German Disarmament After World War I

The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 1920-1931

Richard J. Shuster

• Publisher: Routledge
• Edition: 1
• Year: 2006
• Topic: History
• Print ISBN:
  9780415654951
  9780415358088
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134246151
• Index: History

German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles.

In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31:

• the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace
• the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition
• the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions.

These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany's ability to pose a military threat to European security.

This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world.

This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.

1 Introduction

When the guns in Europe fell silent on 11 November 1918, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, as well as the defeated Central Powers and their allies, opened their eyes to a Europe changed forever by the brutality of war. Over eight million soldiers had died, roughly equal to the amount killed in the previous eight centuries of warfare in Europe.¹ The rapid advance of technology had outpaced the strategic and tactical doctrines of the great European General Staffs and had helped lead to the sustained and costly casualty rate. Geopolitical ambition, diplomatic ineptitude, arrogance, willpower, obsolete planning, together with the twentiethcentury arsenal of heavy artillery, machine-guns, tanks, poison gas, submarines and airplanes, had destroyed a generation. Hence, the leaders of the victorious powers vowed never to allow the repetition of such a catastrophic event. Britain and France held the fate of the powerful German military in their hands, and the diplomatic path upon which the two nations embarked would leave an indelible mark upon the entire post-war decade.

Spawned by strategic concerns and the moral outrage left as a legacy of World War I, the Allies initiated their decision to disarm Germany in broad terms in the Armistice in November 1918 and then much more comprehensively as an entire section of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919.² The disarmament of a defeated enemy was not a novel concept in 1918 but the scale involved in disarming Germany was unprecedented. The most recent instances of European disarmament concerning great powers occurred in the Napoleonic era. Prussia in 1808, Austria in 1809, and France itself in 1815 had experienced various disarmament measures.³ The scale, however, was simply not comparable to the disarmament of a great twentieth-century power. With the introduction of highly lethal weapons, organized General Staffs and industrial proficiency, the modern arsenal of the great powers far surpassed the military capacity of the previous century. To make matters more difficult, the men and material of the German army at the end of the war were quantitatively and qualitatively among the world’s elite. Britain, France and the United States stood victorious over a military force of over 400,000 soldiers, tens of thousands of artillery pieces and trench mortars, approximately 100,000 machine-guns, countless rounds of ammunition, and various types of equipment that constituted a superior modern army. In addition, the German industrial base that produced massive amounts of war materials remained intact. The German military, defeated and demoralized at the end of the war, faced the indictment of the victorious democracies, and the subsequent development and implementation of Allied disarmament strategies and efforts toward Germany became a crucial element of European post-war diplomatic and military affairs.

With the defeat of Germany, Britain and France emerged from World War I as the dominant European powers and quickly established authority over the development and enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. Although Britain, France and the United States were responsible for drafting the treaty, the diplomatic and political withdrawal of America from Europe after the final rejection of the treaty in 1920 resulted in Anglo–French control over the peace settlement toward Germany. Although Belgium, Italy and Japan participated in Allied disarmament operations in Germany, they generally supported either the policies of Britain or France with little initiative of their own. Thus, the disarmament of the German military remained essentially an Anglo–French affair for its duration from 1920 to 1931. Although British and French losses in the war justified Anglo–French control of the disarmament process, the strained relationship raised questions about the efficacy of disarmament operations in Germany. In fact, British and French differences over disarmament priorities augmented the instability of the post-war period and created difficulties in enforcing the military clauses upon a bitter Germany. As a result, Britain and France attempted to assert themselves and rise above the dissolution of the entente in an attempt to control the course of German disarmament.

Great Britain and France emerged from World War I with bipolar outlooks concerning European affairs, and their foreign policies reflected this disparity. Britain, with an insular location essentially safe from military aggression, focused upon the restoration of the balance of power and stability on the Continent.⁴ France, on the other hand, was exclusively concerned with security against the threat of renewed German aggression. Allied in the intense struggle to defeat Germany in World War I, at war’s end the common factor that united the two nations was gone, and the unified effort to bring an everlasting peace to Europe would soon become entangled in conflicting strategies toward the enforcement of the economic, territorial and military aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. Although the British and French eventually reached an accord toward German disarmament at the Paris Peace Conference, differences would remain throughout disarmament operations.

