Post-Conflict Development in East Asia

Brendan M. Howe

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317077404
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

East Asia is a region deeply affected by conflict. Colonial, ideological, and national wars have left their scars and legacies on regional, international, and national governance. Yet East Asian post-conflict development experiences have been viewed as remarkably successful. The three largest economies of East Asia, Japan, China, and South Korea, have all experienced dramatic growth but immediately prior to their periods of expansion, all experienced the devastating impacts of international conflicts and/or civil upheaval. These post-conflict development 'success' stories do not, however, tell the whole tale. Other states in East Asia and in particular certain regions within some of these states, while apparently emerging from similar conflictual backgrounds, have experienced far less positive transitions. This volume critically assesses measurements of success in East Asian post-conflict development from a human-centered perspective. This involves a major re-evaluation of accepted accounts of domestic governance and international relations in East Asia from both a comparative and inter-disciplinary viewpoint. Case study rich, this volume provides policy prescriptions for East Asian donors and actors in an effort to provide Asian solutions for Asian problems.

Part I
Measuring Post-Conflict Development Success: Theory and Practice

Chapter 1
Introduction

Brendan M. Howe

East Asian¹ Post-Conflict Development

On the surface, many East Asian post-conflict development experiences can been viewed as remarkably successful. The three largest economies of East Asia, Japan, China, and South Korea, have all experienced growth of such magnitude and under such difficult conditions as not only to have attracted the tag of East Asian economic “miracles” but also to be seen as development models to be emulated. Immediately prior to their periods of growth all experienced the devastating impacts of international conflicts and/or civil upheaval. Other apparent post-conflict East Asian development success stories include the tiger economies of Taiwan and Singapore, and more recently Vietnam.

These post-conflict development “success” stories do not, however, tell the whole tale. Other states in East Asia and in particular certain regions within some of these states, while apparently emerging from similar conflictual backgrounds, and despite significant assistance and investment, have experienced far less positive transitions. Burma/Myanmar, Lao PDR, East Timor, and North Korea rank among the worst states in the world in terms of both development performance and the measurements of human security. Cambodia fares only slightly better. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand appear stuck in the middle income trap, and each has significant ongoing sub-state internal conflicts (Aceh and West Papua, Muslim Mindanao, and the southern provinces respectively).

Furthermore, the predominant regional focus on the primacy of the state in both domestic and international governance, and the prioritization of national economic growth over other considerations of human security and human development overlooks some of the negative impacts of related policies, and opens regional governments to internal and external criticism and pressures. Thus this volume critically assesses measurements of success in East Asian post-conflict development from a human-centered perspective. This involves a major re-evaluation of accepted accounts of domestic governance and international relations in East Asia from both a comparative and interdisciplinary viewpoint. The book examines a set of perceived success cases (as well as caveats regarding their success claims), a set of obstacle cases, as well as the international dimension, and the potential roles of new actors and initiatives in the region for the promotion of human-centered post-conflict development.

Governance and Post-Conflict Development

We expect those who govern to do so in the interests of the governed, usefully providing services that can best or perhaps only be achieved through collective action. According to the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, “governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” (1995: 2). It is an ongoing and evolutionary process which looks to reconcile conflicting interests in order to protect the weak, through the rule of law, from unjust exploitation, and introduce security for all. Governance is also a process through which collective good and goods are generated so that all are better off than they would be acting individually. Thus governance implies a concern by those who govern with both the security and development, or provision of basic human needs, of those who are governed. This includes steps to eradicate poverty, particularly in conflict affected areas.

Domestically, governance is primarily carried out by instruments of the state—that is to say the government and related institutions. Internationally, governance implies not only global attempts to govern in the absence of world government, dealing with those issues which transcend national boundaries, but also a concern with what can be done by international actors when domestic governance fails. Not only are some states unwilling or unable to provide the degree of governance necessary to protect their people and/or provide collective goods for them, but at times either through neglect or intent states can be sources of insecurity and underdevelopment for their citizens. “One World” is both an aspiration and increasingly, a recognition of reality. Global governance is incrementally being provided by international organizations and institutions. The post–Cold War world has seen a dramatic shift from focusing upon external threats to the state to focusing upon direct and indirect violence upon individuals within the state. Anticipated post–Cold War peace dividends and supposed universal economic benefits from globalization have not, however, materialized, with the number of the world’s population exposed to extreme poverty persisting in spite of pockets of rapid economic development in East Asia.

