Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe

If God be for Us

Philip W. Barker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415775144
• eBook ISBN: 9781135973926
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume examines the enduring nature of religious nationalism in modern Europe. Through a series of in-depth case studies covering Ireland, England, Poland, and Greece; the author argues that religious frontiers, or geographic lines of division between different and unique religions, are central to the formation of religiously-based national identities.

Typically, as states develop economically and politically, religion plays a lesser role in both individual lives and national identity. However, at religious frontiers, religion becomes useful for differentiating and mobilizing groups of people. This is particularly true when the religious frontier also represents a threat or conflict. Although religion may not be the root of conflict in these instances, the conflict takes on religious tones because of its ability to unite an otherwise diverse population. Religion takes precedence over language, culture, or other national building-blocks because the "other" can best be distinguished in religious terms. The in-depth case studies allow for a deep historical understanding of the processes which converge to create a modern religious nation.

Greatly expanding our current understanding of the conditions in which religious nationalism develops, this important book has implications for our understanding of religion and politics, secularization, European politics and foreign policy.

1 Modern religion

Religion is one of the most powerful social forces known to man. It can shape the way we view the world, frame our conceptions of right and wrong, and inform our sense of morality. It has the ability to drive people above and beyond themselves to thoughts of an afterlife, a higher calling, or even self-sacrifice. It has been a part of social movements from abolitionism and anticolonialism to the civil rights movements of the 1960s. It has driven great thinkers and philosophers in an effort to prove the existence of a God—or to disprove it. It has led men and women to take up arms in a fight they see as righteous and steadfast. It has also contributed to or been used as justification for some of history’s greatest tragedies—the Crusades, the Inquisition, and slavery The events of 11 September 2001, the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, the ongoing debate about peace in the Middle East, the resurgence of the Religious Right in America, debates and confrontations about displays of the Ten Commandments—these events and others like them make it abundantly clear that religion continues to play an important part in the modern-day political arena.

And yet a case can be made that in Europe the story is somehow unique. Religion is undoubtedly still important in the continent of the Catholic Church, the Reformation, and the Crusades, but over time there has been a change. Church attendance and other indicators are at historic lows. The role of established churches in the political process has waned dramatically. A widespread push for secularism has become evident in many European states. Without a doubt, the nature of religion has changed in Europe, and quite possibly in irreversible ways. But not everyone agrees about the nature of this shift. There is an ongoing debate about the status of religion in today’s Europe. The trend towards secularism has been accompanied by ethnoreligious fighting in the Balkans, increased concern over immigrant Muslim populations in France and Germany, and continued religious devotion in certain areas such as Poland. Clearly, our understanding of modern religion is far from complete.

There are countless reasons to study religion today. This book examines one small part of the religious puzzle—modern religious nationalism. Specifically, why are certain national identities intertwined with religion? This chapter begins that exploration by looking at how much of a role religion plays in contemporary society. Is God truly dead, at least in the political world? How far has secularization gone? More importantly, interesting and pertinent questions arise in the process—questions that point in the direction of interesting observations and important lapses in our understanding of modern religion. For instance, if secularization is as complete as has been believed in the past, then how do we explain the religious nature of tensions in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia? Exactly what role does religion play in these conflicts? What do we make of the religious resurgence in many of the former Soviet states? What are the reasons for the increase in new religious groups in many parts of the continent? Why do growing Islamic minorities present such a threat to supposedly secular states?

A brief history

Secularization and the death of God

Religion has always been an important force in the history of humankind. In Europe, specifically, religious divisions and wars have shaped the cultures, institutions, and maps of European states. The Reformation and CounterReformation, the Inquisition, the Treaty of Westphalia, and the Holocaust are all key events in the history of Europe and all intricately related to religion and its role in society. The map of Europe and the basic notion of the nation-state arose out of the Treaty of Westphalia and the notion of cuius regio, eius religio—that the religion of the King is the religion of the people. Throughout history, the ties between church and government in Europe have been strong—Henry VIII’s separation from the Catholic Church and the French Revolution were both key events in history, and both were in response, at least partially, to church doctrine. For many centuries, religion was central to the nations of Europe—France, Spain, Italy, and Ireland were Catholic; England, the Netherlands, and much of Germany were Protestant; Greece was Orthodox.

