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Homo politicus and argument (nearly) all the way down
Persuasion in politics1
Neta C. Crawford
A perennial question in the study of politics is just exactly who we are as political animals, and what we characteristically do when we interact. Is Homo politicus essentially driven by power and primarily constrained by force, or are we creatures of a more social inclination, potentially persuaded by good arguments and constrained by norms and a sense of justice? Of course the answer is both – though scholars of politics have tended to emphasize the former even as the role of argument in our domestic and international relations has grown. The role of political argument in world politics is ubiquitous, consequential, and increasing over the longue durée. Gradually displacing the role of brute force coercion, the increased importance of political argument, its institutionalization, is one of the most significant changes in world politics over approximately the last 350 years. These claims are obviously opposed to the conventional wisdom, and in an era that is threatened by weapons of mass destruction, they might seem willfully blind. Yet it is vital to put political argument in context and brute force coercion in its place: if brute force sometimes trumps argument, it is not for long, because arguments must be deployed in the mobilization and maintenance of brute force.
International politics is the hard case for establishing the role of argument. Realists consistently argue that international politics is a struggle for power and often reject a role for persuasion. As E.H. Carr says, “the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war” (Carr 1946: 109). For Hans Morgenthau, power is defined as control of actions of others, the ability to make someone do what they otherwise would not like to do. The roots of national power for realists are found in geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, and a large population base.2 The conventional wisdom is that genuine persuasion – changing how someone thinks or what they believe – is infrequently attempted and rarely successful in international politics. Interests are enduring and the emotions of actors (pride, anger, and stubbornness) often impede communication. Thus, both realists and rationalists hold that if one side changes their behavior, it was likely the result of compulsion, bribes, or fear; actors rarely change their minds because they were persuaded on the basis of good arguments. As German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck said in 1862, “The great questions of the age are not settled by speeches and majority votes … but by iron and blood” (cited Schulze 1998: 140). Or as Samuel Huntington said more recently in The Clash of Civilizations, “While culture has particular salience for post-Cold War global politics, power is the universal and everlasting essence of all politics, and now, as in the past, power considerations shape the policies of states and the relation among them” (Huntington 1996: 318).
The view that narrowly defined self-interest and force, rather than persuasion, are the ultima ratio of world politics goes very deep, and its corollary for many realists is the assumption that morality is neither a characteristic nor strong force among individuals or states.3 For example, international relations theorists are fond of quoting the Athenians’ arguments in Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, that the strong do as they will and the weak as they must: “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides 1954: 402). The Athenians base their claims that morality is irrelevant on an understanding of human nature:
As E.H. Carr says, “in the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less” (Carr 1946: 168). If power trumps, then neither individuals nor states are trustworthy. Thomas Hobbes proclaimed, “covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1651/1986: 223). Therefore, force is necessary to back international agreements, on the assumption that no one ever agrees to a treaty because they are genuinely persuaded by its virtues.
This truncated view of world politics rests on an equally truncated understanding of Homo politicus. In other words, this view of the role of power in politics is intimately related to our understanding of human nature and decision making. Many of us assume that actors in the political realm, Homo politicus, are rather like the economists’ view of Homo economicus: that political actors are rational power seekers who use force when necessary. Our interests are power; our reasoning is predictably (if imperfectly) rational, and our methods are, for most important things, brutal. Yet, too much of what is interesting in world politics (and domestic politics) cannot be explained using these assumptions.
Rather, I suggest, Homo politicus is neither rational nor irrational, but a reasoning actor. As Aristotle argues, humans are political animals: “And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear … man alone of the animals possesses speech [and] speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and wrong” (Aristotle 1990: I, 10: 11). Further, the characteristic processes of world politics include power seeking but much more. Humans do fight for their interests; but they also feel, talk, and build institutions. When I say that they fight, I mean that humans attempt to coerce and compel through the threat and use of force. We feel for ourselves and others; we more or less identify with others and we have more or less developed capacities for empathy. Our feelings orient us toward justice and help us identify injustice. We talk, engage in discourse, make arguments, tell stories; sometimes we listen, more or less well. Our talk follows certain rules or else it would not be comprehensible. We build institutions that constrain and orient and make some things more possible than others. All these activities are done with words and are often accompanied by efforts to persuade; we justify fighting through talk that takes the form of argument; we express and explain our feelings.
My view is thus less Hobbesian than Aristotelian. Where Hobbes says, “the Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death,” Aristotle says, “it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems to have come together originally and to endure” (Hobbes 1651/1986: 188; Aristotle 1980: VIII, 9, 1160: 208). Or rather, I prefer Hobbes in context: he actually says, “the Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodius living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them.” Hobbes’s political actors are driven by hope and desire as much as by fear. Similarly, while Aristotle articulates the paradigm of practical argumentation he also stresses human sociality and affective ties in political communities.
