Militancy and Violence in West Africa

Religion, politics and radicalisation

James Gow, Funmi Olonisakin, Ernst Dijxhoorn, James Gow, Funmi Olonisakin, Ernst Dijxhoorn

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415821377
• eBook ISBN: 9781135968571
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Afrikanische Geschichte

This volume provides a systematic and cross-regional analysis of radicalisation, militancy and violence in West Africa.

Concern about terrorism in, or from, West Africa, has been recognised in academic research, and the adoption of militarised approaches to addressing it questioned. However, the basis for that questioning – the need to investigate factors such as the historical and socio-economic roots of militancy – is not developed, nor is it substantiated in existing studies. The significant impact of religiously motivated radicalisation and violence in West Africa upon international security makes it essential to understand the issues of militancy and violence in the region.

In this volume, the authors draw upon empirical research in West Africa to develop understanding in these areas. Over the course of several chapters written by leading experts in the field, the book successfully blends historical and conceptual analysis with new empirical research gathered from focus group discussions and research interviews. Each of these core studies is structured around five interrelated issues: tracing the antecedents of radicalisation; monitoring trends; identifying actors; anticipating possibilities; and analysing the strength of existing preventive mechanisms.

This book will be of much interest to students of African security, African politics, radicalisation, political Islam, war and conflict studies and security studies in general.

1 Introduction

Militancy and violence in West Africa

James Gow and Funmi Olonisakin

By the start of the twenty-first century, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ had become major global issues, and had already had impact in Africa. Although ‘9/11’ was still a year away, the American Embassies in East Africa had been bombed in 1998 and violent conflicts simmered in many parts of the world. At just about the same time, bitter civil wars, resource-centred conflicts and intra-ethnic strife raged in West Africa. By the time of writing, the region had been a crucible of religious radicalisation and violence for more than three decades. The issue was at the centre of incessant conflicts in Nigeria.¹ It also permeated acrimonious inter-group relations in parts of Ghana.² To some extent, it underpinned and underlined the bitter civil war in Liberia.³ For a long time these conflicts were explained under broader issues like the nature of the ethno-religious divisions of the countries,⁴ the fluidity of their socio-economic and political structures, and the ways both issues underpin politics and governance in them.⁵ But the changes in global perception of radicalisation, brought about by the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, began to change perspectives on both trends in the region and their wider international significance.

Concern about terrorism in, or from, West Africa, has been recognised and the adoption of militarised approaches to addressing it questioned.⁶ However, the basis for that questioning – the need to investigate factors such as the historical and socio-economic roots of militancy – is not developed, nor is it substantiated in existing studies. In the present volume, we use empirical research in West Africa to develop understanding in these areas, while also extending them to bring a more variegated understanding of them. At the same time, we also recognise both the realities of militancy and violence, including Islamist terrorism, in (and from) the region, as well as those of the international and African security contexts and the need for international and state-based responses. In doing so, we note that Nigeria has been and remains the focal point for interest in militancy and violence in the twenty-first century. But we seek to extend analysis across the region, where other countries, particularly the Anglophone ones, live in the shadow of the Nigerian giant and face significant questions, not only of their own, but also in terms of the questions that developments in Nigeria pose for them and the region as a whole.

Several considerations prompt interest in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ in West Africa. First, decades of conflict and instability have made the region vulnerable to various forms of cross-border instability. Indeed, a ‘mobile dissident force’ emerged, operating across countries in the region for much of the 1990s. Second, the region became important in global resource politics, with the United States confirming that quarter of its oil will be coming from the region by 2015. Indeed, the entire Gulf of Guinea is of enormous strategic interest in global energy politics. Third, natural resources in the region were foci of contention, with alleged links to global terrorism, as in the case of uranium in Niger Republic and diamonds in Sierra Leone. The former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, convicted of crimes against humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in a trial held in The Hague, allegedly sold Sierra Leone’s diamonds to al-Qaeda. Finally, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ also underline the crucial issue of youth vulnerability and exclusion, rooted in the phenomenon of the youth bulge, whose prevalence in West Africa remains an issue of global importance.⁷

