Political Representation

Roles, representatives and the represented

Marc Bühlmann, Jan Fivaz, Marc Bühlmann, Jan Fivaz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317353140
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In an ideal democracy, representatives would entirely reflect citizens' views, preferences and wishes in their legislative work. However, real-life democracies do not meet this ideal and citizens' policy preferences and priorities are mirrored only inadequately.

This book provides new insights on political representation. It is guided by three questions:

• what roles should representatives play?
• Who is actually or should be represented?
• How are the representatives (or how should they be) connected with the represented?

Containing contributions from the perspectives of political theory and philosophy, as well as quantitative empirical studies, the volume demonstrates the need to adapt these established questions to new political realities.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of political representation and parties, political theory, democratic theory, political philosophy and comparative politics.

1 Introduction

Marc Bühlmann and Jan Fivaz

A crisis of representative democracy?

In the eighteenth century, the idea of representation “transformed democracy from a doctrine suitable only for small and rapidly vanishing city-states to one applicable to the large nation-states of the modern age” (Dahl 1989: 29). Beginning with the thoughts of Mill (1991 [1861]), the topic of representation has become one of the most widely studied in political science, in theoretical research as well as in empirical research.

In the 150 years of both philosophical thinking on and empirical analysing of democratic representation a huge range of ideas, models and findings have been presented and discussed. However, research about democratic representation is still guided by questions on the characteristics of the relationship between representatives and represented: is there or should there be some sort of relationship between representatives and represented, what should it look like and how does it actually work?

In an ideal representative democracy representatives would be fully responsive to the citizens’ views, preferences and wishes and would entirely reflect them in their legislative work (Powell 2004). Yet real-life democracies do not meet this ideal and citizens’ policy preferences and priorities are mirrored only inadequately. We rather face a representational gap (Whitefield 2006), that is, more or less wide differences between the views and acts of representatives and the preferences of the represented. If this gap gets too large, the representational system will fail to work properly. In recent years – at least in the views of an increasing part of the public and according to the media discourse – almost all modern western democracies are struggling with decreasing political participation, loosening of party ties and affiliations as well as a loss of confidence of the citizens in parties, politics and the political institutions of the representative systems. The representational gap is seen as one of the most important reasons for these developments.

Meanwhile, there is also an on-going debate whether western democracies are facing a general crisis or whether we are moving towards a “post democratic” society (e.g. Crouch 2008). Whereas the public and the media discourse tend to support such theories of crises, political scientists are much more cautious (Merkel 2015). However, there is a general consensus that modern democracies are facing important challenges.

The first and probably most important challenge is the citizens’ loss of confidence in politics, parties and politicians. They have grown distrustful of politicians and parties, become sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about the functioning of the democratic process (Dalton 2007; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). Given this loss of confidence of the citizens in their political elite, the question of the relationship between representatives and represented is of outmost importance. But there remain additional challenges, which should be taken into account: the changing roles of representatives due to growing mediatization and popularization of politics, the breaking of the chain of responsiveness in terms of the national elites’ loss of autonomy due to globalization, and the on-going global migration that challenges the question of congruence between representatives and the represented can be considered the most pressing challenges for democratic nations that all are based on representative political systems.

The continued lack of confidence can have two potentially dangerous consequences for representative democracies (Cox 1996; Dailami 2000; Galbraith and Kum 2002; Longworth 1998; Puddington 2009; Rodrik 1997): first, disappointment about the behaviour of the representatives can lead to political abstention and apathy. Abstention negatively affects responsiveness because the preferences of non-voters are not considered by the representative system. This can lead to even more frustration, to political action bypassing the representative channels, or even violent and anti-democratic political behaviour (Bernstein 2001; Bühlmann et al. 2010; Kitschelt 1995; Mény and Surel 2000; Nye et al. 1997; Uslaner and Brown 2005).

Second, decreasing public confidence strengthens the growth of populism, which profits from the critique of the political elite. Populists employ what Chambers (2004) calls “plebiscitary reason”. They try to manipulate the public by saying what the public wants to hear and by pandering to their audience’s desires only to pursue their own agendas. Is the decreasing confidence in the political elite a sign of interference or even of a rupture of the relationship between represented and representatives? In the United States as well as in Europe extremist and populist parties have been gaining ground in recent years and several of these parties represent ideas which are difficult to match with democratic principles and values. Without question, though, this development confronts democracies with a clear and severe challenge. But does it also necessarily stand for a dysfunctional representative system? This question is much less clear, because the populist parties are getting their votes in open and fair elections. Is the rise of populist parties a sign of a failure of the representative system or rather a sign for changing relationships between representatives and represented?

