The Future of North Korea

Tsuneo Akaha

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780415249652
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134534067
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Studi sull'etnia

This volume explores the possibility of North Korea's'soft-landing' as the most desirable outcome on the Korean Peninsula. The collection of essays by noted students of Asian security examines the perspectives and interests of North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan regarding North Korea's future, including the possibility of its neutrality.

Part I

Options and Realities on the Korean Peninsula

1 Korea

The Options and Perimeters

Robert A. Scalapino

Ours is an age when dramatic changes in domestic and international conditions can take place with a swiftness impossible to envision in earlier times. Since the inception of the Kim Dae-jung presidency in February 1998, major developments have occurred in relations both between the two Koreas and between these states and the major powers with which they have been involved. On balance, moreover, these developments have been strongly positive.

Caution must be exercised. In the decades following the Korean War, there were a number of events that seemed to signal a new era in inter-Korean relations. These events were only to be reversed by subsequent events, among them the 4 July 1972 communiqué pledging a drive toward unification and the December 1991 twenty-five point agreement. For a brief period in 1994, moreover, as a result of former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang, a summit between Kim Il-sung and Kim Young-sam seemed in the offing. This was precluded by the North Korean leader’s death less than one month later.¹

Yet in the past two years, new conditions have come into play in both the South and the North that seem to offer much greater opportunities for effective interaction than in the past.

In the Republic of Korea (ROK), a new President set forth a far-reaching policy of rapprochement from the outset of his administration. In his inaugural address, Kim Dae-jung outlined three principles in defining what has been labeled his Sunshine Policy: no toleration of military threats or actions by the North; rejection of a policy of unification through absorption; and the promotion of exchanges and cooperation by returning to the Basic Agreement of 1991.²

In subsequent pronouncements, President Kim reiterated his commitment to cooperation with the North, a notable example being his Berlin Declaration of March 2000.³ In his address, Kim advanced four goals: to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula; to restart the visits of divided families; to resume inter-governmental talks between South and North; and to assist the economic recovery of the North through inter-Korean economic cooperation.

The Berlin Declaration was soon given substance by the summit meeting in Pyongyang that took place on 13–15 June between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il. Millions of viewers witnessed Chairman Kim come to the Pyongyang airport to greet the South Korean President, smiling and grasping his guest in a fraternal fashion. A new image of Kim Jong-il was encouraged: capable of shedding aloofness, intelligent, and well informed concerning international affairs. The ensuing negotiations were intense, although the resulting communiqué concentrated on generalities, but the signs for improved North-South relations were promising.

Meanwhile, economic and cultural interaction between the two Koreas had already begun to accelerate. In the economic realm, the massive ROK chaebol, Hyundai, had taken the lead. A program to turn Mount Kumgang into a tourist site had been approved by the North, with Hyundai being given exclusive rights to develop the area until the year 2030 in exchange for paying the North nearly US$1 billion through 2004. Between November 1998 – the opening tour – and October 2000, some 350,000 South Korean tourists had visited the site, and, after permission was granted in 2000, 600 foreign tourists also participated. This project, incidentally, was underwritten in a very traditional manner: Hyundai’s founder, Chung Ju-yung, met with Kim Jong-il in the North on two occasions, establishing a personal relationship and securing approval through the “dear leader.” Subsequently, Hyundai agreed to build a gymnasium in Pyongyang, and instituted plans for an industrial zone at Kaesong. Future Hyundai activities, however, have been cast in some doubt because of the financial problems that the combine faces. A company spokesman recently stated that future investments would have to be funded by foreign investors, and efforts have already been made to secure funds from Japanese sources, which, thus far, have been unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, other types of economic interaction have developed, albeit in relatively modest degree. Some 180 small- and medium-sized South Korean companies have reportedly been engaged in “processing on commission” arrangements, utilizing labor from the North and technology and equipment from the South. Several hundred applications for future investment, moreover, have been filed with ROK authorities. In addition, certain large chaebol apart from Hyundai, such as Samsung, have indicated an interest in economic involvement in the North, with the focus on the high-technology field.⁴ By the end of 1999, investments in the North from ROK companies amounted to some US$426 million.⁵

