Political Succession in the Arab World

Constitutions, Family Loyalties and Islam

Anthony Billingsley

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• Print ISBN: 9780415495363
• eBook ISBN: 9781135182571
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

Political succession is a key issue in the contemporary Middle East. In this new study the author examines the process and shows how respect for those in authority and tribal codes of loyalty have been far more influential in maintaining regimes than security institutions and political repression.

The Arab world is faced by political turmoil and demands for reform. Many of the problems of the region are attributed to the form of leadership that dominates the area, leadership that is authoritarian and focused on regime survival rather than political change. The book highlights the ways in which family loyalties pervade political, economic and social life and how constitutions are being used to consolidate the power of ruling families in republics and monarchies.

The volume explores the notion that the region's rulers, monarchic and republican, are inclined to pass their power on to their sons, and evaluates the use they make of family and tribal networks to maintain their power. The work sees to demonstrate that despite economic and social problems, Arabs value stability and prefer an authoritarian family-based regime than government run by Islamist groups.

Providing new insights into the influences on political succession in the Middle East, this work will be of great interests to scholars of Middle East studies, history and international relations.

1
The Arab political tradition

In the light of on-going events, it appears that the Arab psychology has become addicted to the dictatorial model of life. Indeed, all the Arab peoples – all of them – have become completely addicted to dictatorship, oppression, and regimes that beat (the people) on their heads with their shoes and hit them below the belt…I do not exaggerate by saying this because, within each of us, there is a little dictator who feels gratification when he is repressed by those stronger and more brutal than he and who, at the same time, does not refrain from acting this same way, in his milieu, towards those weaker and inferior in status.¹

The Arab region represents one of the world’s most important geo-political units. It occupies a crucial position in the international system, where contests between the world’s major powers have historically been pursued. The region contains a large and rapidly growing population and, of course, vital economic resources on which the world is deeply dependent. The Arab world is described as inherently authoritarian and oppressive, features that are seen as being responsible for major social and economic problems. These problems are inextricably linked to some of the great challenges confronting the international community. What follows is an attempt to understand some of the bases of these criticisms and to place Arab political behaviour in the context of an Arab political tradition with its own unique characteristics and values.

The Arab world has been going through a dramatic transition from the era of Ottoman dominance through the tumult of the colonial and early independence periods to the post-Cold War age of uncertainty. After considerable nation-building progress in the early days after independence, Arab countries have failed to keep up with the development of the rest of the world, despite the region’s economic potential. International organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have highlighted the way economic growth in the region has failed to keep pace with the increase of population.² Instead, in the past 20 years, the region has been marked by high birth rates, struggling economies, growing social inequality, environmental degradation and significant political unrest.

In the period since the end of the Cold War the problems of economic stagnation and social dislocation have come to be attributed largely to the authoritarian nature of Arab politics. Criticism has focused on the failure of governments to adapt to the times and to develop responsible, accessible and representative governance practices. The Arab approach to political succession and the ways in which regimes regenerate and maintain themselves have been identified as among the most intractable elements of this failure, with particular attention focused on the informal, closed and undemocratic nature of this process in most countries of the region. Arab succession practices are seen as inconsistent with the democratisation that is being promoted by the West and by some in the Arab world itself. Current practices are, however, deeply ingrained with strong Islamic and historical underpinnings. They also reflect the fractious and unstable nature of Arab societies. Change, even when possible, is not easy.

It is a characteristic of the Arab world, with its high degree of repression of domestic debate and dissent, that much of the criticism of Arab political processes is being driven from outside. Outsiders argue that change is overdue, especially as regimes age and new cohorts among Arab populations demand to be heard. Modern, invigorated, inclusive and efficient Arab governments are represented by the West as the most effective antidote to economic stagnation and Islamic extremism. There is a danger, however, that attempts by outsiders to promote change in their own image will be unsuccessful and will instead provoke greater unrest and authoritarianism. One of the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, has been the degree to which the overthrow of Saddam Hussein released sectarian and tribal forces that are potentially antipathetic to the West’s stated goals of change.

Demands for change from both within and outside the Arab world include the issue of the rule of law. Indeed, real reform will never occur without a radical change to the way in which Arabs regard the nature of power and the roles of their heads of state and government. Governments need to operate within transparent and predictable guidelines which limit government discretion and share power more evenly throughout the community. This is, however, a fundamental issue within the developing Arab political system and one of the most intractable practical issues confronting Arab political leaders today.