When the war came to a close, Britain found itself in a more advantageous and stable position than France. As a major imperialist rival before the war, Germany had threatened Britain’s security, trade routes, and colonial empire with its navy. Once a primary concern to British interests, German naval competition disappeared with Germany’s defeat and the subsequent scuttling of the Imperial Navy, interned in Scapa Flow, in 1919. During the war Britain had abandoned its traditional foreign and military policy by becoming heavily involved with ground forces on the Continent. With its security re-established in 1918, however, Britain sought to restore the balance of power and stability on the Continent by preventing French domination of Germany. This strategy was present throughout the discussions and negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, and continued to influence British decisions concerning Allied disarmament operations.

In comparison to the relative safety of Great Britain, French political and military authorities considered their security threatened by Germany’s larger population and dominant military-industrial potential. The French had lost Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in the Franco–Prussian War, and World War I left France with almost one and half million dead and many important industrial areas destroyed. The terrible losses in the war thus rendered France obsessed with security, and victory allowed the French to attempt to bolster their position vis-à-vis Germany. Germany’s industrial and military potential was superior to every nation in Europe, and most French leaders, despite emerging victorious from the war, believed that German military-industrial power would inevitably dominate the Continent once again. As a result, at the Paris Peace Conference and throughout the 1920s, France attempted to weaken Germany to ensure French security and leadership on the Continent. Britain, in seeking to maintain a stable balance of power in Europe, feared French hegemony and attempted to thwart French schemes for political and territorial aggrandizement. The result was a mix of treaty enforcement, lengthy negotiations, conferences, modifications and appeasement.

The disarmament of Germany was a contentious issue in post-war international affairs that ultimately proved to be an area of Allied success. As one of the main sections of the Treaty of Versailles, German disarmament emerged in the war’s aftermath as an enormous challenge to the Allied quest for European security. British and French leaders viewed the disarmament of Germany as a focal point of the peace settlement, pushing it to the forefront of issues that the victorious powers addressed in Paris. Although the Treaty of Versailles sought to secure European peace through territorial revision, reparations, occupation, and disarmament, only the latter represented the most concrete means to remove the possibility of German aggression. The Allies agreed unanimously that they had to place severe restrictions upon the German military, and disarmament became an instant and enduring test of Allied treaty enforcement. Despite philosophical differences and German obstruction to their efforts, the Allies stuck to the task for the entire post-war decade. The issue of German disarmament remained a priority in the development and enforcement of the peace and had lasting effects upon the Allied coalition by fostering international cooperation through a system of diplomatic conferences, military operations, and the creation and maintenance of Allied civilian and military organizations.

Disarmament operations in Germany allowed British and French troops, along with their Belgian, Italian and Japanese allies, to work in concert on German soil. The British, French and Belgian soldiers that evaluated the extent of German disarmament eventually outlasted their compatriots stationed at the Rhine bridgeheads in Cologne, Mainz and Coblenz. At the center of the issue of disarmament was the system of international arms inspection that the Allies implemented from 1920 to 1927. The presence of “boots on the ground” in international disarmament operations in Germany should not be underestimated as inspections guaranteed direct oversight of German military installations and industry. Disarmament operations also allowed the inspectors to observe and report on military and political conditions inside Germany. Allied soldiers working to disarm Germany provided critical analysis in evaluating the capability and intentions of the German military for over a decade.

