US-UK Counter-Terrorism after 9/11

Edgar Tembo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781136163500
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides a qualitative analysis of post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategy undertaken by the United Kingdom and United States of America.

Since 9/11, both the UK and the U.S have significantly revamped their counter-terrorism approaches. The approaches apply, to varying degrees, three key policy instruments – intelligence, law enforcement and military force. However, the success or failure of these counter-terrorism strategies has never been satisfactorily validated. Analysts and policymakers alike have assumed success due to the inability of terrorists to conduct 7/7 and 9/11, respectively, scale attacks upon each state. This assumption has existed despite the fact that it fundamentally underestimates the impact of transnational terrorism.

This volume provides an in-depth qualitative assessment of the three primary policy instruments implemented to counter the transnational threat of terrorism during the period 2001-2011; an approach somewhat neglected by the current body of literature which focuses on a purely quantitative methodology. Drawing upon previously unpublished data collected from interviews with policymakers, specialists and academics, the book fills this lacuna by ascertaining and analysing both the UK's and USA's counter-terrorism strategies and developing a holistic approach to understanding these strategies.

This book will be of interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, security studies and IR in general.

1 Introduction

It has been over ten years since planes were flown into symbols of economic and military might of both the United States and the world. Still, even with a change of President, the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden, an increase in economic woes and competing priorities, the United States continues to engage in counter-terrorism initiatives both at home and abroad. The success of the Global War on Terror cannot simply be measured by the internment or killing of insurgents and/ or terrorists. The fear that comes with the acknowledgement that, as an Irish Republican Army member put it in the 1980s, ‘[w]e only have to be lucky once, you have to be lucky always’, is part and parcel of the rationale and associated modus operandi of terrorist violence.

This book draws upon original and previously unpublished interview material conducted by the author. Most of these interviews were conducted in 2009 and included, among others, counter- terrorism professionals with specialist expertise in the implementation of intelligence, law enforcement and military force. The aim of these interviews was to ascertain the changes and effectiveness of policy instruments after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States (9/11). In one interview, conducted in the United States, with an individual who was at that time working on an oversight committee for the Department of Homeland Security, a statement was made that in many ways led to further research and, indeed, to this book. When asked whether the Department of Homeland Security had been effective at countering the threat of transnational terrorism, the interviewee said: ‘Well, I think it’s been effective in that there hasn’t been a major terrorist attack on United States soil since 9/11.’¹ Not least due to issues relating to causality, this struck me as an interesting rationale that deserved further consideration. How can the failure of a terrorist to succeed in an attack denote the success of a state in countering the threat? One does not have to equal the other. Indeed, the failure of a terrorist to succeed may well be due to their own incompetence and have nothing to do with the state’s tactics of interdiction. Beyond this, the research became drawn to issues related to the perceived effectiveness of post- 9/11 counter-terrorism strategy, particularly with reference to the primary policy instruments in this area: intelligence, law enforcement and military force.

A number of failings in analysis from this era were quickly identified. For example, analysis that discussed the effectiveness of strategy tended to focus on quantitative metrics. While this is perfectly understandable (would 9/11 have been as significant if only 100 people had died?), it does not facilitate an understanding of the full picture. Broadly speaking, in order to realise their aims, those who use terrorist violence aim to not only kill as many as possible (although this has not always been the case) but also to cause fear or, more accurately, terror. Indeed, the Department of Defense stated, quite rightly, that “terror is a natural phenomenon; terrorism is the conscious exploitation of it”.² Tragic as it may be, the number of people killed in any one particular terrorist attack is not directly comparable to the fear that is induced. Indeed, the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism strategy should not be measured purely on quantitative methodologies nor, perhaps more so, on utilising exclusively qualitative metrics. If the aim of a terrorist is to gain a qualitative result (be it short or long term), an assessment of its effectiveness should incorporate a qualitative metric.

Counter- terrorism: a qualitative problem

Terrorist violence, by its very design, is intended to strike fear in a manner that resonates beyond the immediate. It is, however, incumbent upon the state to design policies to counter terrorist violence which are not driven by fear. The metric of success of these policies is not simply reducing the amount of violence that is prevented, but rather, and simultaneously, ensuring the continuation of ‘normal’ life. States must therefore develop strategies that strike a balance between effectiveness and acceptability. States, as ultimate securers of individual security, must constantly ask themselves whether the qualitative benefits of a particular strategy outweigh the costs. In doing this they have to strike a balance between the acceptability of a counter- terrorism strategy to the general populace and its effectiveness at stemming the perceived threat while still adhering to such democratic norms as freedom of speech and habeas corpus.

