Boundaries of Clan and Color

Transnational Comparisons of Inter-Group Disparity

William Darity, Ashwini Deshpande

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9781134479955
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Economic disparity between ethnic and racial groups is a ubiquitous and pervasive phenomenon internationally. Gaps between groups encompass employment, wage, occupational status and wealth differentials. Virtually every nation is comprised of a group whose material well-being is sharply depressed in comparison with another, socially dominant group.

1 Boundaries of clan and color

An introduction

Ashwini Deshpande and William Darity, Jr.

Inter-group economic inequality

This volume has evolved out of a special issue of the Review of Social Economy that we edited in 2000.¹ Our interest in understanding patterns of ethnic economic inequality across countries prompted us to look for comparative studies and it turns out there is a small but growing body of work (see Nesiah 1997; Darity 1998; Darity and Deshpande 2000; Darity and Nembhard 2000). Eight general findings have emerged from these studies (Table 1.1 summarizes some of these points for a selected group of countries with well-documented inter-group disparity):

1. Countries with a lower general level of income inequality do not necessarily display lower levels of inter-group inequality. For instance, both Brazil, South Africa and Malaysia with high overall inequality levels on the one hand, and Canada, India, Australia and Israel with low overall inequality levels on the other have substantial inter-group inequality.
2. Inter-group disparity is persistent and significant in countries at all levels of development, whether “development” is measured narrowly by per capita income or more broadly by an index of well-being such as the Human Development Index (HDI). Whether they are “high”-HDI countries (0.8 and above) such as Australia, Canada, Croatia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, and the USA, or “medium”-HDI countries (0.5–0.799) such as Belize, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, or “low”- HDI countries (below 0.5) such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea: all have significant inter-group disparities.
3. Greater gender equity is not generally associated with lower levels of inter-group inequality. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, the selected group of countries has very diverse ranks in the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), going from 5 for Canada to 135 for Rwanda. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is another measure that captures aspects of empowerment of women. There are gaps in the data series for the GEM, but whatever data are available display the same diversity as the GDI.
4. Higher rates of economic growth do not invariably close economic gaps between racial and ethnic groups, nor does lower economic growth inevitably widen the gap. Neither Malaysia, a country that experienced a high average rate of growth between 1975 and 1995, nor South Africa, a country that experienced a negative rate of growth over the same period, demonstrated an inverse movement in the degree of intergroup disparity.
5. Inter-group division at sufficiently high levels of tension to produce civil war conditions or genocidal violence is obviously inimical to economic development, but the mere fact of inter-group economic inequality is not. This is clear from the experience of the high-income, high-HDI countries that have managed to achieve high levels of economic development despite significant inter-group disparity.
6. In all countries where statistical investigations have been undertaken to assess the presence of discrimination in employment markets, substantial evidence of discriminatory losses in earnings and occupational status against a subaltern group is detected. In societies where group distinctions are borne by phenotypical markers, such as color, as in the USA, identifying members of a subaltern group, e.g. the black minority, may be easier than in other countries, such as India, where there are multiple groups subjected to subaltern status. For instance, if religion is used as the group identifier, then there is evidence of discrimination against minority religions such as Islam and Christianity. But if caste is used as a group marker, then the focus shifts to disparity within India’s dominant religious group (Hinduism), and there is evidence of discriminatory losses against lower castes. This complicates the picture, but the overall statement – that subaltern groups face discriminatory losses in labour markets – remains valid.
   The picture also is beset by complicating subtleties in the USA. By US standards, although phenotype has never been as decisive as genotype (the so-called one-drop rule: “one drop of African blood makes you black”), American racial boundaries, seemingly based upon fixed and absolute criteria in laws governing race, did not prevent many persons of recent African ancestry from passing over to the “white” category if they were sufficiently light-skinned. Some clusters of persons of recent African ancestry simply declared themselves to be native American tribal groups, rather than be classified as black.² Others whose phenotypical attributes would have allowed them to “go for white” have chosen to be identified as black. Therefore, whereas charting racial identity in the USA may be easier for the detached observer than charting caste identity in India, it is not necessarily easy to do either. And it would probably be impossible for the detached observer in Rwanda or Burundi to determine who is Hutu and who is Tutsi. But black identity is unequivocally associated with lower economic status in the USA, just as low-caste affiliation is unequivocally associated with lower economic status in India.
7. Cross-national evidence does not indicate that employment discrimi- nation necessarily declines over time, even in strongly market-oriented economies. Labor market studies in Brazil, the USA after 1975, Canada, and even post-apartheid South Africa do not provide evidence of a consistent decline in measured discrimination against subaltern groups.
8. Adoption and implementation of remedies for inter-group disparity, such as affirmative action programs, have not proven sufficient to close the gap anywhere, but there is good evidence to suggest that the gaps would be even wider in the absence of such programs. Consider, for instance, the counter-example of Nepal, which is an official Hindu nation that has no affirmative action for low castes. Here, the low castes and Muslims are seriously under-represented in higher education and the upper end of the employment spectrum. These minority groups do not have a middle class comparable to India that has been created owing to affirmative action policies in education and public employment.

