Contemporary Spanish Foreign Policy

David Garcia, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, David Garcia, Ramon Pacheco Pardo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317631231
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the evolution of Spanish foreign policy since 1975, through five different presidencies, spanning its transformation from a dictatorial political system and backward economy to a modern European state, fully democratic and with a well-functioning market economy, under strain from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt crisis. It explains how domestic developments and external factors have combined to shape Spain's international relations, assessing the impact of EU membership and providing an example of how middle powers can pursue their foreign policy objectives in the international system. The authors explore a range of topics including:

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• Defence and security

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• Economy and development

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• Soft power

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• Spanish policy towards the EU, the United States, Latin America, the Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Spanish politics and history, European Union studies, foreign policy, international relations and security studies.

1 Introduction

Contemporary Spanish foreign policy

Ramon Pacheco Pardo and David Garcia Cantalapiedra

Writing in 1621, Don Baltasar de Zuñiga, valido,¹ uncle and protector of the Count-Duke of Olivares, advised Don Gaspar de Guzman, future valido for King Felipe IV of Spain the following: ‘una monarquia en mi sentir, cuando ha perdido su reputacion, aun cuando no haya perdido el estado, es un cielo sin luz, un sol sin rayos, sin espiritu un cadaver’ (cited in Elliot 2004: 65).² At the centre of Spain’s monarchy during the zenith of the country’s power, Zuñiga governed over an empire that showed clear signals of fatigue and decline. For him, however, it was unthinkable to relinquish his duty due to the double issue of conservacion y reputacion (preservation and standing). Currently, these terms could be translated into two types of power, respectively: hard and soft; that is, maintenance of capabilities, powers and territory, and the ability to be attractive to other actors through one’s diplomacy, culture and values. After a long period of decline taking it from global empire to great power to regional power and finally middle power, contemporary Spain’s interests, goals, needs and problems still converge around these two same types of power.

Historically, there were two different schools of thought advancing their own propositions regarding how to deal with the four issues of interests, goals, needs and problems, not only in terms of Spanish foreign policy but also in relation to state-building and the defence and achievement of the country’s interests.

These two schools were the arbitristas (projectors)³ in the early seventeenth century and the regeneracionistas (regenerationists) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴

Arguably, however, the most important and famous line in recent Spanish history regarding the best means to solve Spain’s state-building and foreign policy problems can be found in the well-known axiom of Spanish philosopher and writer Jose Ortega y Gasset: ‘España es el problema, Europa la solucion.’

This was meant to anchor Spain to the destiny of becoming European not only in terms of modernisation, but also in terms of finally abandoning any ‘international adventurism’ suggesting independent and great power behaviour.

In the view of Ortega y Gasset, this kind of policy had always prevented Spanish elites to modernise and ‘to vertebrate’ the country.

The Europeanisation of Spain and, then, of its foreign policy was at the core of Spanish foreign policy during most of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To a certain extent, Europeanisation meant for Spain to maintain a low profile at the global level, even though the country has vital and enduring interests not only in Europe but also, traditionally, in four other areas: the Mediterranean, Latin America, the Middle East, and the relationship with the United States.

In the early twenty-first century, with its fiscal house in order, Spain would probably have been well-positioned to attain a degree of influence in global affairs disproportionate to its medium size (Coletta and Garcia Cantalapiedra 2013). However, a set of factors and events have shaken the very basis of Spain’s statecraft: the characteristics of Spanish society and its evolution in an uncertain environment resulting from (mis)perceptions about Spain’s role and the realities of a changing international system; the tremendous economic, fiscal and institutional crisis that resulted not only from the global financial crisis and the burst of Spain’s own economic bubble, but also from its mismanagement by the government; the lessons of the Iraq invasion, which created a huge debate regarding Spanish foreign policy; and, following the 2004 Madrid bombings, the split within Spanish society.

Future Spanish governments will probably have to get used to the country’s position as a declining middle power with lower influence in the regions in which Spain often had an important role – such as Europe, North Africa, Latin America or, to an extent, the Middle East. These regions have been the main focus of Spanish foreign policy for a long time, as well as part of Spain’s vital interests since the days when in the Spanish Empire ‘the sun never set down’.⁵ Regardless of this possible future, however, Spain remains strongly linked to Europe for geographical and cultural reasons, as well as due to the country’s interests and needs. Thus, the Europeanisation process of Spanish foreign policy will not cease.

