North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Tae-Hwan Kwak, Seung-Ho Joo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317086611
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Relations between the two Koreas continue to be hostile, volatile and unpredictable with North Korea's nuclear issue remaining as untamed as ever. As such, there is a growing urgency for security cooperation in Northeast Asia to be given immediate attention. The key players in the region - the US, China, Japan and Russia - are keenly aware of the security threat of an armed clash between North and South Korea and are committed to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This book explores the domestic factors of the two Koreas and the four major powers that influence their security policies towards North Korea and Northeast Asia. This well thought out and consistently analysed volume has huge potential to frame the conversation on Northeast Asian relations in the coming years.

Chapter 1
The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks

Tae-Hwan Kwak

Thus far, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea) has conducted three nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, and February 12, 2013. It officially claimed to possess nuclear weapons on February 10, 2005. The DPRK claims that it is now a nuclear power. It has abandoned denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula citing the present Northeast Asian security environment as a reason.

The Six-Party Talks (SPT) involving the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the DPRK, and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) began in August 2003 to achieve verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The talks have been held on and off for the last nine years. Then ROK President Lee Myung-bak for the first time expressed his view on the importance of the long-stalled SPT on December 29, 2010, stressing that the SPT were the only way to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, and called for the resumption of the SPT.¹

The six-party process that aims at North Korea’s denuclearization has long been stalled since the SPT failed to agree on a verification protocol in early December 2008. North Korea’s nuclear issue, a serious international issue and a key obstacle to the Korean peace process, needs to be resolved peacefully and diplomatically through the six-party process. The author has argued over the years that the six-party process is still alive and is the best means to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and that US–DPRK bilateral talks are equally important for a diplomatic solution of the DPRK’s nuclear issue, which is a prerequisite for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The SPT produced three significant international agreements for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula: the September 19, 2005 “Statement of Principles,” the February 13, 2007 “Initial Actions of the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” and the October 3, 2007 “Agreement on Second Phase Actions.”² Although the September 19 agreement contained only the general principles for achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it was the first multilateral agreement among the six parties. The February 13 and October 3 agreements, however, provided specific steps toward implementing the September 19 agreement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action.”³ In the February 13 agreement, a three-phase (initial actions, disablement, and dismantlement) roadmap was proposed for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.⁴

This chapter evaluates the current status of the long stalled SPT, analyzing the major obstacles to the restoration of the six-party process. It then makes policy recommendations to key participants—the United States, China, the DPRK and the ROK—in the SPT for an early resumption of the SPT.

Three key obstacles to the six-party process will be analyzed: (1) inter-Korean hostile interactions in 2009–12; (2) North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP) as a key issue at the SPT; and (3) pre-steps or preconditions for resuming the SPT.

Inter-Korean Hostile Interactions in 2009–2012

North Korea’s long-range rocket launch and the second nuclear test in 2009 were key obstacles to the resumption of the SPT. The DPRK launched its long-range rocket, the Unha, in a failed attempt to place “an experimental communications satellite” into orbit on April 5, 2009. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a presidential statement which condemned the DPRK for having violated its obligations under the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.⁵

North Korea’s reactions were hostile. The DPRK reactivated its Yongbyon nuclear plant that had been shut down in 2007, restarted reprocessing spent fuel rods to extract plutonium, and boycotted the SPT. North Korea officially announced for the first time its intention to develop a uranium enrichment program (UEP), and subsequently kicked US monitors and IAEA inspectors out of the country. The DPRK declared the SPT useless. Since then, the DPRK has refused to return to the SPT.⁶ The DPRK conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, and announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 Korean armistice agreement.⁷ The UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 1874 on June 12, 2009 imposing additional financial, military, and trade sanctions on the DPRK.⁸ In response to UNSCR 1874, the DPRK defiantly vowed to produce more nuclear weapons and rejected the six-party process. Pyongyang also officially acknowledged its UEP.⁹

Inter-Korean Hostile Interactions in 2010

In the spring of 2010, South Korea’s 1,200-ton naval warship, the Cheonan, was broken into two pieces by an external explosion, and sunk in the West Sea (the Yellow Sea), killing 46 sailors. The Cheonan incident had profoundly negative effects on the denuclearization process and security in Northeast Asia. The multinational team, which had “scientifically and objectively” investigated the cause of the Cheonan sinking, concluded that the DPRK was responsible. But Pyongyang has adamantly denied any involvement in incident, asserting that the findings were fabricated. China did not endorse its findings. Russia did not make any announcements on its findings after its own on-site investigation in South Korea. Nor did it renounce the multinational investigation team’s findings.¹⁰

After the Cheonan incident, inter-Korean relations deteriorated to the lowest point and the crisis on the Korean Peninsula escalated. The ROK considered a direct military attack on North Korea as an option, but decided against it since such a course of action would be risky and may lead to a total war, endangering peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The ROK on May 24, 2010, however, adopted five “resolute measures” against the DPRK:

