1 INTRODUCTION
Geraint Parry, Asif Qureshi and Hillel Sterner
This volume consists of two component elements. First, it includes the set of
presentations made to a full plenary session of the conference. And second, it
contains the contributions and discussantsâ comments prepared for the
conferenceâs Law and Political Theory workshop.
The multi-disciplinary nature of the conference provided an especially
opportune and appropriate occasion to hold a common plenary session at
which a panel of prominent representatives of each of the four contributing
disciplines was invited to address the subject of: âThe Feasibility and Desirability
of Global Free Tradeâ.
Accordingly, the presentations of Brian Barry (Political Theory), Paul
Krugman (Economics), and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Law) are reproduced
here. (Regrettably, we were unable to include Deirdre McCloskeyâs historical
contribution in this volume.) As the reader will quickly discover, there is by
no means any consensus amongst the panellists in their views on that issue.
Moreover, the lively general discussion provoked by their presentations bore
ample witness to the presence of widely differing positions within, as well as
between, these academic disciplines. The underlying reasons for this are,
perhaps, not all that difficult to discern.
The campaign against the Corn Laws and in favour of free trade represented,
from its inception, a moral as well as an economic programme. It claimed to
offer to the British population a remarkable combination of economic
improvement and social justice. By liberating trade, serious fetters on industrial
growth would be removed and the injustice of the âbread taxâ on the very
necessities of life abolished. More universally, free trade would bring about a
new manner of conducting affairs between nations. The pursuit of narrowly
conceived national advantage, by protection coupled with warfare, would
gradually give way to an appreciation of the mutual advantages of international
commerce in conditions of peaceful competition. It is thus entirely
comprehensible that Cobden, in championing free trade, also conceived of it
as an instrument for educative enlightenment and sought to promote it through
the establishment of international schools in which pupils of different nations
would learn together the virtues of international cooperation.
At the same time, protection, though castigated by free traders as a doctrine
of short-sighted national interest, had, and continues to have its defenders,
whose arguments similarly deploy moral considerations of undeniable
significance. Protection, it has been urged, may be regarded as safeguarding
those groups who are especially vulnerable to the fluctuations of world markets.
It is seen as a means of providing less developed societies and industries with
a breathing space in which to catch up with those first in the field. Equally
important, it may sometimes be advanced as a necessary means for sustaining
local ways of life endangered by powerful foreign and homogenizing influences.
And increasingly nowadays, protectionism may be invoked to preserve valued
aspects of the global environment.
These issues are all touched upon in a number of ways in the chapters
devoted to political theory. And they are also central to the problems addressed
by the international lawyers. What was distinctive about the Repeal of the
Corn Laws was that it was a unilateral national measure, though one with
significant international repercussions. In the present day, however, the typical
approach to trade regulation is through the creation and development of
international agreements and institutions. Thus as we enter the twenty-first
century, it falls increasingly to a global community of negotiators to interpret
the underlying principles and establish the detailed regulations of a new
economic order which must seek to reconcile the liberalization of trade, in
agricultural commodities and manufactures as well as services of an everchanging
nature, with the still deep-rooted desire for the preservation of
domestic cultures and the growing recognition of the need for conservation.
The coupling together of Law and Political Theory in a single conference
workshop was seen from the outset as being in the nature of a worthwhile
intellectual experiment. Of course, the relation between scholarship in these
two fields possesses a long historical pedigree: political and legal theorists have
been addressing many similar questions for centuries. Our aim in this workshop,
however, was to achieve some complementarity of analytical focus between
the more practical concerns of lawyers and the characteristically abstract
concerns of political theory. Evidently, questions about the desirability of certain
institutions and policies cannot be satisfactorily answered in the absence of
soundly distilled information about their feasibility. Conversely, whether and
in what circumstances realistic prospects for trade liberalization ought to be
pursued must depend upon coherent assessments of their relative meritsâ
assessments that need to be anchored in a set of broader theoretical frameworks.
That said, the pairing of legal and political theory papers at each session
confronted the discussants with the formidable challenge of bridging often
very divergent ways of looking at similar phenomena. This task they discharged
admirably, managing to draw illuminating contrasts and parallels even in
those instances where the papersâ perspectives differed quite markedly.
