The Good Life in a Technological Age

Philip Brey, Adam Briggle, Edward Spence, Philip Brey, Adam Briggle, Edward Spence

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415891264
• eBook ISBN: 9781136445811
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Modern technology has changed the way we live, work, play, communicate, fight, love, and die. Yet few works have systematically explored these changes in light of their implications for individual and social welfare. How can we conceptualize and evaluate the influence of technology on human well-being? Bringing together scholars from a cross-section of disciplines, this volume combines an empirical investigation of technology and its social, psychological, and political effects, and a philosophical analysis and evaluation of the implications of such effects.

Part I
Mapping the Landscape

1 Well-Being in Philosophy, Psychology, and Economics

Philip Brey

Well-being has traditionally been a topic of philosophical study, but in recent decades it has become an important concern in other fields as well, particularly psychology and economics. Empirical research on well-being and happiness has become very influential in the policy world, in which their measurement is increasingly used to guide social and economic policy. In this chapter, I will introduce and discuss the study of well-being and happiness in philosophy, psychology, and economics. These fields have been chosen because they are the ones in which well-being has been studied most extensively. Next to introducing the study of well-being in these fields, I will also discuss academic studies of the relation between well-being and technology.

In the next section, I will discuss how well-being has been taken up in philosophy, and I will introduce and critique major philosophical approaches to well-being, which include hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, and objective list theories (including perfectionism and capability theories). The section that follows focuses on the psychological study of well-being. It discusses its history, its central concepts and methods, such as the notion of subjective well-being, and the new field of positive psychology. This section is then followed by a review of the role of well-being in economics, which focuses on the emerging field of happiness economics and on happiness and quality of life indices. The chapter will be concluded with a discussion of the relation between well-being and technology, as it is studied (or has been failed to be studied) in philosophy, psychology, economics, and other fields.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF WELL-BEING

In philosophy, well-being (the good life, happiness) has been studied since the ancient Greeks. It is an important theme in the works of Aristotle, as it is in ancient Greek philosophy throughout. In modern philosophy, well-being and happiness take center stage in the works of 18th- and 19th-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who present a modern version of hedonism as part of their theory of utilitarianism. In contemporary philosophy, well-being remains an important topic that has received increased attention in the past 30 years. It is generally recognized that there are three major types of theories of well-being in philosophy: hedonist, desire-fulfillment, and objective theories (Parfit 1984; Griffin 1986; Sumner 1996). These will now be discussed in turn.

Hedonism (and Other Mental State Theories)

Hedonist theories hold that only pleasure is intrinsically good, and pain is the only intrinsic bad. A person’s life therefore goes well to the extent that he or she is able to accumulate pleasure and avoid pain. To strive for wellbeing is to strive for the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. Modern hedonism finds its roots in the works of the utilitarian philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, who both argued for the centrality of pleasure in well-being. Earlier forms of hedonism date back to antiquity, including the teachings of Epicurus in the 3rd and 4th century B.C., who held that a good life is attained by maximizing pleasure and by avoiding protracted fear and bodily suffering.

Quantitative hedonism, or simple hedonism, is the view that the value of pleasure is only determined by its quantity (involving parameters such as duration and intensity) and not by its quality. It therefore does not matter what type of pleasure one has or what its source is. A better life is in all circumstances one in which the amount of pleasure is maximized and the amount of pain is minimized. Quantitative hedonism was originally proposed by Jeremy Bentham (1789). It has since then come under severe criticism. A powerful objection to it, brought forward by John Stuart Mill (1863), is that certain types of pleasure seem more desirable, or worth having, than others. As Mill argues, it is better to be an unsatisfied human than a satisfied pig. In other words, if one lives a deprived life, in which one only satisfies one’s most primitive urges and pursues only bodily pleasures, then one’s life is not necessarily good. One misses out on so-called higher pleasures that may involve experiences of friendship, knowledge, art, contemplation, and refinement in taste. These are pleasures that are more worthwhile than the so-called lower pleasures. Qualitative hedonism, proposed by Mill, holds that some pleasures are more valuable or pleasurable than others. A good life is therefore not merely a life in which the duration and intensity of pleasure is maximized, but one in which the highest pleasures are well-represented.

Hedonism, in either its qualitative or quantitative form, has been criticized for not answering sufficiently to our intuitions about what makes a life good. One of the most powerful objections is the experience machine objection of Robert Nozick (1974). Nozick hypothesizes the existence of an “experience machine” that uses neurostimulation to simulate a nonexistent world that provides the user with constant gratification. The user experiences any type of pleasure, without being able to distinguish the simulated world from a real one. Nozick argues that many people would choose not to plug into such a machine for the rest of their lives, because people value real events and experiences and want to live a real life, which they believe is not provided by being hooked up to an experience machine. This, he argues, demonstrates that hedonism does not provide us with an adequate account of well-being.

Hedonist theories are part of a larger class of mental state theories of well-being. Mental state theories hold that well-being depends on the presence of certain types of mental states in humans. These could be cognitive, affective, emotional, volitional, or mixed. Hedonism is by far the most prominent type of mental state theory. Happiness theories of well-being are a second prominent type. Proponents of such theories usually argue that happiness is different from mere pleasure, and that happiness is something more than or different from the mere experience of positive feelings. On a cognitive view of happiness, happiness involves a positive attitude to one’s life as a whole, or the tendency to evaluate one’s life positively. This is a cognitive state that need not be accompanied by positive feelings at all. Hybrid views of happiness hold that happiness is constituted by different types of cognitive states, for instance by a combination of pleasant feelings and positive evaluations of one’s life. On hedonistic views of happiness, happiness is a purely hedonic state and therefore either equals pleasure or constitutes a particular form of it (Brülde 2007). On this view, a happiness theory of well-being is a particular type of hedonistic theory.

