1 Introduction
Civil society, religion and global governance – the power and persuasiveness of civil society
Helen James
Introduction
The chapters presented in this volume were initially delivered at the international conference, ‘Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion’, which was held 1–2 September 2005 at the National Museum of Australia, Canberra, under the aegis of the National Institute of Social Sciences and Law, The Australian National University. Inspiration for the conference, its timeliness and the fine collegiality of the discussions may all be said to have occurred in response to some very ‘uncivil’ aspects of world and domestic governance confronting us at the present time. Each of the main concepts – civil society, religion and global governance – is worthy of an international conference in its own right. Bringing all three into contiguity in order to examine their threefold interactions on human well-being has reinforced the commonality of human aspirations embedded in these major concepts: the desire for improved human security and greater protection of human rights; for implementation as well as recognition of the universality of the values underpinning the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) despite the diversity of cultures amongst the 192 members of the United Nations; and for recognition that the values societies uphold, while differing in detail, often source their origins in religious or spiritual paradigms. We may not always know what is ‘civil’; but we certainly know what is ‘uncivil’, no matter what religious or spiritual paradigm informs our existence; or what system of political governance orders our everyday lives. What is common is that no matter what religious paradigm or system of political governance prescribes our lives, there is a common seeking after an ethical plane which may be largely intuitive. ‘Civil society’ is often seen to fill that conceptual role in human yearning. This volume examines the ‘civil society’ parabola, from problematique to panacea, and ultimately says that, although it may not always be perfect, as a concept ‘civil society’ may be all we have in seeking after better.
How ‘civil society’ is constituted, however, may differ in various societies; the predominant Western liberal paradigm with its emphasis on the primacy of the individual has been under challenge for some time, as alternate approaches to ‘civil societies’ are being explored (Hann and Dunn, 1996). Underlining the emergence of ‘civil society’ as a normative concept in multidisciplinary discourses, indicative of a desirable social order, Hann and Dunn (ibid.: 3) comment:
The term poses problems for political anthropology, but it may also open up new opportunities. Looking at the trajectory of the term as it has evolved from origins in early modern European political thought through to the recent astonishing renewal or reinvention of these traditions, the most important general points to emerge are: (1) that civil society debates hitherto have been too narrowly circumscribed by modern western models of liberal-individualism, and (2) that the exploration of civil society requires that careful attention be paid to a range of informal interpersonal practices overlooked by other disciplines.
Cross-cultural investigations of this emerging normative concept take us into the realms of international relations, politics, history and sociology, as well as anthropology, as our scrutiny is drawn to the moral and ethical applications of power, and issues of social order and cohesion in the contemporary troubled world. Indeed, the terminology itself has been evolving, being variously described as ‘civil anthropology’ or ‘civic society’, as analysts give preference to prescriptions of citizenship in varying social, political or cultural milieus. The amorphous nature and controversial characteristics of ‘civil society’ command our attention: is it an obstacle as in the traditional Marxist view, or an essential aid, as in the prevailing Western liberal paradigm of political and social change, the panacea for all ills in authoritarian polities? The relation between these overlapping planes in all human societies compels detailed consideration of the interactions between the political, social and ethical realms constituted by the concept of ‘civil society’. The chapters in this volume thus range in time and space, from Egypt to the Pacific, from the UK to Indonesia and Australia, from South America to the Philippines, as they explore applications of the concept of ‘civil society’ within varied socio-cultural and political contexts.