A further challenge to modern democracies consists of the growing mediatization of politics, which leads to more superficial politics by increasing the importance of politicians’ images to the public and by decreasing the value of the substantive content of their politics. Politicians react to the economically driven news strategies of the media: the struggle for attention, as well as for the ability to define political issues, become a struggle for control of the news agendas and for the framing of the news (Wolfsfeld 1997). To get attention, politicians must come up with spectacular actions or arguments and/or present themselves as charismatic leaders. This leads to an on-going personalization and “spectacularization” of political communication (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). Thus, on the one hand, mediatization not only changes representatives’ roles but it also handicaps the citizens’ evaluation of the representatives. In other words, the relationship between representatives and represented is disturbed. However, modern and technological means of communication can also help to strengthen and widen this relationship.

A third challenge arises due to globalization in terms of de-nationalization, that is, the supranationalization and regionalization of politics (Kriesi et al. 2013). One can observe a growing number of different stakeholders to whom a representative is accountable. This leads to the question of the legitimacy of these stakeholders. Representatives who pursue not only electoral goals but also hidden agendas that satisfy the stakeholders’ interests are accused of strategic shirking. Globalization further breaks the chain of responsiveness (Powell 2004). A growing number of political decisions are no longer made by national representatives who are accountable to the voters, that is, the citizens of a given country. Political decisions made in supranational organizations affect citizens within nation-states. However, these citizens cannot hold their representatives accountable for these decisions. Furthermore, elites can excuse unpopular national decisions with pressure from global markets or requirements of global institutions out of reach of national politics, and thereby blur the clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993). This leads to the question of whether the de-nationalization does blur or at least change the relationship between represented and representatives.

A last important political challenge for representative democracies is global migration. Depending on the migration laws, the openness and the inclusiveness of different established democracies varies greatly. This, however, raises the question of who the citizens to be represented actually are. Who gets represented? According to Dahl (1998), an important feature of democracy is equality, that is, the possibility for all persons who are affected by a political decision to take part in the respective decision-making process. However, this principle is undermined in countries where migrants do not have suffrage rights or must overcome high obstacles to become citizens. And there is no sign that global migration will decrease in the near future. Hence questions of inclusion and exclusion, that is, who gets represented and who actually are the actors in the relationship between representatives and represented, will become more and more important.

Thinking about representation: sanction vs. selection

An important requirement for answering the questions raised above is the clarification of the nature of the relationship between representatives and represented. This book starts with a comparison of two powerful ideal-type models of representation brought forward by Jane Mansbridge (Chapter 2): the sanctions model and the selection model of representation.

The sanctions model is the more classic model of representation and corresponds to the (neo-)liberal idea of self-interest as the main driver of individual behaviour. Both representatives and represented act according to their own benefits. Whether a representative is a shirking populist or a trustworthy agent is non-relevant because his or her role is only a means to reach the goal of getting (re)elected. According to the sanctions model, the attainment of this goal depends on how the represented are satisfied, that is, how their (self-)interests are fulfilled. Hence, the representatives only have extrinsic incentives to represent the wishes and needs of their voters. It is the fear of being sanctioned, that is, not getting elected at the next election, that drives them to act according to the preferences of their voters. In the sanctions model, elections are a means for both, responsibility and accountability (Kriesi et al. 2013). Voters hold their representatives accountable by threatening them with sanctions at the next election, while the representatives try to act responsibly, that is, in congruence with the voters’ wishes, to avoid these sanctions. The relationship between representatives and represented is seen as static. The main point of contact between the citizens and the elite is the election. In the election campaign, a representative tries to make clear the interests he or she will defend, whereas the voters choose among the different offers, re-elect the representatives that have fulfilled their pledges, or sanction those who did not keep their promises.

In contrast to the sanctions model, Jane Mansbridge proposes an alternative model of how representation could work: the selection model (Chapter 2). In the selection model of representation the relationship is thought of as dynamic and – in its ideal conception – as an on-going deliberation between the representatives and the represented. In this model, intrinsically, self-motivated representatives try to align their objectives with those of the represented through deliberation and communication. The main aim of both representatives and represented is to align objectives of common interests. The societal and institutional context should provide mechanisms that make such alignment possible. Thus, the relationship between represented and representatives sought by the selection model is not hierarchical as in the sanction model but is based much more on mutual confidence. Of course, the hierarchy is present due to the function of representation. However, the closer the common interests are, the less citizens need power to control the representatives. Thus, the search for alignment of interests is much more important than monitoring and sanctioning. The represented prospectively select (rather than retrospectively deselect) intrinsically motivated, honest representatives who try to meet citizens’ preferences.