The Arab world is, inter alia, a manifestation of a people’s yearning for a united or single identity in the face of the reality of 22 separate states, which are the members of the Arab League (see Appendix 2).³ From the early days of independence from the Ottomans and the Europeans, the idea of a united Arab nation has beguiled ordinary Arabs. There are, however, distinct differences that divide the people of the region and lend a certain logic to the continuing existence of those states, including linguistic, cultural and historical variations. Arabic, for example, is, together with Islam, a common thread that runs throughout the region. At the same time, variations between the Arabic spoken on a day-to-day basis in different Arab countries can be considerable. And Islam itself is marked by the great schism between the Sunni and Shi`a branches, which are themselves divided by numerous smaller offshoots. There are differences between Arab countries that draw on their nomadic origins and those that have had more settled histories. Significant variations of outlook exist between those states that have formed part of the Mediterranean civilization and those that have existed on the periphery of that experience. Countries with a long national and cultural history, such as Egypt, display characteristics that are quite different from those of countries with short formal histories as states, such as the countries of the Gulf region.

Despite these differences, the states of the Arab world also reflect shared historical experiences and cultural influences that have resulted in a considerable degree of common identity. On the basis of this identity, it is possible to discern among members of the Arab world clear patterns of similar political and cultural behaviour and attitude from which significant inferences can be drawn. This is a political tradition of considerable coherence and uniformity, making possible meaningful analysis and generalisation of the region.

A system under fire: criticisms of the Arab political system

The reasons for the perceived shortcomings of the Arab world are inevitably diverse. Arab political systems and the tradition on which they are based have been in a state of crisis since the countries of the region achieved independence in the twentieth century. The crisis has been provoked by a number of factors, many of which are exogenous to the region. These include the creation of Israel and the wars that have ensued from that event. Of particular importance, however, has been the impact of Western (and Soviet) interference in the region’s affairs. Brown, for instance, describes the Middle East as ‘the most penetrated international relations sub-system in today’s world’ and suggests that the boundaries between local, national, regional and international politics have become so blurred that the politics of the region cannot be understood without reference to the West.⁴ Lustick comes to a similar conclusion in his analysis of the treatment of Western attitudes to Mohammed Ali and Nasser of Egypt and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Lustick concludes that the West was determined not to permit a regional hegemon to develop in the Arab world.⁵

It is, of course, possible that much of the problem lies closer to home in the outmoded and authoritarian nature of Arab governments and a range of endogenous factors. Arab governments have concentrated on regime survival over other goals. This has led to an inability or at times a reluctance to respond flexibly to changing circumstances and to accommodate popular demands for greater access to national spoils. Regimes fail to operate with the necessary level of transparency that would encourage economic growth and give their citizens a sense of identity and involvement in the well-being of their own countries. The result of these factors has been great pressure on the ruling elites throughout the whole region and a perceptible closing of ranks in the face of criticism.

The lack of democracy in the region, despite the formal trappings of the democratic process (i.e. constitutions, elections, political parties and parliaments), has been a direct focus of major criticism. The Arab Human Development Report, 2002 ranked the Arab world as the least free of all the world’s regions based on a range of indicators, including the political process, civil liberties, political rights and the independence of the media.⁶ The World Bank has criticised the governments of the Arab world on the basis of their lack of inclusiveness and accountability and argues that weaknesses in governance in the region have been a major factor in the region’s poor economic performance since the early 1980s.

This is not to suggest that there is no desire for democracy throughout the Arab world. Public opinion survey results reported over a number of years by various survey organisations suggest that the concept is alive and well throughout much of the Arab world.⁷ It is not clear, however, how Arabs perceive democracy in their region and what they expect to derive from it. The enthusiasm for democracy identified by the surveys should perhaps be qualified by recognition that Arabs’ idea of democracy is relatively vague and varies from country to country and in response to differing experiences. It is possible that Arabs tend to think about democracy as a step towards reviving Arab military and economic greatness and promoting personal economic advantage rather than from the more philosophical or ideological perspective of votes, open debate, the rule of law and individual rights. Arabs’ concern for stability may also condition any enthusiasm for democracy in the region. People of the region highly value political stability and are deeply concerned by the dangers of challenging the established order. In many cases, an attempt to challenge the government is regarded as tantamount to committing a sin.

Regardless of the reasons, it is this lack of a democratic environment within the Arab political system that has been seized upon by critics, both from outside and within the Arab world. The system is accused of being dominated by and even breeding governments that are undemocratic, nepotistic, unaccountable, brutal, corrupt, inflexible and inefficient. Some of the criticisms imply that, for various reasons, Arabs are inherently incapable of organising themselves to run adaptable, efficient and legitimate political systems. Much of the blame for the perceived Arab malaise has been assigned both to Arab culture and to Islam, with its alleged anti-democratic nature. Some Western analysts argue that Western democracy is inconsistent with the Arab and Islamic traditions of the region. Huntington, for example, suggests that the failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Moslem societies is partly a result of the nature of Islam,⁸ while the historian Bernard Lewis is equally convinced about the congenital hostility of the Arab world to Western style democracy. Lewis argues that the basic manifestations of democracy, including elections, did not have a place in the development of Islamic political practice and theory, with the result that Islamic states have, over history, been characterised by autocracy. Obedience to the Moslem ruler became a religious duty and disobedience was a crime but also a sin under Islam.⁹