These are reasons enough to focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ in West Africa. However, there is one more major consideration that needs to inform research on these questions. This is that wider instability in West Africa tends to obscure ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ in the region. The sporadic nature of some of the conflicts spawned from radicalisation, their relatively short duration and the ease with which their root causes can be subsumed under other wider security challenges, have all given the impression that this category of violence is often ‘localised’, and as a result, not likely to have consequences or wider ramifications. Consequently, beyond the broad identification of radicalisation as a possible cause of political instability, not much attention might be given to how radicalisation and violence in West Africa can have wider ramifications. We address this as part of the investigation into radicalisation and violence in the region presented in the present study, blending understanding of how these phenomena link to the international and global levels, while paying close attention to the detail of particular actors, issues and places. Although this view began to change after the arrest of the Christmas bomber in December 2009⁸ and Boko Haram’s emergence began to indicate the potential for violent extremism to have impact and spread beyond the local level, these security and policy challenges remained underplayed and without substantial consideration in West Africa. The continuing attacks by Boko Haram, however, increasingly drove the Nigerian government to recognise the cross-border ramifications of the activities of Boko Haram. This complements the great concern about West Africa’s impact on the global arena.

Against this background, and informed by these understandings, the research and analysis presented in the present book was undertaken. This collection contains studies emerging from that work, with a set of country studies complemented by overarching conceptual and synthetic analysis. The mutually reinforcing links between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violence’ (potentially sensitive terms, discussed by al-Saud and Gow in Chapter 2) were explored as part of an empirical investigation funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.⁹ This core research both complemented, and was complemented by, further research on youth and violence, funded by DFID, the UK development ministry, at King’s College London, and supported by ECOWAS.¹⁰

The project primarily investigated beliefs, values and attitudes to issues of radicalisation and violence in four Anglophone West African countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. To do so, it addressed five interrelated issues: tracing the antecedents of radicalisation; monitoring trends; identifying actors; anticipating possibilities; and analysing the strength of existing preventive mechanisms. In some instances, these issues were the departure point for analysis of beliefs, values and attitudes; in others they were an integrated part of the outcome. The emphasis in our findings is on what research subjects think and feel, as evidenced by qualitative empirical social research. This is distinct from empirically observable information that might be independently identified and verified. However, the latter was an important part of our research overall. The research highlights salient beliefs, values and attitudes, but is neither comprehensive, nor representative.

Process

The research involved a four-stage methodology, which corresponded to four broad phases of research activity. These are described in the following paragraphs. The nature of this research also meant various concerns and difficulties. Some of these were anticipated, though not necessarily to the degree encountered in practice. Others were unexpected, but enhanced the research itself. The various issues confronted in practice are also considered in the following paragraphs. These deal respectively with the four phases of research.

1 The initial phase of research produced what we labelled as ‘baseline studies’, establishing existing knowledge, understanding and interpretation of religion, radicalisation and violence in the countries under investigation. These baseline studies have been adapted to form parts of several chapters in the present volume. Ethical approval was a major concern and part of the process. The relevant panel of the Research Ethics subcommittee subjected the proposed research to considerable scrutiny – as in all other cases at King’s. At the end of this phase, the draft baseline studies were reviewed and evaluated by the project team, as well as by peer reviewers (internally by the Conflict Security and Development research group at King’s, and externally by selected international experts), and discussed at a project meeting in June 2008.

2 Following initial review and discussion at the project meeting, the second stage of research involved both supplementary work on the baseline studies and the outlining of propositions to be tested in the third phase of research. These propositions were refined following the project workshops and in light of initial findings, but, in each case, reflected both broader concerns and matter specific to particular countries.