The Allied disarmament of Germany from 1920 to 1931 is relevant to contemporary questions and lends insight into the understanding and application of foreign policy at the start of the twenty-first century. Although the geopolitical situation of the 1920s differs dramatically from that of the 1990s and early 2000s, the Allied disarmament of Germany does provide certain lessons that could be applied to current events. Some similarities between the Allied attempt to disarm Germany and the efforts of the United Nations in the disarmament of Iraq in the 1990s have been particularly illuminating. For instance, illegal chemical weapons production, clandestine caches of war material, and denial of access to inspectors to sensitive sites are just some of the issues that confronted international inspection efforts in Germany and Iraq. In both cases, inspectors were able to overcome many of the difficulties they faced. Although a continuing controversial subject, evidence suggests that international disarmament operations in Iraq in the 1990s successfully eradicated stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction while the second round of inspections in 2002 to 2003 seemed to verify this success. A robust inspection process, especially when supported by an international coalition that imposes sanctions to punish noncompliance with disarmament demands, can prove to be an effective means of enforcement. Disarmament efforts continue to be a focal point of international affairs in the twenty-first century, and the international community can benefit from the knowledge of Allied strategies and successes in efforts to disarm a modern power of the twentieth century.

The historiography of European inter-war diplomacy is plentiful and diverse, yet the Allied disarmament of Germany has not received the attention it deserves. As Philip Towle argues in Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War, military historians have focused on wartime strategy rather than peacemaking, while diplomatic historians have examined the political questions of peace conferences at the expense of their military aspects.⁵ Despite numerous studies concerning the multitude of issues arising from the Treaty of Versailles, there has been no specific work that encompasses multinational efforts to disarm Germany after World War I. Reparations, occupation, territorial questions and illicit German rearmament have received copious amounts of attention yet historians have largely neglected the question of disarmament. The scholarship has consisted of either general studies or has examined only the German side of the issue. David Williamson, in The British in Germany, 1918–1930: The Reluctant Occupiers, examines British occupation forces in Europe after World War I and surveys Allied disarmament efforts in Germany in the 1920s. In referring to disarmament, Williamson outlines general British policy and concerns, including initial insight into British differences of opinion in assessing the level of fulfillment of the disarmament clauses of the treaty, but points out that there has been no comprehensive analysis of British efforts toward the disarmament of Germany.⁶ Aside from the publication of memoirs of Allied officers involved in the disarmament of Germany, such as General Nollet’s Une Expérience de Désarmement and Paul Roques’s Le Contrôle Militaire Interallié en Allemagne, the French perspective in disarming Germany has been equally neglected.

On the other hand, in Entwaffnung und Militärkontrolle in Deutschland, 1919–1927, Michael Salewski focuses on German strategy and reaction to Allied disarmament and bases his book exclusively upon German archival sources. He argues that the IAMCC exaggerated German violations and asserts that Allied disarmament efforts injured German honor and sovereignty.⁷ Salewski does not, however, provide an analysis of Allied disarmament policies and concludes his study in 1927, four years before the final elements of Allied disarmament disappeared. Francis Ludwig Carsten has explored the political role of the German army after World War I in The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933, where he briefly discusses German violations of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty.⁸ Within the context of the emergence of the Reichswehr as a political force in Weimar Germany, Carsten’s analysis of German disarmament focuses on some of the German military evasions and strategies under General Hans von Seeckt without an examination of the Allied perspective on German disarmament. One additional study, Covert German Disarmament 1919–1939 by Barton Whaley, also focuses upon German disarmament violations of the Treaty of Versailles but precludes an examination of Allied roles in the enforcement of the military clauses of the treaty.⁹

Secondary sources on inter-war Anglo–French relations and the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles are voluminous. Classic studies such as Arnold Wolfers’ Britain and France Between Two Wars and Robert Jordan’s Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 1918–1939 provide historians with the nuts and bolts of inter-war European diplomacy.¹⁰ Current historians have not shied away entirely from additional studies of this particular period of history, nor has the Treaty of Versailles been collecting dust in the current historiography; but the Allied enforcement of disarmament has not yet received due attention. William Kleine- Ahlbrandt in The Burden of Victory: France, Britain, and the Enforcement of the Versailles Peace 1919–1925 surveys Allied conference diplomacy from Versailles to Locarno but ignores disarmament.¹¹ Similarly, Sara Moore, in Peace Without Victory for the Allies 1918–1932, concentrates exclusively on economic issues in Anglo–French relations.¹² Astonishingly, the most comprehensive analysis of the Treaty of Versailles to date, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, examines reparations, territorial questions, war guilt, and British, French, and American policies toward the drafting and enforcement of the treaty but entirely neglects the issue of German disarmament.¹³

In assessing Allied disarmament operations in Germany from 1920 to 1931, this study examines three major areas of interest: the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of Britain and France, British dominance in controlling the direction of Allied disarmament policy toward Germany, and the Allied success in destroying German military strength, most effectively through a united policy backed by military sanctions. The three focal points of the study are interrelated, and in order to clarify Allied motivations behind the disarmament of Germany, they necessarily overlap at various times throughout the period of Allied operations. In addition, the general foreign policy strategies of Britain and France in the post-war period, the balance of power versus security, respectively, will serve as a backdrop to the study.