Some commentators on public affairs have dubbed the first Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Singapore
1 as beinghigh
on rhetoric but short on results. But rhetoric, one might suggest, can often be a prelude to achievement in the long run. There is thus some merit in mentioning that meeting, which was focused inter alia on further expanding and strengthening the system of international trade regulation, since this was also a central theme of the Law and Political Theory workshop. Indeed it is to the credit of the contributors that their chapters closely mirror and predict the concerns and outcomes of the Ministerial Meeting.
Simon Caney distinguishes two dominant theoretical approaches to the general question of what norms ought to govern statesâ dealings with one another in regard to trade as well as other matters: cosmopolitanism and realism. The former is universalistic and does not discriminate among human beings in taking a policyâs impact on their respective interests as the measure of its justifiability. Realism, in all its various forms, rejects this as Utopian and insists that national interest is the paramount consideration determining the moral obligations by which any stateâs policies can or should be judged. Caney carefully examines the three principal types of objection mounted by realists against cosmopolitanism and finds them unsuccessful.
John Hunt integrates a historical and political perspective with a significant breadth of realism. He rightly points out the influence of political structure on trade policy, and the need to create new disciplines, emphasizing particularly competition and investment. His realism leads him to suggest liberalization as an incremental process and not as an immediate fiat. One can but note his accurate prediction that the Singapore Ministerial Meeting would be a premature forum to launch another new round of negotiations for trade liberalization.
Owen McIntyre challenges some of the assumptions underlying Caneyâs dichotomy between the cosmopolitan approach and that of realism. He suggests that national interests can be realized through cosmopolitanism. Drawing on Huntâs paper, he illustrates the point by suggesting that the primary benefit sought by the Anti-Corn Law League was cheap food for the British consumer rather than any universal benefit for the world at large.
Peter Ingram argues that, historically, international law has been chiefly focused on adversarial features of interstate relations, and has not balanced this concern with one for the regulation of those extensive non-conflictual transactions that constitute and advance international economic interdependence. Indeed the voluntaristic character of international legal obligations, as well as the world s plurality of value systems, represent substantial obstacles to the adequate formation of such a regulatory framework. However, Ingram finds the development of international institutions along with the growth of their procedural powersâand the stake nations acquire in their continuing membership of such organizationsâto hold out some promise of overcoming the longstanding problems posed by both voluntarism and the purely formal equality of states.
Ulick Bourke emphasizes the strengthening of multilateral disciplines. He advocates the direct applicability of international trade norms in nationalsystems and interestingly calls for direct access, for private parties, to international judicial processes in the field of trade.
Responding to Ingram and Bourke, William Lucy queries the plausibility of any strongly unified explanation of developments in international law, and suggests that the notion of âtrustâ may have an important role in understanding aspects of interstate cooperation.
Jonathan Wolff contends that, in so far as the moral case for freer trade rests on (various conceptions of) the desirability of competition, it may be weakly grounded. These several conceptions are each identified and subjected to critical assessment. Wolff argues that, although it may be true that competition advances social utility, neither that consideration nor any other of these conceptions precludes the possibility that competitive exchanges are
exploitative. And he therefore concludes that competition and the trade
deregulation that may be needed to bring it about must, to be justifiable, be
accompanied by systems of compensation for those who would otherwise be
the resultant losers.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann offers a detailed exposition of the relationship of
trade and competition rules. His perspective on competition rules is defined in
terms of access to markets. As such, competition policy is conceived both in
terms of governmental as well as private anticompetitive activities. Petersmann,
however, points out the need for strengthening the competition rules as they
relate to private activities. He explains how the seeds for integrating such rules
have to some degree already been sown in the international regulation of tradeâ
particularly the WTO. Petersmann concludes by advocating a progressive
integration of competition rules in the WTO system through, initially, the
establishment of a WTO Committee on Trade and Competition. Thereafter, it
is suggested, a subsequent WTO round of trade negotiations should integrate
competition rules into the WTO code. Parallel to this effort, Petersmann
advocates a Plurilateral Agreement2 on Trade and Competition.
Despite their diverging assessments of the merits of international
competition, Ian Carter argues that several of the caveats respectively offered
by Wolff and Petersmann imply significant points of convergence on the kinds
of circumstance in which liberalized trade is warranted.
Avner de-Shalit outlines four types of international exploitation and
contends that, as standardly interpreted, both Marxist and liberal theories of
exploitation provide deficient explanatory accounts of them. However these
theories fare better when revised to include consideration of the autonomyeroding
effects of inferior bargaining positions. De-Shalit thereby draws
attention to the possibility that free trade between rich and poor nations may
be exploitative, by virtue of fostering manipulation of the lattersâ preferences
through the displacement of their indigenous cultural values.
