as they enter the borders of the state, they cut its grain and fell its tree, destroy the inner and outer walls of its cities to fill in the moats and ponds, seize and slaughter the livestock and animals reserved for sacrifice, and set ablaze its ancestral temples, butcher its myriad peoples, exterminate its old and weak, and carry off its state treasures. As their troops press forward and repeatedly confront the enemy, they shout at them: “He who dies in the line of duty is the finest soldier; he who kills many of the enemy is next; he who is wounded is only third in rank.”

(Mo 2013, 182–183; 19.2)

A few decades later Mencius (or Mengzi, c. 372–289 BCE) echoed the same sentiment: “In wars to gain land, the dead fill the plains; in wars to gain cities, the dead fill the cities” (Mencius 2003, 83; 4A14). Hence most of the thinkers of this age found it necessary to articulate an ethic of the employment of the military.

The Legalist School: all is fair in offensive defense

Articulations in the pivotal period

Some thinkers decided to seize this moment of disorder and go with the times. Since the loosely united Zhou Dynasty could no longer exercise effective governance, there was no central authority to enforce order. Given the chronic chaos and warfare, efforts to promote peaceful co-existence of these states were unlikely to succeed, and every state had to secure its survival by augmenting its own strength. Legalism was a school of thought that taught how to best maximize a state’s power vis-à-vis other states. It is difficult to trace its precise origins because the writings of many of its pioneers are no longer extant. Though not founders, Shang Yang (c. 390–338 BCE) and Han Fei (c. 280–233 BCE) are generally deemed the most important thinkers of this school. There is much continuity between the thoughts of these two novel thinkers, though the former wrote more on warcraft and the latter more on statecraft. Unlike many other thinkers of the time who still respected the ancient sages of previous dynasties, both were forward looking and ignored conventional norms; hence their inclination towards realpolitik. In this age of struggle for survival in which the stronger states survived by preying upon the weaker ones, the goal of interstate statecraft was the same as domestic statecraft for the Legalists; that is, to maximize one’s power and wield it to one’s advantage. Hence both thinkers advocated a strong military supported by intensive agriculture. A “rich country” (fuguo) with a “strong military” (qiangbing) is a motif common among most Legalist thinkers. (Even today, the “Chinese Dream” advocated by the P.R.C. government always has these two components. “A rich and strong China” is on the lips of most people living there.)

Accordingly, Legalist statecraft was more than realpolitik; it was machtpolitik; that is, a policy of relentless pursuit and use of power in domestic as well as interstate relations. The ultimate goal of statecraft was the state’s creation of a world order under its dominion. According to this statecraft, internally, replacing traditional rites, the government was to coerce people into submission through the promulgation and enforcement of new and draconian laws. Externally, the government aimed to coerce other states into submission through brutal wars. Shang Yang, the prime minister of the state of Qin, militarized the entire society and advocated mass slaughter on the battlefield. Han Fei, whose writings were greatly admired by the ruler of Qin, deemed interstate relations a zero-sum game and advocated preventive wars to make sure that one’s state would be the regional hegemon. The state of Qin put Legalism into practice, eventually defeating all other states and becoming the hegemon in China. In the process, much blood was spilled, which prompted responses from other schools of thought.

Legalist interstate statecraft bore much rudimentary resemblance to contemporary offensive realism in international relations theories (Mearsheimer 2014). A Legalist state was proactive in safeguarding national long-term security; it would launch an “anticipated self-defense” military operation against another state, though such an operation would be condemned by others as aggression. Accordingly, such statecraft had little interest in warfare ethics per se. Since one had only oneself to rely on – to ensure long-term national security and to advance national interests – one could not afford to confine warfare within the narrow moral space allowed by any petty moralism. There was no concern for proper conduct in war other than that which guaranteed military success. There were no scruples aiming to restrict violence and human suffering on both sides, and no mercy was to be shown to enemy soldiers, whether captured or surrendered. There was no self-imposed restraint or limit on the use of lethal violence to serve national interests. This amoral position on warfare was bitterly disputed by other schools of thought, as we will see shortly.

Later developments

The Period of the Warring States ended with Qin state conquering all other states and establishing an empire dominating the region. This Pax Qina (previously known as Pax China) was short-lived (221–206 BCE). Rebellions erupted and chaos returned; eventually a dynasty, the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), was established which was stably developed. There would be more dynastic changes to come, but the apparatus of the centralized Chinese imperial empire would remain until 1911.

Ever since Confucianism was established as the state religion in the Han Dynasty, Legalist teaching, along with other schools of thought, was banished from state schools and institutions. This was analogous to the Christianization of the Roman Empire after Constantine, albeit not quite as thoroughly, since other schools of thought were still privately taught and not persecuted. Although emperors and court officials in charge were supposed to follow the Confucian teachings, they could not resist the allure of Legalism. It was Emperor Wu, the architect of the Confucianization of the Han Empire, who put Legalist warcraft into practice as a new interstate anarchy emerged in East and Central Asia. The Xiongnu, a powerful nomadic tribe dominating Mongolia and Central Asia, proved to be an annoying neighbor. After conquering neighboring races and occupying their land in the east, south, and west, Emperor Wu attempted to launch distant expeditions to the north to remove this threat to national security once and for all. Although these decades-long campaigns remained at an impasse at the time of his death, the imperial ministers during the reign of the next emperor wanted to renew these offensive campaigns. A large-scale court debate on this issue was held in 81 BCE in which the government spokesmen defended and elaborated this strategy of offensive defense. The pro-war party raised arguments that were full of Legalist motifs, praised the achievements of Shang Yang and the Qin state, and even quoted a famous saying of Han Fei (“Thus, whoever has great strength sees others visit his court; whoever has little strength visits the courts of others. Therefore the enlightened ruler strives after might”) (Han 1959, 306; ch. 50). This was not an isolated incident; the surreptitious merging of Legalist statecraft into imperial Confucianism became a salient feature of imperial Confucian statecraft for almost 2,000 years. In the modern period, Mao Zedong (1893–1976 CE) appreciated Han Fei’s thought so much that he assimilated Legalist statecraft into his rule of the “New China.” Such an offensive realism may still be found in the official People’s Liberation Army publications on grand strategy. Chapter 11 of this book explains in detail Legalist realist thought, its practice in the Han Dynasty, and its recurrence in the PRC government. Early studies detected the presence of Machiavellianism in this school of thought (Waley 1939), and this chapter elaborates this theme via the theory of offensive realism as articulated by a well-known international relations theorist (Mearsheimer 2014).

The Confucian School: just war as the second best option

Articulations in the pivotal period

The founder of the Confucian School was Master Kong (Kongzi, Latinized as Confucius; 551–479 BCE). Although in the Analects he seldom talked about war, he was adamant that proper statecraft required virtuous politics in continuity with his emphasis on virtuous ethics for individuals. A virtuous ruler, by his personal example, according to Confucius, would have gre...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Preface and acknowledgments
• Notes on citation styles and Romanization
• List of contributors
• Introduction
• 1 Varieties of statecraft and warfare ethics in early China: an overview
• PART I The military strategy tradition
• PART II The Confucian tradition
• PART III The Daoist, Mohist, and Legalist traditions
• General index
• Citation index