This chapter presents the background to the analysis of developments in the IDFâs media strategy from the start of the twenty-first century, with reference to changes in three major spheres: militaryâmedia relations in Israel; relations between the army and society; and the IDFâs military conception of conflicts of the early twenty-first century and the role of the media in these confrontations. In each of these spheres, we shall âdraw the threadsâ leading to the analysis of the mediatization process in the IDF from the start of the twenty-first century in the following chapters.
Military and media relations
Relations between the military and the media in Israel can be divided into a number of clearly defined periods. The first, from the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was characterized by sustained and complete identification of the Israeli media with the national objectives of the new state and its political and military establishment. The Israeli media during this period viewed itself as fulfilling a national role by pandering, even kowtowing, to the political and military establishment, as evidenced by the Editorsâ Committee.1 Concurrently, there was an unofficial understanding between the minister of defence and newspaper editors that media censorship in Israel would operate cooperatively on the basis of mutual interests.2
With the establishment of the State of Israel, the public advocacy (hasbara) domain,3 viewed as of the utmost importance, was placed in the hands of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, including secondary units of the hasbara apparatus that comprised the IDF Press Liaison Unit, which subsequently became the IDF Spokespersonâs Office (operating under the IDFâs Intelligence Branch). In keeping with the natural disposition of the Intelligence Branch, army policy towards the media during these years was essentially an insular and broad-scale prohibition on publicity. This policy was consistent with the position of the media itself vis-Ă -vis military matters.
Despite this highly restrictive policy, up to the mid-1950s IDF spokespersons sought to bring reporters to battle zones to cover the fighting. This practice changed in the wake of the âLavon Affairâ,4 as the IDF General Staff concluded that such a liberal media policy heightened public debate on the abortive operation, which quickly became a bone of political contention. Commander-in-Chief (CoS) Moshe Dayan also decided to appoint a person with a security-intelligence background as a spokesperson for the IDF, and ordered a policy of limited contact with the media.5 As part of this policy, information was transmitted by the IDF using a formal phraseology, always opening with âthe IDF Spokesperson announcesâ, which became emblematic of the media and cultural discourse in Israel.6 During the 1960s, despite initial signs of liberalization of the defence dialogue, the media remained an effective component of the establishment, particularly the army.7 The IDFâs astounding victory in the June 1967 war spurred the Israeli media to continue its support of the army. Before long, Israelâs subsequent control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip became a source of political controversy, yet the IDF remained out of the realm of publicâpolitical dispute.
The 1973 war sparked a deep crisis in Israeli society and eroded the stature of the IDF, with the media undergoing a significant attitudinal change towards the military establishment. When the grave situation on the battlefield became public knowledge within days of the EgyptianâSyrian attack, the credibility of IDF Spokespersonâs Office announcements and additional national hasbara entities was seriously undermined. At the outbreak of the war, media reports focused on the optimistic forecasts of Minister of Defence Dayan, transmitted in his press briefings and those of the Spokespersonâs Office.8 The media did not operate in accordance with any independent policy of its own, but was subordinate to decisions of the General Staff.9 When the magnitude of the fiasco or Hamehdal (literally âa grave oversightâ) became apparent,10 media and public confidence in the military and government leadership was fractured. The media silence was viewed by many, as a contributing factor.11
After the war, reliance on the government and the army as sources of information declined and news coverage changed. Media content became more independent and critical and military affairs were subjected to a wide range of media interpretations.12 The loss of Labourâs political hegemony in Israel and the Likudâs rise to power (in May 1977) contributed to the emergence of an investigative approach to Israeli journalism, news-gathering and reportage. Media content became more critical, even towards the army and the defence establishment. This was paralleled by a reduction in the ability of the state to manipulate and control the media for its own purposes.13 As part of the political struggle over the question of culpability for the 1973 debacle, top IDF commanders came under public criticism.14 Consequently, the Spokespersonâs Office banned background briefings with the press by senior commanders.15 In 1974 the unit was made directly subordinate to the General Staff, allowing the spokesperson to draw authority straight from the CoS.16 Simultaneously, in light of the social changes that were reflected in the media, the army was forced to gradually display more openness and transparency, however partially.17
The 1982 Lebanon War blurred the distinction in the media discourse between military and political issues and led to much public controversy. Although presented by Prime Minister Begin as a preventive war (or âa war of choiceâ to use his words),18 it generated mass protests against the political establishment. In stark contrast to its past practice, the media that had hitherto been identified with the old establishment, played an active role in consolidating the protest movementâs struggle against the governmentâs policy.19 The IDF, which had traditionally sought to disassociate itself and its senior officers from being identified with any specific political position, found itself at the centre of the political controversy. During the course of the war, the political protest movements, for the first time, comprised a large number of activists who were reserve officers, and who considered it legitimate to use their rank as leverage to gain public support and credibility.20 Furthermore, senior IDF officers publicly expressed opposition to the scope of the campaign and its objectives. This opposition was widely covered in the media, contributing to the evolvement of an entirely new public reality for the IDF.21 The relatively high number of IDF soldiers killed or wounded in action fuelled strong sentiments among the Israeli public and served as a significant source of pressure on the government.