Notwithstanding this process, recovering its capabilities after the global financial crisis is vital for Spain. Equally important is Spain’s regaining of a reputation as a reliable partner and a capable middle power with global interests, and with intrinsically imbued resources such as its culture, a global language, an educated population, and still-notable international resources.

A correct analysis and understanding of Spain’s current position as well as of international system dynamics are keys for the development of Spanish foreign policy. Above all, and considering the impact of a changing international system, it is necessary to identify Spain’s interests and priorities, to assess its capabilities, and to understand when vital interests necessitate the implementation of more autonomous policies, due to cooperation with Spain’s partners not being possible.

This edited volume has this vocation. It seeks to analyse and assess contemporary Spanish foreign policy from an academic perspective. This has been difficult in the past, since the discipline of International Relations is quite young in Spain. Thus, an International Relations theory-based analysis of Spanish foreign policy is uncommon, both in the Spanish literature and in Spain’s foreign policy doctrine. The tradition of academic participation in foreign policy-making and advising is not as common in Spain as it is in most of Europe – not to mention in the Anglo-Saxon world. Traditionally, foreign policy-making in Spain has been kept in the hands of government policy-makers, the diplomatic corps, and the military.

Concurrently, this edited volume seeks to provide one of the first and most comprehensive English-language introductions to contemporary Spanish foreign policy. Following the end of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, Spain reassessed its foreign policy strategy with regards to the issues of defence and security, economy and development, and soft power. Meanwhile, Spain’s policy towards its traditional areas of interest – Europe, the United States, Latin America, and the Mediterranean – evolved. Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia became more prominent foreign policy interests. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the evolution and current state of Spanish foreign policy.

Spain’s foreign policy-making structures

Foreign policy-making structures in Spain are similar to those in other Western European countries. There is a formal structure encompassing the prime minister, his Cabinet, relevant ministries, and foreign policy-implementation agencies. Concurrently, there is an informal structure involving civil society as well as regional governments – particularly relevant in the case of a decentralised country such as Spain. Meanwhile, Spain’s membership of the EU means that there is a third foreign policy-making structure with formal and informal aspects.

Spanish politics are defined by increasing presidentialism (Van Biezen and Hopkin 2007). The prime minister has a strong position, to the detriment of other ministers and parliament. Thus, the formal structure taking foreign policy decisions in Spain is dominated by the prime minister. The Council of Ministers (i.e. the Cabinet), however, meets on a weekly basis. This gives ministries direct, regular access to the prime minister through their respective ministers. Ministries therefore have strong input on Spain’s foreign policy decisions.

Similarly to other Western European countries, the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economy are often involved in Spain’s foreign policy decision-making and implementation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence represent the interests of diplomats and the military, respectively, the two groups with greatest influence in Spanish foreign policy – after the Cabinet itself. Other ministries, most notably Culture and Home Affairs, are regularly invited to participate in foreign policy decisions as well. The weekly Council of Ministers meetings ensure that Spanish foreign policy strategy can receive input from these and other ministries when necessary, even if final decisions are taken by the prime minister. In 2000, the Foreign Policy Council was created as an advisory mechanism for projecting Spanish foreign policy in a moment of expansion in the interests of Spain.⁶ The council’s members are mostly ministers, other government officials, prime minister’s office members, and the High Commisioner for Marca España (when required). However, this council has hardly been used for years, although the new PP government has started to use it recently. In this vein, the last Spanish Security Strategies (2011 and 2013) called of a National Security Council, which was finally created in 2013.⁷ This new council was one of the main goals of the 2013 Spanish National Security Strategy, although it was also a goal of the 2011 Spanish Security Strategy. At the same time, the Office of the Prime Minister (Presidencia del Gobierno) created a department for National Security for the management of this area and the goal of the 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS).

