Constrained Elitism and Contemporary Democratic Theory

Timothy Kersey

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317928270
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Today, examples of the public's engagement with political issues through commercial and communicative mechanisms have become increasingly common. In February 2012, the Susan G. Komen Foundation reversed a decision to cease funding of cancer screening programs through Planned Parenthood amidst massive public disapproval. The same year, restaurant chain Chic-fil-A became embroiled in a massive public debate over statements its President made regarding same-sex marriage. What exactly is going on in such public engagement, and how does this relate to existing ideas regarding the public sphere and political participation? Is the public becoming increasingly vocal in its complaints? Or are new relationships between the public and economic and political leaders emerging?

Timothy Kersey's book asserts that the widespread utilization of internet communications technologies, especially social media applications, has brought forth a variety of new communicative behaviors and relationships within liberal polities. Through quick and seemingly chaotic streams of networked communication, the actions of these elites are subject to increasingly intense scrutiny and short-term pressure to ameliorate or at least address the concerns of segments of the population. By examining these new patterns of behavior among both elites and the general public, Kersey unearths the implications of these patterns for contemporary democratic theory, and argues that contemporary conceptualizations of "the public'" need to be modified to more accurately reflect practices of online communication and participation.

By engaging with this topical issue, Kersey is able to closely examine the self-organization of both elite and non-elite segments of the population within the realm of networked communication, and the relations and interactions between these segments. His book combines perspectives from political theory and communication studies and so will be widely relevant across both disciplines.

1 Two Approaches to Elite Dominance

Introduction

An uncommon event occurred in late 2014, when a fairly sophisticated piece of academic writing captured the attention of multiple national media outlets. In “Testing Theories of American Politics,” Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page presented an empirical analysis of policy outcomes in the United States which suggested that the preferences of economically powerful individuals and interest groups are more significant than the preferences of average citizens.¹ While asserting the facticity of elite dominance is not noteworthy in itself, this article was seen as something of an innovation for using quantitative analysis for a conventionally normative topic. Beyond its potential impact as a work of social science, Gilens and Page’s article was highly significant for the amount of attention within commercial and social media it generated. The idea that the American political system was not egalitarian, and perhaps not even democratic, moved outside of the realm of conspiracy theory or paranoia and into mainstream political discourse.

While the response to Gilens and Page’s article is only anecdotal, it is nonetheless a powerful example of the resonance of the idea of elite dominance within the American public sphere. Questions of accuracy notwithstanding, a sufficient portion of the populace accept elite dominance as real enough to think about and discuss in the same manner as other political issues. That such considerations of the legitimacy of the political system itself became a part of the public agenda suggests an increased relevance, both within scholarly and non-scholarly communicative fora, to seriously examine the relationships between the elites and non-elite strata of contemporary American democracy.

As will be examined throughout this book, elites are conceptualized and differentiated from non-elites in multiple ways, an exhaustive review of which is outside of the intended scope of this project. Instead, what follows in this chapter is a structural model of two broad approaches to the role of elites within democratic polities as found within the disciplinary tradition of political science. The first approach, termed elite-realism, holds that the concentration of political power by an elite political class is both naturally occurring and necessary for the proper functioning of democratic systems; this approach primarily views elite actions through the lens of institutionalized elections. The second approach, termed elite-liberalism, emphasizes the need for elites to guide and assist the public in opinion-formation and decision-making processes; within this approach, elites primarily operate within the realm of public discourse. Each approach offers a different explanation of the relationship between elites and non-elites within the overall functioning of the political system; however, both share a similar assessment of the undesirability and/or impracticality of mass political participation. The following sections examine these two approaches, with a particular emphasis on the capacity of the (non-elite) public within the political process.

Electoral Competition and the Elite-Realist Approach

Beginning in the early twentieth century, numerous works of political, social, and economic scholarship examined the applicability of the “classical theory” of democracy to contemporary western societies. The classical theory of democracy, characterized by an assertion of the normative ideal of popular self-governance through highly responsive representative structures, was heavily scrutinized by such diverse theorists as Joseph Schumpeter, Walter Lippmann, Max Weber, V.O. Key, among many others. The various alternative perspectives to the classical theory offered by such scholars are commonly described as elitist in some manner (e.g. the elite theory of democracy, democratic elitism). The term elitist in this sense is not necessarily pejorative, but rather descriptive, as such theories explain the functioning of democratic systems not in reference to concepts such as the “common good,” or the “will of the people,” but rather to the concentration of decision-making power in a small subset of the population. Despite the broad range of arguments and normative commitments of the authors discussed in this section, their common acceptance of the empirical facticity of rule by a limited political class creates a shared quality of methodological realism, and can thus be seen as existing within a broad category of an elite-realist approach.

From the elite-realist perspective, large-scale political participation is unnecessary, if not undesirable. Whether through mechanisms of direct or representative democracy, citizens should play a minimal role within political decision-making processes, leaving the complex work of governing to more seasoned political actors. The only real responsibility of citizens is to vote regularly, exercising their capacity to affirm or negate their support for elected leaders. This limited role of citizens within the political system is not necessarily a function of disdain for the common person, but instead is justified on functional and psychological sets of arguments.

