French Relations with the European Union

Helen Drake, Helen Drake

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781134403653
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

This scholarly work examines how key actors within French politics and society have related to the challenges and opportunities posed by the European Union, and how these relations have driven or hindered change in France.

The collection invites the reader to explore below the surface image of a France troubled by its relations with the EU in the post-Cold War era, and see the dynamics of change in empirical detail. Each chapter offers insights into specific aspects of the France-EU relationship, including:

• the characteristics of Euroscepticism à la française amongst the electorate and political parties
• the dynamics of change in the political, media and legal establishments in their dealings with the EU
• the priorities for labour, business and la vie associative in their relations with French decision-makers regarding the EU.

1

Perspectives on French relations with the European Union

An introduction

Helen Drake

Relations between the EU and France are neither simple nor easy.

(Moreau Defarges, ‘The View from France’)

Introduction

This collection aims to explore and refine dominant images of a France disconcerted by the demands of its relations with the European Union in the early twenty-first century. French relations with the European Union (EU) in the early twenty-first century certainly seemed troubled and unpredictable. For at least a decade France had been episodically at odds with at least some of the institutions, rules, policies, or other member states of the European Union. Just as significant, Paris seemed to lack a sense of strategic direction where its European policy was concerned. These difficulties had combined to project an image of defensive and, importantly, prolonged eurofrilosité (Frank, 2002), or wariness, which was uncharacteristic, from a historical perspective of French membership of the EU. France, it would appear, ‘still has doubts about the direction in which Europe is moving’ (Bell, 2002, p. 228). Moreau-Defarges (2003, p. 109) has described France as both tétanisée (paralysed) in the face of such self-inflicted transformations and as ‘comfortable in the European club’ most of the time (p. 120); and the chapters in this volume each scratch at these images of a France both resistant to and embracing of change wrought by connections with Brussels. The notion of image seems important here, since it is not at all difficult to detect in current French discourse on Europe a recurrent theme; namely, that of France seeking to claw back its traditional influence in the EU by, amongst other things, restoring its credibility with its partners, as well as with its own population.

Together, the chapters offer an analysis of political and social elite actors—their attitudes, values and behaviours—in a variety of institutional settings. These actors include political leaders, but not exclusively so. In taking this perspective, the volume explicitly recognises, first, that ‘institutions do not make decisions. Actors make decisions and they do so on the basis of their preferences and beliefs’ (Elgie, 2003, p. 242). Actors, moreover, constitute the ‘forces at work in France’ (Bell, 2002, p. 15). Our focus on institutions is secondary, although, inevitably, it is very much present: all chapters prioritise the analysis of actors in their institutional context. Second, this outlook acknowledges the traditional emphasis placed on the role and influence of key individuals in the making of French policy towards the EU—and in the building of Europe itself. It recognises that for a number of reasons France's relationship with the EU has been shaped, expressed and mediated by powerful individuals in the forefront of the political game, setting, shaping and breaking the rules of engagement. Many of these factors are products of French political culture, and the presidentialism of the Fifth Republic; yet others of the generally relentless hunt for the human factor and foible in the political process.

The origins of the EU in the 1950s have themselves been fairly described as ‘one of the most creative acts of statesmanship’ (Bell, 2002, p. 226). Presidents of the Fifth Republic from Charles de Gaulle to Jacques Chirac have exercised personal authority to shape European-level decisions. De Gaulle's successors in this respect all drew on his unique interpretation of the French constitution for their inspiration and latitude. A second pedigree of influential Frenchmen, in the guise of so-called ‘statesmen of interdependence’, from Jean Monnet to Jacques Delors and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (as president of the Convention on the Future of Europe, 2002-3), have set the agenda for these decisions by flexing their authority as European-level leaders.

The volume also examines a range of other French elite actors and, specifically, their responses to changes and the opportunities perceived to arise from ‘Europe’. We look to the conduct of influential individuals connected to the making of French policy towards the EU—in the French political and legal establishments, in the press, in the trade unions, in political parties, in la vie associative that is so central to the fabric of French daily life—for evidence of different thinking, new language, or otherwise altered norms in their relations with Europe. We are particularly interested in the représentations that various actors hold of their role. This sociological notion, central to much French-language analysis of European integration, is probably best summed up in the notion of the perceptions held by and about these individuals, their constraints, opportunities and modus operandi.

We pursue this line of enquiry into France's elites in the full knowledge of the backdrop in contemporary France where the credibility gap between the socio-economic elites and their constituencies (notably the electorate) is gaping wider than ever, as the 2002–4 electoral cycle demonstrated; where trust has been lost and is thus at a premium. In the specific case of European matters, claims Moreau-Defarges (2003, p. 114), ‘The gap between European integration and French perceptions of integration remains huge— too huge’. One reason he gives for this is the lack of commitment on the part of social elites to explain matters accurately. To this we can add a lack of commitment to formal training in the French education system, even (especially) at the highest levels, about the European dimension of French life; certainly in comparison with, for example, the UK. Several of our chapters demonstrate the communication problems encountered in conveying the realities of ‘Europe’ to an increasingly indifferent public. This is all the more reason to look for signs of change or resistance to change amongst these influential and sometimes powerful individuals. The volume does not set out to offer an exhaustive analysis of all significant elites in the frame of French-EU relations. It does however take a sample of cases of behaviours with which particularly strong images are associated, and challenges these rather familiar notions with the benefit of detailed empirical observation and conceptually rich interpretation.