While it is common practice to view the term, ‘civil society’ as delineating a distinct private realm separate from church and state, and based on the sanctity of private property rights and the workings of the market, contemporary writers are again identifying close relationships between ‘civil society’ and the world’s varied religious cultures. From the private legal realm in the writings of Hobbes and Locke to the unresolved conflicts and tensions between particular individual interests and the perceived public or universal ‘good’ articulated by Ferguson and the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, this fundamental tension continues to embue the concept of ‘civil society’. At heart is the relationship between the individual and the community, between the individual state and the community of nations. Mindful of the lessons of the mid- and later twentieth century, we in the early twenty-first century may no longer have Tocquevillean confidence in the associational life as the litmus test of non-authoritarian governance systems. However, while ‘civil society’ may no longer be considered a panacea for the demonic socialist state in Eastern Europe where the term’s renascence began in 1989, in regions still struggling to emerge from authoritarian governance systems in Asia, Latin America and Africa, ‘civil society’ is often the paradigm by which greater human security, improved protection of human rights and democratic governance are articulated.
Increasingly, the influence of value systems, informal networks of association and friendship, kinship groups, communities of interest derived from ethnicity or shared religious cultures are seen to have valid roles in constituting ‘civil society’. Formal structures and organizations, the schematic liberal division of state, market and civil society, may be too limited to encompass the full workings of ‘civil society’ in enhancing human well-being. The chapters in this volume thus seek to move debates about ‘civil society’ away from the restrictive considerations embodied in the Western liberal paradigm, to take into account a wider mosaic of human interrelationships.
In contemporary academic explorations, ‘civil society’ is usually defined to refer to the level of governance between the state and the governed (Cohen and Arato,1992) consistent with the criteria set out by Alagappa (2004: 35). It includes, but is not limited to, non-government organizations involved in service delivery and advocacy activities, charitable organizations, private foundations, professional associations, social movements, activist networks. The key common denominator with all these groups is that they be ‘not for profit’, and seek to achieve their objectives through non-violent methods. However, such a definition might not apply, for example, to those ‘global civil society’ organizations taking part in violent demonstrations against the international trade regime (see He and Murphy, Chapter 18), nor to some activist advocacy groups where the ‘non-violent’ criterion is frequently set aside. In similar vein, some civil society organizations, whilst meeting some of the criteria, can have very uncivil outcomes or programme platforms. Some quasi-political, religious and private foundations may fall into this category. Definitions of civil society organizations can thus be fraught with controversy. Whilst ‘civil society’ is recognized by many political scientists as a desirable structural element in the institutions underpinning democratic governance, it too can exhibit undemocratic, even corrupt, modes of operating.
Similar reservations can be made of the other two pillars in this conceptual journey – religion and global governance. All of us are only too keenly aware of the negatives as well as the positives which may be applied to these overarching concepts, and history is replete with examples of both, from the excesses of the religious wars in seventeenth century Europe to the contemporary scandal of the UN’s ‘food for oil’ programme. It is not intellectually robust, however, to decry the institution (or concept) because imperfect; rather we should seek to apply our resources to continual improvement, and if a Sisyphean task, at least, like Sir Gawain, we shall have been able to say ‘What can one do but try?’
Civil society and paradigms of power and persuasion
Western oriented paradigms of power assign an active role to civil society organizations in confronting state power structures through their efforts to bring about political and social transformations. Such advocacy networks are seen as indispensable elements of transitioning societies which seek to slough off their authoritarian pasts, reduce corruption and implant more transparent systems of governance consistent with the formulae of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Confrontational strategies thus become integral to the way ‘civil society’ is seen to operate. This paradigm of civil society’s power has a very public face. In February 2006, more than 100 civil society organizations in Thailand were reported to have joined with members of other sectors – academics, labourers, professional and religious groups – in large demonstrations calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, for alleged abuse of power (Irrawaddy Magazine, the Bangkok Post, 28 February 2006). The decision by key opposition political parties to boycott the snap elections called for 2 April 2006 complements the withdrawal from the government by a key faction of the ruling Thai Rak Thai political party, the Wang Nam Yen faction, in developing what appears to be broad-based ‘people power’ determined to end Thaksin’s increasingly undemocratic style of governing. Such actions by broad-based sectors of Thai civil society also toppled the military governments in Thailand in 1973 and 1992. A similar scenario unfolded in 1986 in the Philippines when ‘people power’ brought the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos to an end. ‘Civil society’ organizations initially played similar roles in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Eastern Europe in the 1989–1991 period, especially in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Undemocratic governments are therefore wary of the political power which activist advocacy networks within civil society can wield.
