1 Government after independence
Indigenous leadership with colonial habits, 1956–72
The first seventeen years after Morocco gained independence proved to be a volatile time. The period from 1956 until mid-1972 can be roughly divided into two phases, each dominated by different political dynamics and each culminating in constitutional amendment. This chapter seeks to explore these two phases and their dynamics, paying particular emphasis to the position of, and the roles played by, the different political actors.
In the first phase, from 1956 until 1962, events in Moroccan political life centred on a power struggle between the leading party of the independence movement, the Parti Istiqlal, and another influential figure from this struggle, the King.1 Interestingly, as shall become evident later, in this phase, it was not the monarchy but the Istiqlal, which worked against the achievement of further democratization as the party tried to counter the King’s efforts to institutionalize a competitive party system.
This first phase of political struggle was succeeded by another, which, although still faced with a power struggle, was dominated by different dynamics. In this second phase, from 1962 until 1972, the terms on which the political games were played out changed. Although the King and the Istiqlal continued their feud, the struggle was no longer over who should rule but over whether the Istiqlal or any of the other parties should have a say in governing Morocco. Having played ‘tit for tat’ with an almost equal Istiqlal in the first phase, the King’s room for manoeuvre in the second phase was drastically improved as the Istiqlal lost much of its power due to the emergence of new parties.
In an effort to ensure that the new parties would not evolve into as fierce competitors for political power as the Istiqlal had been in the previous phase, the King changed his strategy to repression and absolute monarchical rule in the second phase; as much as the King was in favour of the democratic element of political contestation when it came to competition between the parties, he was entirely opposed to the idea when there was a chance that it might eventually result in a diminished role for the monarchy in political life.
Phase one: the power struggles of 1956–62
When gaining independence on 18 November 1956, most Moroccans accredited this achievement to the two most influential actors in political life at that time: Mohammed V and the Istiqlal.2 As the fight for independence finally came to an end, however, it seemed like the struggle between these two dominant actors had only just begun. Having fought foreign occupation side by side, the monarchy and the Istiqlal now turned on each other in a conflict over the design of the political landscape of independent Morocco.
Dynamics of power: coercion and political parties
Of the Istiqlal and King Mohammed, the latter had emerged from the independence struggle as the stronger of the two actors, being largely identified as the ‘hero of independence’ due to his defiance of the French during the years of the protectorate (Hammoudi 1997: 18; Pennell 2000: 299).3 Adding to the support for the King among the populace was his role as Amir al-Muminine, the ‘commander of the faithful’. In the eyes of the general population, not only did Mohammed V stand up for the Moroccan state and the people as a political leader, but also he was a devout Muslim, their spiritual leader (Hammoudi 1997: 18). These two factors coupled together resulted in Mohammed V being able to secure for himself as King a very strong position within political life; he was not a mere figurehead leader of the state, nor was he just a symbol of national unity; he was a highly influential and a very actively participating political actor.
The Istiqlal, on the other hand, came out of the independence struggle in a much weaker position. First, the party suffered from the fact that it was only one of several groupings within the independence movement; hence, the party had to share the glory with other groupings, particularly the rivalling Parti Démocra-tique de l’Indépendance (Democratic Party of Independence, PDI).
Second, and much more damaging, was the reality that the Istiqlal emerged as a divided party. Although the Istiqlal, with regard to political power, was still in a league of its own compared with the other parties at the time, it suffered from deep internal splits between a radical left wing led by Mehdi Ben Barka and supported by the trade unions and the student organizations and a right wing formed by the more conservative government officials under the leadership of Allal el-Fassi (Pennell 2000: 303).4
Finally, the Istiqlal struggled with popular support. Apart from the issue of independence, the Istiqlal had always appealed to a small segment of society, principally the urban middle class. Hence, having achieved the goal of independence, the Istiqlal had lost its main attraction with many Moroccans and, consequently, the support for the party began to decline in favour of other parties, particularly the PDI (Waterbury 1970: 234; Pennell 2000: 303).