A richer understanding of Homo politicus – what moves us and how we think – enables us to see that attempts to persuade are more common than is usually granted in world politics, at all levels of analysis. At the same time the method of persuasion, political argumentation to promote belief and behavior change, is also more common than conventional wisdom holds. Argument, defined as the attempt to persuade, occurs at multiple levels – in diplomatic negotiations between states and within states. Indeed, political argument, what might be called public reasoning, is ubiquitous in domestic and international settings and engages not simply the rational but also the emotional elements of Homo politicus. The questions I address here concern the limits of argument and persuasion processes in world politics. When do arguments matter? When does force trump argumentation and persuasion?
Talk is the characteristic or dominant activity of world politics, much the way it is in domestic politics. This talk is often an attempt to persuade others and thus argumentation is a fundamental process of world politics that is not separable from strategic action. Although argument is pervasive, its role varies in a continuum in inverse proportion to the role of strategic action. In other words, the characteristic elements of argumentation (framing, definition, analogical and syllogistic reason) are used in conjunction with the characteristic behaviors of strategic action. The realm of pure force/simple coercion is relatively small. The scope and necessity for argumentation is comparatively large. Homo politicus is quite different from what is even now recognized by many economists to be an incompletely formulated ideal type, Homo economicus. Homo politicus is a social actor who engages in reasoning and argument, who cares as much or more about their social relations with others as their personal advantage.
Thus, I agree with Thomas Risse on the importance of argument, but I go much farther in my claims about the role of argumentation, perhaps because my starting point is a re-reading of human nature, rather than of theoretical debates between rational choice and constructivism. Risse identifies three logics – consequentialism, appropriateness, and arguing – and says that “processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion constitute a distinct mode of social interaction to be distinguished from both strategic bargaining – the realm of rational choice – and rule guided behavior – the realm of sociological institutionalism” (Risse 2000: 1). Argumentation is not simply one form of political behavior or logic of action, as compared to say the logic of strategic action or the logic of appropriateness; argument is the process that underpins (almost) all other forms of action including strategic action and norm guided behavior. Without argument, there could be no mobilization for strategic action in politics and coercion could not be sustained. Without argumentation – public deliberation and persuasion – we could not come to consensus about the content of norms and where to apply them.
In sum, I make three claims. First, the characteristic behavior of international politics is not the search by states for material power. Rather, world politics is characterized by attempts at persuasion in the absence of a sturdy institutional framework that could facilitate discourse among individuals and corporate entities who don’t know or care about each other. There is an increasing number of venues/ international institutions where arguments may occur, and the big change over the longue durée of world politics has been the increasing role of political argument as opposed to the use of force.
Second, argument, as an attempt to persuade, has limits, but the limits are so few in politics that it is possible to say it is argument all the way down. (Or nearly all the way down.)4 Even coercion and compellence in a political context depend more than we might at first think on persuasive argument. Argument is more common than the use of force, while political uses of force depend on argument. Force results from either a failure of argumentative discourse to yield a solution, or a calculation that argument will yield unfavorable results. It is thus perhaps misleading to suggest that there are distinct logics of argument and coercion or strategic action.
Third, although political argument and persuasion are certainly characterized by logic, they are not simple rational processes. Argument and persuasion are characterized by emotion and normative concerns as well as by rational or logical processes.
I proceed by first defining political argument, and refining the questions. Second, I summarize my claims about Homo politicus as a reasoning actor. Third, in a section that forms the bulk of the chapter, I answer this question: what is the relationship of argument and persuasion to other forms of action? I contextualize political argument along a continuum of action that includes brute force coercion on one end and mutual communication on the other end. Fourth, I give a short example of how political arguments worked in the case of ending the slave trade. Fifth, returning to theory, I discuss the moral assumptions that underpin the ideal types of political action. Sixth, I briefly summarize the barriers to political argument and how they are overcome. Seventh, I describe the process of making persuasive ethical arguments in greater detail. Finally, I conclude by suggesting some of the implications for the study of politics of having a richer understanding of Homo politicus and the role of argument in politics.
Political argument as public reason
We all engage in acts of private reasoning on a daily basis when we make decisions or inferences. Public reason occurs when we attempt to persuade others with arguments. To engage in public reasoning is to find or demonstrate a conclusion based on what scholars of argument call premises, but what may also be called proof, evidence, or reasons. Not all arguments are convincing or persuasive, but the process of argumentation is nevertheless important and the content of argument even more so. Once we believe the contents of an argument, we think of its conclusions as valid. We can of course distinguish arguing from other sorts of communication, such as story telling, by the fact that arguments are attempts to persuade or justify rather than simply command, inform, coordinate actions, or express emotions (although informing and expressing emotions may lead to persuasion). Arguments are also distinguished from other forms of speech by their logical form. The steps and rules for going from evidence to conclusion may be top-down, logical inference, or sideways reasoning as in analogy or metaphor. The top-down form (premises X and Y yield conclusion Z ), is known as Aristotelian practical inference or syllogism. Of course, to be persuaded by an argument of this form requires that interlocutors share a linguistic and factual understanding of the terms of the premises and agree on how...
