Gibraltar

British or Spanish?

Peter Gold

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134276745
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The year 2004 marks three hundred years since Britain took possession of Gibraltar, a rocky promontory at the foot of the Iberian Peninsula sometimes referred to as 'The Rock'. Gibraltar: British or Spanish? provides a detailed study of the attempts that have been made by Spain, especially since 1984 when Britain and Spain signed an agreement to discuss the future of Gibraltar, to regain the sovereignty of 'The Rock', despite the wishes of the Gibraltarians.

1 Introduction

 

 

The British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, a rocky promontory that rises to a height of about 420 metres and is therefore often referred to as ‘the Rock’, is a little over six kilometres in length, about 1,200 metres wide and covers an area of some seven square kilometres. It is connected to the southern tip of Spain by a low-lying isthmus about 800 metres wide at the border-crossing. Eight kilometres away across the bay to the west of Gibraltar lies the Spanish port of Algeciras, while on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar lies Morocco, 32 kilometres distant.

The British have occupied the Rock since 1704 and under the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, the territory was ceded to Britain in perpetuity.¹ Less than 100 Spaniards remained on the Rock after it was seized, but they have since been joined by Britons, Genoese, Maltese, Moroccans, Portuguese, Minorcans, Sephardic Jews from North Africa and, more recently, migrants from the Indian subcontinent. The population currently numbers about 28,500, of whom some 23,000 are Gibraltarians, 3,500 are other British subjects (including military personnel and their families), and 2,000 are non-British. Despite their mixed origins, the way of life of the majority is essentially British but with a Mediterranean flavour. Pubs, British shops and schools, police officers in British ‘bobby’ uniforms are typical manifestations of the fundamental Britishness of the colony, although when it comes to that other quintessential cultural identifier — language — most Gibraltarians speak fluent Spanish as well as English.²

Several attempts were made by Spain to retake Gibraltar by force, the most recent and most notable between 1779 and 1783. Since 1713 Spain has retained its claims to sovereignty over the territory, and since the 1960s, in an international climate supportive of decolonization, it has had the backing of numerous UN resolutions to resolve the issue. In 1969 the Spanish dictator General Franco tried to force Britain's negotiating hand by removing Spanish workers from Gibraltar, closing the border between the Rock and mainland Spain, and cutting off all other direct communications in the hope of irreparably damaging the Gibraltarian economy and bringing Britain to the negotiating table. Not only did the move not have the desired effect; it also stiffened the Gibraltarians' resolve to remain tied to Britain and by isolating them it alienated them from Spaniards, with whom thereafter they could have little direct contact for 16 years.

The fact is that even without the Spanish blockade the British Government would never have contemplated a transfer of sovereignty to Spain while the Franco regime was still in power. However, since the restoration of democracy in Spain following Franco's death in 1975 and Spain's subsequent full re-incorporation into the international community, the way has been open for Britain and Spain to seek a settlement for the future of the only remaining colony in Europe. In the late 1970s, with Spain eager to join the European Community (EC) and to become a member of NATO, many felt that it was time to resolve a situation that had come to be seen as an anachronism and an impediment to good bilateral relations. The signing of the Lisbon Agreement in 1980, which this work takes as its starting point for a detailed analysis, was the first important step in that process. Subsequently Britain and Spain agreed, through the signing of the Brussels Declaration in 1984, to attempt to solve all of their differences over Gibraltar, including the issue of sovereignty. Progress was extraordinarily slow and tortuous until 2001, but despite an apparent leap forward at that time negotiations have not yet reached a conclusion 25 years on from Lisbon. This study explores in some detail the negotiation process, the context in which it occurred and the issues related to it in order to try to answer the question — should Gibraltar be British or Spanish?

In order to understand why this question has proved to be so difficult to answer we must consider the complications of Gibraltar's history and its geography. As far as history is concerned, there are three factors at work. First, Gibraltar is one of 16 territories that remain on the UN list awaiting decolonization. However, decolonization in a conventional sense is not an option for Gibraltar, since the Treaty of Utrecht, if properly observed, says that if Britain should wish to ‘grant, sell or by any means to alienate’ ownership of Gibraltar, Spain should be given first preference to it. Hence Gibraltar is not a straightforward case of a colony choosing one of the conventional routes to decolonization: seeking independent status from a colonial power (most Gibraltarians do not wish to pursue that course, anyway); or establishing a relationship of free association with that colonial power (which many Gibraltarians find attractive); or requesting integration with it (often proposed by Gibraltarians but ruled out by Britain). Rather it is a territory whose sovereignty is disputed by two nations that have been required through numerous United Nations resolutions to find a bilateral solution to their dispute. The options, therefore, are not those normally available to colonial territories but are limited to what is acceptable to two other parties. Within a United Nations context, no-one has thus far even agreed on the principle — self-determination for the Gibraltarians, or the restoration of Spain's territorial integrity — that should be applied.