While the leadership of the Istiqlal was preoccupied with trying to ensure the future unity of the party and simultaneously stifling the competition from the PDI, Mohammed V began to establish new institutions that would secure the position of the monarchy in the long term. Although the King declared almost immediately after independence his commitment to the creation of a constitution, the first in Moroccan history, other institutions whose presence were more urgent to the monarchy – such as the police and the armed forces – received the most attention from the King in the period immediately after independence (Pennell 2000: 299).
The reason for the King’s commitment to first establishing institutions of coercive power, rather than drawing up a constitution, was strongly linked to the presence of the Shabab Nizam (Youth of Order), the unofficial police force created by the Istiqlal and made up by party militiamen. Adding further to the urgency was the Istiqlal’s claim that it controlled the Armée de Libération Marocaine (Army of Liberation, ALM), which had played such an important role in the independence struggle. Consequently, Mohammed V created a national police force and the Forces Armées Royales (Royal Armed Forces, FAR) in May 1956, ensuring that two of the most powerful institutions in post-independence Morocco would be loyal to the monarchy rather than to the Istiqlal (Pennell 2000: 300).
The creation of the national police force and the FAR was a major setback for the Istiqlal. Not only did the new police force reduce the power of the party by rendering the services of its Shabab Nizam redundant, that is, apart from the services it offered the party itself, but also its creation challenged the Istiqlal financially, since the King appointed one of the party’s most important sponsors, Mohamed Laghzaoui, as head of police and director of national security. With regard to the FAR, the power of the Istiqlal was challenged even further. Despite the party’s claims of being in command of the ALM, in reality it did not control it. Although two of the most important figures of the ALM, Mohammed Basri and Hassan el-Araj, sympathized with the Istiqlal, many of the other leaders did not, and most were in disagreement with the party as to whether the struggle for independence had come to an end. Several leaders of the ALM wished to continue the fight against foreign military and administrative presence not only in Morocco but also in Western Sahara, Mali, Algeria and Mauritania since the ALM considered parts of these neighbouring territories as rightfully belonging to the Kingdom of Morocco.5
In other words, with the creation of the FAR, the bleak reality for the Istiqlal was that it was merely in control of a small section of the ALM, something that became very clear as several ALM factions chose to join the FAR; the new unified armed forces was also a much larger and more powerful institution in comparison with the Istiqlal militia. Adding further to the injury was the reality that the upper echelons of the FAR in particular, but also the new police force, were made up largely by rural notables, many of Berber descent, a segment of society that was traditionally loyal to the King and which had very little in common with the urban middle-class-based Istiqlal (Zartman 1964: 16; Waterbury 1970: 146–7, 206; Pennell 2000: 301–2).
In October 1957, the Istiqlal suffered yet another blow related to the party’s narrow support base; two of the most prominent ALM figures from the independence struggle, Abdelkrim el-Khatib and Mahjoubi Aherdane, set up a new party, the Mouvement Populaire (Popular Movement, MP; Pennell 2000: 303). With its heavy focus on the urban middle class, the Istiqlal had managed to alienate great parts of the rural population, many of whom were Berber. Keen to make an impact on political life after independence, el-Khatib and Aherdane soon took the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the Istiqlal in particular, but also by the PDI (Mounjib 2004).6 Accordingly, it came as no surprise that the Istiqlal strongly opposed the creation of the MP and that the party, consequently, experienced serious difficulties in gaining legal recognition as the Istiqlal dominated the government at the time. In 1959, after having operated as a clandestine party since its formation in 1957, the party finally gained legal recognition, albeit only after the non-Istiqlal members and the prime minister of the 1958 Bekkaï government had resigned in protest over the party not being legalized and after suffering severe repression by the subsequent Istiqlal-dominated governments (Zartman 1964: 21; Waterbury 1970: 181; Pennell 2000: 303–4; Mounjib 2004).
In the late 1950s, the Istiqlal fought hard to ensure the continuation of the party’s dominance of the political scene, and consequently, the party’s efforts to avoid the introduction of more contestation into the political system were not only directed at the MP. Among the other organizations subject to repression and harassment by the Istiqlal-dominated governments during this period were the PDI, which saw the banning of its newspapers, and the ALM, which witnessed the assassination of one of its leaders, Abbès Messaâdi (Pennell 2000: 304). In short, the Istiqlal was willing to violate basic civil liberties and sacrifice further democratization in the form of more political contestation, if it meant that the party would be able to maintain its position as the country’s dominant party. It seemed as if the primary concern of the Istiqlal was not so much the introduction of democracy in the wake of independence but to ensure the party’s future position as one of the most dominant actors in political life.
