Russian Governance in the 21st Century

Irina Isakova

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135769802
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A stimulating newanalysis of the dramatic systemic changes of the Russian state, principles of the governance and its foreign policy orientation.

It reviews the extent of changes in Russian approaches to geopolitics and the most appropriate geopolitical development patterns that influenced the transformation of Russian foreign policies and military strategic thinking on the eve of the 21st century.

Part I

GEOPOLITICS, GEO-STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

1

GEO-STRATEGY AND RUSSIA’S VISION OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

What is ‘new’ in geopolitics and why?

A Russian geopolitical school of thought has emerged much later than similar theories in the West. However, the first recorded geopolitical statements can be traced back to 1510. It was the time when, according to church manuscripts, Filofei, a monk from the Spaso-Elizarova monastery in Pskov, formulated the concept: ‘Moscow is the third Rome’. This phrase turned to be the fundamental principle of Russian geopolitics. Since then missionary and global vision became recognisable features of Russian geopolitics.¹

The geopolitical positioning of any state has been defined by Russian scholars not as some once permanently given state of historic development but as a process where the factors of geography (place) and timing matter in changing that environment and reality of geopolitics.² In order to understand the specifics of the geopolitical position of any country, however, one has to follow the historic patterns of development of that country. Russia’s geopolitical position has not been given to it on a silver platter; Russia had to fight for it. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, during the time of the formation of Russia as a state, it spent 160 years fighting the external threat. From the Kulikov battle until the end of the First World War Russia was at war for almost 334 years.³ During this period Russia’s territory was increased by 400 times.

Russian scholars proclaimed Ivan the Terrible as the first practitioner of geopolitics. During his reign the key geopolitical priorities for Russia were formulated. First, the importance of accession of the neighbouring unstable (in geopolitical terms) areas of the former enemies (like Kazan, Astrakhan or Siberia) was stressed. Second, it was recognised that access to the oceans was vital for the state’s development. These assumptions led to the Livonian wars for the Baltic Sea and increasing activity of the country in the northern part of the White Sea. Both priorities were named as strategic goals of the nation. The most interesting combination appeared in the support of the synergy between the Russian Orthodoxy and autocracy in the framework of the people’s monarchy.

Russian geopolitics as an area of study went through two main phases in its development. The first phase dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. The second is connected with the developments in the last century. The most prominent intellectuals of that time, like S. Soloviev, B. Kluchevskiy, A.P. Shapov, B.N. Checherin and I.L. Solonevich, contributed to the development of these theories. Russian geopolitics was not just about the state and its external environment and missions, it also touched upon the issues of what was the most appropriate type of government for the country and relationships between the authority and the people: those who govern and those who were governed. The founding fathers of Russian geopolitics pointed out that there were certain characteristics in Russia’s geography and life styles, such as large vast national territory, under-populated areas, non-diversification of labour activities and permanent threat of invasion, that determined the existence and preservation of powerful central authorities.

Analysing the climate and its influence on the labour patterns, and indirectly on the national character of the local population, S. Soloviev pointed to a link between natural life–climate changes and the types of activity and forms of social organisation that the local population was choosing. In his writings he gave an explanation as to why central Russia’s territories, and Moscow in particular, were to become the natural centre for the state’s unification. According to Soloviev, severe climate hardened national character and tested determination to succeed. These conditions predetermined certain types of social-political organisation which developed with strong authoritative tendencies. I.L. Solonevich focused his attention on the comparative analysis of geography, climate and levels of individual freedoms in Russia and in the USA, writing:

The American liberties, as well as American wealth are determined by American geography. Our freedom and our wealth are determined by Russian geography. Thus, we’ll never have the same freedoms as the British and Americans have, because their security is guaranteed by the seas and oceans, but ours could only be guaranteed by military conscription.⁴

Further development of geopolitics as a theory and policy occurred within the Eurasian school of thought. In the twentieth century, popular philologist and historian Count N.S. Trubetskoy (1890–1938), professor of geography and geo-politician P.N. Savitskyi (1895–1968) and historian G.V. Vernadskiy (1877–1973) were among many prominent representatives of this philosophical school. N.S. Trubetskoy explained the net meaning of the concept:

National base of the state, that was previously called the Russian Empire and presently is named the Soviet Union, could only be a composition of all nationalities, multinational identities with special brand of nationalism. We call these peoples the Eurasians, its territory is named Eurasia, its nationalism is called Eurasian.⁵

