Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Stephen C. Calleya

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781135772604
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what relevant role can the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) play in the future?

After decades of a Mediterranean policy that was actually more focused on improving economic relations between Europe and the Mediterranean riparian states than anything else, the EU launched a more comprehensive Mediterranean policy in November 1995, the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that also embraced political and security relations and socio-cultural relations.As the tenth anniversary of this partnership approaches, this book discusses measures that could help transform this multilateral initiative from a boundary management exercise to a process that focuses more on encouraging boundary transformation. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline, such as the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for Peace and Stability, the creation of a free trade area, and justice and home affairs co-operation, are also discussed.

1	Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

Conceptualizing regionalism in Europe and the Middle East

The main aim of this section is to identify the patterns of relations evolving in the international regions that are operating in the Mediterranean area. An attempt is made to assess the patterns of interaction within each existing international region in an effort to distinguish the nature of regional dynamics taking place. This is followed by an examination of the distinct sub groupings within each of the regions that border the Mediterranean, namely Southern Europe, the Levant and the Maghreb. After examining the patterns of interaction within each of these units, this section concludes with a review of the connections and disconnections between the three Mediterranean hinterlands in an effort to detect regional dynamics, which would suggest the re-emergence of a more cooperative or conflictual Mediterranean international region.

The following criteria are necessary for an area to qualify as a region: the states’ pattern of cooperative or conflictual relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change in their foreign policy actions have a direct influence on the policy making of neighbouring states; the states are proximate; the region consists of at least two but probably more states; the influence of intrusive action is considered.

When this set of criteria is applied to the Mediterranean area, two prominent groupings of states emerges: namely the geographical space which borders the north-west sector of the Mediterranean which is labelled Europe, and the geographical area covering the south-eastern flank of the basin and is labelled the Middle East.

The terminology used to define the position of different states in their respective sub region is the following: the core represents those states which form a central focus of international politics within an international region. The semi-periphery represents those states that actively participate within a given region and whose aspiration is membership of the core. The periphery represents those states within an international region which are alienated from the core sector in some degree by social, political, economic or organizational factors, but which still play a role in the politics of the region.

The term Europe, as used in this analysis, does not coincide with the geographic definition: it includes all the European Union member states, plus Turkey. Although geographically Turkey lies on the periphery of the European continent, it is included in the European international region because the secular choice of Kemalist nationalism has brought the country into the Western and European sphere. Institutionally Turkey is a decisive component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as demonstrated during the Gulf Wars of 1990–91 and 2003 and it is closely linked to the European Union, particularly after negotiating a customs union with Brussels in the mid-1990s.⁴ In short, Turkey shares strong intergovernmental and transnational links with Europe.

Thus, the concept of a European region adopted in this study is geopolitical. As members or prospective members of the EU, all of the countries within this geo-strategic area share similar domestic and foreign policy concerns and have pledged to integrate their policies in accordance with the regulations of the Maastricht Treaty.

This region also shares a similar line of ethno-cultural thinking, with an emphasis on the role of Latin Christendom in defining a community of states.⁵ The area also meets the other regional criteria in that it consists of more than two states, the countries considered are generally proximate in geopolitical terms, and all of the countries are affected by similar external constraints (they are members of the Western security system). Above all else, this international region is distinct from the areas in its vicinity because of the particular intensity of intergovernmental and cross-border interactions between the countries listed.⁶

Objections can always be raised regarding the cast of actors included in an international region.⁷ In such an exercise, the major methodological problem remains in drawing boundaries between such regions. One way to overcome the complexity of boundary delineation and simultaneously test the validity of the proposed international region is to verify that the intimacy of interaction among the participating states begins to wane as the edge of one international region and the start of the next is approached.

This test certainly reinforces the notion of a European region, as this area shares similar constellations of political and economic patterns, which contrast sharply with the patterns of interaction and the Middle East. It is the latter international region, which mainly concerns us in this analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean area. Although Central and Eastern European patterns of relations influence regional dynamics in the Mediterranean, particularly those which involve Albania, Croatia and Bosnia, they have more of a direct impact on European relations than those of the Mediterranean.

During the Cold War, the European international region was an area of uneven development. The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, and the rival European Free Trade Association shortly afterwards, symbolize the alternative visions shared by European policy makers in the post-war period. The enactment of the Single European Act in 1986 and phases of EC enlargement (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995) have combined to make Europe, i.e. the EU and associate members, an intricate political and economic bloc. The level of integration achieved is evident when one notes that accepting to abide by the EU's acquis communautaires is equivalent to agreeing to 14,000 pages of EU legislation.⁸

Interdependence among the states of Europe is not a new phenomenon; intergovernmental ties are exemplified in the multiplicity of the EU. What has changed is the extension of globalization since the 1970s which has led to a rapid development of the networks of links between these states.⁹ Transnational patterns of interaction have engulfed the world at the end of the twentieth century.