With regards to specialised foreign policy-implementation agencies, three stand out. The National Intelligence Centre (CNI) is Spain’s civil intelligence agency, under the control of the Ministry of the Presidency; the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID) is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is the main organisation in the area of aid and development; and the Cervantes Institute, which is also part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supports the implementation of Spanish foreign policy goals in the area of culture, thus fostering Spain’s soft power. Other agencies also support the implementation of Spain’s foreign policy when necessary.

Spain’s informal foreign policy structure includes two different groups. Civil society is considered to be underdeveloped in Spain when compared to its Western European counterparts (Magone 2009). Nevertheless, well-organised groups seeking to influence policy do exist. These include the media, think tanks, NGOs, business groups and academia. As already mentioned, foreign policy-making in Spain has been dominated by government officials, diplomats and the military; nonetheless, civil society groups with an interest in world politics, foreign policy, and Spain’s role in international affairs seek to influence the direction of the country’s foreign policy.

Indeed, foreign policy matters have become of growing interest for civil society as Spain’s democracy has consolidated and EU membership has shown the close links between international and domestic matters. Most notably, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), the Elcano Royal Institute, and the Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE) are foreign policy-specific think tanks in Spain ranked among the top 100 in the world (McGann 2013). Meanwhile, the media and academic sectors produce highquality reports and papers on Spanish foreign policy and international affairs. The challenge seems to be to increase their impact on policy-making.

The second group which is part of Spain’s informal foreign policy structure is made up of regional governments. Following the consolidation of its democratic transition, Spain has become a highly decentralised country: for instance, Colomer (1998) talks about a non-institutionalised federalism. Strong regional governments command a high degree of autonomy (Colino and del Pino 2011). Decentralisation first began as a means for regional governments to have more control over domestic matters such as education, financing and healthcare. Eventually, decentralisation reached the area of foreign policy as well.

At the time of writing, regional governments have over 160 offices overseas. Andalusia, Basque Country, Catalonia and Valencia are the four regions with the largest number of offices overseas, with China, Belgium, the United States, Brazil, France and Germany being – in this order – the leading hosts of these offices (Gonzalez 2013). Furthermore, regional governments signed over 270 international agreements for the 1990–2010 period. Andalusia, Catalonia and Galicia led the way in this respect (Gonzalez 2013). In short, some regional governments are active actors in global affairs and therefore influence Spanish international relations.

The third structure in which the foreign policy of Spain is made is the EU, or more specifically the network of formal and informal, official and unofficial channels linking the foreign policy of the EU with that of its member states. Spain joined the EU in 1986 and, from the outset, the country was supportive of policies aimed at strengthening European integration (Magone 2009). This included the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiated in the 1990s. Eventually, Spain tried to become a major player in CFSP decisions (Barbe 2000). This led to some disagreements with other European countries – most notably regarding participation in the Iraq War. Nonetheless, Spain remains supportive of the CFSP, aiming to strengthen the role of the EU in the international system while seeking to shape this role.

Formal foreign policy decision making-related mechanisms among EU member states strengthened following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. The treaty conferred legal personality to the EU, created the positions of President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, established the European External Action Service, and laid the basis for future common defence policy. The treaty also created the Foreign Affairs Council, which meets at least once a month and brings together member state ministers of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, a Political and Security Committee – established in 2000 – meets twice a week and allows member state ambassadors to the EU to discuss the CFSP.⁸

These formal mechanisms are supplemented by informal networks. Brussels is home to a wide range of EU, member state, and third country foreign policy representations. Thousands of pressure groups, think tanks, NGOs and similar organisations also populate the Belgian capital. The result is a network of highly qualified individuals discussing and influencing EU and member state foreign policy decisions (Kuus 2014). Furthermore, as Keoahe and Nye (1974) have demonstrated, transgovernmental relations can influence foreign policy decisions taken by countries whose bureaucrats interact informally with foreign counterparts. Brussels is an ideal setting for informal networks to be formed. Therefore, the EU structure influences Spanish foreign policy not only through formal mechanisms but through informal ones as well.

Trends in post-Francoist Spanish foreign policy

Readers of this edited volume will realize that the different chapters point out at four trends in contemporary Spanish foreign policy crossing across regions and issues. These four trends are the following: contemporary Spain has become a middle power in international relations; generally there is a cross-party consensus with regards to Spanish foreign policy, yet discord sometimes occur...