The Politics and Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott

Stuart Isaacs

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2006
• eBook ISBN: 9781134155712
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Michael Oakeshott was a leading Political theorist described by The Telegraph in 1990 as "the greatest political philosopher in the Anglo-Saxon tradition since Mill – or even Burke". There has been sustained interest in his work, and a developing body of literature, over recent years. This book offers a clearly written and accessible critical analysis: it presents complex theories and concepts in a way that will introduce new readers to Oakeshott's work, and at the same time offers a fresh approach for those already familiar with his philosophy.

The Politics and Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott reveals how his work relates to contemporary political philosophy (for example, Arendt, Rorty, Rawls); and moreover, how it links to broader debates within philosophy and the social sciences and, building upon the work of Devigne, through to postmodernism.

This book brings together the disparate influences that have, at various times, been associated with Oakeshott's work, and draws from a number of essays which have been published posthumously. Referring to these, and other more well-known texts, the author makes sense of the many dimensions of Oakeshott's work by placing a moral concern as central to his system of thought. All in all this book considers the recently published 'lesser-known' essays as well as the latest secondary appraisals of Oakeshott's work, which sets his thought in the contemporary political environment of the twenty-first century. This much-needed text with be of great interest to students and researchers in political science and philosophy.

Part I
Philosophy and morality

1
Philosophical influences

Introduction

The philosophical tradition of Idealism, which is the starting point of Oakeshott’s philosophy, has a long and rich pedigree. If its development is followed, not only are the twists and turns of one particular philosophical school revealed but also the expansion of some of the most significant framing concepts of Western philosophy. Idealism is one of the ‘grand’ traditions of philosophy. Since the Enlightenment it has been fighting the battle for theoretical supremacy with, first, rationalism and, later, empiricism.¹ At the time that Oakeshott began to publish, the old antagonisms were firmly in place. But the character of his work and that of his contemporaries was to alter the shape of philosophical debate up to and including the present time.

In general terms, rationalism contends that what we know about the world can only come to us through reason. That is not to say that ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ correspond. Rather, our experience may indicate how things appear to be but it is reason alone that explains how things really are. The disjuncture between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’, while central to rationalism, is not exclusive to it.

The question of the relation between the two has been an important concern of Idealism, and in common with their rationalist opponents they have often answered in Monist terms.

This dualism was formulated first by Plato² and it is at the point of trying to reconcile this binary distinction that the two traditions meet. So it is, then, that Oakeshott shares a similar conceptual framework with arch-rationalists like Spinoza.³ However, it must be emphasised that his philosophical system has a likeness to Monist rationalism, rather than the rationalism of Descartes.⁴

In almost direct opposition to rationalism stands empiricism. Here it is taken that experience, not reason, holds the key to what we can know. It is from our senses that we begin measuring the validity or otherwise of what we appear to understand as true. This most generalised understanding might be associated with Hume.⁵ British philosophy has been dominated by empiricism. This bias originated in modern times from Lockian thought and was reinforced in the nineteenth century by John Stuart Mill. It has often been said that the British Idealists spent as much time attacking empiricism as they did in outlining their own positions. As I shall illustrate, Oakeshott’s first text was no exception. However, there is something similar in the scepticism of both traditions. Locke, for example, famously described the task of the philosopher to be that of an ‘under-labourer’ who merely removes some of the clutter that lies in the way of our knowledge. He wanted to avoid the rationalists’ inordinate ‘meddling with things’.⁶

In seeking to ‘elucidate’ rather than ‘prescribe’, the philosophical systems of Bradley and Oakeshott have something in common with this view. All that being said, it is possible to distinguish Idealism as a school of thought that stands on its own metaphysical two feet. Idealism begins by identifying reality with experience. Experience is self-authenticating. There is nothing outside of experience, no reality beyond it to validate it. Everything in experience is an idea, a part of consciousness. In this way the world is understood as a mental construct. Things exist but never independently of the mind.

Generally speaking, then, Idealism is any system of thought in which the object of external perception is held to consist of ideas. My task in this chapter is to illustrate how Idealism has shaped Oakeshott’s philosophical position. This is not meant to be a systematic comparison with previous Idealists. Not only would this be tedious but it would also be inappropriate. My aim here is to merely outline the general historical context from which Oakeshott takes his ‘framing’ concepts. It is ‘general’ and ‘framing’ in that Oakeshott uses these theoretical tools in a distinctive and unique way. I wish to avoid the conclusion that his concepts ‘match’ or ‘correspond to’ those of any other author. To this end, this chapter on the context of Oakeshott’s thought is simplified and generalised, and purposefully so.