Second, Franco's policy of isolating Gibraltar, which is seen by democratic Spain to have been a grave mistake, has had the effect of making the Gibraltarians' attitude towards successive Spanish Governments at best mistrustful and at worst hostile. Although Spain has made it quite clear that its objective is to restore its territorial integrity and not to turn Gibraltarians into Spaniards against their wishes, the process of undoing the damage caused by the blockade is one which requires time, patience and ‘wooing’, for want of a better term. As this study will demonstrate, Spain has shown itself to be singularly inept at ‘wooing’ the Gibraltarians since the reopening of the border in 1985, and consequently the vast majority have no interest in entertaining the idea of any Spanish involvement in their affairs. It is impossible to evaluate the extent to which that would have been the case even without the blockade, but it is certainly true as a consequence of it.

The third historical factor concerns the length of time that has elapsed since Britain first established its presence in Gibraltar. Although (as Chapter 2 will indicate) Britain has in the past been prepared to relinquish Gibraltar on several occasions, with the passing of the centuries not only have strategic interests evolved but also, more significantly, attitudes have changed towards the rights of people who live in colonial territories. Some citizens can trace their Gibraltarian ancestry back to the early years of the eighteenth century, while the average is about 150 years or six generations (Gold 2001: 74–5), and such a length of time, it can be argued, gives them some entitlement to choose the nature of their own future governance. Such an argument — based on the principle of acquisition by long-continued use, or ‘prescription’ — has not been recognized by all parties.

The role of Gibraltar's geography in the decolonization process is in some respects self-evident. It is indisputably part of the Iberian Peninsula, and closer to Spain than to Britain by 1,000 miles. Gibraltar controls the seaway between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean, as well as being at the crossroads between southern Europe and North Africa. Every vessel that enters or leaves the Mediterranean has to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar, from warships to oil-tankers, merchant fleets and cruise liners, making the Rock a key strategic location. As a supply resource, forward operational base and ship-repair facility it has proved invaluable in time of war or emergency, and although its location may not be as important as it once was when nations with powerful naval forces ruled the world, it operates as an important intelligence-gathering centre for NATO. It is not surprising that Gibraltar has been so important to Britain for so long, nor why Britain is reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over the military base, especially in the context of the current ‘war on terror’.

The second geographical factor in Gibraltar's case is its size. It is smaller in terms of both territory and population than most independent states, and it would be difficult, not to say impossible, for it to achieve full self-sufficiency in the area of defence.³ In addition, although Gibraltar has now achieved economic independence, its continuation could be dependent upon existing favourable tax regimes that cannot be guaranteed indefinitely.

The third aspect of Gibraltar's geography that impinges upon any change in sovereignty is the fact that it is located in Europe. Its proximity to Britain makes it a much more sensitive and immediate issue as far as domestic British politics are concerned than would be the case if it were an African or Asian colony, and therefore it is more problematic for a British Government to go against the wishes of the Gibraltarians (although some would argue that that has not prevented the present Government from trying). The former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington is quoted as having said that ‘the problem for Spain is that Gibraltar is in Europe … the issue would be settled, just like Rhodesia and Hong Kong, if the Spaniards were black or Chinese’ (El País, 4 August 1987).⁴

The fourth geographical aspect concerns the fact that there are really two separate areas that are under negotiation: the town and the Rock on the one hand, and the isthmus that connects the Rock to the Spanish mainland on the other. The isthmus is territory that has been occupied by Britain since 1814 but it is not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht, so that whereas Britain can use de jure arguments in relation to the promontory, it has to rely on the more contentious de facto arguments of possession by prescription in relation to the isthmus and the airport that has been built upon it. As a consequence Spain has often seen the isthmus as more fruitful territory for negotiation, and at times British Governments have felt more vulnerable in relation to it, although the Gibraltarians consider it to be as much part of their territory as any other.