Table 1.1 Ranking of countries by selected indicators, 2000

One phase of the comparative inquiry involves construction of and examination of international cross-section, cross-country macro-level data on a variety of country characteristics and on group economic differences within each country. A second phase of the comparative inquiry involves development of increasingly detailed and accurate accounts of intergroup disparity for each country. We believe that both phases feed into each other to produce a nuanced account of inter group disparity across countries. In the special issue of the Review of Social Economy we addressed the second phase. Through this volume, we hope to further strengthen that quest.

Why clan and color?

It would be in order, at this stage, to elaborate a little on the title of this volume, “Boundaries of clan and color.” Group disparities are not based on skin color in all parts of the world. In Western Europe and in the Americas, particularly North America, skin color (and phenotype), or what is popularly known as “race,” forms the basis of group disparities. Even though it is established that there is greater variation in phenotype and appearance within so-called “races” than between them, the concept of race has proved to be a powerful tool that is used to keep the minorities in these societies segregated, discriminated against and oppressed.³ In a country that celebrates its multiculturalism, Canada’s use of the term “visible minorities” makes this distinction explicit. Visible are those whose skin color is not white; the 1986 Employment Equity Act designated the visible minorities and other groups such as women and disabled persons as facing discrimination in the labor market.

As Chapter 3 by the late Morton Stelcner in this volume demonstrates, the racial/ethnic differentiation picture in Canada is complex and the single umbrella term of “visible minorities” does not capture the multifaceted nature of discrimination in the labor market. However, the fact remains that skin color or race forms a crucial group marker. Racism or color-based disparity and discrimination in another big country of North America, the USA, is more well-known internationally. Large parts of Europe, notably Western Europe, and South America, exhibit similar color-based disparities, with racism being a major economic and social problem.

However, not all ethnic disparities and conflicts are based on skin color. Take, for instance, conflicts that have been particularly bloody and violent such as those in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Israel or the Ethiopian conflict that led to the formation of Eritrea. In fact, in African countries where a group of European descent is not involved, ethnic conflicts are between groups whose identities are not based on skin color. Indeed, even inside Europe, the Balkan crisis did not originate in race-based conflicts. In both Singapore and Malaysia, the subject matter of Chapters 6 and 9 in this volume, inter-group disparity is based on national origins. Thus, in non-color-based societies, the conflicting groups are not defined on the basis of skin color or race but upon other social categories – religion, nationality or other ethnic groupings. In such societies skin color is considered more an individual attribute than a group characteristic. Thus, it is entirely possible that in these societies individual distinctions in skin color are noticed or might be considered an attribute of beauty, but the defining character of social groups is not their common skin color.