Makinda states that counter- terrorism policies have varied ‘from the most liberal to the most authoritarian and, even within democracies frequently span both extremes of the ideological spectrum’.³ Liberal democracies are disadvantaged in the struggle against terrorism, as ‘rule by the majority while respecting the right[s] of the minority’ has invariably meant the application of ‘measured, rule based force [… placing the state] at a tactical disadvantage in the conflict with an anonymous opponent showing no restraint’.⁴ Undeniably, ‘by tolerating the intolerant, democracies allow terrorists to plan and prepare their strikes’.⁵ In contrast and ‘by definition totalitarian regimes suppress all effective opposition within their boundaries and are entirely unimpeded by any judicial or humanitarian constraints’.⁶ The preservation of values such as equality, freedom of speech, justice and tolerance are not values to which totalitarian- authoritarian regimes necessarily subscribe. As such, these regimes are able to employ harsh, unyielding forms of oppression and retribution, and to selectively apply counter-terrorist-related activity to their own, often politically motivated, ends. Liberal-democratic states (broadly defined) therefore have, when it comes to counter- terrorism, asked themselves, ‘do we want to sacrifice some democratic substance in order to be effective against terrorism or do we have to tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the sake of maintaining the civil liberties and political rights which we cherish?’⁷ States must therefore find an adequate balance so as not to infringe upon civil liberties in the pursuit of security.

In the aftermath of 9/11 both the United States and the United Kingdom sought to revamp their counter- terrorism strategies. At the centre of these strategies, but to varying degrees of implementation, were three distinct policy instruments: intelligence, law enforcement and military force. Did the United States and the United Kingdom strike an adequate balance between the effectiveness of their counter-terrorism strategies and their acceptability? Qualitatively speaking, how effective were these strategies in not only preventing terrorist violence but also the possible contagion of fear surrounding these acts? In essence, this book investigates and analyses the qualitative effectiveness surrounding the use of intelligence, law enforcement and military force in the decade following 9/11, at the level of practitioners drawing upon both interviews and primary documents.

All too frequently, scholarly evaluations of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism initiatives have been based either on quantitative methodologies or value- free statements. There are good reasons for this. Indeed, the road to an objective qualitative appraisal of a policy is fraught with difficulty as, essentially, any qualitative analysis has a higher degree of subjectivity than rudimentary quantitative analysis. This, however, does not mean it should not be attempted. The study of terrorism lends itself readily to qualitative analysis due to the fact that the long- term objectives of terrorists themselves are rarely wholly quantitative but are in fact mostly frequently qualitative. Logically, it is argued here, it makes sense to consider the implementation of counter- terrorism strategy, certainly over the long term but also in the short term, in ways that are more attuned to qualitative rather than quantitative metrics of success or failure. Beatrice de Graaf adopts an approach that is based on in- depth case study analysis of counter- terrorism professionals. She analyses the relationship between counter- terrorism measures and radicalisation processes across multiple states during the 1970s.⁸

This book is structured in such a way as to provide a unique holistic understanding of both United Kingdom and United States post- 9/11 strategies to counter the threat of transnational terrorist violence espoused by al Qaeda. The United Kingdom and United States faced a broadly similar threat of transnational terrorism insofar as the overarching organisation, al Qaeda, had affirmed its desire to target both states. That said both states have divergent social, cultural, political and economic foundations. Moreover, a deeper analysis of the threat, as undertaken in Chapter 2 , highlights differing conceptualisations of the danger posited by al Qaeda. For the United Kingdom, the threat was considered to be one that originates, both domestically and internationally, whereas for the United States it is seen as one that originates, wholly, internationally. The divergent social, cultural, political and economic foundations of each state, combined with the differing conceptualisations of the threat posed by al Qaeda, should serve as a warning regarding the usefulness of comparing each state’s counter- terrorism strategies. This book assesses the implementation of each policy instrument largely from the perspective of counter-terrorism practitioners.

The United Kingdom first published its counter- terrorism strategy, CONTEST, in July 2006, one year after 7/7.⁹ The strategy itself had actually been in existence, but classified as secret, since 2003. A revised edition was published in March 2009 and another in July 2011 under a new coalition government.¹⁰ In CONTEST- 2009 it was stated that the British government believed that, to date, it had achieved its aim of reducing the risk to the United Kingdom and protected its interests overseas from the threat of terrorism.¹¹ This assertion was based on the fact that no terrorist attack on a scale of 7/7 had been successfully undertaken in the United Kingdom since the 2006 publication. As is argued throughout this book, such a quantitative methodology fails to take account of the qualitative aim and objectives, such as the spread of fear and reduction in confidence of the state to provi...