Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge

Roger Eatwell, Cas Mudde

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9781134201563
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Communism, Post-Communism & Socialism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

By the turn of the 1990s, Western democracy appeared destined to become the universal governmental norm. However, as we move into the new millennium there are growing signs that extremism is far from dead. In recent years, the extreme right has gathered notable support in many Western countries, such as Austria, France and Italy. Racist violence, initially aimed at 'immigrants', is on the rise, and in the US, and increasingly in Europe, the state itself has become a major target. This book considers the varying trajectories of the 'extreme right' and 'populist' parties and focuses on the problems of responses to these trends, an issue which has hitherto been neglected in academic literature.

Part I
Right-wing extremism in contemporary democracies

1 Between adaptation, differentiation and distinction
Extreme right-wing parties within democratic political systems

Alexandre Dézé

Introduction

On the whole, classical approaches to extreme right parties have analyzed the question of their relationship to European democratic political systems in four different ways: first, by considering extreme right movements as a danger for democracy (e.g. Taguieff and Tribalat 1998); second, by examining the responses of democratic regimes to extremist challenges (e.g. Capoccia and Pedahzur 2003); third, by evaluating the impact of extremist formations on political systems (e.g. Schain 2001); finally, by interpreting the phenomenon’s emergence in Europe as the consequence of factors such as the transformation (Kitschelt and McGann 1995) or the crisis of West European party systems (e.g. Ivaldi 1999a). In this chapter, I would like to suggest another way of exploring the relationship between extremism and democracy, and more specifically its consequences for extreme right parties.

Some of these parties can now be considered as full members of the political arena. This is particularly true in Belgium, Austria, Italy, and France. However, it does not entail that the relationship between these parties and European democratic systems is less problematic. Although based on an ideology whose roots are in contradiction to essential liberal democratic principles, such parties have nonetheless tried to win power through proper constitutional means. How have these parties managed, and how do they still manage, to deal with this contradiction–institutional logic versus doctrinal orthodoxy? My hypothesis is that the manner in which these parties have managed this contradiction partly explains their present evolution. I will try to test this hypothesis through the comparative analysis of four organizations–the French National Front (FN), the Flemish Block (VB), the National Alliance-Italian Social Movement (AN-MSI) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The comparative approach to the extreme right in Europe raises several taxonomic problems (Backes 2001; Mudde 1996). However, using Piero Ignazi’s (1992, 1994a) definition, I will consider these as extreme right parties.¹

Adaptation, differentiation and distinction

According to the main teachings of the systemic and environmentalist approaches to political parties, parties are both dependent and independent from their global environment.² The dependency factor forces them to ‘adapt themselves’ to it. As emphasized by Jean and Monica Charlot, it is a ‘matter of life and death’ (Charlot and Charlot 1985, p. 431). Thus, parties are ‘dependent variables’ of the systems in which they operate. Nevertheless, they also ‘always manage to maintain […] sufficient autonomy so as to be independent variables as well’ (Charlot and Charlot, p. 471). Parties are free to decide not to adapt to the environment; however, this choice partly excludes them from it. Whether parties abide by liberal democratic values depends on the ideological distance separating these values from those on which the identity of a given party is built.

In the particular instance of extreme right formations, this distance is important enough for the relationship with democratic political systems to be problematic. We can formulate, theoretically, that this interaction leaves extreme right parties with one alternative: either adapt themselves to the system, hence running the risk of losing a part of their original identities and of the support of their most orthodox members, or distinguish themselves from the system, thereby running the risk of being excluded from it, or of being marginalized.

It is necessary, at this point, to clarify notions and to specify how this theoretical schema works. First, I think that the strategic alternative between adaptation and distinction is an alternative between terms that are contradictory for extreme right parties. However, I do not think that for any party, there is any contradiction or ‘paradox’ (Villalba 1997) between adaptation and differentiation. Political systems in representative democracies create a competitive game: parties are therefore forced to use strategic differentiation (Parodi 1991; Ysmal 1985). Hence, adapting themselves to the system and differentiating themselves within the system are ‘two essential rules of the political game’ (Birenbaum 1992, p. 18).

However, a party wishing to participate in the electoral game must reconcile these two imperatives (adaptation and differentiation), which creates an intra-party tension centering around the relationship to ideology. The changing pattern of positions occupied within the system implies that, in some circumstances, parties are led to stress their differentiation strategy and propose some of the most controversial elements in their ideologies and platforms. In other circumstances, particularly while allying themselves with other parties or while trying to broaden their electoral base, these singular aspects in their ideologies are marginalized (Bourdieu 1981; Michels 1962).