This form of criticism has also been taken up by some Arab commentators. Abdallah Rashid laments the dictatorial impulse of the Arab people, arguing that despotism and oppression have become a central element of the Arab approach to politics.¹⁰ In commenting on the way in which Arab regimes manipulate the political system, Rami Khouri makes the observation that there is a certain predictability surrounding Arab elections with those gaining most in elections comprising largely representatives of Islamist movements, incumbent regimes and allied parties, as well as centrist tribal groups who are close to the regimes.¹¹

As if to confirm the critics’ concerns, some on the Islamist right tend to portray liberal democracy as an anti-Islamic, anti-Arab, Western intrusion. Influential writers like Sayed Qutb consistently pursue the line that Western imports are detrimental to the interests of Moslems. The deputy leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, Ali Belhadj, welcomed the Algerian Government’s announcement that it was to hold general elections in early 1992. He declared that, having won power, the Front would not be holding any more elections. Belhadj suggested the idea of popular elections was inconsistent with Shari`a law.¹² He argued that once an Islamic government had been achieved, by definition there would be no further need for elections. This prompted the cancellation of national elections by the Algerian government and a famous comment by a former American diplomat, Edward Djerejian, that, while the West supported the idea of ‘one man, one vote’, it nevertheless opposed an alternative that boiled down to ‘one man, one vote, one time’.¹³

Such a response highlights the region’s concern about a potential descent into Islamic totalitarianism that has not been isolated to Algeria. In the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt’s President Nasser and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia both considered introducing measures that would have led to a degree of democratisation in their countries. Initially they envisaged that they would be able to control or manage the change, but increasingly public responses to the proposed measures came to be seen as opportunities for opposition to their governments. Both came to fear a descent into chaos as radical elements, especially the Moslem Brotherhood, sought to take advantage of any weaknesses exposed by liberalising changes introduced to impose their own dictatorships. Nasser’s and Feisal’s responses were retreats from their democratisation goals towards more authoritarian approaches.¹⁴

An important element of the various criticisms is the issue of whether there is, in fact, a cause and effect relationship between the nature of Arab governments and the persistence of widespread problems in the Arab world, including poverty, social and economic rigidity, terrorism, instability and religious fundamentalism. Arab power structures clearly have an impact on national development and regional stability. The tendency for power to be exercised by a small group means that government is not accessible to the majority of citizens, does not tolerate criticism and diversity of opinion and, therefore, does not respond efficiently to the demands of a rapidly changing political, social and economic environment. A key question underlying the nature of power in the Arab world is how legitimacy is achieved in such a political system. The Western liberal tradition is relatively clear and united on the role of government and its sources of legitimacy. Liberalism follows Aristotle’s dictum that the state’s reason for existence is to promote the public good. It also is concerned with the excessive accumulation of power in a small number hands, which it sees as an opportunity for tyranny. Finally, liberalism is holds that governments must not only make and enforce the law, but also abide by it.

By these measures, Arab governments have never satisfied the liberal criteria. This has only become an international concern over the final quarter of the twentieth century. In the early years after independence, many Arab governments and their populations were carried along in post-colonial enthusiasms for independence and nation building. Economic growth was generally strong and social change was rapid. Discontent was ignored or firmly repressed. During the Cold War, the shortcomings of any pro-Western government were ignored or camouflaged by the exigencies of the all-important need to confront the Soviet Union. Repressive and autocratic rule was seen as acceptable by the West provided it was anti-Communist.¹⁵ Indeed, Western powers worked to thwart popular movements in a number of Arab countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, in favour of autocratic rulers who were sympathetic to Western interests. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, released huge pressures on Arab governments from many directions. The sweeping and indiscriminate effects of globalisation (including its pressure towards economic and social openness and the rule of law) and the sudden disappearance of the super power patronage system that provided Arab countries with financial, military and political support threw the underlying challenges to Arab political systems into stark relief.

While offending Western ideals of governance and legitimacy, and despite the massive problems confronting the region, the governments now in place in most Arab countries do meet certain levels of legitimacy, especially when the difficult political, social and economic circumstances are taken into account. It is missing the point to claim that the Arabs’ failure to develop Western constitutional processes and procedures to regulate political power within their deeply divided and stressed societies is necessarily evidence that the governments of these societies lack legitimacy. Some of the autocratic measures adopted by Ara...

Table of contents

• Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Note on transliteration
• Introduction
• 1 The Arab political tradition
• 2 Competing influences
• 3 The just prince
• 4 Family first
• 5 Constitutionalism and constitutions
• 6 Back to the future
• 7 Hybrids
• 8 Tradition versus change
• Appendix 1 Definition of some terms used
• Appendix 2 Formal constitutional status: members of the Arab League
• Appendix 3 Long-standing leaders: terms of office
• Appendix 4 The constitution of Medina1
• Appendix 5 Power maps
• Appendix 6 Letter from Hussein to Hassan1
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index