Portugal in the European Union

Assessing Twenty-Five Years of Integration Experience

Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780415580533
• eBook ISBN: 9781317815440
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Diplomatie & Abkommen

This book examines the involvement of Portugal in the European integration process since the country signed the Accession Treaty in 1985.

The volume elicits how Portugal has grasped opportunities and challenges emanating from its participation in the institutional, regulatory and political frameworks of the European Union (EU), as these have become more intricate as well as intrusive. It scrutinizes the adjustments and transformations that have taken place in Portuguese society, politics and economics as well as in the country's international relations, as engendered by its increasing enmeshment in the Community-building dynamics. It is divided into three main parts:

• Part I focuses on the major changes within the domestic arena, notably on the political, economic and social fronts;

• Part II addresses the adjustments that the Portuguese leadership had to make in order to secure the country's participation in key common policies and strategies;

• Part III is centred on foreign policy and assesses and discusses the impact upon Portugal's international relations.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, EU studies, comparative politics and those with a strong interest in Portugal.

Part I

Twenty-five years’ experience

The evolution of Portuguese politics, economics and society

1 Portuguese exceptionalism and the return to Europe

The April 25, 1974 coup and democratization (1974–2010)¹

Paul Christopher Manuel

Napoleon is said to have once quipped that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees” or “Europe ends at the Pyrenees,” given the Moorish conquest and their 700-year rule of the Iberian Peninsula. This notion of Spanish and Portuguese exceptionalism resonated with the European political and economic elite for some two hundred years. There was a widespread belief that Portuguese society and government existed outside of European understandings of society, politics and authority relations. This belief could draw some support from the fact that even at the start of the twentieth century, the political views still dominating Portuguese political discourse involved a rejection of the democratic and liberal revolutions of the modern era (see Payne 1976, Robinson 1979, Manuel 2002, Royo and Manuel 2003). In the 1960s some social science scholars even wondered if the Roman Catholic country could ever become democratic, because its hierarchical political culture rejected the fundamental Enlightenment values of equality, individualism and the general will (see Almond and Verba 1965). Portugal was accordingly viewed among the European political and economic elite as existing at the outer orbit of the European existential space, trapped in the historical and philosophical vacuum of overseas exploration and lusotropicalism² (see Freyre 1942, Martins 1969, Birmingham 1993).

Portugal’s return to Europe was complex, multi-dimensional, and featured a wide variety of players. During the turbulent days following the Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974, one political slogan particularly resonated with the hopes and dreams of the Portuguese people: A Europa Connosco (Europe is with us). This slogan – coined by the Socialist Party to help gain electoral support in the 1975 and 1976 elections – spoke to both a generalized hope to end the country’s historical isolation from the rest of Europe, and a European future of peace and prosperity for Portugal. In many ways, Portugal’s successful transition to democracy, and its subsequent adhesion to the European Union, were two concrete steps that helped to fulfill the existential hopes pregnant in that slogan.

Perhaps the starting point of the process took place on April 28, 1974 when Socialist leader Mário Soares arrived in Lisbon from his long political exile in Paris, on what he called the comboio da liberdade, or the liberty train. He knew that a dramatic change had occurred when he was greeted by huge crowds at each train stop – at one stop, the train driver even waited for Soares to tell him when it was time to depart (Soares 1976: 24). Lisbon was full of admirers who looked to Soares with great hope and anticipation. Arguably, more than any other single individual, Mário Soares’s articulated vision of a socialist and European Portugal eventually captured the imagination of most Portuguese, and helped propel his party to electoral success over the Communists and other rivals in the following years. He subsequently made relevant policy decisions as Prime Minister and as President, which deepened the democratization and the Europeanization process of the country, and resulted in its economic integration into the European Union (Manuel 1996a: 17–70).