Of course, both models are ideal-types. In fact, representative democracies will comprise elements from both models. However, the predominant model in representational research is definitely the sanctions model. Since Downs’ (1957) simplifying but empirically very fruitful comparison between political and market logic, the rational choice perspective on policy, polity and politics has become dominant in many fields of political science. The prevailing (empiric) view on representation is an economic one. Empirical scholars are normally very sceptical about intrinsically motivated representatives. The rational choice-based model of delegates, which empirical research (onesidedly) favours, defines representatives as rational actors aiming at (re)election and that do not shy away from using shirking strategies to reach this aim.

The sanctions model also seems to dominate the public discussion and perception. Very often, media picture representatives as egoistic and corrupt, trying only to fulfil their own interests. It is lamented that the represented are more and more prevented from controlling and even sanctioning the representatives because there is no choice of honest politicians. Furthermore, the increasing lack of transparency makes it impossible for the people to control the political elite. Bearing in mind the alternative selection model, one could ask whether it is this perception of representation according to the sanctions model that is finally responsible for the statement of a crisis of representation. It is difficult to develop confidence in representatives who are solely described as corrupt and shirking egoists.

An important role of political theorists is to challenge existing views and mirror specific circumstances. The recent theoretical discussions on representation indeed scrutinize the predominant economic view on the topic, that is, the sanctions model (see Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 11 in this book). Although this model seems quite useful for empirical investigations of representation, it is criticized by political theorists as being much too simple. Political philosophers plead for more parsimonious approaches to the very complex concept of representation. The question is whether the idea of a selection model of representation can help to rethink the relationship between representatives and represented and to open the quite one-sided empirical and societal discussion on the crisis of representation.

While theorists should challenge existing views, political scientists should test theoretical ideas and challenge comforting research rituals. The question is whether the sanction model is more adequate to describe the representational relationship than the selection model or whether the selection model has the potential for new insights on representation.

This book combines theoretical as well as empirical research. Beside Jane Mansbridge’s contribution, which provides a common ground for the other contributions in the book, it contains three further chapters with a theoretical perspective and six chapters based on empirical analyses. By jointly discussing recent developments in both the theoretical and the empirical research, by challenging normative assumptions with empirical insights, and by confronting real-life observations with theoretical concepts our book provides some new insights into the long-standing questions on how the relationship between representatives and represented should be structured and is structured in real life. The interaction between theory and empirics has turned out to be very fruitful.

But this book is also a response to the renewed interest in representation within contemporary research on democratic theories and on political representation. On the one hand, it takes into account theoretical enlargements of the very notion of “representation”. The questioning of the so far predominant sanction model by the alternative selection model presents a first example of that, but the other theoretical chapters also provide new perspectives on the representational processes. On the other hand, the book includes new empirical findings to some extent based on new measurement tools or data sources that help us to understand how the actual relationship between representatives and represented is working.

Theory meets empirics I – the relationship of representatives and represented

A number of chapters focus explicitly on the relationship between representatives and represented. Andrew Rehfeld (Chapter 3) provides a theoretical introduction to the different roles representatives can fulfil. He discusses the question of how closely a representative’s vote on legislation must normally correspond to the will of his or her constituents within the dichotomy between two classic ideal role types: the idea of trustees (i.e., representatives acting relatively detached from their voters, aiming at the best for the whole nation) and the idea of delegates (i.e., representatives acting closely in accordance with the preferences of their constituents). Andrew Rehfeld takes these two well-known ideal types only as a starting point and systematically enlarges this dichotomy, arguing that it obscures three fundamental distinctions: the aims of a representative (or according to Jane Mansbridge the intrinsic motivation, i.e., whether a representative aims at the good of all or the good of some), the source of judgement (i.e., whether a representative relies on his or her own jud...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgement
• 1. Introduction
• 2. A “selection model” for political representation
• 3. Beyond trustees and delegates
• 4. Institutional constraints and territorial representation
• 5. Promises and lies: an empirical comparison of Swiss MPs’ pre- and post-electoral positions
• 6. Beyond congruence
• 7. Dimensionality of the European issue space
• 8. Representation of political opinions: is the structuring pattern of policy preferences the same for citizens and elites?
• 9. “Alignment of objectives” between parties and their electors: the role of personal issue salience in political representation
• 10. Studying the voter–party match: congruence and incongruence between voters and parties
• 11. Measuring representation: rethinking the role of exclusion
• 12. Conclusion
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C
• Appendix D
• Appendix E
• Index