Of course, in such societies, there are internally understood or recognized markers to distinguish members of racial or ethnic groups. These markers may not always provide correct signals, but they are the operating guidelines in their particular social context. Rwandans and Burundians generally will claim they can tell who is what based on various social markers. In Japan the Burakumin typically were identified by their mode of speaking/dress, since they lived for many years in segregated communities. Jacob Meerman, in Chapter 8 in this volume, suggests that with the dispersal of the Burakumin ghettos Japan may experience a dissolution of the Buraku identity. That may be true, but will it also mean that the inequalities besetting persons of Buraku ancestry, people scarred by Japan’s history of degrading them, will disappear while they still carry the legacy of deprivation? These questions point to the complexity of this issue.

India is a compelling country in that the definitions of group identity are multifaceted, as we have already seen. Thus, to talk in terms of a single majority or a dominant group that is in conflict with one or several subaltern groups is not very meaningful in understanding the totality of group divisions in the country. To go back to the two examples that we referred to earlier, within Hinduism caste is an important group identifier (Chapter 7 in this volume is focused on inter-caste disparity). In this context, the subaltern groups would be the low castes. However, as we go to press, India is still emerging from the aftermath of one of the worst instances of communal carnage in its history, where forces claiming to represent the majority religion (Hinduism) went on a rampage against Muslims, a small but significant minority. Here, the majority comprises all Hindus (including low castes) pitted against the subaltern Muslim community. In addition, linguistic groups, regional groups and women all add layers of complexity to the meaning of inter group disparity that makes straightforward generalizations impossible.

Race and caste

Another reason makes India of special interest. The caste system has fascinated western scholarship, which has often seen direct parallels between racial divisions in color-segregated societies and caste divisions in India. While several of the manifestations of racism and casteism are identical, especially towards those at the receiving end, we would like to suggest that there are fundamental differences between “race” and caste as social categories.⁴ We use the word “race” in a qualified sense: modern physical anthropology no longer subscribes to the popular typology of race. However, given the widespread use of the term and the fact that disparities in several societies are “race”-based, a volume that discusses both race-based and caste-based disparities ought to devote some space to a discussion of “race and caste.” To begin with, the histories of the two systems differ greatly. Racism is a direct product of slavery under colonialism: the ascriptive differences between the slaves and their masters were extended to defining group characteristics. The negative stereotyping of blacks truly began with capitalism and was consolidated during colonialism.

Caste, on the other hand, represents a system of social stratification that pre-dates colonialism by centuries. Therefore, for caste to be color-coded, there would have to be a strong historical basis. The history of present-day India does not in fact offer straightforward answers to why the caste system ought to be color-coded. The racial theory of Indian civilization is a formation of the late nineteenth century, when “in the wake of slave emancipation, white–black relations in the Anglo-Saxon world were being restructured with ideological support from a rush of racial essentialism” (Trautmann 1997: 208). Another reason that the theory is erroneous is that the Indus valley civilization predates the arrival of the Aryan-speaking people, so to argue that the Indian (sic) civilization is the product of the conflict between lighter-skinned Aryans and darker-skinned aborigines is misleading. This racial theory was extended to the formulation of the racial theory of caste.⁵ One important basis of the racial theory of caste is that “Varna” (the ancient Indian caste divisions, see Chapter 7 in this volume for definitions) can be interpreted as skin color. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the “Varnas” are racially different among themselves. Trautmann (1997: 211) analyzes the British colonial quest:

In this fantastic back-projection of systems of racial segregation in the American South and in South Africa onto early Indian history, the relations of the British “new invader from Europe” with the peoples of India is prefigured thousands of years before by t...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgments
• 1: Boundaries of Clan and Color An Introduction
• 2: Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil
• 3: Earnings Differentials Amongethnic Groups in Canada A Review of the Research
• 4: Understanding Recent Empirical Evidence on Race and Labor Market Outcomes in the USA*
• 5: If not Reconciliation, then What? Race and the “Stolen Generation” in Australia
• 6: Multiracialism and Meritocracy Singapore’s Approach to Race and Inequality
• 7: Recasting Economic Inequality
• 8: The Mobility of Japan’s Burakumin Militant Advocacy and Government Response
• 9: Malaysia’s New Economic Policy Has it been a Success?