At the outset of the First Intifada in December 1987, for the first time the Spokespersonâs Office was forced to contend with reports that were dominated by the Palestinian perspective in the international media, as the IDF operated within a densely populated civilian environment under âthe eye of the cameraâ. Despite IDF attempts to block access to reporters by declaring flash points âclosed military zonesâ,22 information and footage documenting violent treatment of Palestinians was widely disseminated. The IDF and its personnel saw the media as a catalyst of confrontation and increased violence, and reporters were viewed with hostility.23 The sense of a lack of control over information disseminated within the IDF gravely undermined the ability of the Spokespersonâs Office to be a central player in media conduct.24 Spokespersonship policy at that time still reflected the militaryâs traditional position, which sought the maximum restriction of information availed to the public. Concurrently, the presence of the media and its impact in the course of the Intifada, particularly the IDFâs inability to control the activities of the international media, led to a more complex understanding within the army regarding its desired media management: âAny attempt to hide or cover up the facts, any attempt to exercise selectiveness in reporting is doomed to fail.â25
For the first time, Israeli media criticism was directed at the military, criticizing its operational conduct.26 This in turn forced the IDF to devise a systematic response to the evolving new phenomenon, leading the Spokespersonâs Office to procure PR outfits in some of the branches of the General Staff during this period.27 Such an array ran counter to the centralized outlook that would come to typify military spokespersonship in later years.
Media criticism and waning readiness to cooperate with the army and the military establishment rapidly developed.28 This pattern was also accompanied by legal precedents, the most influential being a Supreme Court ruling that curtailed the authority of military censorship following a 1989 High Court of Justice appeal (the Schnitzer case). Chief Justice Aharon Barak stipulated that censorship on security matters could be justified only when there was âan imminent certaintyâ of serious and grave harm to security as a result of publicity.29 The High Court of Justiceâs guidelines were integrated and still apply today. The yardstick of âimminent certaintyâ has continued to serve as the measure for examining cases brought before the censor by the IDF.30
Consequently, during the 1990s the media arena became a core conflict zone.31 In 1989 Israeli news entities contributed to reformulating the editorsâ understanding with the censor. Papers began to increasingly rely on sources outside the security establishment and to give prominence to failures within the IDF and the defence establishment and to the actions of social groupings, all of which weakened the traditional bond between the media and the IDF.32 These changes took place concurrently with the evolution of a new communications environment in Israel, the core element of which was the end of the monopoly of state-owned electronic media and the development of multichannel television, commercial channels, internet and cable television that enabled Israelis to receive numerous foreign channels. These broadcasts brought about more critical coverage. The competition that developed amplified the need for instant news reporting, cutting commentary and âyellow-tingedâ journalism that could appeal to the broadest possible audience even in security matters. Such changes led the Spokespersonâs Office to expand from a unit to a division, subordinated to the Operations Division (rather than directly to the CoS) as part of the IDFâs reorganization at the time.33 Reacting to public perceptions in the 1990s of a decline in the security threat (due to the PLOâIsrael Oslo accords), the IDF realized that in order to maintain Israeli public support and legitimacy it needed to incorporate a systematic and professional method concerning its public image in general, and tha...