There is no doubt that Oakeshott was extremely well versed in the thought of the ‘ancients’, particularly the writings of Plato.⁷ In the first part of this chapter I examine Platonic Idealism. I point to the concern with ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’, and the dichotomy between the ‘One’ and the ‘Many’. I also highlight the Socratic style that informs Oakeshott’s idea of philosophy. Equally as important, I indicate where Oakeshott diverges from Platonic reasoning. Next, I narrate the development of the neo-Platonic Idealism of Plotinus. I go on to highlight the significance of Spinoza’s theory of modality for Oakeshott’s framing ideas. I point out that, while Oakeshott was indebted to his Monism, his philosophical reflections are of an entirely different character. Furthermore, he is distinguished from Spinoza by his scepticism and anti-rationalism.

From this point I turn to German Idealism, in particular the work of Hegel. Here there are a number of important connecting points to draw out. First, Hegel’s challenge to Kantian subjectivism was maintained in Oakeshott’s philosophy that attempted to sustain the Hegelian resolution of the subject/object dichotomy. Second, Hegel’s theory of knowledge, and his understanding of ‘Absolute knowing’ as the totality of all consciousness, were radicalised by Oakeshott into a non-foundational philosophy. Third, I illustrate that Hegel’s ‘concrete universal’ was central to British Idealism in general. Over the next two chapters it will be seen how, in Oakeshott’s hands, this notion became a non-essentialist concept. In concluding this discussion I point out how Oakeshott shares a similar idea of philosophy with Hegel in so far as it is tied to the Socratic method, and its aim is to make life rationally apprehensible. Oakeshott parts with Hegel in two respects. He never has recourse to the Hegelian dialectic and he does not privilege philosophical discourse. I move on to establish the general terrain of British Idealism. I argue that at its heart was a moral concern, and central to this was a preoccupation with religion. This may be seen by the omnipresence of the notion of self-realisation. I also highlight that ‘politics’ (or, at least, a concern with the idea of the ‘state’) had a place in the writings of the British Idealists. Oakeshott follows his philosophical ancestors’ footsteps except where they tend towards social prescription. To illustrate the general position of British Idealism I provide an overview of the work of Bosanquet and Green.

In the last part of this chapter I examine the rise of logical positivism. After outlining the challenge laid down to Idealism by Moore and Russell, I review the position of the ‘early’ Wittgenstein. In contradistinction to the Idealist ‘project’ I maintain that positivism sought to end the traditional questions of philosophy, in particular moral reflection. It was this point of view that Oakeshott challenged when he sought to defend Idealism long after it had ceased to be fashionable.

Platonic Idealism

The first full-blown Idealist philosophy may be said to begin with Plato, Socrates’ most famous pupil and Aristotle’s teacher. Plato’s philosophy was systematically stated in the Phaedo but it is in the Republic that Plato provides us with the most comprehensive account of his position.⁸ His ideas about the nature of reality rest upon the premise that there exists a world of intelligible Forms or Ideas that exists independent of the things we take to be real. The Forms are eternal and unchanging. It is possible to come to an intuitive knowledge of the Forms through an appropriate education, leading to an understanding of the ‘One’, the Form of the Good.

By attempting to establish a distinction between the intelligible world of the Forms and the world of appearances Plato makes a significant binary distinction. This is between the ‘One’ and the ‘Many’.⁹ First, Plato maintains that even though different qualities may exhibit themselves in one thing it is a misunderstanding to take them as ultimately combined: ‘since beauty and ugliness are opposites, they are two things; and consequently each of them is one. The same holds of justice and injustice, good and bad, and all the essential Forms: each itself is one’ (Ch. XIX v. 476).

Second, it is not only that each particular Form is one in itself but that there is an ultimate end or telos of human life, the quest for the knowledge of the Good, which is the ‘One’ of which everything else is only a part (Ch. XXIII vi. 502–9). When the essential nature of the Good is comprehended, it reveals not only what is morally correct but also what is good in nature and the whole universe. It is the completion of knowledge. It might be noted that Oakeshott’s work opposes this position. In so far as Plato, along with Aristotle, is the founder of the tradition of ‘natural law’ theory, Oakeshott’s political and moral ideas stand as a refutation to any notion of a fixed or determinate ‘Good’.

The doctrine of the Forms has a corresponding theory of knowledge

In philosophy there can be no false knowledge as its objects of study are the unchanging principles of the world. Philosophical knowledge takes us to the essence of things. In contrast, a concern with the world of appearances leads only to a mere opinion, or ‘doxa’ (Ch. XIX v. 478). In this world any particular thing may be beautiful or ugly in the eye of the beholder. It is a world of intermediate things, between what is real and unreal, what ‘is’ and ‘is not’. Thus, our day-to-day understanding of things is not concerned with what is unreal but is shaped by a belief that objects are real. For the man who seeks wisdom, for the philosopher, what must be comprehended is the reality of the Forms. Even though the Forms may be invisible they are real and rational: ‘the many things, we say, can be seen, but are not objects of rational thought: whereas the Forms are objects of thought but invisible’ (Ch. XXIII v. 507).