Desire-Fulfillment Theories

Desire-fulfillment theories, also called preference-satisfaction theories, hold that well-being lies in the fulfillment of one’s desires. Desire-fulfillment theories emerged in the 19th century, in part as an outgrowth of welfare economics. Welfare economists wanted to have objective criteria for measuring well-being or utility in economic subjects. However, pleasure and pain are in people’s heads and therefore cannot be easily measured. So economists instead came to a conception of well-being as the satisfaction of preferences or desires. People are normally able to state their preferences and rank them in relation to each other, which then allows economists to measure preferences and include them in ‘utility functions’ in which value is attached to the satisfactions of preferences.

Next to this practical advantage, a more fundamental advantage of desire-fulfillment theories over hedonist theories is that they are capable of avoiding the “experience machine” dilemma. This dilemma can be avoided because desire theories can account for the fact that people sometimes desire that one’s experiences are real. For example, if one desires to be genuinely loved by people, and an “experience machine” simulates people that seem to love one, then one’s desire is not really satisfied, because this love is only simulated and not real. Therefore, this love can be held to be of less value than genuine love.

Three major types of desire-fulfillment theories have been proposed (Crisp 2008). Simple desire-fulfillment theories (also called present desire theories) hold that one is better off to the extent that one’s current desires are fulfilled, and the best life is one in which all one’s actual desires are fulfilled. A major problem with this view is that many desires that people have seem to go against their long-term interests. An angry and impulsive adolescent, who chooses a life of crime and substance abuse and engages in reckless acts, may follow his short-term desires but is not likely to be better off by following them in the long run. He would have a better life by suppressing some of his impulsive desires and choosing different ones.

Reflective or comprehensive desire-fulfillment theories give priority to one’s reflective preferences that concern one’s life as a whole. If it is one’s preference, on reflection, to have a long and happy life, then this preference would trump short-term preferences that seem to go against this goal. An objection to reflective theories is that they, also, may result in choices that are not optimal for a particular person. Take, for example, an orphan monk who has lived a very sheltered life, but then wins the lottery. He now has two choices: to either stay in the cloister and give away his prize, or to live a new life outside the cloister. Because he has no conception of what life may be like outside the cloister, he chooses, after much careful reflection, to remain a monk. It is conceivable that the monk did not make the choice that is best for him, because he was not properly informed about the alternatives. But if this is the case, then the reflective view does not give us the best account of well-being (cf. Crisp 2008).

Informed desire-fulfillment theories hold that the best life one could lead is the life in which all desires are fulfilled that one would have if one were fully informed of one’s situation. Relevant information could include information about possible alternative courses of action and objects of desire, about possible and likely consequences of actions, and about one’s own psychological makeup and behavioral tendencies. The idea is that if one is properly informed, one would be smart about the desires that one would have and strive to satisfy, both in terms of ensuring a good fit between one’s desires and one’s character and in terms of choosing (sets of) desires that one is sufficiently likely to be able to realize.

A general objection to desire-fulfillment theories is that they present a very abstract, formal theory of well-being that does not tell us anything about the sources of well-being. It tells us that a necessary and sufficient condition of well-being is that our desires are satisfied. But it does not tell us anything about the source of these desires. Yet, it would seem that it is not the case that things are good for us because we desire them, but rather that we desire things because they are good for us. Yet, desire theories tell us nothing about the reasons why things may be good for us. In addition, they have a difficult time accounting for so-called defective desires: desires that seem to be bad for one, such as base, poorly cultivated, and pointless desires. People may hold such desires even after being properly informed, but if this is the case, it is not clear that we should conclude that satisfying them improves the quality of their lives more so than alternative courses of action would.

Objective List Theories

Objective list theories hold that well-being is the result of a number of objective conditions of persons rather than the subjective experience of pleasure or the fulfillment of subjective desires. They propose that there are goods that contribute to our well-being even if we do not desire them or experience pleasure from them. Well-being is attained by living a life in which one is in possession of all or most of the goods on the list. The list is objective in the sense that items on the list increase the value of one’s life independently of one’s tastes, attitudes, traits, or interests. Acquiring goods or doing things on the list makes one’s life better, even if one does not desire or want them.

Let us consider a few such lists. Derek Parfit has proposed a list that includes as items moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty (Parfit 1984). James Griffin’s list includes accomplishment, the components of human existence (autonomy, capability, and liberty), understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relationships (Griffin 1986, p. 60). John Finnis, finally, has proposed a list that includes life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion (Finnis 1980, p. 60).

Objective list theories can be distinguished not only by what items the list contains but also by the explanation, if any, of why they are on the list. Philip Kitcher (1999) has made a distinction between bare and explanatory objective theories of well-being. Bare objective theories merely present a list of items that have no single unifying element. Each item on the list contributes to well-being independently of the others. Explanator...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• PART I. Mapping the Landscape
• PART II. Theoretical Approaches
• PART III. Consumer Products and Well-Being
• PART IV. Information Technology and Well-Being
• PART V. Medical and Agricultural Technology and Well-Being
• PART VI. Technology Design and Policy
• Contributors
• Index