However, the tension at work in the relationship of these parties to their ideologies does not simply vary according to the position occupied within the system. It also, and more importantly, depends on the nature of the relationship with this system. For contemporary extreme right parties, who show ‘opposition of principle’ (Kirchheimer 1966, p. 237) to democratic systems, differentiating themselves can imply putting forward, in some circumstances and on some topics, an ideology and a platform that contradict the principles on which the system is based. In this case, extreme right parties not only stress their difference within the system but also with the system: they distinguish themselves from it.

An ‘alternative within the system’ and an ‘alternative to the system’: an irreducible dilemma?

It is now time to test the validity of this schema from an empirical point of view. Now that they have become full-time actors in the political game, how have extreme right parties managed to deal with this paradoxical relationship with the system? To answer this question, it is important to grant full attention to the contextual evolution of the global environment which, from the mid-1980s onward, has been rather favorable to the emergence and implantation of extreme right organizations in representative democracies (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Ignazi 1994a).

Incidentally, political organizations are far from able to control the full process granting them access to, and survival within, a given political system. Their recognition, which is the key to access the decision-making process (Charlot and Charlot 1985), comes from a host of complex institutional, cultural, economic, social and political mechanisms that they can only partially control (Lagroye 1985). Still, these organizations use strategies and discourses, in the competitive game over power, which are clear testimonies of the type of political behaviors that they have adopted towards both the system and the other political actors. I will use the–inevitably summary and fragmentary–analysis of these strategies and discourses as a basis for empirical verification, while taking the environmental global context into consideration as a constraint on the elaboration and the implementation of these strategies and discourses.

The MSI: from the ‘excluded’ to the ‘integrated’ pole

Founded in 1946 by ex-dignitaries of the Italian Social Republic, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) positioned itself from the start at the fringe of the Italian democratic political system. As the movement ‘owed its raison d’être to its bond with fascism, accepting […] the “anti-fascist” system was a painful operation as it was difficult to reconcile with its manifest ideology’ (Ignazi 1994b, pp. 1016–17). In a first phase, the party clearly refused to compromise with the system. It overtly used strategic distinction and violently criticized the institutional regime. Its platform was unambiguous–‘to keep on calling on the spirit of fascism and the spirit of the Italian Social Republic’ (in Simon 1992, p. 73)–and its activities focused on activism and anti-communism.

In spite of this rejection, the political system still functioned as the MSI’s inescapable center of attraction. As early as 1947, the MSI endeavored to implement both a strategy of adaptation and of electoral participation. As underlined by Roberto Chiarini, ‘the very fact of entering Parliament [in 1948] and local councils [in 1947] forced the MSI to moderate its ideology’ (Chiarini 1995, p. 98), i.e. to reduce the distance between their own values and those of representative democracy. This strategic participation raised the sensitive question of the relationship with the political system. As such, it became the issue of a heated conflict between the two wings of the party–the intransigents hostile to any type of compromise, and the moderates in favor of an anti-communist alliance with the Christian Democrats and the monarchists.³

In 1950, Augusto de Marsanich, the leader of the moderate wing, acceded to the leadership of the party. From this year onward, the MSI planned to become a ‘credible’ political force, the ‘hub of a future government of national union’ (Milza 1991, p. 481). They concluded a ‘pact of alliance’ with the Monarchist Party, and supported successive moderate governments. This change had immediate positive electoral consequences. However, it gave rise to strong tensions with the intransigent, revolutionary and social wing. Remaining faithful to the tradition of the Social Republic, Giorgio Almirante, Principal Private Secretary at the Ministry of Popular Culture (Minculpop) under the Social Republic and an irreconcilable opponent to the regime, resigned from the national leadership of the party in April 1956. Pino Rauti, likewise, parted with the Almirantian group of the party to form the Evolian movement Ordine Nuovo (New Order).

In 1960, the strategic insertion of the MSI seemed complete (Ignazi 1996) when Tambroni’s Christian Democrat government obtained a vote of confidence thanks to the support of the neo-fascist party. But this event triggered a strong reaction from the Italian population, and violent confrontations between leftist militants and the police took place during the congress of the MSI, which was held in Genoa (the former capital of the Resistance). Twelve people died in the street battles and hundreds were injured, leading the government to resign.

From this date, the MSI entered a phase of political decline, during which the moderate leadership was increasingly contested. However, when Arturo Michelini (de Marsanich’s successor) died in 1969, the MSI was once again faced with the ‘contradiction between theoretico-verbal maxi-malism and the daily practice of a somewhat receptive attitude towards the moderation of the Christian Democrats’ (Ignazi 1989, p. 133). Paradoxically, the election of Giorgio Almirante as Secretary General did not lead to radicalization of the movement’s strategy. Strengthened by increasing electoral support, Almirante asserted his intention to pursue and update the strategy of insertion by reconciling the extremes within a vast ‘autonomous’ union. The party was then redefined as the party of ‘the alternative to the system and of the alternative within the system’ (Almirante 1969).