P.N. Savitskyi believed that Russia was a separate civilisation, where the geopolitical and social-cultural ‘mainland’ represented its basic features. He argued that Russia had more potential to be called the mainland than China due to its geopolitical position, where Western Europe was only the western ‘border’ of Eurasia and Russia was located in the middle of this new continent. Savitskyi believed that Eurasia had not only a synergy overlap with different civilisations, as the Western European and Asian, but was also considered to be a core of the Old World. It had its own specific characteristics, civilisation patterns, morale, assessment logic and cultural background. He strongly believed that Russia was an essential link between continental states and regions such as Europe, Asia, Iran, Iraq, Indo-China, China and Japan. In his view, without it the Continent would lose its sense of identity, and linkages, connections and states would find themselves fragmented. Thus, according to Savitskyi, the natural and cultural–geographic characteristics create two main principles of the Russian statehood. They were, in his view, the imperial character of foreign policy and the sense of great power (velikoderzhavnost) statehood. Historically the formation of the Russian territory was done by accession of the neighbouring states and the geopolitically unstable areas. Instead of waging permanent wars with the neighbouring countries over the territories, Russia was incorporating the contested regions into the Russian Empire. Russian geopolitics was an ideology rather than a mechanism of policy implementation.⁶

Russian geopolitics was always part of the conservative political trend and mentality. One of the distinctive examples of this conservative geopolitical behaviour was the Russian policy in Europe that preserved the status quo of the regime after the establishing of the Sacred Union in 1815. Russia took over a mission to suppress any democratic regimes in Europe, turning herself into a police force to that effect. The policy of Nicholas I was a sort of culmination of this policy, when the Russian army was sent to suppress the Hungarian revolt against the Habsburgs and in support of the dynasty.

Though Pan-Slavic ideas also carried geopolitical orientations they were not always conservative. For instance, the famous poet F. Tutchev urged the Russian tsar to use the revolutionary situation in Europe and the dissatisfaction of the European nations with the Austrian Empire in order to reintegrate all Slavic territories under the Russian rule. Instead, Nicholas I chose to support the Habsburgs. However, Pan-Slavic ideas were based on geo-strategic theories put forward by N. Danilevskiy who was lobbying for the establishing of the All-Slavic federation, with its capital in Constantinople. This federation was to unite the following Slavic lands: two Orthodox states (the Russian Empire and the kingdom of Bulgaria), one Slavic-Catholic state (the Czecho–Moravo-Slovak kingdom), the Yugoslav state of the Serbian-Croatian-Slavic kingdom (with a population of both Orthodox and Catholic faiths); the Orthodox, but not Slavic, kingdom of Romania, the Hellenic kingdom, as well as the Hungarian kingdom. This concept proposed by Danilevskiyi synchronised the Pan-Slavic ideas and orthodox unanimity. It fully incorporated Russia’s geopolitical intentions in the south-western and western directions. As a matter of fact it was so in tune with Russia’s geopolitical self-projection that it was finally realised in the political-military and economic alliances after the Second World War in the Council of Economic Assistance (1949) and the Warsaw Pact Treaty (1955).

Thus, the second phase of the development of this political thought in Russia can be dated back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In Russian terminology it received the name of ‘socialist continentalism’.⁷ Though denying any geopolitical connotation, this theory was strictly speaking purely anti-transatlantic, based on the assumption of the need to oppose the leading nations of the transatlantic community. The idea initially was to establish socialism in one country and then, with expanding influence, to other regions to create a vast socialist community. This system was functioning within the territorial limits of the Heartland theory.

In the 1980s, for the first time in the history of Russia, the transatlantic vision prevailed and dominated in the political thinking as well as in the theoretical justifications of the policy decisions. As a result of the decisions taken during this period the state found itself in a vulnerable geo-strategic position. It was pushed further inside the continent, losing access to the open seas, accepting buffer zones between Western Europe and Russia that were made of the states which intended to distance themselves from Russia.

Current debates on geopolitics as the result of the above dilemma are concentrated around three trends: transatlantic, isolation from the Western civilised world and choosing the Eastern diversity and appeal; or the balanced pragmatic approach to the Western and Eastern neighbours with sustainable Russian cultural exclusiveness.

In comparison with the Western traditions Russia’s geopolitical culture was always advertising a polycentric world order. Eurasia has never been portrayed as a static heartland, as in the works of Mackinder. Eurasia was always seen as one among many centres of power such as Europe, China or India. Multipolar diversity became the main methodological principle of Russia’s geopolitical theory and practice.

For this purpose it is important to describe the main geopolitical trends that are currently popular. The following concept signifies a transition to a new qualitative level. On the basis of the ethno-genesis theory, L.N. Gumilev managed to combine the features of development of natural and political systems. He proved that passive stimuli (micromutation that produces passive signs in the populace and brings to life new ethnic systems in the regions affected by it) determined the rhythms of Eurasia and its internal structure.

