Autonomy, Self Governance and Conflict Resolution

Marc Weller, Stefan Wolff, Marc Weller, Stefan Wolff

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781134299072
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Conflicts over the rights of self-defined population groups to determine their own destiny within the boundaries of existing states are among the most violent forms of inter-communal conflict.
Many experts agree that autonomy regimes are a useful framework within which competing claims to self-determination can be accommodated. This volume explores and analyses the different options available. The contributors assess the current state of the theory and practice of institutional design for the settlement of self-determination conflicts, and also compare and contrast detailed case studies on autonomous regimes in the former Yugoslavia, the Crimea, Åland, Northern Ireland, Latin America, Indonesia and Vietnam.

1
Self-determination and autonomy

A conceptual introduction

Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller

Introduction

Autonomy is neither a new phenomenon, nor has it been understudied. However, up to the period of time when the post-Cold War transitions in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe were beginning, it appeared to be at best a highly unusual tool of state construction, or at worst a highly dangerous one. It was seen to be unusual, inasmuch as autonomy generally seemed to be attached to fairly obscure, historical examples, born out of very distinctive historical settings. Often autonomy regimes operated in remote or otherwise geographically unique locations, such as islands (for example, the Åland autonomy) or enclaves (for example, Klaipeda). These types of cases, it was widely believed, could not offer a great deal by way of guidance in less unique circumstances. Even the few new autonomies that were established after World War II, such as South Tyrol, were until recently taken to be too dependent on the special local conditions to be of wider interest. Similarly, the Soviet and other socialist autonomies were taken to be too deeply rooted in ideology, rather than genuine practice, to be of wider applicability.

Autonomy was also not given a great deal of consideration because the concept was, rightly or wrongly, associated with self-determination struggles. Outside of the colonial context, any self-determination discourse was viewed with great suspicion by governments, seeing it as a first step onto that slippery slope that inevitably leads towards irredentist or secessionist claims. Thus, autonomy was widely regarded as a somewhat dangerous concept that a state would only employ at its own peril.

Since the end of the Cold War, this climate has changed somewhat. In the transitional states of Central and Eastern Europe, the almost simultaneous breakdown of mechanisms of external (through the Warsaw Pact Organisation) and internal control (through dictatorial forms of government) led to the re-emergence of the so-called national minority question. In Georgia, Moldova, the new Russian Federation, and in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the doctrine of territorial integrity was undermined by intense armed conflict. These conflicts, framed in the rhetoric of self-determination, and the prospect (and subsequently the reality) of the dissolution of Yugoslavia added to the perceived threat to the principle of territorial integrity.

In response, autonomy was re-discovered as a potential remedy to self-determination claims. It was now no longer seen as the secessionists’ stepping stone towards independence, but instead, in a 180-degree reversal of the previous position, autonomy was now considered as a possible tool in accommodating separatist movements without endangering the continued territorial integrity of an existing state. In 1990, the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as it then was, were still cautious when noting

the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.

(Article 35 (2), 1990 Copenhagen Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE)

But by 1991, the governments of the member states of the European Community (EC) went further in endorsing autonomy as a means of addressing minority issues and ethnic conflict when establishing conditions for recognition of the new states of Central and Eastern Europe emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the separation of Czechoslovakia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In two declarations on European Political Cooperation, one addressing all of Central and Eastern Europe, the other pertaining to Yugoslavia, minority rights and, to a certain extent, autonomy for national minority groups was prescribed as part of the price that the states of that region might have to pay for diplomatic relations with the member states and institutions of the EC. This demand built upon the work of the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. Through that conference, the EC member states attempted to achieve an agreed dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Serbia was the only republic vigorously opposed to this approach. In an effort to address Serb concerns, two successive peace plans provided by Lord Carrington, the Chair of the Conference, offered autonomy arrangements for Serb communities living outside the boundaries of the Serbian Republic within the crumbling Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the meantime, autonomy as a tool of state construction was of course being applied, discussed and analysed outside the context of the former Yugoslavia as well. Some states in Western Europe have embraced auto nomy (or devolution) as a means of maintaining their territorial integrity. In addition to the more established case of Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom have also made startling progress in this direction. Even centralist France has attempted to move towards autonomy as a means of addressing the Corsica conflict. A number of innovative settlements have been adopted in relation to other areas of conflict or ethnic tension, some of which are principally autonomy-based, such as Gagauzia in the Republic of Moldova or Crimea in Ukraine. Autonomy structures also play a part in several new models of more complex forms of power-sharing that can be found in Northern Ireland, and further afield, in the framework agreement for Sudan and in Bougainville and Mindanao.