The outcome of this strategy of conciliation was the creation of the Destra Nazionale (National Right, DN) with a view to contesting the legislative elections. The aim of the DN was clearly to broaden their electoral base as well as their political staff (Monarchists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, whose presence helped grant legitimacy to the party). This process contributed to changing the party label to MSI-DN, and to effacing a part of the original ideological grounding. Henceforward, in their speeches ‘any subversive or revolutionary attempts were rejected’ (Almirante 1970) while ‘democracy’ and ‘liberty’ were redefined as ‘priority values that cannot be renounced’ (Almirante 1972).

The party could not totally renounce its ideological grounding without estranging part of its electorate and its most orthodox militants. Nevertheless, MSI leaders were conscious that it was no longer possible to ‘present fascism in a grotesque […], old-fashioned, anachronistic and stupidly nostalgic manner’ (Almirante cited in Cheles 1986, p. 29). The party therefore developed a latent ideology, expressed through the use of a ‘double’ discourse perfectly illustrated by the slogan found on a poster of the 1970 regional elections campaign–‘Nostalgia dell’avvenire’ (Nostalgia for the future), a conceptual expression of this search for compromise between the past (fascism) and the future (the integration of the MSI). The results of the 1972 election initially seemed to confirm Almirante’s strategy. However, unable to complete this ideological revision because of strong criticism among the more militant, intransigent fringes of the party, he was faced with the failure of the DN project during the 1976 elections.

Jeopardized by a context of gruesome terrorism, abandoned by the advocates of ideological renovation (the faction led by Ernesto De Marzio having decided to leave the party in order to extend ‘the limits of the DN strategy into a right-wing conservative party’ (Ignazi 1996, p. 698) by founding National Democracy), the MSI relaunched its policy of an alternative to the system (one of their slogans was ‘Struggle against the regime’) and became increasingly isolated. More than 30 years after its creation, the issue of its relationship with the political system centered around contradictory ideas, as it failed to overcome the alternative between loyalty to fascism and adaptation to the system. As Almirante had underlined in 1956, ‘the ambiguity […] is to be fascists within democracy’ (cited in Campi 1995, p. 121).

At the end of the 1980s, the death of the historical leaders (Almirante, Romualdi) did not change anything. As the ‘Dauphin’ of Almirante, Gianfranco Fini, the young and new Secretary of the party whose nomination had been strongly debated, maintained the traditional line of opposition to the system and kept stressing the continuity of the party’s ideals with fascism. His strategy left things unchanged, and Fini was criticized and defeated by Pino Rauti at the 1990 Congress. Both leaders disagreed about strategic options: while Fini, inspired by the French FN, tried to put forward immigration issues as a means of electoral mobilization (Simon 1992), Rauti elaborated a program combining elements of both neoright-ist thought and early Fascist radicalism with the intention of attracting leftist voters. At the 1990 municipal and regional elections, the MSI obtained the worst results of its history (3.9 per cent of the vote). As the 1991 Sicily elections were no better, Rauti resigned and Fini was reelected. The following year the MSI commemorated the 70th anniversary of the ‘March on Rome’.

At the dawn of the 1990s, everything seemed to indicate that the neo-fascist movement was doomed to remaining a marginal force in the Italian political system. However, its recent evolution, based on full integration into the system and, consequently, on the acceptance of the founding principles of representative democracy, proves different. How did the MSI succeed in overcoming the historic dilemma with which it had been faced during 50 years?

First, a series of exogenous factors contributed to the progressive rehabilitation of the MSI, as well as encouraging the constitution of the ‘List of Agreement of the Good Government’ linking it to the new Forza Italia, and the Northern League.⁴ Thus, a political pariah became one of the main actors of the ‘Pole of Liberty’. It is at this moment that the neo-fascist movement adopted the label National Alliance-Italian Social Movement (AN-MSI), thereby stressing its will to change and renew the party.

The ensuing 1994 legislative elections were a triumphant success. The AN-MSI got 13.5 per cent of the vote, 107 deputies and five ministers. Now a member of the Berlusconi government, the MSI went much further than simply changing labels: it also stopped referring to corporatism, and accepted the market economy as well as the fundamental principles of democracy. Finally, the party clearly distanced itself from fascism; for example, Fini (re)defined anti-fascism as ‘a moment which was historically essential to the return of democratic values in Italy’. The 1995 Fiuggi Congress made the party transformation official. In protest, Rauti left the party together with a militant...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction: The new extreme right challenge
• Part I: Right-wing extremism in contemporary democracies
• Part II: Democratic responses to right-wing extremism