Michael Johnson aptly describes the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) as âwork in progressâ and, in that context, traces the influences which
led to its establishment. Some of these resulted in limited market
accesscommitments, in a list of exemptions from the most-favoured-nation
(MFN) standard and the postponing of negotiations for liberalization of trade
in parts of the services sector. Further, he highlights some of the difficulties in
the current structure of GATS: for example, the problem of quantifying
commitments in the services sector and identifying market access problems.
Finally, in looking to the future, he notes the difficulties of defining a subsidy
in the services sector and of formulating a safeguard agreement.
David Milman concludes that exploitation is indeed a common theme
between what de-Shalit explains and what Johnson examines in the field of
trade in services, the former being concerned with constructing a viable theory
of exploitation and the latter with the operation of practical realpolitik in the
field of trade in services. But Milman observes that the new GATS has some
way to go before it can be assessed in terms of equity and exploitation.
Bhaskar Vira explores the substantive conflict between economic deregulation,
such as trade liberalization, and environmental regulation. Acknowledging both
the strength and limitations of the efficiency argument for deregulated trade,
he argues that economic growth by itself is insufficient to mitigate the
environmental impact of much human activity. The fact that both
environmentalists and free trade advocates support full cost internalization
does not imply invariable compatibility between their positions since, in some
circumstances, optimal environmental policies must include quantitative controls
on resource extraction and product and technology useâcontrols which directly
affect the volume and composition of international trade.
James Cameron comprehensively surveys recent developments in the
international trade and environment debateâparticularly in the context of
conflicting interests in trade and the environment. This is done by considering
inter alia some GATT/WTO cases and the agenda of the WTO Committee on
Trade and the Environment. Essentially he advocates the balancing of trade
and environmental concerns in the WTO forum. He is firmly of the view that there need to be changes in the WTO code: for example, by the amendment of Article XX of the GATT,
3 and through a presumption of compatibility between
national measures conforming to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
and provisions of the WTO code. He concludes by noting the need for some
demonstrable success at the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.
Strongly endorsing central points in the accounts offered by Vira and
Cameron, Brian Barry argues that trade-restricting measures must have a
role to play in the economic system of any society that seeks to balance
considerations of consumer satisfaction with those of producer satisfaction
and environmental protection.4
Asif Qureshi focuses on the trade-related aspects of international taxation.
He traces fiscal sovereignty under General International Law and under the
GATT/WTO framework in the light of the trade-distortive effects of taxation.
He concludes by making a proposal for a WTO code of conduct on the
trade-related aspects of international taxation.
Reflecting on Qureshiâs chapter, Anthony Carty draws attention to the
German conviction that perpetual peace requires consideration of not just
the removal of trade barriers but also effective political structures.
Hillel Steiner claims that, although it seems certain that some kinds of
international trade are morally undesirable and that persons ought not to
engage in them, this fact is insufficient to justify their enforced restriction on
grounds of justice which requires that they be legally permitted. Identifying
several broad types of morally objectionable trade, he argues that legal
restriction of only one of themâtrade with regimes that countenance domestic
rights violationsâcan be so justified and may, perhaps, be morally mandatory.
Edmond McGovern supplies an interesting exploration of how standards
and technical regulations can operate as barriers to trade. In particular, he
considers the existing opportunities within the WTO system to deal with the
capacity of national technical regulations and standards to create problems
for international trade. Four strategies are identified for dealing with standards
and technical regulations from the perspective of liberal trade: namely, nondiscrimination,
control of trade-restrictive regulations, harmonization and
integration, and procedural and institutional improvements.
Commenting on Steinerâs and McGovernâs papers, Peter Jones finds moral
consequentialism to be the normative approach underpinning the ECâs and
WTOâs official ideology and its capacity to accommodate important social
values threatened by free tradeâa capacity which is absent in rights-based
conceptions of justice.
Notes
1 Held in December 1996.
2 That is, an agreement binding only on the parties to the agreement.
3 Article XX lists the general exceptions to the GATT prohibitions against the
imposition of trade-restrictive measures.
4 Barryâs comments on the papers by Vira and Cameron are incorporated in his
plenary panel presentation, pp. 12â25.