Europeanization of National Security Identity

The EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states

Pernille Rieker

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2006
• eBook ISBN: 9781134180356
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This new book tackles two key questions: 1) How is the EU functioning as a security actor? 2) How and to what extent is the EU affecting national security identities?

Focusing on the four largest Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), this incisive study analyzes how and to what extent the EU affects national security identities. It shows how the EU has developed into a special kind of security actor that, due to its level of political integration, has an important influence on national security approaches and identities.

This new analysis applies a fresh combination of integration theory, security studies and studies of Europeanization. The main argument in this book is that, rather than adapting to the changing conditions created by the end of the Cold War, the Nordic states changed their security approaches in response to the European integration process. It shows how different phases in the post Cold War European integration process have influenced the national security approaches of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. While all four security approaches seem to have been Europeanized, the speed and the character of these changes seem to vary due to a combination of differing ties to the EU and differing security policy traditions.

This new book will be of great interest to all students of European Defence, national security and of security studies in general.

1

INTRODUCTION

This book deals with the relationship between European integration, security and national identity change. How and to what extent has the development towards a specific European Union security view – understood as a comprehensive security identity – led to adaptations and changes in national security approaches and identities?

The theoretical point of departure is an interest in national identity changes in response to community norms. The book argues that national security approaches are adapted to the norms defined by a community to which they are closely linked. This adaptation evolves over time, through a socialization process, and may also lead to a change in national security identities. These observations challenge two common assumptions in conventional International Relations (IR). First, the idea that national security is primarily about the nation-state defending its national territory against military threats, making military means the central tool of security policy (see for instance Walt 1991). Second, the assumption held by rationalists that both national identities and interests are fixed and independent of structural factors such as international norms.

This book argues in favour of a broader approach to security and that the development of an EU security identity affects national identities and interests. The empirical focus will be restricted to changes in the national security approaches and identities in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden after the end of the Cold War. I show that the security approaches in these countries have been influenced by the development of a specific EU security identity. However, the character and the degree of Europeanization depend both on the country’s traditions in security policy and on its relationship to the Union.

This introductory chapter is divided into three main parts. First, the main research questions are presented. Second, some key concepts are clarified. Finally, the analytical framework and research design are introduced.

Research questions

Focusing on the Europeanization of the security identities of the Nordic states, the analysis in this book is closely related to other studies of the Union’s impact on various policies and institutions in different nation-states. In addition, it helps to fill an important gap in this literature, since little or no research has been done on the Europeanization of national security identities. There are also few recent comparative studies of the relationship between the EU and the Nordic countries.

Most of the research on the EU and the Nordic countries¹ within the field of IR has focused on individual Nordic countries and their attempts at achieving EU accession. Thus, there are few comparative studies of the Nordic states and their relationship with the EU. However, after Sweden and Finland joined the Union in 1995 whereas Norway and Iceland decided not to, interest in such comparative work has increased. One comprehensive treatment of the relationship between the EU and the Nordic countries was a volume edited by Lee Miles (Miles 1996), in which EU–Nordic relations were studied through chronological, state-centred and issue-based approaches.² While each chapter in the Miles study provides important insights into this relationship, the volume as a whole lacks a clear theoretical focus. More recent work has tried to highlight differences between the attitudes of the Nordic countries towards the European integration process, by focusing either on differences in economic and material factors (Ingebritsen 1998), or on differences in national identity formation (Hansen and Wæver 2002). Thus, while the main argument in Christine Ingebritsen’s study is that the specificities of the economic structure of each country explain the differences, the study by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver emphasizes the differences in national identities, and especially how the relationship between concepts like state, nation and Europe becomes elaborated in the national discourse.

The focus of this book is somewhat different. Instead of seeking to explain why the Nordic countries have chosen differing approaches to the EU, this study has a more specific ambition. It aims at assessing how and to what extent the development of a distinct EU security identity has influenced the security approaches and identities of the four largest Nordic states – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In order to illustrate this relationship, it may be useful to present the Union’s security identity as the independent variable, national security identity change as the dependent variable and Europeanization as one important process of change.

Figure 1.1 Europeanization of national security identity.