The quest of Idealism since Plato has always been to ‘reject the appearance and demand the reality’ (Ch. XXIII v. 505). The idea that philosophy should be concerned with what was real and, correspondingly, rational was to persist in nineteenth-century Idealism. It was also to influence the rationalist tradition associated with the Enlightenment.

Where the two traditions overlap is in taking from Plato the idea that the objects of thought should be rationally apprehensible. One of the distinctive marks of Oakeshott’s work has been to illustrate that our emotions, religion and inarticulate forms of knowledge may all be legitimate objects of ‘rational’ study for philosophy while not taking anything away from their character. Voegelin has a similar position, also conscious of the Platonic legacy.¹⁰

Alongside Plato’s theory of knowledge there unfolds a theory of mind. He describes a diagram that is intended to illustrate various levels of understanding (Ch. XXIV vi. 509). These are arranged hierarchically and divided into two sections, understanding of the world of appearances and the world of Forms. The lowest state of mind is ‘eikasia’. It appears to be associated with those who only take what they see as real when they are but the ‘imaginings’ of their mind. The highest state of mind is one that has reached a stage of discursive thinking using the Socratic dialectic method. This is understood as reasoning carried out by questions and answers that attempt to reach an explanation of a particular Form. The point of the dialogue is to examine the premises of statements and the principles upon which they depend: ‘you may understand me to mean all that unaided reasoning apprehends by the power of dialectic, when it treats its assumptions, not as first principles, but as hypotheses in the literal sences, things “laid down”’ (Ch. XXIV vi. 511).

Although it would be the antithesis of Oakeshott’s philosophical view to look for the ‘logos’ of an object, his idea of philosophy is close to that of Plato. Indeed, there is no Hegelian dialectic in his work but there is something akin to the Socratic one.¹¹ Oakeshott’s idea of philosophy takes it as a manner of thinking which aims to explain the presuppositions of our thought. Philosophy attempts to get to know what in another sense we already know. There can be no false knowledge. Philosophy is a parasitic activity. In OHC he states,

Philosophical reflection is recognised here as an adventure of one who seeks to understand in other terms what he already understands and in which the understanding sought (itself unavoidably conditional) is a disclosure of the conditions of the understanding enjoyed and not a substitute for it.

(OHC p. vii)

From EM to OHC, Oakeshott’s idea of philosophy has a basic Platonic character. He has stated that, like Plato in the Phaedo, he also takes philosophy to be the study of dying and death (EM p. 310). In philosophy we are able to face up to our mortality in a disinterested manner that is not possible under the terms of any other idiom of thought. Given this view, philosophy has no bearing upon everyday or ‘practical’ life (as we shall see).

Oakeshott parts company with Plato when he attempts to unite theory and practice and privilege philosophical experience. Socrates is provoked into declaring how far his ideal state and his ideal man can have any practical use (Ch. XVIII v. 471–4). In response he advances the view that his ideas would be practical where a philosopher obtains political power. The idea of the ‘philosopher-king’ is antithetical to the character of Oakeshott’s philosophy. He makes this clear in OHC where he rewrites the ‘allegory of the cave’ so that the cave-dwellers tell the philosopher – in so many words – to get lost. (OHC pp. 27–31). It is here that his journey with Plato ends and where that of the rationalist in politics begins.

It is in terms of his epistemology (his theory of knowledge), rather than his ontology (his theory regarding the nature of existence), that Plato’s work is most significant for getting to grips with the framing concepts of Oakeshott’s thought. Plato’s general understanding of the character of philosophy, which takes philosophy to be concerned with what is rational and real, or with what is ‘concrete’ rather than ‘abstract’, left its mark on the whole tradition of Idealism. The Idealist theory of knowledge has been such that ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ have been synonymous with what is ‘concrete’ in experience. That which does not relate to what is ultimately real has no meaning. The various theoretical frameworks that have tried to explain this have also largely done so under the terms of Plato’s distinction between the ‘One’ and the ‘Many’. There is one absolute reality that provides a context for understanding the cosmos.

This may be the ‘Good’ or, later, ‘Mind’ or the ‘Whole’ or, ‘Experience’. Oakeshott both worked within...

Table of contents

• Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Philosophy and morality
• Part II Politics and morality
• Part III Oakeshott and contemporary thought
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index