But civil society can also operate effectively within the paradigms of what might be called ‘soft power’, by persuading and negotiating; through effective input to policy development which has a beneficial social outcome, by efficient service delivery in sectors either unprovided for in government policy frameworks, or where the resources are unavailable. Whilst perhaps less dramatic or even less public than the confrontational style, the ‘soft power’ of civil society may, in certain situations, be more enduring and more sustainable with longer lasting beneficial effects for vulnerable groups who are the recipients of such services. There is now a goodly body of scholarship which questions the traditional Western paradigm of civil society as necessarily confrontational and overtly political in its operations (Schak and Hudson, 2003; Tendler, 1997; Hann and Dunn, 1996). Many of the vast numbers of civil society organizations which have appeared since the early 1990s operate in cooperative mode with the state authorities, complement state initiatives in bringing about improved service delivery to vulnerable populations and use the arts of persuasion to nudge state power structures towards improved modes of governance. Since many – particularly in Africa, Asia and South America – are ensconced in non-democratic political cultures where the space in which civil society can operate is very limited, the cooperative, rather than the confrontational, mode of operating is necessary, if they are not only to survive, but also to be able to continue to carry out their important social work.
As Fisher (2003) has shown, civil society organizations may increase in numbers in proportion to the restrictive political culture in which they are established. By gradually increasing that space through both horizontal and vertical networks, like spreading circles on a pond, they may be able to spread their influence through ever larger communities of interest, enhancing the possibilities for social transformation almost imperceptibly. That many civil society organizations are charitable foundations often with religious origins or affiliations goes to the heart of their powers of persuasion. Focused on improving human well-being, often at grass-roots level, through alleviation of suffering, they are often found at the forefront of initiatives for the protection of human rights and greater human security, calling into question government policy frameworks which impact adversely on socially acceptable levels of human well-being. If the institutions of global governance are to remain robust, they will need to heed the voices of ‘civil society’ in restoring that desirable balance and common sense (see Chapter 2) seen to be essential to the art of keeping the peace, without the dubious prescription of resort to continual war, a theme explored by several papers in this volume.
Thematic organization of the book
The 21 chapters of this volume have been presented in six thematic parts each of which focuses on a particular aspect of the magical mandala constituting ‘civil society’. These parts are: Human security and human rights; The politics of civil religion; The ethics of civil development; Civil society and global governance: panacea or problematique?; Cross-cultural perspectives on institutional development for civil society; and International civil society: prospects for enhancing human security. Amongst the broad kaleidoscope of views, problems and issues presented, the enduring common themes are clearly those which underline shared notions of concepts of human and social well-being; and appropriate measures to be taken when it is recognized that that well-being is in jeopardy from either exogenous or endogenous forces. ‘Civil society’ is often the paradigm for the collective or individual initiatives seeking to confront the state power structures which impact adversely on human security and human rights. A prominent theme in the Hon. Justice Michael Kirby’s chapter, ‘National security: proportionality, restraint and common sense’, is thus the need to uphold the rule of law in protecting human rights; not to allow it to be subverted in pursuit of the selfish motives of powerful individuals. It is a theme developed further in the chapter based on the keynote address by Amitav Acharya, ‘Human security, identity politics and global governance: from freedom from fear to fear of freedoms’. The unfortunate securitization of religion which has been artificially engendered post-September 11 by politicians in support of their own secular power bases is undermining the very fabric of that ‘civil society’ that the institutions of global governance created after the Second World War were established to enhance. As Amitav has so clearly argued, this new global identity politics is giving birth to societies where increasingly larger proportions of the nation’s resources are being devoted to surveillance, detention without trial and less-than-convincing obfuscations of torture, rendition and secret prisons, all of which smack of the Kafkaesque nightmare world of the medieval Star Chamber and the Prisoner in the Iron Mask. Is this the endgame of secularism? That it is the world’s major democracies which have so readily caved in to the politics of fear does not augur well for the robustness of their social and political institutions. This impending descent into the maelstrom of self-doubt may be forestalled by the intercivilizational perspective on human rights proposed by Yasuaki Onuma, special Toyota Lecturer for the conference.