More widespread implementation of autonomy regimes as mechanisms to address self-determinationconflicts have been complemented by an increased scholarly interest and output in this respect, with several significant scholarly works on autonomy published over the past decade. In terms of standard-setting, the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, the successor organisation of the CSCE) has also maintained an interest in the issue. Its Lund Recommendations provide perhaps the most comprehensive reference to autonomy as a means of good governance and state construction in an authoritative international document thus far. Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly has addressed itself to this—previously altogether too delicate—topic in the shape of the Liechtenstein Initiative on Self-determination through Self-administration, which seeks to offer autonomy as an alternative to secessionist self-determinationclaims. The United Nations Working Group on Minorities has also been cautiously addressing the issue of autonomy.

Thus, developments over the past decade and a half seem to indicate that there is renewed interest among scholars and practitioners to engage with the thorny issue of autonomy alongside an apparently increasing willingness among major actors in the international community to recommend, and where necessary impose, autonomy regimes on states that might otherwise collapse under the pressure of self-determination conflicts. Increasingly, autonomy is also made available in situations where a self-determination conflict has not yet fully developed. While self-determination conflicts are characterised by a claim to a unilateral change in status, in other instances, ethnic groups may merely be seeking a greater expression of their identity within the state. This can take the form of a claim to enhanced regional or local self-governance.

Taken together, these two trends make it now possible to consider autonomy as a means of state construction that does not always, and of necessity, have to raise the spectre of self-determination struggles and ultimate secession. Instead, autonomy is just seen as one element of state construction addressing the needs of diverse communities.

Accordingly, this book attempts to test the proposition that autonomy, including territorial autonomy, can substitute for self-determination discourse within states. Of course, we do not proceed from the simple assumption that autonomy in itself will be a simple substitute for secessionist tendencies. Instead, autonomy needs to be an element of well-balanced constitutional design that matches the sense of regional self-administration and identity with the strengthening of an interest within the autonomous entity in the success of the overall state.

This introductory chapter outlines our core assumptions about the nature and determinants of self-determination conflicts and campaigns for enhanced self-governance.These are then linked to the different models of state designs that are principally built around autonomy solutions. The introduction first examines ethnicity and territory—two of the key determinants of many self-determination conflicts or campaigns for enhanced self-governance. While we are aware that not all such conflicts are per se ethnic in their nature, most of them are, in one way or another, conflicts between communities that distinguish themselves from one another by ‘ethnic’ criteria, such as language, religion, culture, etc. Self-determination conflicts and campaigns for enhanced self-governance will, by definition, appear to focus on a struggle for control over territory. In the more extreme manifestations, these can take the form of secessionist and irredentist conflicts; they can also manifest themselves as, or be combined with, a struggle for territorial control and/or ‘ethnic purity’, leading to policies of ethnic cleansing. Thus, tensions or conflicts, and their potential solutions covered in this volume, are characterised by the politicisation of ethnicity and territory.

Ethnicity

An ethnic group is ‘a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasises the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognised by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language, or institutions’ (Smith 1991:20). As a self-definedcommunity, ethnic groups are distinguishable by a collective name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, the association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith 1991:21).