Eurasia is not some mythical centre dominating in the world, as Mackinder believed, but one of the centres – as are Europe, China and India. Polycentrism is the most important common methodological principle of ‘Eurasianess’ in contrast to many European concepts.

Another promising Russian geopolitical concept is the theory of ‘Great Limitrof’ by S. Khatuntsev and V. Tzimbursky. On the basis of the six main types of civilisation of S. Huntington, which determine the present geopolitical picture of the world, the authors introduce a thesis about a great number of inter-civilised zones where numerous conflicts are of a pseudo-civilised, not civilised, nature. In these zones there are some states which do not belong completely to any civilisation. They constitute the area of ‘Great Living Limit’. It covers Eastern Europe, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The authors maintain that ‘Great Limitrof’ is a phenomenon exclusively of the new times and is a remaining vestige of ancient Eurasia which clearly outlined the contour of Russia.

In contrast to the ‘Eurasians’, S. Khatuntsev and V. Tzimbursky affirm that Russia is the destroyer of Eurasia, and ‘Great Limitrof’ is all that is left from it. A conclusion is made from this premise that as far as the limitrof states are concerned Russia should conduct a policy based on the ‘pragmatism of gains’ and not on the ‘internationalism of unselfishness’. That is why the authors state that ‘Great Limitrof’ is in the sphere of Russia’s vital interests – of geopolitical interest rather than an internal political one. Reflecting on the peculiarities of Russia’s destiny they come to a conclusion that its civilisation is not numerous, though having vast territories. That is why in order to survive it removed the question of preserving its own niche by sublimating it in expansion on ‘Great Limitrof’. It subdued great masses of people, and by interfering in the life of other civilisations, especially those of the Euro-Atlantic, it finally turned into the second world power.

When national interests are discussed, the discussion in fact is about national state interests. As a rule they are divided into permanent, fundamental, and transient, intermediate interests.

The first mentioned is concerned above all with the defence of the territory, population and state institutions from external danger. H. Morgenthau, a classic of American tradition, included the following as paramount in the structure of the term ‘national power’: geographic situation, natural resources, military potential, number of people, national character, morale of the people and efficiency of diplomacy. In the 1990s attention to the problem of the national interest of Russia considerably increased. The national interest includes a system of relations, which combine the necessities of functioning and developing a nation-people as a single body. Its basis is composed of the needs of a society necessary for its developing and functioning, defence of people against threats from other states, and natural–climatic factors, as well as the preservation of social peace and order inside the country. Basic national interests include the questions of territorial integrity and cultural identity, security of a nation-people, as well as control of, and the possibility of using, important natural resources.

The most important systemic factor of national interest is the preservation of culture and system of education, science and their bearers, as well as the territory where they live. The natural borders of national interest are represented by the scantiness of the resources base and the national interests of other countries. The international law and international organisations are the major consequence of the mutual limitation.

The geo-strategic situation of a state is usually characterised by the following parameters:

• location in the world (geographic co-ordinates) and ties to the theatres of military operations;

• distance from important regions and international communications (nets of trade and economic ties, industrial regions, transportation lines, energy and raw material resources, etc.);

• its own territorial size, keeping in mind the needs of organising defence and conducting military operations;

• combination of natural and artificial means of using the geopolitical space for the needs of military construction and conducting a war;

• closeness to potential and real hotbeds of war and military conflicts.⁸

Russian foreign policy theories: in search of ‘adequate geo-strategy’

Contemporary Russian geo-strategy differs from that of the Western, as pointed out in the Introduction where the definitions of Russia’s vision of the concept were discussed. Although contemporary, Russian geo-strategy is based on many traditions formed both in the period prior to 1917 and during the Soviet times. There are several schools of thought that are important to have in mind in assessing the influence of geopolitics on current foreign policy decision-making. They are the so-called westernism, eurasianism, neo-eurasianist model, and the so-called pragmatic geopolitical model.

Westernism was initially developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The postulates of this philosophical approach became dominant among Russian intelligentsia. They were also popular in the society of the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period the approach was dominant in the country’s foreign policy thinking. Gorbachev’s doctrine of ‘new political thinking’ and the so-called ‘Kozyrev doctrine’, named after the then minister of foreign affairs of Russia, are typical examples of this approach. The basic principles of this mindset were the following. The concessions to the West were in exchange for supposed tolerance and assistance, corresponding to the mutual interests of both Russia and the West. Deep idealisation of the Western model of liberal democracy and market economy, seen as a panacea for Russia, would guarantee Russia’s economic revival and attract an inflow of foreign investments if adopted rapidly and decisively. Disintegration of the socialist community and the USSR, political concessions, the economic and financial collapse of 1998 in Russia, all strongly undermined support for this geopolitical and development model in Russia.

Eurasianism again...