Good governance means different things to different people depending on their disciplinary, cultural, and organizational background. Indeed, it is an essentially contested concept with no single and exhaustive definition, nor a delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. From an international institutional perspective on governance derived from major international donor frameworks, good governance refers to efficiency in the provision of services and economic competitiveness, comparing ineffective economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies (Agere 2000: 1). For instance, historically, “the IMF’s main focus has been on encouraging countries to correct macroeconomic imbalances, reduce inflation, and undertake key trade, exchange, and other market reforms needed to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth” (IMF 1997). Likewise the World Bank has emphasized that overall economic growth is crucial for generating opportunity, and that market reforms can be central in expanding opportunities for poor people assuming adequate mechanisms are in place to create new opportunities and compensate the potential losers in transitions. “Access to market opportunities and to public sector services is often strongly influenced by state and social institutions, which must be responsive and accountable to poor people” (World Bank 2000: 7).

Contemporary discourse focuses increasingly on the latter part of this policy statement, and therefore as much on the political and administrative as the economic, looking at the degree of accountability of public institutions. The way in which instruments of public administration operate, provide or restrict information, deliver services in an equitable or discriminatory manner and provide or prevent opportunities for peoples’ voices in the policy making debate has a direct impact on the way citizens perceive the degree of legitimacy of the system (UN Secretary General 2007: 8). The terms “governance” and “good governance” are also being used increasingly in development literature, with bad governance regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies, and major donors and international financial institutions basing their aid and loans on the condition that reforms ensuring “good governance” are undertaken (UNESCAP 2012). Thus for the UNDP, good governance is participatory, transparent and accountable as well as effective and equitable, while also promoting the rule of law (1997: 1).

There are, however, a number of problems even with this modified emphasis. First, all the above policy prescriptions are essentially top-down in nature. The international community (however it is defined or configured) prescribes concepts of good governance for national governments. In response national governments implement pro-growth economic policies, and, if they wish to receive international support, open up their public administrative practices. The practical implications of such policies are [1] that the measurement of success is of a macro or aggregate nature—for example whether a particular policy promotes an increase in GDP per capita, and may therefore overlook the impact of policies on the extreme poor, or even increase path dependency; [2] that exogenous values and primarily Western standards are used in all evaluations, over-riding cultural relativity concerns; and [3] that political rights such as those associated with democracy and the rule of law are seen to trump other entitlement rights.

These issues are of particular concern in East Asia where, in many cases, countries have prioritized economic development over social or political development. Indeed, the region has been described as suffused with a remarkable “econophoria,” wherein all governance problems, whether domestic or international, are seen as surmountable through development and growth—an outlook which has emerged alongside the dynamic economic success stories of most states in the region (Buzan and Segal 1998: 107). While this prioritization has contributed to remarkable patterns of economic growth, it has also seen the rise in importance of challenges to human security in both absolute and relative terms (ibid). East Asia remains a decidedly state-centric operating environment, resistant to Western concepts of universalism, solidarism, and collective security, and to external intervention in domestic affairs (Chu 2001: 1).

This volume, however, explores a growing international consensus on the responsibilities owed by those who govern to the most vulnerable of those who are governed (particularly in conflict-affected states). This is seen even among East Asian states where traditionally a more top-down, aggregate, developmental state model has been preferred. This volume, therefore examines the concept of near-universal principles, which have coalesced in support of “objective” but at the same time non-traditional measurements of post-conflict development success, embraced by the concepts of human security, human development, a responsibility to protect (R2P) and, increasing, a responsibility to promote safe havens free from both fear and want. The unifying theme is the necessity of those who govern to provide a holistic and human-centered path to post-conflict development. The first section of the book fleshes out the normative and rational obligations upon those who govern to protect and promote safe havens for the most vulnerable in post-conflict states. The second and third sections investigate degrees of success and ongoing challenges to this mission in conflicted affected states in East Asia. The final section of the book assesses the degree to which new initiatives in the region hold promise for providing East Asian solutions to East Asian problems. Thus a secondary theme of the volume concerns how, despite the substantial overlapping normative consensus between East and West, there may nevertheless remain a degree of divergence when it comes to the practical and policy implementations of these norms.

Chapter Overview

Although perhaps no other region on earth is as culturally and socio-economically diverse, opposition to Western liberal or universal cosmopolitan values emanating from East Asia has tended to be identified collectively as the challenge of “Asian values” (Khong 1997). The Asian challenge to solidarism can be seen in cultural, economic and political terms. Culturally, it asserts that the Western liberal or universalist approach ignores the specific cultural traditions and historical circumstances of Asian societies, whose interpretations of human rights are different from those in the West. Politically it calls into question the motives of the West accusing them of using human rights merely as an instrument for advancing Western economic or security interests—“power politics in disguise” and a shallow pretense for the use of force against regimes which stand up to Western neo-imperialism. Economically, it maintains that the priority of developing Asian societies has to be the eradication of poverty. “Asian values” have been invoked as a form of developmentalism, with the claim that, until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an unaffordable luxury (Thompson 2004: 1085). Indeed for Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy “development has assumed cult-like status” in East Asia (2001: 5).