This is not to say that this is a one-way process. In reality the EU member states also influence the development of an EU security identity. Still, the aim of this particular study is to investigate to what extent the development of an EU security identity has challenged also the national security identity. This means that while a state promotes a certain security policy at the EU level, it does not mean that this particular policy is adopted at the national level. For instance, while Sweden has promoted a comprehensive security approach in the EU, it has until recently upheld a rather traditional national security and defence policy, dominated by non-alignment and territorial defence.

I am well aware that there are also other factors, institutions and actors, be they national or international, which might impact on national security identities. However, since the EU is such an important and large entity it is interesting to try to examine its specific impact on national security identities. I also argue, and hopefully show, that it is possible to separate the effects of the EU from other institutions and actors if one uses the method of process-tracing, carefully examining the temporal order of the various changes and the arguments used for these changes. That being said, I think that a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of national security identities would benefit further by also supplementing such studies with the impact of NATO, the US and other external factors and crises arising. In addition various internal factors could also be included. In this analysis I have limited the focus to the impact of the EU. In fact, the EU is assumed to have a decisive influence on the nation-state’s security identities, and the study is based on the following three assumptions:

• First, that the European security context has changed radically since the end of the Cold War, giving the concept of security a different and broader meaning.

• Second, that the European Union has developed a security identity in tune with this new security context.

• Third, that this security identity influences the national security identities of EU member states as well as other states closely linked to the integration process, through a process of Europeanization.

The first assumption is given a more extensive presentation in the second part of this chapter (under ‘key concepts’). Let us now move on to examine the other two.

The security identity of the EU

In order to understand the importance of studying the Europeanization of nation-state security identities, the character of the independent variable has to be clarified. Assuming both that the EU is an actor and that it has a distinct security approach is in fact controversial. For a long time the main opposition stood between those who perceived European integration solely as an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, and those who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state.³ The argument put forward in this book, however, is that the European integration process has gradually consolidated parts of Europe as a political actor, but without having become a supranational state. The establishment of a political union (EU), the implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and increased co-operative policies in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA) have been important steps in that direction. This is not to say that the European Community (EC) never acted as such, but rather that the Maastricht Treaty represented a qualitative step towards the establishment of a European political actor.⁴

In addition, whether or not the EU has a distinct security approach depends on how one defines ‘security’. While it is generally agreed that there is a relationship between integration and security, those who defend a traditional definition of security may tend to ignore the EU as a security actor. The EU’s lack of effective military capabilities makes it difficult for them to characterize it as a security actor (Bull 1982; Walt 1991; Hill 1993; Regelsberger and Wessels 1996; Hoffmann 2000; Kagan 2003). To those who understand security in a broader sense, however, the situation will look quite different. For them, the Union’s potential to co-ordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and military – makes it a major security actor of the post-Cold War context (Wæver 1995a; Smith 1999; Ginsberg 2001; White 2001; Sjursen 2001b; Manners 2002; Smith 2002; Rieker and Ulriksen 2003; Smith 2003; Krahmann 2003; Cooper 2003). Not surprisingly, it is the latter view that is emphasized by the EU itself through its official documents and speeches.

This understanding of security has also moved beyond the rhetorical level, as the EU has begun to transform these ideas into concrete policy. This has been the case in international crisis management, where a civilian component has been established in parallel to the military one, and where the need for improved co-ordination between the two has been emphasized. For several decades, considerable attention has also been given to developing an effective policy for curtailing crime and terrorism within the EU. Initially this threat was considered as an internal one, so the EU’s policy focused on security within the EU area, by strengthening co-operation in justice and home affairs. More recently, the traditional distinction between internal and external security has become less clear-cut, and there is now general agreement within the EU that a combination of external and internal tools is necessary in order to respond to today’s security challenges. All this indicates that the EU has begun to adopt a security political approach that goes beyond the CFSP, including the Community policies linked both to economic integration (pillar I) and to justice and home affairs (pillar III). This approach is referred to as a comprehensive security approach. Used on the EU, this means that the EU focuses on the potential of the EU for coordinating a broad spectre of security threats (both internal and external) and a wide range of security policy tools (both civilian and military).⁵

The development of a comprehensive approach to security has occurred gradually, and as a response to the dramatic changes in the European security context in the early 1990s. Existing multilateral security policy frameworks, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have also adapted to the new security context. However, the most radical transformation has occurred within the EU – the only multilateral framework with no security policy legacy from the Cold War period. While the fact that the EU has no clear security legacy is a consequence of earlier reluctance of the part of the member states to relinquish national sovereignty in this area, it seems that this reluctance has actually facilitated the development of an innovative security approach. Using Robert Cooper’s terminology, this is what one may call a post-modern security approach.⁶ Cooper argues that the EU must be considered as the most developed postmodern system, since the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is being erased, states are giving up their traditional monopoly on violence and [internal] borders are increasingly irrelevant (Cooper 2003: 36–7).

