Research on the transnational realm and a polity shift toward non-state actors (NSA), is often still very much statist inspired, in the sense that its ultimate aim has often been to explore the possible declining role of the state.4 Ironically, given that goal, when there is consideration of NSAs in this work, there is often less attention paid to the violent non-state actors who arguably pose the most direct challenges to state authority. This tendency may be because the authors of these works are more likely to come from a liberal strand of international relations theorizing, and thus their attention is drawn to the more benign actors, issues and activities, such as transnational activists,5 advocacy networks,6 and NGOs.7 Moreover, such research has also generally focused more on western-originated and developed-world groups and activitiesâand in doing so has left relatively under-considered the âotherâ (e.g., the developing world, Eastern originated) entities and activities, which comprise many of the current non-benign groups with potential impact on transnational power shifts.
Among these efforts to explore VNSAs and their implications for global politics are those works that have sought to identify and define NSAs and actorness overall (with VNSAs as a part of this),8 and works showing how NSAs have interacted both with states and within the larger environment to mobilize strength and project power.9 To make fuller sense of the diverse literature on VNSAs and their role in a polity shift away from the state, we can broadly categorize it into works with a power-centric starting point, and those with a threat-centric analysis.
Power-centric images of violent non-state actors
âPower-centricâ inquiries refers broadly to those works attempting to explore the shift in power polity from the statist international realm to the non-statist, transnational one and, in particular, to the latterâs most unruly actors, by offering frameworks for understanding these activities or by suggesting typologies of the actors themselves. A well-known example of such a framework is that proposed in Josselin and Wallaceâs volume, in which their understanding of NSAsâ role in a power polity shift is revealed in their distinguishing between transnationalism and transgovernmentalism. By focusing on the former, NSAsâ power source is seen in transnationalism, while transgovernmental entities are confirmed as remaining, to some extent, under state control.
Some have viewed these emerging threats and power sources as the continuation of âinformal violence,â10 others have characterized them as the âprivatization of warâ11 or as a new kind of warfare.12 Still others have explored the emergence of âprivate authorityâ13 in global politics, a heading which includes the conceptualization of âillicit authorityâ for malign examples,14 and the idea that security is now being transformed from a service provided by the state to being a âmarket goodâ for those who can afford it.15
With power and authority often being used interchangeably in this literature, it is possible to look at various typologies of authority to gain insights into the divergent natures of non-state power. For example, according to Hall and Biersteker, âprivate authorityâ refers to something that is obviously not a state itself, but is also not âstate-based, nor state created.â Rather, private authority is defined as âinstitutionalized forms or expressions of powerâ that are legitimate in the sense that there is âsome form of normative, un-coerced consent or recognition of authority on the part of the regulated or governed.â They go on to divide types of private authority into three: (a) market, (b) moral, and (c) illicit. Figures and collectives of âillicit authorityâ are those NSAs that are motivated by either financial gain or political purposes.16 The primary examples for the illicit authority category are groups using terrorist tactics (often motivated by political motives), transnational criminal groups (driven by profit), and some mercenaries whose services are not transparently documented, thus distinguishing them from more formal privately contracted security services.17 If politically motivated, such groups are likely to adapt asymmetric strategies18 via the transnational space to wage their battle against states and the state-centric system.
The illicit authoritiesâ relation with the state and state system are in obvious stark contrast to that of the âmarketâ or âmoral,â or, essentially, non-violent NSAs. Multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example, are often very much intertwined with the state. The former in particular, are likely to try and maintain good relationships with statesâthey pay taxes, and may lobby their own statespeople in order to insure positive relationships with other nations where their subsidiaries are located. Even for so-called non-governmental organizations, the boundaries with the state-centric world are often not well separated. Many NGOs still use governmental monies, (take, for example, NGOs supporting the development of democracy), and frequently rely on statist support in other ways as well, for example, to provide security when an NGO is trying to function in an unstable region. The distinction can also be seen on the issue of ethical self-restraintâa trait more likely to be lacking in violent NSAs. MNCs, NGOs, and other forms of market or moral private authorities, are still under some restraint from international norms and peer pressure, whereas illicit authorities not only face the least amount of such âethicalâ pressures, but also have the most compelling motivation to explore new (even unethical) ways to ensure their own survival.
Clearly, individuals and collectives of illicit authority are the most independent of the NSAs, but even among them there may be varying degrees of loyalty and affiliation to the state. Organized criminal groups, for example, as long as their financial interests are secured, may still remain loyal to their states, leading to one description of organized criminals as those trying to take advantage of the malfunctions of the state system while still living within it.19 Politically driven examples of illicit authority on the other hand are often seeking expressly to overthrow a state or the state-system at a broader level.20 Because of this, they face particularly harsh statist efforts aimed at their destruction. Such examples seem to represent a kind of extreme autonomy, meaning not just being separate from the state, but being actively in conflict with itâa distinction that could also be described as âpassiveâ versus âactiveâ autonomy. One might speculate that so-called âactiveâ or âextremeâ autonomy could contribute in a Darwinian sense to increased adaptability among these entities, since their autonomy makes them truly on their own, and may force them to put themselves and their own survival needs before all others. If they view their environment as truly âjungle-likeâ and unreliable, might they be compelled to become particularly self-reliant and innovative?
Rather than looking at the different types of non-state authority, other works have opted to consider the dynamics of actual power transition from states to non-states, identifying such different contexts as those in which a lack of public authority leaves a void that is filled by non-state newcomers; or, particularly within the economic realm, contexts in which certain ideological positionings (e.g., the popularity of neo-liberal economic ideas) aim to reduce the extent of public power.21
In looking at the conditions under which public to private power transition may occur, the argument has also been made that when a state becomes convinced that certain non-state activities are of benefit t...