Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey 1979-2000

Sleeping with a Tiger

Ekavi Athanassopoulou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780415834315
• eBook ISBN: 9781317694533
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Taking the period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, this book critically examines the evolution of the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey during this period, with a particular focus on the Middle Eastern context.

Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey employs interviews with US, Turkish and Israeli officials and archival research in order to offer an alternative reading of the realities that shaped bilateral co-operation through multi-level analysis. The unraveling of these realities enlightens the reader about the past course of events but also aids the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship today.

Essential reading for students and scholars of U.S. and Turkish foreign policy, this study of co-operation between a super-power and a relatively weak state in the international system will also be of use to those interested in International Relations, Diplomatic History and World Politics more broadly.

Part I

The 1980s

The rekindling of the relationship

1 A piece of real estate

Difficulties between allies

Since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine (1947) and throughout the Cold War the US interest in Turkey was shaped exclusively by strategic considerations. From Washington’s point of view Turkey’s strategic value was threefold.¹ For one, there was the large number of Turkish military forces which were available for NATO use since Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952. In addition, Turkey’s location enabled its participation in three of the four major theatres of war in NATO’s southern flank: the Mediterranean, eastern Turkey and eastern Thrace. Furthermore, Turkey could provide a host of bases and intelligence-gathering facilities in support of the interests of NATO but also of the US. Two of the biggest and most important of the Turkish intelligence facilities were located in Sinop on the Black Sea coast in north-central Turkey and in Pirinçlik near Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey. Their importance lay in the collection of various data regarding Soviet military activities within the Soviet Union, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. A smaller but equally important intelligence facility was Belbasi station, a US seismographic detection base near Ankara, which monitored Soviet nuclear tests. When it came to bases used by the US in support of NATO commitments the Incirlik air base in the southeastern part of Turkey was the biggest. A large number of US Department of Defense personnel worked and resided there (in the 1970s the number amounted to around 2,500 people).² It was a major tactical fighter base which served as a key deployment base for US Air Force Europe participating in NATO-related missions. Its significance was due to the fact that US fighters (capable of launching a conventional or a tactical nuclear strike) when located at Incirlik were the most forward deployed land-based aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition Turkey offered two important supply and storage centers for US military forces in the extreme eastern Mediterranean near the border with Syria. These were Iskenderun and Yumurtalik, close to Adana. During most of the Cold War almost 20 per cent of the Mediterranean-based fuel for the US Sixth Fleet was stored in Turkey.

It was because of the allure of these strategic assets that US officials considered a socially and politically stable, co-operative Turkey very important to their strategy of containing Soviet power. To protect the US strategic stake in Turkey the Americans developed a close dialogue not only with the Turkish governments but also with Turkey’s military leadership. The running discussion over security issues between US military officers and their Turkish counterparts over time would gather a lot of momentum, partly due to regular contact through their participation in the various NATO bodies.

For most of the 1950s the Americans co-operated closely on security issues with the government of Adnan Menderes, not only with reference to the needs of the North Atlantic Treaty but also with regard to US strategic interests in the Middle East. Thus, Turkey played a leading role in the creation of the Baghdad Pact (1955), which was part of the US strategy of containing the Soviet Union along the Northern Tier.³ At the time Ankara’s wish to closely co-operate with Washington in the Middle East originated to a large extent in the belief of the Menderes’ government that Turkey’s security interests in the region were very close with those of the US.⁴ The Turks’ willingness to assist the Americans in their strategic plans for the Middle East was greatly facilitated by handsome amounts of US aid given to Turkey (although mainly for NATO-related purposes). The Americans saw that the Turks needed military assistance if they were to maintain and modernize their large army; also, they recognized that economic assistance was necessary to help Turkey maintain its stability. Between 1946 and 1961 Turkey received on average over 100 million dollars per year in military assistance and around 86 million dollars in economic assistance. Over the Menderes period alone (1950–60) US assistance had averaged a quarter of a billion dollars per year.⁵