The repressive strategy of the Istiqlal proved to be a major miscalculation as the murder of Messaâdi in 1956 and his subsequent reburial in 1958, coupled with deep economic crisis and popular dissatisfaction with the party, sparked a rural rebellion in the Rif region.7 The rebellion was of such strength that the government found itself unable to quell it by political means, leaving it up to Crown Prince Hassan as the chief of staff of the FAR to bring it to an end, which he successfully did with the help of a 20,000-strong army. As a result, the monarchy came out of the episode significantly strengthened, while the Istiqlal was left without influence and support in the Rif region and facing growing resentment across the countryside (Pennell 2000: 304).
Tensions within society continued to grow after the Rif rebellion. Large segments of the population suffered under the severe economic crisis, and many were also fiercely opposed to the continued presence of American military bases on Moroccan soil. These growing tensions also had their impact on the Istiqlal, widening the already existing gulf between the party’s two wings. The left wing under the leadership of Ben Barka began to advocate publicly the holding of popular elections, and introducing limits on the powers of the monarchy, while also bringing an end to the presence of American bases in the country. On the other hand, the party’s right wing, in the shape of Prime Minister Balafrej and his government ministers, found itself forced to support the preservation of the American bases since the government was in desperate needed for economic assistance from the United States. Moreover, Balafrej and his colleagues were not keen on holding popular elections in any form or shape, fearing that the party might loose its grip on government power (Pennell 2000: 307–8).
Consequently, the Istiqlal finally split despite efforts to keep the party together, as the tensions within society came to a head in 1958 when the national union, the Union Marocaine du Travail (Moroccan Labor Union, UMT), called for a general strike in Rabat, which eventually spread across the country causing extensive chaos and violence (Waterbury 1970: 185–7; Pennell 2000). The massive strikes were not the only factor contributing to the split up of the Istiqlal; however, the King also played a major role. Aware of the widening gap between the two factions of the party and hoping to facilitate a break-up, Waterbury (1970: 217–18) and Pennell (2000: 308) both claim that Mohammed V gave his support to Ben Barka’s left wing by appointing the leader of the UMT, Abdallah Ibrahim, head of the new government replacing that of Bekkaï.
The King’s plan was successful above all expectations. Not only did el-Fassi, one of the most dominant figures within the Istiqlal, retire from the party, but also Mohammed V managed to keep the radical Ben Barka from power by appointing other, less radical, members of the Istiqlal’s left wing as government ministers. Unhappy with the line of the party and the design of the new government, Ben Barka finally resigned from the party executive and formed the National Confederation of the Istiqlal Party, which was eventually, despite Ben Barka’s claims that it was merely a ‘union’, turned into a separate party, the Union National des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces, UNFP), as it merged with factions of the MP and the PDI in 1959 (Zartman 1964: 200; Pennell 2000).
With the creation of the UNFP, Mohammed V had succeeded in strengthening the monarchy greatly at the expense of not only the Istiqlal but the entire party system. Because the King seemed to favour the UNFP, several members of parliament, among them Prime Minister Ibrahim, shifted their allegiance to the UNFP abandoning their previous political platforms. In essence, the creation of the UNFP led to deep fragmentation of the party system and consequently also in parliament, leaving the King in such a powerful position that was in fact in political control of the country (Waterbury 1970: 217–19; Pennell 2000: 313).
Monarchical dominance and the first constitution
In December 1958, when Mohammed V appointed Ibrahim prime minister of the third government since independence, he also announced the monarchy’s commitment to turning Morocco into a democratic, constitutional monarchy. Accordingly, the King tasked the Ibrahim government with preparing for the initial step: the holding of municipal and parliamentary elections (Hassan II 1978: 67).8 However, Mohammed V did not let this expressed commitment stand in the way of complete monarchical dominance of the political system.
On 27 May 1960, two days before the first municipal elections in the history of the Kingdom were to take place, the King announced that he had dismissed the Ibrahim government and that a new government would be formed, composed of the King himself as prime...