Key to understanding the political implications of ethnic identity and of the formation of conflict groups based on ethnicity is the link between the tangible and intangible aspects of ethnic identity. Connor (1994:104) has noted that tangible characteristics are only important inasmuch as they ‘contribute to this notion or sense of a group’s self-identityand uniqueness’. In turn, then, a threat to, or opportunity for, these tangibles, real or perceived, is considered as a threat to, or opportunity for, self-identity and uniqueness. Confronting this threat or taking this opportunity leads to ethnicity being politicised, that is, to the ethnic group becoming a political actor by virtue of its shared ethnic identity. As such, ethnic identity ‘can be located on a spectrum between primordial historic continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations’ (Esman 1994:15). However, it would be simplistic to regard ethnic groups per se as collectivities seeking to use their distinctiveness to enhance their status. Where an ethnic group is in a non-dominant position, such a desire primarily results from state pressure to assimilate an ethnic group, exploit its non-dominant role or perpetuate a status quo that is advantageous to a favoured group.

Viewed against this background, ethnic minorities make demands that reflect both the historic continuities and perceived contemporary opportunities (or necessities) (seeTable 1.1). These claims are generally related to one or more of four closely intertwined areas (nature of the ethnic claim)—self-determination; linguistic, religious, and cultural rights; access to resources/equality of opportunity, and/or material and political aid in support of these other three claims. Ethnic minorities make these claims vis-à-vis their host-state or their host-nation, and/or, where applicable, their kin-state or kin-nation (addressee of the ethnic claim). In the absence of a kin-state willing or able to support an external minority, kin-groups in countries other than the kin-state or other external actors (international organisations, individual states) may be sought out and lobbied to assume this patron role.

Territory

Europe has one of the longest traditions of state-building and with it of the institutionalised definition of state territories. For states, territory possesses certain values in and of itself. These include natural resources, such as water, iron, coal, oil, or gas, they extend to the goods and services produced by the population living in this territory and the tax revenue generated from them, and they can comprise military or strategic advantages in terms of natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and control over transport routes and waterways. Even where there is no tangible value to be extracted from a given territory, most governments will nevertheless feel a historic duty to ensure the continued territorial integrity of the state they represent.³

Table 1.1 The nature and addressees of ethnic claims²

Ethnic groups, too, may be connected to territory in intangible ways. Their territorial appurtenance may be a constitutive element of their identity. Territory is then conceptualised more appropriately as ‘place’, bearing significance in relation to the group’s history, collective memories, and ‘character’. The deep emotional attachment to territory that ethnic groups can develop and maintain can lead to intense conflict. Nevertheless, for ethnic groups, too, territory is, or can become, a valuable commodity as it provides resources and a potential power base in their bid to change an unacceptable status quo. In the case of minorities with a kinstate, a relationship is also established between host-state and kin-state, which shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the relationship each of the states has with the minority. In many cases, this state-state relationship is not so much one determined by the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, but rather one that is founded on the notion of ‘territory’, precisely because of the value territory has for states.

Disputed territories are, thus, a phenomenon of inter-state relations as well as of interethnic relations, and similarly to ethnic claims, it is possible to distinguish between the nature and the level of the territorial claim (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 The nature and level of territorial claims

Conflict and patronage: the role of state actors

In their attempts to preserve, express, and develop their distinct identities, ethnic groups may at times be mobilised in ways that make them perceive threats and opportunities and then devise their responses to them in a particular way. The more deeply felt these perceptions are, the more they will be linked to the very survival of the group and the more intense will be the conflict that they can potentially generate. This links the issue of ethnicity to the notion of political power. The political implication of this connection between ethnicity and power is that any ethnic group that is conscious of its uniqueness, and wishes to preserve it, is involved in a struggle for political power—either retaining the measure of political power it possesses or striving to acquire the amount of power that it deems necessary to preserve its identity as a distinct ethnic group, that is, to defeat the threats and seize the opportunities it faces. This desire to gain political power for an ethnic group is expressed in the concept of (ethno)nationalism; according to Smith (1991:20) ‘an ideological movement aiming to attain or maintain autonomy, unity and identity for a social group which is deemed to constitute a nation’.

When incompatible ethno-nationalist doctrines are at the centre of the relationship between minority and host-state, opportunity and threat acquire various, yet concretely identifiable, meanings, being either positively or negatively related to the preservation, expression, and development of a group’s ethnic identity and to the ability of the host-stateto preserve the integrity of the territorial or civic nation. For a minority, opportunities will manifest themselves, for example, in rights of self-administration or self-government, and they can be realised in local, regional, or federal fra...