European Union Enlargement

Material interests, community norms and anomie

Thomas Mehlhausen

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138505001
• eBook ISBN: 9781317479291
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The continuous expansion of the European Union has transformed its very own self-conception. While Eastern enlargement was widely celebrated as the 'reuniting of Europe', the sheer number of applicants, their low economic development and the need for new states to transform in accordance with EU values required considerable adjustments to the EU's self-image.

By examining the European Council's contentious approval of the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European countries in the 1970s and 1990s, this book investigates why the European Union enlarges. Based on new and hitherto not analysed data, it introduces the concept of 'anomie' to the discourse and, in doing so, makes a timely contribution to the literature of constitutional politics and enlargement of the European Union.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of the European Union, area studies (European studies, central and east European studies, Mediterranean studies) and more broadly comparative politics and constitutional politics.

1 Introduction

The continuous expansion of the European Union incrementally transformed its very own self-conception. Initially, the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) was designed to assure enduring peace and growing welfare by establishing an authority to control the most relevant resources for both warfare and the reconstruction of its member states after the disastrous Second World War. The first enlargement in 1973 settled the brief rivalry between the European Communities (EC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The EFTA initiator – the UK – soon changed sides together with Denmark and Ireland, rendering the EC the dominant format for economic cooperation in post-war Western Europe. While the EC-9 comprised rather highly developed industrial states, this image profoundly changed with the Mediterranean enlargements in 1981 and 1986. As poor transformation states at the Southern periphery, the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese accessions transmuted the EC into a democratisation and modernisation project. The pan-European vision of the founding years resurfaced in 1990 with German unification and the accession prospect of the two Mediterranean island states Cyprus and Malta, the four EFTA states Austria. Sweden, Finland and Norway, the eight post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) Poland. Czechoslovakia. Hungary. Romania, Bulgaria. Lithuania. Latvia and Estonia, and last but not least Turkey. The three EFTA states fitted rather well into the European Union (EU) with Norway having withdrawn its application after the failed public vote the year before. However, the pending CEEC applications posed the greatest challenge yet for European integration. While Eastern enlargement was widely celebrated as the 'reuniting of Europe', the sheer number of applicants, their low economic development and the apparent need for profound transformation required considerable adjustments on the EU's behalf. Croatia – becoming the 28th EU member in 2013 – is unlikely to be the last state to join the EU given the ongoing negotiations with Turkey. Montenegro and Serbia, as well as the membership prospect for the other South-Eastern and West European countries still outside the EU. This impressive enlargement history mirrors the EU's unfading attractiveness. However, given the heterogeneity of the successive entrants one keeps wondering what drives the European Union in its persistent willingness to accept new members.

Theory-building on European integration had long been rather negligent of EU enlargement. Traditionally, integration theories addressed the gradual yet increasing delegation and pooling of sovereignty. An intense debate evolved on the core motives for deepening, which initially divided neo-functionalists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1971; Nye 1971; Schmitter 1971; Busch 1996) and intergovernmentalists (Hoffmann 1966; Grieco 1996; Majone 1996; Moravcsik 1998) although the spectrum of theoretical approaches later broadened ever further (e.g. Pierson 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Risse et al. 1999). From a Westphalian perspective, the massive and voluntary self-disempowerment was astonishing, calling into question the notion of undivided sovereignty as the central assumption on interstate cooperation. When approaching a political entity in the tradition of Georg Jellinek (1929 [1990]) by attributing to it the trilogy of central power, territory and people, the focal point of the research has long been almost exclusively on the first element. Only recently has the EU-widening dimension been theorised (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Indeed, once we accept the existence of powerful international organisations and the notion of shared sovereignty in interstate relations the more pressing question seems to concern what determines the dynamic of international organisations, i.e. its creation, persistence and expansion. The Eastern enlargement prompted a multifaceted debate on the EU's widening. Accordingly, this study aims to contribute to this growing body of literature concerning the question of why and when the European Union accepts new members.

The remainder of this introduction specifies the research question and provides a succinct overview of this study. It sets out to adduce the decision-making process on EU enlargement. Subsequently, the research design is presented, i.e. the theoretical perspectives, the case selection, the research period and the methodology. Finally, the substance of each chapter will be summarised to provide an insight into the general line of argumentation.

1.1 Decision-making on EU enlargement

When studying EU enlargement two questions need to be addressed: who is eligible for membership and which actors within the EU are in a position to accept or reject an applicant?

The Treaty on European Union stipulates in Article 49 that '[a]ny European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union'. Four basic membership criteria can be directly or indirectly deduced which an applicant has to fulfil. First, a non-member must voice its willingness to access the EU (intentional criterion). The EU neither forces nor invites third states. At first glance, this may appear trivial but when analysing enlargement in the (narrow) sense of a process by which a non-member obtains the full member status (see section 1.2), the actual process starts with the first sign of an intention to join the EU. Although the CEEC started to lodge their membership applications as late as 1994, the process had already commenced much earlier. Second, applicants have to be states recognising and being recognised by all members (legal criterion). A case in point is the independence declaration of the Republic of Macedonia which has not been recognised by Greece and led to the provisional name of 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. This unresolved name dispute prevented the opening of accession negotiations. A somewhat inverted case is the non-recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. It is hardly conceivable that Turkey might enter the EU without finally opening official relations with Nicosia. Third, future member states have to be European (geographical criterion). This is attributed to the pan-European spirit at the beginning of European integration. While the Turkish East Thrace indisputably belongs to Europe, giving Turkey a basis for an EU membership application. Morocco is clearly situated outside of Europe and was therefore denied membership in 1987. Last but not least, applicants have to share the liberal values codified in Article 2 (political criterion). The 1962 Birkelbach Report pointed to the need to respect the common values as the EC had to respond to the Spanish bid for association with the final goal of full membership. The Copenhagen criteria elaborated on this membership precondition.