All of these issues, however, are subject to challenges if we revert to basics and ask in whose interest should governance primarily function? Chapter 2 answers this foundational question in the following way: that “good governance” as opposed to merely efficient governance, is that set of policy prescriptions and practices which prioritizes the interests of the most vulnerable sections of society; that the most foundational interests of these individuals can be found in entitlement rights covered by the newly emerging paradigms of human security and human development; and that particular attention must be paid to the confluence of these two sets of concerns in conflict affected and environmentally challenged states. Even in East Asia such fundamental concepts are increasingly accepted, with authoritarian states facing number of internal normative challenges when attempting to justify policies and actions that may negatively impact upon the entitlement rights of those they govern, and external pressures from members of the international community and international civil society to govern and develop in the interests of the most vulnerable.

Chapter 2 explores these internal and external pressures to conform to international good governance norms, noting that although Asian exceptionalism survives in the constitutive documents of regional international organizations, and in many of the foreign policy priorities of Asian states, there is something like a global overlapping consensus emerging regarding the concept of individual human entitlement rights. These foundational rights are best summed up by the concepts of freedom from want and freedom from fear. As these rights may be seen as universal, they impose concurrent obligations on all national and local governments, as embodied in the R2P doctrine, but they also imply a responsibility to promote the conditions which facilitate the emergence of safe havens. Furthermore, Chapter 2 considers whether these obligations extend to members of the international community if a national government is unable or unwilling to fulfill its governance duties. Finally the chapter emphasizes that practicing good governance, from the perspective of maximizing the wellbeing of the most vulnerable of those who are governed, is not only the normatively “right” thing to do, it is also the rational course to follow from a national security perspective.

Chapter 3 further explores the emerging R2P doctrine in the context of Northeast Asia. This sub-region is frequently viewed as among the most dangerous in the world (Calder 2001: 106). Two un-resolved conflicts, China-Taiwan and North-South Korea not only perpetuate the Cold War, but also threaten to drag rival great powers into all-out conflict. Yet, as noted above, the sub-region is also home to some of the greatest post-conflict or conflict-affected development success stories, not only among East Asian countries but also as measured against anywhere in the world. Perhaps the biggest remaining challenge in Northeast Asia, in terms of both domestic governance and international security, is North Korea. Furthermore, although the responsibility to protect in international relations and international law has been widely debated during the last decade, relatively few commentators have focused on the impact and interpretation of the paradigm in Northeast Asia. Despite enduring state-centric and non-interventionary tendencies in the sub-region, governance actors are increasingly constrained and enabled by related international normative and legal frameworks.

In Chapter 3, therefore, Boris Kondoch first examines the background to the R2P, wherein international governance failures to prevent atrocities in places like Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo in the 1990s, led to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) publishing its landmark report. He notes that the foundation of this document is that every state has the responsibility to protect its own citizens, and that if a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. Kondoch then assesses the position of the doctrine in Northeast Asia, noting that the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have all engaged actively with the R2P, although with different interpretations and reservations. In particular, Northeast Asian states have welcomed the shift of thinking away from discussing a right to humanitarian intervention to a responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. This therefore continues the secondary theme of this volume, that there is an overlapping consensus on many normative principles regarding post-conflict development and governance, but that approaches and interpretations in East Asia may nevertheless differ from those in the West.

Kondoch conducts a detailed analysis of the failure of the government of the DPRK to protect its citizens, and further how Pyongyang, through gross violations of human rights is a direct threat to their human security. He further notes that so egregious are these violations that they may be considered crimes against humanity thereby triggering a responsibility for the international community to act in order to bring about their cessation. Precisely what action is obligated is, however, still subject to a great deal of discussion, and is further constrained by political and strategic practicalities. He therefore concludes, rather pessimistically, that the obstacles to acting on the R2P, even when there is substantial consensus on obligations and violations, may, in this case, prove insurmountable.

The second section of the book looks at those countries in the region which have generally, in the literature, been perceived as post-conflict development success stories. The cases have been selected not only as some of the most striking examples of such success, but also to cover Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, consolidated success stories, and those which are works in process. The chapters also, however, challenge the extent to which each of these can truly be seen as a success story when analyzed in accordance with the new human-centered criteria introduced in part one of the book, and introduce other important caveats before they can be taken as paradigmatic examples of good governance.

In Chapter 4, Jae-Jung Suh and Jinkyoung Kim consider the “miracle on the Han river” through which South Korea successfully rose to the challenge to transform itself from a war-torn shell, one of the poorest states in the world, to an industrialized country. The authors argue that this was achieved, to a great extent, thanks to the Republic of Korea’s success in building governance capacity in the decade after the Korean War. They note th...