Democratic waves

Placing democratic development on a timeline, Samuel Huntington has usefully noted that there have been three main periods of democratic expansion since the eighteenth century, which he refers to as “waves.” Huntington’s first long wave lasted some ninety-eight years, from 1828 to 1926, and includes the development of democratic regimes in Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Argentina. This first wave suffered a setback in the period 1922 to 1942, when several formerly democratic countries adopted fascist governments, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Argentina. For the most part, these were elite-driven, fragile, democratic institutions, with little connection to, or support from, civil sectors. Yet, the democratic procedures they introduced into policy-making processes – limited as they were – were a marked improvement on the authoritarian governmental structures that preceded, and followed, this democratic interlude. After World War II, Huntington notes the development of a second democratic wave. This short wave lasted from 1945 until 1962 and includes Japan, West Germany, Italy, and India. This wave was reversed for a second time, and from 1958 to 1975 several countries abandoned democratic forms of government in favor of military regimes, including Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The third wave stated in 1974 with the creation of new democracies in Portugal, Spain, Greece, then moving on to Latin America in the 1980s, and to Eastern Europe after the events of 1989 (Huntington 1993: 13–26).

Portugal was very slow in accepting democratic values, institutions, and procedures during the first wave; in 1910, towards the end of this wave, the Portuguese First Republic was finally established by reformers. Although problematic, the reformers sought to effectuate political and economic reforms in line with Enlightenment and democratic principles (see Wheeler 1978). The First Republic unfortunately suffered through years of governmental instability, economic hardships, and the burden of World War I, and was overthrown by a military coup on May 28, 1926. The military sought to restore political order and economic stability, and eventually established the anti-modern, anti-European Estado Novo regime, under the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar (see Kay 1970 and Figueiredo 1976).

Under Salazar, Portugal maintained some of the vestiges of the First Republic. He held the title of Prime Minister, and regularly scheduled elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency were held throughout his rule. But this was not a democracy: this was a corporative system of government, which limited the actual impact of elections (Manuel 1995: 21–23). For instance, voter registration procedures kept the electorate small, and members of the National Assembly were not allowed to influence public policy significantly. Yet, officially recognized political parties were allowed some measure of free speech to debate policies during the brief period leading up to the election (see Georgel 1985).

The most contested election during the Salazar era took place in 1958, when General Humberto Delgado, known as the General sem medo (General without fear) ran a robust campaign against the Salazar-backed candidate, Admiral Américo Tomás. Delgado was a feisty candidate, and even promised to dismiss Prime Minister Salazar if elected. Delgado basked in the huge anti-Salazar election rallies he held around the country. He was finally defeated in what may have been a rigged election.³ Following this electoral challenge, Salazar decided to do away with the system of direct presidential elections. Delgado continued his anti-Salazar movement, and attempted to overthrow the regime by military coup on a few occasions. He was killed in 1965 by members of Salazar’s secret police (Marques 1976: 212–235).

Salazar was finally removed from office in 1968 when he slipped into a coma after having fallen in his bathroom. His successor, Marcelo Caetano, was overthrown on April 25, 1974 by young military officers – an event that marks the commencement of Huntington’s third wave. Portugal appeared finally to be on the brink of adopting and consolidating institutional reforms consistent with the democratic and liberal revolutions of post-1789 Europe.

The revolution of April 25, 1974

Juan Linz has insightfully observed that the Portuguese transition to democracy involved a rupture (ruptura), or break from the fascist past, compared with the gradual reform process (reforma) that took place in Spain in the 1970s. Whereas various sectors of Spanish political and civil society engaged in a gradual transition punctuated by a series of pacts, or agreements, among the various players, junior military officers in Portugal, calling themselves the Armed Forces Movement (MLA) simply overthrew the dictatorship on April 25, 1974. This military action led to the quick eradication of the former regime, a rupture from the past, and required that a new regime be made from scratch (Linz 1977: 237–296).

The development of the MLA is a complicated story (Bandeira 1976: 1–56). In brief, the prolonged and seemingly interminable colonial struggle in Africa put great strains on the Portuguese military, especially the junior officers. Many had been forced to spend ten or more years in Africa, which disrupted their families and careers. The formation of the Armed Forces Movement started principally in response to the professional grievances of junior officers, notably their demand for the repeal of Decree Law 373–73 (which allowed the milicianos, or conscripted officers, to count all of their service toward seniority, moving ahead of professional junior officers). When the Caetano administration appeared both disinterested and antagonistic toward their demands, the MFA decided that regime change was the only way to repeal Decree Law 373–73, end the colonial war, and offer a new political model for Portugal. The officers responsible for the planning and execution of the April 25, 1974 Carnation Revolution, known as the “April Captains,” promised the Portuguese people a political program known as the three “Ds,” meaning democracy, development and decolonization (Bruneau 1974).⁴ However, the members of the Armed Forces Movement themselves could not agree as to the content of these terms (Manuel 1995: 26–37).