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

(European Council 1993: 14)

While it is irrefutable that these criteria have to be met, theoretical dispute prevails as to whether they are sufficient for full membership (Chapter 2).

Turning to the decision-making within the EU, the formal process can be divided into three phases. In the application phase, the Council receives the application and asks the Commission to prepare an 'Opinion' which assesses the applicant's suitability for full membership. On this basis the Council unanimously determines as to whether to grant the candidate status. In the negotiation phase, the Council decides on the commencement of accession talks. For each negotiation chapter, the Commission gives a recommendation on its opening which the Council might accept or reject. After an applicant lodges its position paper the Commission prepares a common position to be approved by the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Council (screening). The Council defines the benchmarks for the conclusion of a chapter. Until the closure of all chapters, the Council may suspend or reopen the negotiation of any chapter. In the ratification phase, the European Parliament votes with a simple majority over accession on the basis of the Commission's Opinion. Once the Council unanimously gives its approval, the applicant and the member states have to ratify the accession treaty so that the candidate is granted full member status.

The pivotal player within the EU is the Council (see Schneider 2009: 16–19). Due to the unanimity rule, each member state may veto the admission of an applicant in any enlargement phase. To be sure, there are various other actors involved. The European Commission exerts considerable influence on the accession process through its agenda-setting power but is in no formal position to block or ratify accession. The power asymmetry in the enlargement process between the Commission and the Council became most visible when the Council overruled the Commission's proposition to postpone the opening of accession negotiations with Greece in 1976 (see Chapter 4). The European Parliament (EP) has arguably even less power, notwithstanding its formal right to reject the accession treaty by absolute vote. Although John O'Brennan (2006: 95–112; see also Baun 2000: 16–20) underlines that its role cannot be reduced to a formal one but instead has to be conceptualised as a norm entrepreneur, he concedes that it is much less influential than both the Council and the Commission. Finally, depending on the respective ratification procedures the national parliaments or populations in referenda cast their votes on the accession of a new member. Since the research period of this study ends with the application phase (see section 1.2), neither the Parliament, the Commission nor national players may significantly influence the enlargement policy at this early point of time. This is why the research question will be constricted on the Council's willingness to enlarge the European Union.

1.2 Methodology

The study of such a broad topic as EU enlargement requires several assumptions to qualify in the research perspective.

Case selection: The European Union expanded in five waves from initially six to 28 member states (Table 1.1). The successive enlargement rounds considerably differ as to what extent the applicants were set to foster the EU's security, enhance its welfare or internalise its core values.

The 1973 accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland did not endanger the EC's security and welfare or its liberal identity. The applicants were not likely to import any substantial security risks, they represented relatively rich countries with the exception only of the smallest candidate. Ireland, and they were all stable democracies. In contrast, the Mediterranean countries which joined in 1981 and 1986 were rather poor, had just recovered from a long period of authoritarianism and were located at the periphery, with Greece having traditionally strained relations with Turkey. While the second EFTA enlargement granted access to the almost 'ideal' candidates of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 as neutral and highly industrialised democracies, the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements represented the hitherto greatest challenge for the EU in all regards. Croatia's entry shared some characteristics of Eastern enlargement, but as a single and small state it virtually posed no serious threats to the EU-27. In sum, among concluded enlargements only the Southern and the Eastern accessions raise the crucial question as to why the EU accepted these applicants.

Table 1.1 Concluded EU enlargement rounds

	Application	Negotiation period	Accession
UK	09.09.1961; 10.05.1967	08.11.1961–29.01.1963	01.01.1973
Denmark	10.08.1961; 11.05.1967	30.06.1970–22.01.1972	01.01.1973
Ireland	31.07.1961; 11.05.1967	30.06.1970–22.01.1972	01.01.1973
		30.06.1970–22.01.1972
Greece	12.06.1975	27.07.1976–28.05.1979	01.01.1981
Spain	28.03.1977	17.10.1978–12.06.1985	01.01.1986
Portugal	28.07.1977	05.02.1979–12.06.1985	01.01.1986
Austria	17.07.1989	01.02.1993–12.04.1994	01.01.1995
Sweden	01.07.1991	01.02.1993–12.04.1994	01.01.1995
Finland	18.03.1992	01.02.1993–12.04.1994	01.01.1995
Malta	16.07.1990	15.02.2000–13.12.2002	01.05.2004
Cyprus	03.07.1990	31.03.1998–13.12.2002	01.05.2004
Hungary	31.03.1994	31.03.1998–13.12.2002	01.05.2004
Poland	05.04.1994	31.03.1998–13.12.2002	01.05.2004
Romania	2...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• PART I Theory test: Eastern and Southern European Union enlargements
• PART II Theory building: anomie and diffuse decision contexts
• Index