Yet today we find ourselves in an era of secular states and declining church attendance. A shift has occurred, and modern Europe has a drastically different relationship with religion. Scholars of secularization, most notably in sociology, have claimed that there has been an undeniable and unchangeable drift away from traditional religion. As S. S. Acquaviva argues, “everywhere and in all departments, the dynamic of religious practice reveals a weakening of ecclesiastical religiosity and, within certain limits, of every type of religious belief, including the belief in God” (Acquaviva 1979: 83). In other words, every aspect of religion is withering away, from the institutional to the personal, the spiritual, and the societal.

This is by no means a new argument. Social scientists have been predicting the demise of religion for a hundred years or more. As Malcolm Hamilton explains, “The demise of religion in modern society has been predicted by many theorists, especially those writing in the nineteenth century” (Hamilton 1995: 185). Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Auguste Comte, and others all predicted the weakening of religion in one form or another. Karl Marx famously said that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 1844). Freud compared religion to a “childhood neurosis” (Freud 1927). Acceptance of secularization became so widespread that “the consensus was such that not only did the theory [remain] uncontested but apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted” (Casanova 1994: 17).

This acceptance was reasonable, but it meant that the thesis went relatively unexamined. It is only in recent decades that secularization has been examined and questioned in a more thorough and scientific manner. Specifically, scholars such as Peter Berger, Steve Bruce, Bryan Wilson, and Sabino Acquaviva have put forth increasingly convincing accounts of the process and nature of secularization (Acquaviva 1979; Berger 1973, 1974; Bruce 1992; Wilson 1966, 1982). It is important to understand exactly what these arguments are and what is meant by the term “secularization” so that we can move forward in an informed and analytical way.

Defining secularization

The secularization thesis argues that religion loses its importance in nearly every way as countries become more modern (i.e., economically developed, scientifically advanced, and urbanized). Or as Steve Bruce states:

the basic elements of what we conveniently refer to as “modernization” fundamentally altered the pace and nature of religious beliefs, practices, and organizations so as to reduce their relevance to the lives of nationstates, social groups, and individuals, in roughly that order.

Bruce (1996a: 1), Gill (2001), Martin (1978), Moyser (1991)

This definition is, of course, a very strong one. Much weaker definitions and understandings of secularization have since been proposed, but each of them, at their core, argues that religion is in decline. The strong definition is a useful starting point for our discussion here.

Secularization occurs through a variety of processes, each of which contributes to the larger effect. For instance, Steve Bruce breaks the process of secularization down into three key factors or elements. The first is differentiation, which he describes as “the fragmentation of social life as specialized roles and institutions are created to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in or carried out by one role or institution” (Bruce 1999:8). In other words, a single social institution may have carried out many different and varied functions in the past, but the process of modernization has meant that those functions are now carried out by a wide variety of diverse and specialized institutions. Family structure is used as an example. Historically, the family unit served an economic and social purpose—work, socialization, education, and many other dimensions of everyday life revolved around the home. Now, family members leave the home to go to work and school. Similarly, in terms of religion, the church has lost its grasp on its former strongholds of education, welfare, policy agendas, and moral leadership. Other institutions have taken over in these arenas, and religion as a whole has lost social significance as a result.

Second, Bruce points to “societalization” as a factor in secularization. The reference here is to Bryan Wilson, who states that “life is increasingly enmeshed and organized, not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, the nation state)” (Wilson 1982: 154). In layman’s terms, the local community has been weakened by the growth of largescale society. As individuals focus more and more on national and regional identities, the heart of religion’s strength is cut, as the church has traditionally found its strength at the local level. The rural life is in retreat, and with it, religion.

Rationalization is the final nail in religion’s coffin, according to Bruce. Whereas the first two factors were essentially structural changes, rationalization is a shift in the way people think about the world. Modernization and the Enlightenment brought about a shift towards rationalism and the sciences. People sought scientific explanations for phenomena that had previously fallen squarely in the realm of the church (Bruce 1999: 13–14). Reason, not faith, became central to human thinking, and belief in ghosts, monsters, and angels withered away. The mysteriousness of the universe did not seem so mysterious, and once again religion suffered. The need for a god diminished with an increase in mankind’s own power of exploration.