3 The third phase involved focus group research in various countries, supplemented, as necessary, by semi-structured interviews with individuals with either particular expertise or positions. As far as relevant and possible, focus groups were conducted to reflect regional differentiation, and were of two types: either general, mixed ethnicity, religion and gender groups, or with specific segments, identified for a particular reason (ethnicity, religion, gender, or a mix of these). Twenty-five focus group sessions were conducted across the region and this research forms the basis for the country study chapters that appear in this volume. While sessions were generally conducted in a positive and harmonious atmosphere, despite the issues under discussion, on two occasions, tension was great and some participants became intemperate, requiring temporary suspension of sessions and conciliation by the session leader. There were particular problems arranging sessions in Kano, in northern Nigeria, where there had been (and continues to be, at the time of writing) violence, and where the situation is fraught. Sensitivities were great in this case, and caution had to be used. This was the sharpest of several instances in which participants would not agree to electronic recording of sessions and were reluctant to sign ethical consent forms. For the most part, however, participants in sessions were content with both recording and signing consent forms. Nonetheless, this must be noted as an important sensitivity in the research.

4 The final phase of research involved integration of the different parts of the research, including critical evaluation by the project team and, where appropriate, comparative analysis. We present some of the integrated findings and major themes stemming from this research in the remainder of this chapter.

Analysis

Despite the differences between the countries studied, a number of common research findings emerge. It is clear, however, that differences between the countries also mean some issues are specific. In addition, it is also evident that Nigeria, which has a population the size of all other countries in West Africa put together, is the most important and potentially volatile state. The research also generated critical reflection on concepts and terms, albeit of an indeterminate character.

• Deep history. Both informed researchers and peer reviewers, initially, suggested that ‘history’ and historical awareness had to be part of the baseline studies and the research overall. This was a surprise, but proved to be well judged and in line with the perspectives of participants. This was an issue that spanned the region. The arrival, presence and history of Islam, as well as very strong perceptions of injustice, featured prominently in each of the country studies – all the more so as this issue was incorporated as part of the baseline studies and emergent propositions for empirical research.¹¹ Islam arrived in the region during the ninth century, at least three centuries before Christianity. Christianity became a dominant (if not majority) force across the region under colonial rule (excepting Liberia, where this process was quasi-indigenous, led by Christians freed from slavery in the US, during the nineteenth century). Colonial rule, or the process of decolonisation, is seen as relevant to contemporary political radicalisation. In one Muslim-only focus group in northern Nigeria, there was agreement that ‘the situation would have been different if the British colonial government had been more understanding in the ways it treated Islam’. Nonetheless, the apparent historical usurping of Islam and the impact of colonial rule are clearly perceived as sources of injustice, underpinning radicalisation.

• Islam and violence. There was a surprising consensus, notably among Muslim participants, that Islam is more pre-disposed to violence as a religious force than other religions. This does not necessarily mean that Islam has a greater inclination to violence, of course, merely that there is a consensus believing or judging this to be the case among participants across the region. It, clearly, was a perception, not necessarily an objective comment on the relationship between Islam and violence, or radicalisation. This view was particularly salient among a specific Christian minority group in Muslim-dominated Kano, in northern Nigeria. As a perception, however, it is surprising to find it supported among Muslim participants, particularly, in Nigeria – though some of those acknowledging the phenomenon did not approve of it and offered criticism. One exception to this view of Islam and violence was found in Ghana, during a focus group in Tamale, where one respondent qualified understanding of this kind: ‘I don’t share the view that Muslims are radicals and violent. … People misconstrue the Islamic justice system to mean that Islam is violent.’ Even in this context, however, there was agreement that Muslims, against the Qur’an, engaged in violence.