There are two further factors that may have had a restraining influence on Spain's pursuit of its claim to Gibraltar. The first is the question of the Spanish towns or enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Melilla, which is less than 13 square kilometres and has a population of 69,000, has belonged to Spain since 1497, when Spain pursued some of the last Muslims to be expelled from the Peninsula across the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1912 it was declared a Spanish protectorate, which enabled it to become more than just a fortress around the castle. Ceuta, 160 kilometres to the west, is less than 20 square kilometres and has 76,000 inhabitants. The fort was established by the Portuguese in 1415 and ceded to Spain in 1668. When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, both Ceuta and Melilla were retained by Spain as garrisons or fortified towns, together with several islands, and are incorporated into metropolitan Spain. These territories are claimed by Morocco, and every time that progress is made on Gibraltar, Morocco raises them as an issue, although Spain has never acknowledged any justification for Morocco's claim and insists that there is no parallel between the enclaves and Gibraltar.⁵

The second additional influencing factor, especially in recent years, is the growing interest in self-determination by Spain's regions, or autonomous communities, in particular the Basque Country and Cataluña. The recent exploration by Britain and Spain of the possibility that Gibraltar might partly come under Spanish sovereignty with a degree of autonomy greater than that enjoyed by even the most autonomous of Spanish regions inevitably aroused both interest in those regions and also a degree of alarm in Madrid regarding the implications for the unity of the Spanish state. This and the issue of the North African enclaves help to explain why Spain has not at times applied pressure on reaching a solution on Gibraltar quite as forcefully as it otherwise might have done.

These historical and geographical factors have weighed heavily on the debate about Gibraltar's future. They provide the backdrop to the countless actions and counteractions that have been taken by one side or another in order to protect or promote its own interests in the dispute. This study explores these actions and counteractions in some detail in the attempt to answer the question posed by the book's title. Of course many Gibraltarians would quite properly suggest that such a question is too two-dimensional, and that they are an essential part of any solution. It is hoped that this study will make it quite clear that that has to be the case.

2 British Gibraltar (1704–1963¹

On 1 August 1704, as part of the Wars of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714),² an Anglo-Dutch force under the command of Admiral Sir George Rooke began the bombardment of the fortified town of Gibraltar on the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula. After three days of battle, on 4 August, Gibraltar was successfully seized. Of the 4,000 inhabitants, all but 70 fled across the isthmus into the hinterland of the Campo de Gibraltar, many settling temporarily (or so they thought) in San Roque, which two years later King Philip V of Spain dubbed ‘My city of Gibraltar resident in its Campo’ (ea, by April 1705 Gibraltar was, to all intents and purposes, conceded to England (Harvey 1996: 73). It was garrisoned by Dutch and English regiments, but a mixture of Jews, Moroccans and other civilians from elsewhere in Europe were allowed to come back to the town (idem). Initially no interest was shown from London in accepting responsibility for the administration of Gibraltar, indicating that at this stage it had little intention of retaining the Rock (Harvey 1996: 72). However, there were those, like the MP Robert Harley, who recognized its potential, and he wrote in 1704: ‘The taking of Gibraltar may yet turn to great account, it being the greatest thorofare of trade in the world’ (quoted in Hills 1974: 204–5). However, perhaps surprisingly for a seafaring nation at the height of its imperial power, the British Admiralty saw it as of little strategic significance — its harbour was limited and its upkeep and defence could prove costly (Harvey 1996: 74). Nevertheless, in 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht (which was designed to ensure that the thrones of Spain and France would never be united) required the Dutch to remove their troops from Gibraltar and, in Article X, assigned the territory to Britain (as it had become after the Act of Union in 1707). However, the way in which the Article was drafted has led to arguments between Britain and Spain ever since.

Arrticle X (see Appendix 1) has been described as ‘unusual as to its length and unique in phraseology’ (Hills 1974: 222). It may be that by using the word ‘propriety’ with reference to Gibraltar, King Philip intended to give Britain its ownership and use but not sovereignty over it, and that if Britain acquired sovereignty it was through prescription rather than by treaty (Hills 1974: 224). Nor did the Article make clear whether Britain acquired Gibraltar by right of conquest, later confirmed by treaty (which is how Britain saw it), or simply by right of treaty; the text says that ‘hereby’ the King of Spain was ‘yielding’ Gibraltar, with no reference to conquest (Hills 1974: 225). These ambiguities, together with the anomalies and constraints of the Treaty — the fact that from the outset certain stipulations (such as no communication by land and sea, or the banning of Jews or Moors) were simply not observed; the absence from it of reference to the isthmus; the commitment that it shall be ‘held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever’ by Britain, followed by the reversionary clause that if Britain decided to ‘grant, sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom the propriety’ of Gibraltar then ‘the preference of having the same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others’ (see Appendix 1) — have all served to make the Treaty as much of a hindrance as a help in solving the dispute between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar.