According to the elite-realist perspective, democratic political institutions function more effectively without excessive involvement from citizens. This is due in no small part to the complexity of political decision-making within large, modern polities; the degree of detail and quantity of information needed for rational considerations of law and regulation within contemporary societies is too great for ordinary citizens. Instead, it is only through experience and the assistance of policy experts that professional political actors can attempt to make the best governing decisions possible within any given context. For such experts and political agents, the opinion of the public is only marginally useful. According to Lippmann, public opinion only indicates the general sentiments of citizens; it cannot produce actual decisions regarding workable executive political action.² Similarly, Schumpeter argues that citizen participation outside the context of elections is an unnecessary distraction for political leaders, akin to “back-seat driving.” Attempts by the public to continuously guide their representatives through highly participatory activities, such as the “practice of bombarding [legislators] with letters and telegrams,” ultimately detract from the effectiveness of the democratic process by restricting the ability of elected officials to act freely.³

Weber provides a similar argument for professionalized, experienced political actors through his examinations of the modern state. The highly organized nature of the political system creates distinctions between elected political officials and administrative officials within state bureaucracies. Over time, as bureaucracies amass specialized knowledge regarding specific policy areas, the relative power of administrative officials increases within the political system. In the face of such bureaucratic power, even seasoned political actors appear as “‘dilettantes” in regards to actual policy management, according to Weber.⁴ Successful direction of the modern bureaucracy towards public ends (rather than towards its own ends) requires constant monitoring by a sufficiently experienced and independent parliament; the kind of intense oversight necessary to keep bureaucracy in check simply cannot be performed through mechanisms of mass democracy or public opinion.⁵

In addition to such functional arguments for the limiting the political power of citizens, the elite-realist approach holds that aspects of human psychology make mass participation inherently problematic. Elite-realists affirm that individuals are inherently rational, but that such rationality does not extend to the political realm. Instead, according to Schumpeter, individual rationality develops through praxis, as the consequences of decisions made within an individual’s immediate sphere of life and activity are directly felt. As problems, decisions, and consequences become increasingly distant from daily life, they are further outside of the reach of individual reason, making opinions highly susceptible to prejudice, manipulation, or misinformation.

In relation to national politics, individual behavior ceases to appear even remotely based in rationality; the population, according to Schumpeter, is “incapable of action other than a stampede” within the electoral realm. When in groups, people are “terribly easy to work up into a psychological crowd and into a state of frenzy in which attempt at rational argument only spurs the animal spirits.”⁶ To the extent that any true will of the people exists, the public itself is incapable of articulating it; as Lippmann writes, “the making of one general will out of a multitude of general wishes is not an Hegelian mystery, as so many social philosophers have imagined, but an art well known to leaders, politicians and steering committees.”⁷

The elite-realist perspective places a similar emphasis on limitations on the behaviors of members of the political class as well. Elites, according to Schumpeter, must demonstrate “democratic self-control” for the proper functioning of the political system. Such self-control comes in two forms: patience and temperance. As a characteristic of democratic self-control, patience is manifest in the willingness to let the inherently slow democratic process take its time; legislators should refrain from hasty decision making or manipulating parliamentary procedures for temporary advantages. Likewise, minority parties should be temperate in their behavior towards the majority group or party; all elites, whether in or out of power, must uphold the integrity of the democratic process by honoring the outcomes:

… the democratic method cannot work smoothly unless all the groups that count in a nation are willing to accept any legislative measure as long as it is on the statute book and all executive orders issued by legally competent authorities.⁸

This need for a shared culture of self-control underscores the importance of the existence of a distinct political class—one in which there is both a consensus on and commitment to democratic norms.⁹ While such norms and limitations are effectively self-imposed by the political class, the threat of losing power through institutionalized competitive elections serves as an effective external restraint.

Under the elite-realist approach, the public has minimal responsibility within the political system; citizens should vote regularly, and leave the rest to whoever wins. This act of voting itself, however, is not necessarily a function of expressing the general will of the population, but rather a mechanism required to prevent collusion among the members of the political class. So long as there are more putative members of the political class than actual positions of power, elites will remain in competition for the public’s electoral support. This general process of elite competition works in the following manner.

First, existing elite actors recruit more persons for positions within the political class (elected officials, party leaders, bureaucrats, etc.). Having a sufficiently large corps of quality potential political agents is necessary, according to Schumpeter, to meet the political system’s need for “human material.” The self-recruiting nature of the political class is also significant as a means of guaranteeing the talents and professional qualities of its members. Ideally, political careers would be made available only to those who have proven their capacity for good judgment as well as their commitment to democratic norms within other realms of society (e.g. through private sector or civic organizations). Due to such self-selection, citizens are effectively unable to pick their political leaders for themselves; in this sense, voting is a passive choice amongst a pre-selected slate of candidates, rather than an active choice of representatives.

Second, through voting and public opinion, citizens express approval or disapproval to existing political actions and elected officials. Agai...