These major themes are developed further in the chapters by Philip Towle, Gordon Briscoe and Robert Miller in the section dealing with ‘The politics of civil religion’. Each of these chapters looks to religion as the centripetal force interacting with the state to engender different paradigms of societal transformation. The Anglican church, in Towle’s chapter, has moved from support for state warfare to vocal dissent, as views on what constitutes ‘just war’ have changed, in parallel with notions of what constitutes ‘civil society’. Briscoe’s chapter on the other hand, delineates the central role the Anglican church had in Australia, in destroying indigenous civil societies, and setting up paradigms of societal control that had very adverse and enduring effects for Australia’s indigenous peoples. Robert F. Miller’s chapter on church–state relations in post-communist Eastern Europe also examines in depth the very ambivalent, indeed, one might say, frequently malevolent, role of the church in some areas of Eastern Europe; far from enhancing or protecting ‘civil society’ the church in some parts of Eastern Europe at times aided and abetted the power structures of the authoritarian state for the sake of preserving its own position and status. Whilst the value systems embedded in the religious perspective are seen to be the catalysts for actions taken to bring about social and political transformation, such actions may be ambivalent; not to be necessarily advantageous for the recipients, nor to advance the cause of ‘civil society’. In like manner, ‘civil society’ itself may become perverted, placed at the behest of power structures supportive of egoistic individualism.
Part III, ‘The ethics of civil development’, develops the debate further. The three chapters by Runzo, Oxhorn and Seumas Miller take us further into the nuances of the operations of civil society confronting state power structures. Runzo examines the current global context of the ethics of the Iraq War, and calls into question the dubious public prescriptions used to justify it. In doing so, he seeks to elaborate a religious perspective which would yet uphold an ethical stance, quite at odds with that present in the politics of securitized religion. Oxhorn looks beyond religious structures to the very secular operations of civil society in Latin America as it seeks to bring traditional entrenched power structures to account. That its operations are not always confrontational, but sometimes operate more within modes of persuasion, is a significant contribution to the debate on civil society–state relations in transitional democracies with a history of authoritarian governance. His exploration of citizenship as consumption, devoted to market forces, or citizenship as agency, seeking to bring about greater experience of well-being for a larger proportion of society, questions some of the fundamental aspects of the received Western liberal paradigm of ‘civil society.’ Seumas Miller’s finely nuanced examination of corruption, governance and transcultural interaction goes to the heart of definitions of ‘civil society,’ how it may operate to bring about more transparent governance and how corruption may be perceived and enacted in different cultural contexts. That this is an enduring theme in analysis of political cultures may be attested to by the sorry saga of the Australian Wheat Board’s payment of bribes to the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in defiance of UN sanctions. Far from promoting ‘civil society’ in a very undemocratic state, this is an example, par excellence, of the ‘market’ sector undermining initiatives towards a ‘more civil society’ by the formal institutions of global governance. Moreover, large-scale corruption and malfeasance in recent years amongst some of the largest corporations in the ‘market’ sector in both the US (e.g. Enron) and in Australia (the HIA debacle) must cause one to question any glib assumptions that the institutions of the market are an essential panacea for enhanced democratic governance; that the full force of the law has been brought to bear on the corporate perpetrators is small comfort to the millions who lost their retirement savings, livelihoods and homes as a consequence of this malfeasance.
Part IV, Civil society and global governance: panacea or problematique?’, paves the way for considerations of the varied aspects of ‘civil society’, in recognition that civil society organizations themselves can become prey to undemocratic and corrupt practices. Hudson’s chapter spotlights that the post-September 11 world sits amidst ‘post-secular’ civ...