According to this logic, one may argue that it is the special character of the EU – the fact that the EU is an institutional hybrid between an international organization and a federal state,⁷ and the fact that it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past – that makes it post-modern. While the first opens up a path to forms of governance other than the ones we are used to, the second makes it easier to develop an innovative (comprehensive) security approach. Thus, rather than being the result of the influence of a particular member state or a particular group of member states, the Union’s current security approach seems to be a result of the special character of the integration process and the fact that the EU did not have an institutionalized security policy from the past. As Craig Parsons argues, one idea of European integration becomes institutionalized rather than another simply because it is easier to institutionalize or because it fits better with elements of the environment (Parsons 2003: 20).

It is possible to distinguish between three important formative phases in the development of the EU security identity:

• The establishment of a political union and the CFSP in the early 1990s;

• The process towards the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the end of the 1990s, with the focus on the development of both a military and a civilian capacity for international crisis management;

• The intensified efforts of integrating civilian and military instruments in relation to both internal and external security. Such a comprehensive security approach has received increased attention at the turn of the century, and is explicitly emphasized in the European Security Strategy (ESS).

The development towards a specific EU security identity is discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

Europeanization of the security identities of the Nordic states

The close link between security and identity makes radical changes in national security policy difficult. This means that only minor adaptations are likely to take place. Due to the high level of political integration in the EU compared to other multilateral frameworks, however, one may expect that the development of a comprehensive security approach will also, in turn, influence the security approaches and/or identities of the individual European nation-state. The empirical focus of this study is the changes in security approaches and identities in the four largest Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.⁸ A comparative study of these countries is interesting since they differ both with respect to their individual national security approaches and in their formal relationship to the EU.

During the Cold War period, the security approaches of the Nordic states were based on the different security policy choices made in the late 1940s: Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined the newly established Atlantic alliance, NATO; Finland became non-aligned but signed the FCMA (Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance) Treaty with the USSR, and Sweden remained neutral and non-aligned. By the early 1960s it had become normal to use the concept of ‘balance’ to describe the Nordic security policy context (Brundtland 1966, 1981; Holst 1983). For the most part ‘Nordic balance’ has been portrayed as a description of the Nordic pattern, providing an understanding of how the mechanisms of security work; but it has also been presented as a model, a system or doctrine – and ultimately, as a ‘theory’ (Joenniemi 1992: 58).

In the context of research, the primary purpose of the concept of ‘Nordic balance’ has been to provide an explanation for the prevailing conditions of peace and stability in the Nordic area. The concept rests on assumptions of a bipolar East–West system, with the Nordic region as one of its components, and a perception of an interplay between regional policies and those of a larger system of blocs and major powers. As a rule ‘Norden’ was not considered to be part of a traditional military balance. Rather, the argument was that it constituted a system of political deterrence, a balance of potential options for keeping the superpowers out of ‘Norden’ as much as possible and for preventing them from applying maximalist policies of confrontation in the region. The perspective focused particularly on Norway and Finland, each of which had its own superpower to keep in check. This conceptualization of Nordic balance was originally elaborated by analysts within the Realist school of thought, seeking to fit ‘Norden’ into the normal world of power politics (Brundtland 1966, 1981; Holst 1983, 1994).

With the end of the Cold War, this special Nordic identity characterized by a security community and ‘Nordic balance’ disappeared, and the Nordic countries became involved in a new European security discourse (Joenniemi 1992). The acceleration of the European integration process in the immediate wake of this dramatic and profound change in European security presented ‘Norden’ with complex challenges. While the rivalry between the superpowers had led to a situation that could easily be discussed within the framework of traditional security analysis, the security dimension of this more recent European integration process is more complex, evading analy...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The EU: a comprehensive security actor
• 3 Europeanization as socialization
• 4 Sweden: teacher and pupil
• 5 Finland: pragmatic adapter
• 6 Denmark: reluctant adapter
• 7 Norway: adaptive non-member
• 8 Comparisons, conclusions and implications
• Notes
• References
• Index