• Ideological competition and intra-Islamic violence. There was general agreement that ideological competition between religious leaders and religiously linked political movements was a key spur to radicalisation and violence. This was noted as occurring between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, especially in the north, where tensions run high and violence has occurred. This was also directly evident in a focus group in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, where one Christian pastor’s comments on the character of Islam provoked anger among Muslim participants, forcing the session to be suspended until tempers had settled. Against this, competition between Christian and Islamic groups, including mosque-for-church building rivalry, has generated, or embedded in, a culture of tolerance and even fusion in Sierra Leone. Across the region, however, there was clear recognition among participants that competition between different Islamic groups was a strong source of both radicalisation and violence, with violence occurring between Muslim groups, except in northern Nigeria. In this context, ‘desecration’, or threats to the practice of religious observance, was also seen as particularly important, whether this involved Christian acts or ideological (or other forms) of competition concerning the ‘true’ Islam, the Qur’an, or the Hadith (the limited examples of religio-political violence in both Sierra Leone and Liberia had this character, as well as more prevalent examples in Nigeria and Ghana). The biggest fear of the north Nigerian Christian minority in Kano is being ‘wrongly accused of desecrating the Qur’an’ and ‘being caught at the wrong place in times of religious conflict’. Against this, one example was cited of how some young Christians and Muslims in Jos joined together to use force to protect life and property in their areas during the violence there, rather than taking sides in the clashes between groups of their respective co-religionists.

• Ethnic and regional mapping. Participants generally believed that any inter-religious tension and radicalisation mapped onto ethnic and regional divisions. Thus, religion was seen as a factor in, or marker of, conflicts that had other underlining drivers. This was evident in the comments during the Ile-Ife focus group in Nigeria, where Muslim Yoruba participants claimed that their fellow Muslims in Kano in the north (of Hausa ethnicity) would see the southwesterners primarily as Yoruba and only secondarily as Muslims, compounded by the perceived belief among northerners that the Yoruba practise an adulterated version of Islam, which needs to be corrected through violent means, if necessary. Sierra Leone is an exception to the pattern of ethno-regional religious mapping, as Muslims are found across all regions and in all political parties, with no peculiar Muslim political or regional identity having formed.

• The role of elites. There is a general sense, especially in Nigeria, that ‘political elites benefit from radicalisation’. There was almost universal support for this proposition, supported by the sense that structures to address issues of radicalisation and its consequences are inadequate, or non-existent, and that political elites benefited from this situation. In some cases, the view was expressed and noted that some Muslim political leaders sponsor religious violence. Some participants in Jos, a city in Nigeria that has experienced politico-religious violence, argued that all cases of religious violence occurred after Friday prayers, during which youths at prayer-grounds were alleged to have been radicalised and prompted to commit acts of violence by their imams. Although it chimed with more generally expressed views in some other sessions, this view was rejected by Muslim participants, who cited a complex of social contradictions as underpinning bouts of violence. Nonetheless, it was notable that – contrary to our expectations – the purely Muslim focus group in Kano, in general, condemned their leaders’ role in Nigeria’s religio-political violence, with most respondents uncomfortable talking about the topic further, but some arguing that their leaders had exploited groups in society to provoke trouble. There was support in other focus groups for the suggestion that national leaders had no interest in creating adequate structures to deal with radicalisation and violence, as they benefited – in the view of one group, for example – from the opportunities the violence created ‘for treasury looting’. The only situation in which it was envisaged this neglect by the political elite might be changed was said to be ‘if the issue extends to the level of suicide mission’, which would force leaders to ‘take it seriously’, whereas the bombing of buildings and contingent deaths would not make a difference.

• Domestic and international factors. There was general agreement that domestic factors, rather than external influences, were more important in causing radicalisation and violence. External influences were only ‘excuses’ for domestic agitation. In some instances, participants perceived limited influence of external actors – for example, Saudi Arabian support of various kinds for Islamic development in the 1980s and 1990s. In Sierra Leone, this external influence appears to have gained no purchase, while impact elsewhere in the region was mixed. It was noted that these forms of external funding had mainly ceased in the 1990s. It was also noted that, in the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: militancy and violence in West Africa
• 2 Religion, radicalisation and violence
• 3 Islamic radicalisation and violence in Nigeria
• 4 Islamic radicalisation and violence in Ghana
• 5 Islamic radicalisation and violence in Liberia
• 6 Religious militancy and violence in West Africa: a study of Islam in Sierra Leone
• 7 Beyond Anglophone West Africa: endemic conflicts and new Islamic radicalism
• 8 The regional and international implications of radicalisation and violent extremism in West Africa
• Index