Bruce’s analysis is by no means lacking in controversy. There is, and likely will continue to be for some time, an ongoing debate about exactly what secularization is. Hamilton indicates that there are at least six different definitions of secularization in the field of sociology (Hamilton 1995:187). Jose Casanova argues that what we consider to be secularization is actually three entirely different, although intertwined, processes: differentiation, historical decline in religion, and privatization—meaning the separation of religion from the public sphere (Casanova 1994: 212–15).

The scope of secularization is also in dispute. Some, like Peter Berger, argue that secularization is a phenomenon unique to the Christian world. The very nature of Christianity (its organization, its focus on pluralism) was the trigger for the secularization of Europe (Berger 1973). Others, including Bryan Wilson, argue that the impetus for secularization came from outside the religious realm, instead focusing on the issues of modernization, science, technology, and urbanization (Wilson 1966, 1982). Still others point to the fact that an increase in science and rationality can no more be a cause of secularization than secularization itself. In other words, the two are opposite sides of the same coin. “[T]he growth of alternative interpretations of the world of a materialist and scientific kind is itself a part or aspect of the very process of change of which the decline of religion is also a part” (Hamilton 1995: 202).

Clearly, secularization itself is in need of clarification. What is important to understand is the fact that, for the latter half of the twentieth century, there was a shift in thinking—a shift that pointed to the rapid and inevitable decline of religion in the modern world, however defined. Such thinking shaped the way we viewed the world—in politics, sociology, theology, policy, and more. However, the undisputed explanatory power of secularization has not endured.

The return of God (Anderson 1983)

Beginning in the 1970s, the secularization thesis was subjected to renewed criticism. Social scientists such as Anthony Gill, Peter Berger, Callum Brown, and Jose Casanova began to point to the flaws in the secularization argument (Berger 1999; Brown 1992; Casanova 1994; Davie 2000; Gill 2001; Hastings 1997). Peter Berger, who had helped spawn the secularization thesis earlier in the century, now led the charge against it. “In the last few years I have come to believe that many observers of the religious scene (I among them) have over-estimated both the degree and irreversibility of secularization” (Berger 1974: 16). Berger later added, “[t]he big mistake, which I shared with everyone who worked in this area in the 1950s and 60s, was to believe that modernity necessarily leads to a decline in religion” (Berger 1998: 782). Social scientists were no longer so certain about their assumptions.

The reasons for the concerns were clear. The 1970s and 1980s saw a new resurgence of religiosity in many parts of the world: from the Iranian revolution, to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, to a vigorous emergence of charismatic churches in America. As Jose Casanova explains:

From a global perspective, since World War II most religious traditions in most parts of the world have either experienced some growth or maintained their vitality. This has been the case despite the fact that throughout the world since World War II, there have been rapid increases in industrialization, urbanization, education, and so forth.

The main exceptions to this apparently global trend are the rapid decline of primal religions, the sudden and dramatic decline of religion in communist countries following the establishment of communist states, and the continuous decline of religion throughout much of Western Europe…

Casanova (1994: 26)

These observations led to a new wave of thought regarding modern religion. Some pointed to Europe as the exception and not the rule. Europe may have been secularizing, but the rest of the world was as religious as ever (Casanova 1994; Davie 2001a,b). At the same time, scholars made a point of showing that religious revival was not limited to Islamic fundamentalism. As Samuel Huntington points out, “The renewal of religion throughout the world far transcends the activities of fundamentalist extremists” (Huntington 1996: 96). Still others argued that religion had remained strong—we were simply looking in the wrong places. Religion was changing, but certainly not disappearing (Davie 200Ib). “Religious sentiment does not simply wax and wane; it changes clothes and appears in garb to which we are sometimes unaccustomed. It may well be all around us, and yet we have not trained ourselves to recognize it” (Wuthnow 1992: 4).

