China's Development and Harmonization

Bin Wu, Shujie Yao, Jian Chen, Bin Wu, Shujie Yao, Jian Chen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135907600
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

The concept of 'harmonization' has become very popular in China, with the Chinese government increasingly applying the term 'harmonious society' to internal affairs and the term 'harmonious world' to international relationships. Harmonization as both an end and a means of China's development is deeply rooted in China's cultural tradition, which emphasizes moderation, balance and harmony between human beings and nature, between different social groups, and between the Chinese and other nationalities. This book examines the experience of enacting the concept of harmonization in China in recent years. It explores this in terms of developments within Chinese society, economic developments and changes in business practices, environmental challenges and coping strategies, and changing patterns of international relations. Throughout, it discusses the gaps between rhetoric and reality, policy and practice.

Part I

Global perspective on China’s development

1 From morality to morality: the rhetoric of Chinese foreign policy over four decades

Dominik Mierzejewski

Since 1949, China has gone through several ups and downs, starting from establishing the New State, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the four modernizations, opening up and Tiananmen ‘89 right the way through to sustainable economic growth and building the ‘socialist state with Chinese characteristics.’ Every period of China’s modern history has been characterized by its own language, rhetoric and propaganda. Throughout the last 30 years, China has been building and strengthening its position in international relations. Rhetoric plays an important role in foreign policy. As a passive aspect of diplomacy, it may play a very useful part in introducing intentions, questions or checking the reactions of third parties.

In the first part of this chapter, the author describes the major differences between the Western and Chinese rhetorical traditions and practices. Important focus is placed on explaining rhetoric and the soft-power nexus. Next, the author analyses the revolutionary rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. China’s rhetorical posture presented the Middle Kingdom as the moral and revolutionary centre of the world. In the third part, the morality of Hu Jintao is compared with ‘universal values’ and the Wilsonian concept of international relations. This kind of analysis is similar to certain strands of constructivist textual analysis that take note of ways in which political and cultural influences on the foreign policy–making process are inherent in the texts of foreign policy: speeches, planning documents and public relations connected with politics. Taking a foreign policy rhetoric as an example, the author argues that not only do material values play an important role in shaping external affairs, but so too do the non-material aspects such as: culture, identity, ideas or even rhetoric. Social constructivism argues that the ideational structure shapes the identity of the agent. Structure, in Wendt’s constructivism, is not material but cultural, defined by the distribution of ideas. The essence of international politics, in the view of Wendt, is ideas rather than material capabilities (Qin and Wei, 2008: 121–124).

This chapter aims to present and analyse the rhetoric of Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), described as ‘revolutionary morality’ and during Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious era’ where it possesses a ‘Confucian morality.’ To the author, the most important question concerns the purpose in using moral language instead of pragmatic language, like that presented by Deng Xiaoping. As rhetoricians, we must ask an initial question: do rhetors intend to utilize their power through/within the act of discourse? In the final part of the chapter, the author tries to prove the hypothesis that China aims to portray itself as a moral and just state, capable of playing an important role in international relations, by means of moral rhetoric. The author will also argue that soft power reveals the legitimate priorities of the state as much as it reinforces the strategic agenda. Finally, the chapter will address the issue of how Chinese leaders have presented the notion of soft power in foreign policy discourse.

Rhetoric and soft power

Rhetoric itself has been broadly discussed by scholars from ancient times till the present. In ancient Greece, Aristotle considered rhetoric as a means of persuasion. He described man as a rational animal, and this kind of stance on human nature affected his rhetoric:

Underlying the classical tradition is the notion that although men are often swayed by passions, their basic and distinguishing characteristic is their ability to reason…. [Thus, for classical rhetoricians] logical argument… was the heart of persuasive discource.

(Lunsford, et al., 1984: 38)

On the other hand, Plato in Phaedrus realized that rhetoric could be used positively or negatively. The third great ancient thinker, Demosthenes, claimed that ‘rhetoric is delivery.’

In Ancient China, thinkers also touched upon the problem of rhetoric (xiuci). Chinese had their own sense of rhetoric described as: yan

(language, speech), ci

(made of speech, artistic explanation), jian

(advising, persuading), shui

(persuasion), shuo

(explanation), ming

(naming) and bian

(distinction, argumentation) (Welch, 1990: 90–95). As Burton Watson in his Early Chinese Literature states:

Public address and discussions of rhetoric in China before the third century BCE are almost totally concerned with efforts to restore order to society, to induce rulers to act wisely, justly, and compassionately toward the people, to encourage the public to respond with loyalty to the regime, and to perpetuate ancient traditions in ritual and social relationships.

(Tu, Hejtmanek and Wachman, 1992: 28)

The earliest examples of Chinese rhetoric are the ‘instructions,’ especially those concerning the ways in which a minister of state should address a ruler, for it is here that the speaker is expected to be honest, sincere, and forthright, to preserve his own dignity, to avoid flattery and, at the same time, to show respect for the ruler and keep from antagonizing him (Kennedy, 1998: 158). The major difference between the Chinese and Western ways of using rhetoric was that what it had to say about speech, persuasion and other aspects of rhetoric was addressed to rulers or to their own philosophical students. It does not consider techniques for addressing a mass audience. Furthermore, contrary to the West, within the hierarchical system, the Chinese failed to use public discussion that would have an impact on the political system. From Confucius’ perspective, the rectification of names (zhengming) or rhetoric (xiuci) should be subordinated and subservient to, as well as based on cheng– the spirit of sincerity (xiuciliqicheng). Confucius also remarked: ‘I transmit but do not create. Being fond of the truth, I am an admirer of antiquity. I venture to be compared with our old Peng.’