From the outset of Allied disarmament operations in Germany, Britain and France held dichotomous opinions toward the most efficient means of degrading the strength of the German military. Whereas British political and military authorities advocated the destruction of German armaments as the most effective means to disarm Germany, the French stressed the reduction of the German army and police and the eradication of all paramilitary organizations. Although the French supported and initially demanded the enforcement of every clause of the Versailles Treaty, their focus on the question of German armed military personnel led to a distinct difference of opinion with the British in the development and implementation of Allied disarmament strategies and operations. The most pressing ramification of the Anglo–French variance in disarmament priorities was the centrifugal force it applied to a common disarmament policy. The Allied promises of 1918 to enforce a peace settlement in its entirety would not survive the post-war divergence of British and French disarmament priorities, but Allied disarmament operations in Germany would last beyond all expectations.

Within the post-war Anglo–French relationship, British leadership in the development and implementation of Allied disarmament operations was an influential factor in the outcome of German disarmament. Although German disarmament was largely an Anglo–French undertaking, British political and military leadership asserted itself as a forceful presence from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to the withdrawal of the last vestiges of Allied military control in 1931. After the political and military withdrawal of the United States from Europe, the Anglo–French relationship was the key to the maintenance of peaceful European relations in the post-war period. The Allied enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles was the initial means to achieve such lofty ends, but changes in British attitudes toward enforcement throughout the 1920s impacted upon overall German fulfilment, albeit in a relatively trivial amount. French security depended upon the strict enforcement of the treaty but the clash of British and French strategies toward treaty enforcement and the disarmament of Germany necessitated a change in French policy. The dominant British presence and the reciprocal French acquiescence in the Allied disarmament of Germany was a microcosm of Anglo–French relations toward Germany in the inter-war period. The periodically antagonistic Anglo–French relationship of the 1920s would have lasting effects until the outbreak of World War II.

An examination of the use of Allied sanctions to ensure fulfilment of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty is crucial to assessing the effectiveness of Anglo–French disarmament efforts in Germany and sheds light upon a subject that will continue to influence modern foreign and military relations. The Treaty of Versailles reflected Allied desires in 1919 to punish Germany for her aggressive role in the outbreak of the war, address nationalistic ambitions and the cries for self-determination of peoples, and prevent another world war. It was an ambitious attempt to address Europe’s grievances but contained a serious flaw. Although the treaty comprised 440 articles, an oversight that would affect the enforcement of the disarmament clauses and the execution of the treaty in general was the absence of any effective schemes to address German non-compliance or violations other than the prolongation of the Rhineland occupation. As a result, Britain and France had to develop ad hoc policies of enforcement.

Despite violations of the military clauses of the treaty, the Allies experienced much success in disarming Germany, especially when enforcing common disarmament strategies with the threat of military sanctions. The development and implementation of Allied sanctions to enforce the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles illustrated the importance Britain and France placed upon the demilitarization of Germany. With no legal recourse to apply sanctions in case of German non-fulfilment of its treaty obligations, except to extend the duration of the Rhineland occupation under Article 429, the Allies eventually established their authority in the enforcement of the military clauses of the treaty by applying the threat of occupation. The use of the threat of military sanctions by Britain and France in July 1920, May 192...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• 1 Introduction
• Part I Allied disarmament (1919)
• Part II Germany disarmed (1920–1922)
• Part III The Ruhr crisis and the resumption of disarmament operations (1923–1924)
• Part IV A new era (1925–1927)
• Part V Goodbye to all that (1927–1931)
• Notes
• Bibliography