In spite of the fact that the Treaty conceded Gibraltar to Britain in perpetuity, there were seven occasions between 1713 and 1728 when British ministers were prepared to bargain Gibraltar away (Jackson 1987: 115). King George I even had a treaty drafted in 1720 that promised to return Gibraltar to Spain in exchange for peace, but by the time that a treaty was signed with Spain a year later the reference to Gibraltar had disappeared (Hills 1974: 256). France and Spain signed a secret treaty in 1721 in which France agreed to press Britain to return Gibraltar to Spain (Jackson 1987: 122) — a move (when it became known) that made Britain rather more determined to hold on to it. The fact that Spain laid siege to the Rock for 123 days in 1727 did nothing to encourage either the British monarch or his Parliament to entertain the possibility of handing it back (Hills 1974: 278). However, possession of it continued to be seen as a mixed blessing — useful for keeping an eye on the French (although not as useful as Minorca, which had also come Britain's way as part of the Treaty of Utrecht), but expensive to maintain and not central to Britain's interests in the New World and in India (Harvey 1996: 75–6).

Nevertheless, with a relatively quiet half century following the 1727 siege, Britain was able to develop Gibraltar commercially and establish a sounder administrative base. The population in the mid-eighteenth century settled at around 6,000, with the garrison and their dependants constituting about three-quarters of it. The remainder consisted principally of Genoese and Jews, while only 6 per cent were British (Jackson 1987: 143). Gibraltar managed to avoid being an issue in any of the conflicts that occurred during that period, such as the Seven Years War (1756–1763), but that ceased to be the case when the so-called Great Siege (1779–1783) began as part of the Franco-Spanish hostilities against Britain that started in 1778. Thanks to the improvements to the fortifications set in train by Colonel (later Major General Sir) William Green in 1769, Gibraltar had been transformed, and ‘so long as Britain retained her naval supremacy, or at least local naval supremacy, Gibraltar was impregnable’ (Hills 1974: 309). The defences, together with a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge advances in European politics
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 British Gibraltar (1704–1963)
• 3 Gibraltar incommunicado (September 1963–October 1979)
• 4 The Lisbon Agreement (July 1979–April 1980)
• 5 Spain's approaches to NATO (June 1980–March 1982)
• 6 ‘Different and distant’?: the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (April–June 1982)
• 7 Spain joins NATO but the border remains closed (May–October 1982)
• 8 Felipe opens the gates (October–December 1982)
• 9 Towards the Brussels Declaration (March 1983–November 1984)
• 10 The border is fully opened: negotiations get under way (January–February 1985)
• 11 Osmosis begins (February–November 1985)
• 12 Sovereignty and sovereigns (December 1985–April 1986)
• 13 Into Felipe's second term: guards and gates (June 1986–January 1987)
• 14 The battle over the airport (January–December 1987)
• 15 Gibraltarians vote to resist (December 1987–March 1988)
• 16 First visits by first ladies (April–December 1988)
• 17 The Bossano strategy (January–February 1989)
• 18 A European Hong Kong? (March-December 1989)
• 19 Tackling money-laundering and smuggling (February–December 1990)
• 20 Felipe visits London (January–May 1991)
• 21 Four more years for Joe Bossano (May 1991–January 1992)
• 22 The external frontier issue remains unresolved (February 1992–March 1993)
• 23 Setbacks in moves towards economic independence (April 1993–April 1994)
• 24 The Brussels Declaration ten years on: slow progress on all fronts (June–December 1994)
• 25 Defiant Bossano finally gives way (January–July 1995)
• 26 Changing Spanish attitudes? (July 1995–April 1996)
• 27 All change, but no change: Aznar, Caruana and Blair in power (May 1996–June 1997)
• 28 Spain's full integration into NATO (May–December 1997)
• 29 The shadow of the shared sovereignty proposal (January–December 1998)
• 30 Confrontation sparked by fishing row escalates (January–March 1999)
• 31 Border events continue to predominate (April–July 1999)
• 32 A second term and a satisfying agreement for Caruana (August 1999–April 2000)
• 33 The saga of HMS Tireless (I) (May–December 2000)
• 34 The saga of HMS Tireless (II) (January–May 2001)
• 35 The Brussels Process resumed (May–October 2001)
• 36 Piqué and Straw meet in Barcelona (November 2001)
• 37 Rumours of joint sovereignty proposals (November 2001–January 2002)
• 38 Gibraltarians plan their resistance (February 2002)
• 39 Gibraltarians take to the streets (March–April 2002)
• 40 Negotiations run into difficulties (April–May 2002)
• 41 Straw announces agreed principles (June–July 2002)
• 42 Gibraltar holds its own referendum (July–November 2002)
• 43 Recognition of democratic reality (December 2002–June 2003)
• 44 Conclusion
• Appendix 1: The Treaty of Utrecht (2–13 July 1713)
• Appendix 2: The Lisbon Agreement (10 April 1980)
• Appendix 3: The Brussels Declaration (27 November 1984)
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index