During the 1974–1976 revolutionary process, known as the PREC (or the Processo Revolucionário em Curso), the MFA divided into four main ideological factions, one in favor of the creation of a West European Social Democratic state, another advancing an Eastern Bloc Communist model, a third group preferring the establishment of a Cuban-style socialist state, and a traditionalist vision seeking gradually to reform the pre-existing authoritarian model. This internal MFA conflict controlled the final outcome; the victorious faction was able to shape the new form of social and political organization. All of the players sought to implement the “three Ds,” but the actual policy preferences varied considerably, depending on their proposed political model (Manuel 1995: 55–83; also see Maxwell 1997).

Mário Soares was the leading civilian political leader advancing a West European style social democratic model, while Communist Party leader Álvaro Cunhal supported the Eastern Bloc Communist system of government. Of note, these two leaders had known each other for a very long time. In his youth, Soares studied at the Colégio Moderno in Lisbon, founded by his father. Álvaro Cunhal was employed as a teacher at the Colégio, and actually taught geography to the young Soares. They both opposed the dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, and were each imprisoned and exiled (Soares in Paris, Cunhal in Moscow). Soares subsequently became a political opponent of Cunhal (Manuel 1996a: 4–6)

The eyes of Europe were upon Portugal during the PREC. Jean-Paul Sartre, the great French existential philosopher, visited Portugal in the spring of 1975. Sartre was given a very warm welcome by hoards of young university students. At one of his press conferences, Sartre told the students that he considered the Portuguese revolution to be one of the most important events in post-war Europe, and called upon them to build West Europe’s first socialist state (Sartre et al. 1975: 32–34). Another development of European-wide consequence took place on November 6, 1975. Appearing on a French television station, Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares debated the future of Portugal for almost four hours. During this robust back- and-forth, Cunhal praised the equality of the Eastern bloc countries, and suggested that their political system would be a good model for Portugal. Soares countered by arguing that the person of Joseph Stalin separated the Communists from the Socialists, not Karl Marx and/or Vladimir Lenin. Soares railed against a “socialism of misery” common to the East. Citing the examples of Germany and Sweden, Soares instead proposed a democratic, prosperous and equitable political, social and economic system for Portugal.

What is perhaps most interesting is that this Communist–Socialist debate was very current in the 1970s, when the reform communist ideology of Eurocommunism was gaining electoral strength throughout Europe, and especially in Italy.⁵ The political dynamic in Portugal served to illustrate larger issues for all Europeans. The decision to appear on French television – hence a window to a greater European audience – was a dramatic break from the isolation of the Salazar/Caetano years, and opened the floodgate to deeper and more European interest and investment into Portugal. The April 25, 1974 Revolution clearly represented a significant break from the past and to new possibilities with Europe (see Gallagher 1983).⁶

The six provisional governments in office from 1974 to 1976 tried to strike a balance between macroeconomic challenges and the immediate needs of the Portuguese. The continuing political instability and regional actions for social revolution precluded stable economic growth; causing great anguish and turmoil among the population (see Bermeo 1986). With each new austerity measure taken by the regime in Lisbon, young militants would take direct action against the policy. In the end, rather than bringing law, order, and progress, the MFA’s own internal divisions became a source of the political, economic, and social upheaval (Manuel 1995: 55–130).

By the spring of 1976, Prime Minister General Vasco Gonçalves, who had been in favor of the construction of a East European communist state with Álvaro Cunhal, and Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who had been in favor of the creation of an MFA–Povo (MFA–People) alliance, had been politically out-maneuvered and discredited by the MFA moderate group known as the “Group of Nine.” These moderate officers had gained control of the Council of the Revolution by July of 1976, and enjoyed the widespread support of political society, including Mário Soares’s Portuguese Socialist Party, the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) led by Francisco Sá Carneiro, and Freitas do Amaral’s Party of the Social Democratic Centre (CDS). Only the Communist Party, which enjoyed about 10 percent of electoral support, regretted this turn of events, but it too eventually accepted the new democratic rules and institutions. In time, all of the more militant and leftist anti-democratic elements were forced out of the political process.

The d...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Part I Twenty-five years' experience the evolution of Portuguese politics, economics and society
• Part II The adjustment in policy areas
• Part III Redesigning Portuguese foreign policy
• Index