1. ROK’s immediate use of the right of self-defense in case of any additional North Korean military provocation;

2. ROK’s request for the UN Security Council for further sanctions;

3. ROK’s halt of all exchange programs and all trade and economic cooperation with the DPRK except for the Kaesong project and provision of minimum levels of humanitarian aid for infants and children;

4. no use of South Korean waterways for North Korean ships; and

5. demand for DPRK’s apology.¹¹

The United States, Japan, and South Korea urged China to actively resolve the Cheonan issue. China’s role as a mediator was crucial in resolving the incident. But it remained neutral on the investigation’s findings, asking all parties to remain “cool-headed and self-restrained” and to “avoid an escalation of the situation.”¹²

North Korea’s Attack on Yeonpyeong Island

The ROK and the United States staged the annual Hoguk (Defending Nation) joint military exercises in November 2010. The DPRK considered the exercise as a preparation for a combined armed attack on the North. On the morning of November 23, the DPRK “wired a complaint [to the South] … asking whether (the [Hoguk] exercise) was an attack against the North.” It warned that it would not tolerate firing in what it regarded as its territorial waters.¹³ ROK forces went ahead with live-ammunition military exercises in waters off Baengyeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island within South Korean-held territory below the Northern Limit Line (NLL). In response, the DPRK carried out an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, for the first time since the end of the Korean War, killing four South Korean soldiers and injuring 18 people. The DPRK subsequently stated that it responded to South Korean shells being fired into North Korean territorial waters.¹⁴ The incident quickly prompted widespread international condemnation of the North Korean military provocations. The UN declared it to be one of the most serious incidents since the end of the Korean War.

President Lee instructed the ROK military to strike North Korea’s missile base near its coastal artillery positions if there was a sign of further provocation. On November 24, US aircraft carrier USS George Washington participated in joint military exercises with the ROK Navy in the West Sea, in part to deter further North Korea’s military provocations and also to “send a message” to China.¹⁵

North Korea’s official statement explained its motivation. The DPRK said the artillery attack was in retaliation of South Korea’s shelling into the disputed NLL that North Korea had claimed as its own since 1999. Some argued that it was partly related to an attempt to create a strong image of Kim Jong-un as the designated successor to Chairman Kim Jong-il. Some also argued that the attack was linked to the North’s tactic for food aid.¹⁶ The attack was reportedly ordered by Kim Jong-il himself.¹⁷

Inter-Korean Hostile Interaction in 2011

South–North Korean relations in 2011 can be characterized as hostile, lacking inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The two Koreas must share joint responsibility for such hostile relations. North Korea’s insincere attitudes toward the Cheonan ship incident and the denuclearization process, and South Korea’s irresponsible “strategic patience” strategy were major factors contributing to intense tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

For the first time since 2004, the ROK military staged a leaflet-dropping operation to inform pro-democracy protests in Egypt and Libya in an attempt to encourage North Koreans to rise up to similar protests. Small radios and daily necessities attached to helium balloons floated to North Korea in early 2011. The DPRK was very sensitive about the ROK’s psychological warfare campaign. The DPRK threatened to fire cross-border shots if the ROK continued its anti-North psychological campaigns.¹⁸

In addition, the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle annual military exercises jointly staged by US and ROK troops were conducted from February 28 through April 30, 2011, with training on land, air, and sea amid tense rhetoric. Key Resolve ended on March 10, 2011. Some 200,000 South Korean and 12,800 US troops participated in the joint military exercises. Ten international observers from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission overseeing the Korean armistice agreement were invited to observe the exercises. In response, the DPRK denounced the joint military exercises as a preparation for a new war on the Korean Peninsula, warning that it would respond to the joint drills with “all-out war” if there is any provocation. According to KCNA, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un threatened to launch a retaliatory strike against the ROK if provoked, commenting on the 2012 annual US–ROK military drills that the DPRK calls a “new war of aggression.”¹⁹

There were open discussions in South Korea on the need for the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea. Former Grand National Party (GNP) Chairman Chung Mong-joon contended that the ROK should request that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and others even asserted that the ROK should develop its own nuclear weapons.²⁰ However, the ROK’s basic stance is to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the SPT.²¹ Robert Einhorn, the US State Department’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control, officially confirmed that there was no need for US nuclear weapons to be redeployed in South Korea.

In the second half of 2011, limited dialogue between the two Koreas began, reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas discussed various issues relating to the Mt. Kumgang tourism and property management on July 13, and the first South–North Korean high-level meeting was held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 22–23. The second inter-Korean high-level talks were held in Beijing on September 21. No progress was made however.

In the meantime, President Lee’s hard-line policy toward the North was under attack and policy change was strongly demanded by politi...