This famous saying lends sufficient credence to the view that Chinese rhetorical practices value custom over innovation and privilege imitation over creation. (Lu Ming Mao, 1995: 128–129) As John Makeham explains, Confucius did not regard names as passive labels, rather as social and, hence, political catalysts. In this sense, zheng ming aimed at transforming Chinese society and its people though the advocacy of certain terms or concepts. In the Chinese rhetorical tradition, thinkers were very much aware of the power of symbols in human motivation, in perception of the reality and in control of human action (Xing, 2000: 5–7).

As George A. Kennedy remarked, the closest Western analogy to the ‘rectification of names’ in Chinese was the concern held by 17th Century philosophers such as Descartes and, especially, John Locke. They desired to create a precise language for philosophy and science, denying its poetical and rhetorical elements such as metaphor (Kennedy, 1998: 159).

In Taoism, according to Vernon Jensen, the rhetorical principles were described as follows: 1. deprecate eloquence and honour silence; 2. deprecate argumentation; 3. look inward for truths; 4. avoid willful critical thinking and instead utilize spontaneous intuition; 5. rest assertions on time-honored authority; and 6. rely on ethos: sincerity, humility, goodness, respectfulness and trustworthiness. The last and most practical piece of advice was provided by Han Fei of the legalist school. In ‘The Difficulties of Persuasion,’ his persuasions were as follows:

On the whole, the difficult thing about persuading others is not that one lacks the knowledge needed to state his case nor the audacity to exercise his abilities to the full. On the whole, the difficult thing about persuasion is to know the mind of the person one is trying to persuade and to be able to fit one’s words to it.

(Ibid.: 163–164)

Similarly, Han Fei advocated that the speaker must know the ‘soul’ of the listener and adapt the message to his understanding. Han Fei had in mind something more sophisticated and manipulative. Rhetoric was conceptualized in ancient China and terminology was created to describe features of invention and style, but speech was not studied as a separate discipline; it was always thought of as a part of political and moral philosophy (ibid.: 165–166).

The legalist school formulated the definition of rhetoric as subordinate to power. In this context, Barry Brummet’s definition sounds similar. In his conceptualization of rhetoric privileges, rhetoric is considered an agency of power, an ontological device through which we construct the world of meaning. Economic status, social position, and military power frame the contexts so important to Brummet’s epistemological theorizing. Rhetorical power, so conceived, thus possesses persuasive appeal, designed to control or shape or influence the world around the rhetor. As Barbara Biesecker notes: ‘the power of persuasive discourse’ is ‘to constitute audiences out of individuals, to transform singularities into collectivities, to fashion a ‘we’ out of a plurality of ‘I’s,’ and to move them to collective action’ (Rufo, 2003).

For another scholar, Pierre Bourdieu, power is manifested through a structured discourse – an active phenomenon that rests upon accumulated capital (status), and mediated by the body. Language still has the individualized potential to shape the meaning for an individual; rhetoric contains the capacity to advocate a particular, privileged version of the reality. McGee is right to argue that: ‘Virtually nothing about rhetoric is innocent of this power. Pick any rhetorical principle, and we’ll put it on the table, and I’ll show you how it’s connected with power ’ (ibid.).

A conceptualization of rhetoric as the articulation of power bridges the gap between passive materiality and active discourses of power, allowing for a more complete understanding of the constitutive discourses of power.

The link between rhetoric and power leads to the conclusion that rhetoric itself has become an important component of soft-power – a concept introduced by Joseph Nye. With regard to the ‘soft-power’ notion, a vast discussion has been held by scholars, mainly from Beijing and Shanghai academic circles. Joseph Nye’s concept has been both challenged and developed. Nye concentrated on the potential of arguments to move people, and their ability to attract (xiyin li) and shape the preferences of others. Moreover, as Joseph Nye argues, the current leadership should be based on institutions, values, culture and politics in order to shape other people’s needs (Nye, 2004: 11–14). If that is the case, this, according to Aristotle, is a major task for rhetoric. Moreover, to the author, rhetoric plays an important role in shaping the image of the country. Portraying itself as a moral, good and reliable partner, any country might be able to win the trust of the third party and build its position in international relations. All the values have been articulated via language, and, what goes with it, the rhetoric is considered, as it was mentioned above, an important component of contemporary diplomacy. Foreign policy discourse is rhetorical, in the sense that it attempts to reconstruct a desired, practical, or normative framework from inconsistent and often competing assumptions that underlie the institutional inertia of a nation-state’s foreign policy.

For Chinese authorities, soft-power might be a kind of leverage and agency used in order to exercise political objectives, with the additional dimension of it being both derived from and contributing to domestic stability and the internal strength o...