Trade between the ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) totaled US$333 million in 1999, and was somewhat higher in 2000. Much of this trade, however, came in the form of tourist fees and economic assistance from the South – food, fertilizer, medical supplies, and other forms of aid. A portion of this aid came from private groups such as the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The obstacles to regular trade and investment have remained formidable. In an effort to remedy these, an agreement was reached at the end of 2000 that provides for investment protection, the avoidance of double taxation, procedures for the clearance of accounts, and means for the settlement of disputes. In the inter-ministerial meeting in Pyongyang on 15 December, it was also agreed that a new committee would be set up – tentatively named the South-North Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee – in order to define the specifics of these matters, advance the construction of the Kaesong industrial park, promote progress with respect to rail and road links across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and cooperate in flood prevention along the Imjin River.⁶ If effective, this committee could represent a major step forward in North-South economic relations.

One basic factor has underwritten all recent developments on the inter-Korean economic front. From the early 1990s, Northern authorities progressively came to realize that economic change was imperative. Their economy was slipping further and further into crisis because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, hitherto a key benefactor, because of adverse weather conditions, and, most importantly, because of the failure of the Stalinist socialist strategy.

The first evidence of a new effort came with the establishment of a free trade zone at Rajin-Sonbong, the North’s northeast region, which opened in the early 1990s. The hope was that this venture would attract foreign investors, but the results proved to be very limited owing to location, infrastructural deficiencies, and an absence of legal protection.⁷ Other efforts followed, and the revised 1998 Constitution, in addition to reconstructing the government in the aftermath of Kim Il-sung’s death, made some provisions for a private sector, albeit in very general terms and with the emphasis still upon juche (self-reliance) and collectivization.⁸ By the time that Kim Dae-jung launched the Sunshine Policy, however, the urgency of change was ever more apparent. Decline had been continuous for nearly a decade, and, in economic terms, the DPRK was a failing state. Thus, President Kim’s new policy was well timed to coincide with a positive Northern response.

In assessing the North’s attitude, one must be cautious. The DPRK’s leaders’ goal is effective economic change with minimal political alteration. They have observed developments in Russia, and certain events indicating rising instability in China worry them. Thus, caution must be exercised, even in terminology. “Reform” is impermissible since it suggests system alteration; “change” is an acceptable term, but it must be applied carefully. There is always the possibility, therefore, that change will come too slowly to prevent the upheaval that Northern leaders fear.

Nonetheless, recent developments suggest that a point of no return may have been reached. Up to mid-1999, over 100 individuals had been sent abroad to undertake training or to garner information in a range of fields, from economics to legal and scientific studies. For example, a small group of individuals studied economics at Australian National University. Another group undertook legal studies at Peking University under American auspices. Small groups specializing in agriculture and energy have also visited the United States, as have doctors, spending time at Johns Hopkins University Hospital. There is evidence, moreover, that the North is interested in advancing in the information technology (IT) field, with an ambitious four-year project to develop software launched in 1999. In addition, an interest in having access to international financial agencies has been repeatedly expressed.

Kim Jong-il himself has indicated an interest in the earlier development program of President Park Chung-hee, and – after a lengthy silence on the part of the North despite numerous Chinese-conducted tours – in some of the current People’s Republic of China (PRC) programs. While retreats may take place, the momentum is toward accelerating change – with the North’s current limitations being the principal obstacle. After some improvement in 1999, the economy took new hits in 2000, with severely adverse weather reducing crop production and mounting problems with aging facilities inhibiting industrial recovery. In its inter-ministerial negotiations with the South in December 2000, the North reportedly requested a supply of 2 million kilowatts of electricity from the ROK – later reduced to 500,000 kilowatts – to assist in offsetting the severe shortage. It has been estimated that current production might be as low as 2 million kilowatts (in contrast to the ROK’s production of 47 million kilowatts) owing to the fact that some three-quarters of its electric facilities are in need of repair. Negotiations on this and other economic issues were scheduled to take place in the opening months of 2001.