Yet this state of affairs between the two allies did not last beyond the 1950s. By the end of the decade and mainly since the 1960s the bilateral relationship entered a new, less co-operative phase.⁶ A number of interrelated factors accounted for this. Many analysts identify the differences of perspective between Ankara and Washington over Turkish policy regarding Cyprus as the main cause behind Turkey’s new, less-engaged policy towards the US. According to this argument, because of these differences the Turks were deeply disappointed in their ally and their trust in the Americans was under- mined.⁷ However, a few scholars provide a more comprehensive explanation. They point out that while the Cyprus issue was undoubtedly a major contributing factor, the root causes of the distance that emerged between Ankara and Washington should rather be looked for in the easing of tension between the two superpowers.⁸ In other words, under the influence of détente the US attitude towards Turkey changed both in qualitative and quantitative terms. It has been remarked that as the Cold War-tension between the US and the Soviet Union eased and the ‘tight’ bipolar system changed into a ‘loose’ one the bargaining position of many non-aligned weaker states was automatically undermined.⁹ Turkey is a good example of how the same applied also to aligned weaker states. In the new international environment Washington no longer felt that its alliance with Turkey was serving pressing security needs as had been the case in the 1950s. Consequently, from the mid 1960s US aid to Turkey in the form of grants was drastically reduced. Turkey was now expected to assume most of the expenses necessary to support its defence budget (excluding expenses for the acquisition of supplies and equipment which incurred the use of foreign currency).¹⁰ Moreover, Washington was contemplating ending all grant aid to Turkey from the 1972 fiscal year onwards (something that in the end did not happen).¹¹ In short, while successive American administrations continued to recognize Turkey’s significance for US strategic interests they were less sensitive about upsetting the Turks.

The Turkish leadership regarded these developments as extremely adverse for both the country’s economic development and its future military preparedness, for it was clear that they could not achieve their NATO-approved force goals without enough US assistance. Moreover, they firmly believed that Turkey could not take on the immense cost of supporting its military forces without seriously jeopardizing its economy.¹² Actually, as Walter Laqueur, the distinguished contemporary analyst of Middle Eastern affairs, observed at the time, ‘to many Turks, the continuing economic and social backwardness of their country, in a world which is so much dependent on technology and productivity, was an even greater menace than the Soviet army or navy.’¹³ Hence, it was not surprising that the Turks in their turn started re-examining their policy toward the US. Turkey’s attitude was not solely a reaction to Washington’s unwillingness to support Turkey financially (or politically regarding Cyprus) at least to the degree Ankara wished. It also reflected the easing of Turkish security concerns due to the reduction of the threat of a clash between the two superpowers and the improvement of Ankara’s relations with Moscow.¹⁴ Following Stalin’s death (1953) the Soviets renounced their territorial claims against Turkey and towards the end of the decade bilateral relations began slowly to improve. As from 1963 trade relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and a number of its East European satellites grew. Moscow was also offering economic help in the form of credits, which the Turkish governments were ready to accept, though the amount of help was not significant enough to replace the West as a source of credit for Turkey.¹⁵ By 1968 the State Department was referring to the existence of a ‘limited Soviet-Turkish détente’.¹⁶ Naturally these developments allowed Ankara more room for maneuvering in their policy towards the US than in the tight bipolar environment at the height of the Cold War.

The change of political leadership in 1960 also contributed to the re-examination of Turkey’s approach toward the US. After the 1960 military coup, which ousted Menderes’s Democratic Party from power, and the 1961 general elections that followed, Ismet Inönü, the leader of the Republican People’s Party became prime minister. Inönü, the older statesman who had steered Turkey through the extremely difficult course of neutrality during the Second World War, was against the ‘Americanization’ of Turkey’s foreign policy. In the 1950s as head of the opposition he had repeatedly criticized Menderes for co-operating too closely with the Americans.¹⁷ Inönü’s perception was that Turkey’s national interests did not fully coincide with those of the US. On the contrary they demanded a more flexible Turkish policy towards the Third World, compared to the one dictated by America’s hegemonic leadership. Inönü’s approach resonated with a very large part of the Kemalist political and military elite,¹⁸ who were the adherents to the republican strategic culture.¹⁹ A central component of this culture was the avoidance of ties which undermined the independence of the country. Inönü’s viewpoint was in fact vindicated by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. When the US government decided to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey it was generally assumed in Ankara that this was part of a secret arrangement between the two superpowers,²⁰ in spite of the assurances of the US government that there had been no ‘deal’ with Moscow regarding the missiles.²¹ Hence, Ankara began to think that in the midst of the new, more relaxed environment between the two superpowers Turkey ran the risk of becoming a pawn in the service of US interests and strategic calculations.²² Many members of Inönü’s government began to argue that if Washington put its own security above the interests of its allies, ‘Turkey, too, should put its national interests first...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Two traditional Turkish stories
• Maps
• Introduction
• Part I The 1980s: The rekindling of the relationship
• Part II 1991: Facing up to reality
• Part III The 1990s: New strategic games, old ideas
• Epilogue
• Bibliography
• Index of names
• General index