Where does this approach place us within the literatures that study relations between the EU and its member states? Bulmer and Lequesne (2002, 2005) have reviewed the various theoretical and empirical approaches to this subject, making in passing the point that many empirical studies of EU-member state relations do not explicitly attach themselves to a precise theoretical school or thought or even conceptual framework. Nor is our primary aim to nourish or test a given theoretical approach per se. This volume was conceived on the basis, first, of an observation: that within the study of French relations with the EU the role of individuals and agency was relatively under-represented within national government and political structures, and in society more broadly. Second, our working assumption was that this level of analysis, what Bulmer and Lequesne refer to as the study of ‘micro-sociological’ perspectives (2002, p. 29), would inform us and the reader about important trends and processes which inform, however subtly, the processes of French EU policy-making below the political summits. We sought to contrast the realities of these processes with the more dominant images of French EU policy-making that French leaders themselves have typically not troubled themselves to correct. Such a focus seems all the more pertinent since by the early 2000s the discourse of domestic reform explicitly referred to the goal of reviving the Republic by attention to its many tiers of individuals, actors and activity, from local through to European level. Such a discourse, moreover, explicitly welcomed the opportunity for French-EU relations to be modernised and improved.

Drawing in this volume on contributions from the UK and French political science communities, furthermore, has allowed us to develop, collectively, a range of approaches to the analysis of significant actors in the field. As a result, the following chapters represent a deliberate diversity of focal points and methodologies from quantitative data analysis (Flood, Startin), to discourse analysis (Milner) and sociologically inspired interviews with elite actors (Costa and Daloz, Baisnée, Mangenot). Overall, our approach is essentially inductive, since we seek to explain specific phenomena observed in the realities of French relations with the EU, using the most appropriate conceptual and methodological tools in each case.

In the remainder of this chapter we review the various contexts which form the backdrop to French relations with the European Union in the 2000s. Jacques Chirac inherited Mitterrand's unfinished business, and Franco-European relations were always going to look different, and be just as difficult, as under Chirac's predecessor. Chirac's inheritance specifically included the weight of the Gaullist past; growing public indifference to Europe, with its roots in Mitterrand's 1992 Maastricht referendum; altered relations with Germany; declining presidential autonomy; and a fast-moving international context. We conclude the chapter with a more detailed survey of how the following chapters, individually and collectively, explore this terrain.

The contexts of change

Since 1950, French political leaders had felt themselves compelled (Parsons, 2000) to drive European integration forward in a mainly continuous manner, and had chalked up many successful initiatives to their names, not least the single currency of 2002, despite a small number of early, failed attempts to ‘jump off the European train’ (Moreau-Defarges, 2003, p. 116). But by the early 2000s signs of resistance to this momentum, even outright opposition, had made themselves known within French politics and society, with the Maastricht referendum of 1992 marking a turning-point in this respect. The opening years of the twenty-first century were in many respects marked by discontinuities and a loss of pace with respect to France's commitment to la construction européenne, due as much to external events as to changes of government or president. The days of French claims to a monopoly of political, intellectual and moral leadership of European integration appeared to have been a twentieth-century phenomenon. Indeed, twenty-first century French political leadership of the European question seemed in short supply, in comparison with the demands from various sources—not necessarily aggregated or organised demands—for a more, different, or better ‘Europe’.

As a political system that France helped bring into being, the European Union poses challenges of many orders to all its member states; it is more than the sum of its parts. In the case of France, and only in the case of France, membership of the EU derives from a strong and pervasive sense of imperative, or lack of alternative, that dates back to the Fourth Republic (1946–58) and the foundations of what we know today as the EU. In fact, Parsons (2000, 2003) has demonstrated that in those years the ‘community’ option for la construction européenne was not the only means of reaching France's primary foreign policy objective—national security via reconciliation with Germany—others being the ‘traditional’ or ‘confederal’ methods of European cooperation; but it had the most supporters, fewest opponents, and the best luck. Once France had embarked upon European community-building, the leaders of the Fifth Republic (Charles de Gaulle included) turned France's European commitment into a virtue and a vehicle for its top foreign policy objectives of rank and greatness (grandeur), via defiant shows of national sovereignty and independence and a constant balancing act between integration and autonomy (MoreauDefarges, 2003, p. 106).

This self-inflicted need for France to relate successfully to the institutions, policies and emerging norms of the European Communities has entailed compromise. Compromise between the national sovereignty at the essence of French national identity, and the transfers of sovereignty required to make the European Communities/Union function; between national pride at France's trappings of independent world status, and the economic and political capability and clout that comes through interdependence with European partners; between the integration needed for open (lucrative) but buffered trade, and the national autonomy required to preserve a sense of identity (Moreau-Defarges, 2003, p. 111); between Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet as competing symbols of French leadership of the European ‘project’. These are compromises achieved by a permanent balancing act that have themselves become an integral part of contemporary Frenchness. They have complicated the sense of national republican identity, and defied the French to stay untouched by the institutions and practices that they conjured into being. These compromises have become irrevocable and increasingly tangible, as the scope of European integration has expanded. They have, accordingly, become part of French political and, more broadly, domestic life.

Indeed, in the campaign for the 2004 elections to the European Parliament the government used precisely this theme—of the relevance of ‘Europe’ to people's daily lives—in an attempt to persuade them to turn out and vote, and so stem the decline in public enthusiasm for Europe. The opening years of the twenty-first century had been problematic in this respect. By the time of the 2002 presidential and legislative elections, the picture regarding France's relations with the EU was blurred, and the elections as a whole mirrored France's altered electoral and political context. France's population as a whole had adopted the Euro with little or no protest in January 2002, and the authorities had planned the transition efficiently. Residual concerns in this respect were of a practical, consumer kind—worries about price inflation—rather than more abstract expressions of a loss of national identity or sovereignty (as was the case with muc...