Europe is still organized politically into nation-states with sovereign governments, but increasing integration between these nations is gradually eroding the differences among national economies and undermining the autonomy of national governments. Profound technological, social and cultural changes have brought European states closer together by reducing the effective economic distance among them.¹⁰

Exchanges take the form of trade, investment, capital flows, cross-national corporations, large-scale movements of people, dense patterns of rail, road, sea and air traffic, and an instantaneous sharing of information, news and media.¹¹ The European region is specifically characterized by these intricate transnational patterns of interaction. When coupled with already existing intergovernmental ties, this group of countries clearly demonstrates the attributes of a quasi-comprehensive international region, sharing similar social movements, economic shocks and political developments.

Immediate developments in Europe during the post-Cold War period have been the attempts to consolidate economic and security cooperation. By 2003, convergence in both of these sectors was gradually taking place. The functioning of a single European currency and the establishment of a common foreign and security policy remain high on the political agenda. In security, European states are increasingly showing a willingness to coordinate their foreign policies. This is reflected in the similar priorities this group of countries attaches to external relations: bilateral relations within the European region are most important, followed by European Union affairs which are linked to EU ties with Eastern Europe, North America and Asia; ties with the Middle East are a distant third, and it is within this category that Mediterranean issues are considered.

At first it might appear misleading to talk about the Middle East as a region, especially if one mistakenly perceives the Middle East as being on a par with Europe in being defined as a region. Yet, international regions vary in both nature and degree. Thus while the European model conforms to a certain modality of regionalism (cooperative transnational, intergovernmental and comprehensive dominant) the Middle East entity is of a completely different nature (conflictual intergovernmental and transnational dominant).

The term Middle East, as used in this analysis, does not coincide with the geographical definition. It stretches from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. It is distinct from South Asia which lies to its east and black Africa which lies south of the Sahara. The Middle East international region includes the following sub groupings: the Maghreb, which is referred to usually as North Africa in the West but which is considered as part of the collective consciousness of the Arab Middle East (especially in an historical sense), the Levant, also referred to as the Mashreq, or the Fertile Crescent, which in this study includes Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula including the Persian Gulf which incorporates Iran.

Although geographically Egypt is located along the North African coastline, it is included in the Levant because of its consistent northern policy concentration dating back to the nineteenth century and its clashes with the Ottoman Empire.¹² Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, Egypt also played a key role in intergovernmental relations across the Mashreq, involved in all of the major wars in the area and setting a precedent in the Arab World when it recognized Israel in the Camp David peace talks.¹³

The one salient reality that most unites this area is the Islamic religion and the history of the Islamic Empire. This common denominator has more recently been supplemented by what may be described as the transnational political force of Islam.¹⁴ This phenomenon, perhaps more than anything else, combines to create a potent Middle East region. Political Islam effectively challenges secular European nationalism which dominates an area that was Islamic for well over a millennium. One objective shared by Islam groups throughout this area is a return to a societal system that is indigenously Islamic. Seen from such a perspective, a secular national state is a continuation of external rule by other than direct physical means. It is at this political level, rather than at a religious one, that a clash between the West and Islam lies.¹⁵

As a people, Arabs enjoy a high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Despite the distinct regional dynamics at play within the various Middle Eastern sub groupings, most Arabs belong to the same religion, converse in the same language and share the same cultural traditions.¹⁶ These facts gave rise to the pan-Arab nationalist trend, which dominated intergovernmental regional proceedings throughout the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁷ They also played a significant role in the anti-colonial movement in Africa and in the development of the non-aligned movement.

Like its European counterpart, the concept of a Middle Eastern region is geopolitical. However, the patterns of interaction between Middle East actors are much more erratic and more conflictual than cooperative in nature. This is not to deny that they may occasionally share certain concerns – primarily related to security – or might cooperate in specific fields, as has been the case in the energy sector. But the track record of the Arab League and other efforts to institutionalize relations in the Middle East, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), clearly demonstrate the limits of cooperation among the majority of the countries within this region.¹⁸

Although each Middle East sub grouping has its own node of security interdependence with its own distinctive dynamics, there is enough cross-border interaction within the Middle East to justify identifying it as regional unit of analysis. Even though opposition towards Israel sometimes wanes, the two-dozen states in this region continue to share similar political and socio-economic challenges. These grievances are often voiced at Arab League meetings, which provide a legitimate forum in which the affairs of the different Middle Eastern sub groupings are brought together.