Thus, North Korea remains a failing state in economic terms. The DPRK’s output is estimated to have decreased by about 50 percent between 1994 and 1999,⁹ and, despite some economic gains in 1999, the North slipped again in 2000, with adverse weather being one factor. At the end of the year, the United Nations (UN) resident coordinator in the DPRK stated that some 810,000 tons of food would be required to provide minimal needs for the population until the next harvest. Some estimates indicated that approximately one-quarter of domestic food consumption came via private markets, given the inadequacy of the state system.

In 2000, the ROK’s assistance was substantial, with 200,000 tons of fertilizer, 500,000 tons of food, and assorted other forms of assistance advanced.¹⁰ As certain clouds appeared over the South Korean economy in the fall of the year, domestic criticism mounted with respect to Kim’s Sunshine Policy. It was argued that reciprocity was lacking in the South–North relationship; the South was providing extensive assistance to the North but the North was making no concessions in the strategic field, thus still representing a threat. It was also asserted that food aid and other forms of assistance might be going primarily to the military and officials, thereby strengthening the regime. Interestingly, in late 2000, DPRK authorities allowed Southern representatives to inspect a food distribution site for the first time.

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Kim certainly bolstered his support at home, but certain issues remained contentious. Critical sources now claimed that President Kim was devoting his attention almost wholly to foreign policies, including North-South relations, and neglecting vital domestic concerns. Kim responded by reasserting his determination to push basic economic reforms relating to the financial–banking and industrial sectors, and quickly faced opposition from both labor and segments of industry, which were fearful of rising unemployment and credit shrinkage. In any case, the status of the ROK’s economy in the period ahead will clearly impact upon all facets of economic relations with the DPRK.¹¹

On the cultural front, equally significant advances were made in the aftermath of the summit. Various musical and sports events were held that involved visits to the opposite side or joint performances. Perhaps the most spectacular – and certainly the most widely publicized – was the joint entry of the athletes of the two Koreas under a single flag at the Australian Olympics. At the end of 2000, representatives of labor unions from the two sides met in Panmunjom.

Meetings of divided families also took place twice in the latter part of 2000, with l00 individuals from each side selected to make the trip.¹² Each side selected this group from a large pool of individuals who had registered or indicated a desire to visit relatives. The meetings took place in prominent hotels in Seoul and Pyongyang, and were carefully supervised. Most of the visitors were elderly, and South Korean authorities asserted that the guests from the North were carefully selected, with flawless political credentials. A pledge was made for a third visit in early 2001, and discussions continue with respect to the establishment of a permanent center for such contacts, whether at Panmunjom or elsewhere.

In addition, ground-breaking ceremonies have been held for the reconnection of the Seoul–Shinuiju railway line across the DMZ together with an adjacent highway.¹³ The UN Command has given the two Koreas permission to have administrative control over the DMZ area through which the line is to pass, and, by the end of 2000, some 60 percent of the land mines had reportedly been cleared from this area.

These economic and cultural developments appeared to augur well for a shift from the confrontation of the past. As skeptics pointed out, however, there were no similar developments on the strategic front. As 2001 opened, an armistice rather than a peace treaty served to symbolize the end of the Korean War. Further, massive military forces from the two sides confronted each other in the near vicinity of the DMZ. It has been estimated that some 55 percent of the North’s 1 million mil...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction Uncertainty, complexity, and fluidity on the Korean Peninsula
• Part I Options and realities on the Korean Peninsula
• 1 Korea The Options and Perimeters
• 2 The Sunshine Policy and the Korean summit Assessments and Prospects
• Part II Possible Futures and National Perspectives
• 3 A Neutral Democratic People's Republic of Korea? Historical Background, Rationale, and Prospects
• 4 US Policy Interests and the Concept of North Korean Neutrality
• 5 Japan's Policy toward North Korea Interests and Options
• 6 The US–Japan Security Treaty and Neutrality for North Korea
• 7 China and the Future of the Korean Peninsula
• 8 A Russian View of the Future Korean Peninsula
• 9 Russia and North Korea Ten years later
• 10 The European Union and North Korea
• Conclusion The future of Korea
• Index