In addition to the debate about the nature of secularization, there were growing arguments for desecularization (religion has returned) and/or nonsecularization (religion never left), depending on your perspective. Regardless, it is now clear that the secularization thesis is no longer seen as a given. As Nicholas Demerath points out, “[I]n the eyes of its critics, secularization is a hypothesis that has been proved false and a term that should be expunged from proper usage” (Demerath 2001: 211). Samuel Huntington, in his now famous Clash of Civilizations, makes a similar point: “The Westphalian separation of religion and international politics, an idiosyncratic product of Western civilization, is coming to an end, and religion, as Edward Mortimer suggests, is ‘increasingly likely to intrude into international affairs'” (Huntington 1996: 54).

So which is it? Is religion truly a dying force in the world of modern politics? Malcolm Hamilton describes the conundrum that we find ourselves in: “What is alleged to have been a fundamental change characterizing modern society is alleged by others not to have taken place at all. It is rather as if economic historians were in deep dispute as to whether the industrial revolution ever actually occurred” (Hamilton 1995: 186). And yet in spite of all the disagreement in the field, there is one area on which almost everyone agrees: Europe.

The European exception

Peter Berger, the one-time proponent of secularization turned critic, wrote in a recent book that:

In Western Europe, if nowhere else, the old secularization theory would seem to hold. With increasing modernization, there has been an increase in key indicators of secularization, both on the level of expressed beliefs…and, dramatically, on the level of church-related behavior…

Berger (1999: 9)

Grace Davie espouses a similar line of thought—that a shift has occurred and what was once seen as the rule (Europe) is now seen as the exception: “European patterns of religion are no longer seen as a global prototype, but constitute an unusual case in a world in which vibrant religiosity becomes the norm” (Davie 2001b: 101). If there is a place in the world that demonstrates secularization, it is certainly Europe.

The evidence is everywhere. Polls show that the number of people who attend church at least once a month is incredibly low—less that 19 percent in England, 12 percent in France and the Czech Republic, under 10 percent in Sweden and Russia (http://www.europeanvalues.nl; 2007). When statistics for church attendance of once a week or more are examined, the results are even more striking. The number of monasteries and convents has decreased rapidly. When attendance figures are examined closely, it becomes clear that there is a large generation gap, with the older generations still attending regularly, but with younger generations generally separated from the church. Official separation of church and state is in principle formal and strict, most notably in places such as France, where there have been many disputes over the place of immigrant Muslims and their right to wear head scarves in schools. The list can go on and on. The point, however, is that Europe is different: different from the Middle East, different from Africa, Asia, even different from the United States and other “Western” countries. Secularization seems to be alive and well in Europe.

And yet, today’s headlines still feature stories on talks in Cyprus that aim to ease tensions between Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks on the island; Slobodan Milosevic’s war crimes in the former Yugoslavia; the ongoing and increasingly heated debate in France regarding Muslim head scarves in schools; and anti-Semitism in Europe. And all this in the most secular part of the world. As political scientists, we are all too often missing the bigger picture.

While the secular is the norm on the European continent, certain countries clearly defy the broader trend and cling closely to religion. Poland, Ireland, and Greece are prime examples. In spite of the wider secularism of Europe, these areas still maintain high attendance figures—nearly 70 percent in Ireland and just less than 80 percent in Poland—drastically higher than the numbers discussed earlier. In Greece, over 96 percent of the population still claim to be members of the Greek Orthodox Church; the same is true of the Catholic Church in Poland (http://www.europeanvalues.nl; 2007).

The exceptions do not stop at the level of attendance. In Ireland, divorce has only recently been made legal, and the conditions under which it is allowed are strict: legal separation for at least four of the last five years and “no reasonable prospect of reconciliation between the spouses.” Abortion remains illegal. Three referenda in the last twenty years sought to liberalize the policy. All three failed. Very few other European states have restrictions as tight on abortion—among them are Poland and Portugal, which also has attendance figures of nearly 90 percent.

We are all familiar, of course, with the religious violence in Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. Many are also familiar with the conflicts in Cyprus. All these cases have centered on political, economic, and social issues, but have found their strength in religious identities. Identity plays a role far beyond religious conflicts, too. It is widely accepted that “to be Polish is to be Catholic” (Safran 2003: 6). In addition, Greek Orthodoxy is a key component of Greek identity—so much so that a papal...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1 Modern religion
• 2 The current understanding
• 3 A new perspective
• 4 Ireland and England
• 5 Poland
• 6 Greece
• 7 The broader context
• 8 Conclusions
• Bibliography