The Middle East also meets the other criteria associated with an international region. It consists of more than two states and the countries considered are generally proximate in geopolitical terms. In sharing similar economic, political and cultural patterns, the Middle East is also affected by external challenges, which emanate from Western secularism. As emphasized above, it is the intensity of intergovernmental interactions between the countries in this area, which qualifies the Middle East as a region. When compared with the degree and nature of relations which exist across the Mediterranean, the distinct attributes of this region become even more pronounced.

A comparative analysis of political and economic patterns in Europe and the Middle East reveals that comparable patterns of interaction are conspicuously absent. Europe and the Middle East developed very different patterns during the Cold War. Intergovernmental ties in the Middle East were relatively strong, as was reflected in the creation of the Arab League in 1944–45, which quickly grew to include 21 states.¹⁹

The process of decolonization and independence facilitated pan-Arab nationalism and Islam's ability to create transnational political linkages across the whole international region. In the period between achieving independence and the end of the Cold War, the Middle East consolidated itself further as a distinct and mainly self-contained international region.²⁰ Most of the states have been too preoccupied with distinct domestic or regional sub grouping security dynamics to attempt nurturing a complex network of relations with all the states in the region.

Since the end of the Cold War, older patterns of relations have been released, as manifested in the force of political Islam. There has also been a shift in the patterns of amity and enmity within the region. Relations in the Levant momentarily improved following breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and then reverted to a conflictual pattern of interaction as peace talks broke down.

In contrast, intergovernmental ties in the Maghreb throughout the 1990s were at an all time low, with the crisis in Algeria and the Libyan-Lockerbie affair becoming fixed diplomatic impasses. A review of post-Cold War events thus reveals that there is no consistent pattern of relations in the Middle East. In the Mashreq, political developments since the end of the Cold War have tended to increase the level of interdependence. In the Maghreb, the opposite process has largely taken place.

Transnational flows in the Middle East are much less dense than in Europe and are more controlled. North-south non-state economic links radiate around the energy sector. Pipelines across the Maghreb stretch across the Mediterranean to Europe. Similar projects link the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Levant. But no intricate pattern of transnational interdependence involving trading links, cross-border investment and common institutions has yet been developed.

South-south transnational patterns of interaction are mainly limited to the area of Islam. This low level of interdependence partly explains the high level of enmity in the Middle Eastern patterns of relations. Interdependence does not in itself determine either cooperation or conflict, but it does increase the stakes in relationships. The more a sense of common interests is apparent, the less likely is the outbreak of hostilities. This in fact is one of the reasons why the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up in 1952.

A key difference between Europe and the Middle East is that, whereas the former has developed a multi-level international society in which international institutions, states and sub-national organizations all play important roles in managing cross-national transactions, the latter has not. Within the Middle East, the level of cross-national transactions is much lower and has not been institutionalized in any comprehensive manner.

For example, the Arab League met with success in only six of seventy-seven conflictual situations it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981.²¹ Similarly, other cooperative initiatives undertaken by sub-regional organizations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union, have never achieved any significant degree of real political or economic consensus. One can also say that centrifugal forces have superseded centripetal forces as the majority of states in the Maghreb see their future in securing market access to Europe.

In the Middle East, post-Cold War efforts to increase economic and security cooperation are still at an embryonic stage. The international Middle East economic summits at Casablanca in October 1994 and Amman in October 1995 through to Doha in 1997 displayed many of the obstacles that would have to be overcome before this international region could begin to develop stronger transnational and institutional links.²² No measures have been introduced to tackle the indebtedness of certain Arab countries, which amounted to $142 billion in 1989 with a yearly debt service of $14 billion, or 33 per cent of the export earnings of these countries.²³

In addition, within the Arab world the gap between the ‘north’, which groups the nine oil-producing countries with small populations (except for Algeria and Iraq), and the ‘south’, which groups the remaining twelve Arab countries, remains wide. The gross domestic product of the former group reached $300 billion in 1990 compared with a GDP of only $119 billion in the latter group.²⁴

A shift to more cooperative indigenous political practices must therefore be coupled with large influxes of foreign direct investment if the necessary infrastructural changes are to occur so that transnational links can be strengthened. Perhaps valuable lessons can be learned from the 1970s, when economic links within the Arab world were considerable as a result of the boom in the petroleum industry. Intra-regional financial flows floundered in the 1980s as a decline...