Durkheim and Representations

W. S. F. Pickering, W. S. F. Pickering

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134655373
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Durkheim's sociological thought is based on the premise that the world cannot be known as a thing in itself, but only through representations, rough approximations of the world created either individually or collectively. This set of papers by leading Durkheimians from Britain, America and continental Europe is the first concentrated attempt to understand what he meant by representations, how his understanding of the term was influenced by Kant and by neo-Kantians like Charles Renouvier and how his use of the concept in his work developed over time. By arguing that his use of representations at the the core of Durkheim's sociological thought, this book makes a unique contribution to Durkheimian studies which have recently been dominated by positivist and functionalist interpretations, and reveals a thinker very much in tune with contemporary developments in philosophy, linguistics and sociology.

Part I

THE INTELLECTUAL TERRITORY

1
REPRESENTATIONS AS UNDERSTOOD BY DURKHEIM

An introductory sketch

W.S.F.Pickering

Introduction: definition

Whether one considers Durkheim was a sociologist pure and simple, a sociologist with an interest in philosophy, a philosopher devoted to sociology, a moralist, or a man of common sense with an interest in society, one thing cannot be denied: he firmly set his mind on acquiring knowledge. This goal par excellence dominated his life. It is reflected most surely in the seriousness of his character (see Pickering 1984:352ff.).

The knowledge he sought was external to himself: it was not self-knowledge. What was to be known existed ‘out there’ and was not dependent on his own attitudes or character, nor was it acquired through intuition. It was something to be acquired, to be discovered, and in so many cases very laboriously, for that is the nature of scientific knowledge which Durkheim saw as the surest of all knowledge. He held that science bestows autonomy and it supremely imparts the way to recognize the nature of things and to understand them.

But how is one to proceed practically in the quest of obtaining this knowledge of the exterior world? The way for Durkheim was through the gate of representations—representations of the phenomena of the world. It is of course true that representations exist in the mind of individuals, though they may not be consciously realized as such. Whether representations are universal, whether things can be understood in themselves without further representations, are matters to be considered later.

We start where Durkheim starts, with the assumption that knowledge can only be established through representations. In a slightly different vein he wrote that people cannot become attached to external objects unless they imagine them in some fashion: ‘they exist and live in us in the form of the representation expressing them’ (1925a:255–6/t.1961a:223–4).

Although Durkheim always held that it was necessary to define terms precisely, he did not always live up to the ideal. Only after years of writing about religion did he define it in a way that satisfied him (Pickering 1984:163ff.). Nor did he offer a precise definition of the key concept, society. It might be argued that he did not trouble to define words on which he thought there might be general agreement. After all, no writer has time to define everything!

A non-controversial, general usage may well have been the reason why Durkheim never defined representation. The concept was in fact commonly used in his day among artists and other professionals such as lawyers, as well as philosophers. Durkheim, it seems, unhesitatingly accepted what might be held to be the generally recognized meaning. So, for contemporary philosophers and the public at large, a representation meant quite simply a mental or intellectual idea—a picture or projection held in the mind. Its equivalent in German is Vorstellung (representation, performance, etc.). In English, the word représentation used by the French is difficult to translate. Obviously it means a representation. But that is too vague in conveying the way Durkheim and contemporary philosophers used it. In most respects représentation is, therefore, best left in the French, with the implication that the French meaning or meanings must be employed. However, here, for reasons given in the Preface, the English word representation is used to translate the French representation. The French word idée is very seldom used as a substitute for représentation. As sometimes with the English word idea, idée is associated with phantasy, originality or uniqueness, whereas the French représentation is connected with the aim of accurate portrayal. A representation is like a mental photographic picture rather than a painting. But in addition, representations relate to ideas, ways of evaluating, seeing and imagining objects or persons. Poggi defines representations as ‘mental entities’: we might say mental pictures or projections (Poggi 1971:xxx).

Where they relate to the social world, representations are not just ideological reflections or superstructures of various social orders. The claim is that they picture the social order as an objective expression of systems of ideas (Evans-Pritchard 1960:17).

Around the turn of the century Octave Hamelin, a friend of Durkheim in his Bordeaux days, wrote a thesis which became a famous book, Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation. Némedi has shown that the book, important in its day on the subject of epistemology, does not deal with representations as Durkheim and others used the term (see Némedi and Pickering 1995; this volume chapter 5). It is concerned with the theoretical problem of representation as a whole.

Importance of representations: their function

As we have just said, for Durkheim representations constitute the key to knowledge, to logic and to an understanding of mankind (and see Pickering 1984:ch. 15; Lukes 1973:436–8). In this he was merely taking a position similar to that of many Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes, Hegel, Kant, Malebranche, Renouvier, Hamelin, Wundt, Bergson, Schopenhauer, and so on (for the use of representations by certain European thinkers, see Mauss 1950:3, 12; Mestrovic 1988:46ff.; and chapters 2, 3 and 7 here).

By representations knowledge is derived and through them the person can visualize a world beyond that of his immediate senses. In an academic debate in 1913 in which Durkheim gave a paper, ‘Le Problème religieux et la dualité de la nature humaine’, he said:

Collective representations originate only when they are embodied in material objects, things, or beings of every sort—figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on—that symbolize and delineate them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings, by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciences, which are, by nature, closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison.

(1913b/1970a:328/t.1960c:335–6)

Elsewhere Durkheim gave as an example the fact that the whiteness of paper is not the same as that of snow and that ‘the two appear in different representations’ (1898b/1924a:16/t.1953b:11). He went on to argue that there is no evidence to show that they both rely on a general impression of whiteness common to the two. Human beings create a psychic continuum which is made up of a series of representations and this gives rise to the general notion of whiteness.

As the basis of all knowledge, Durkheim held that human beings cannot represent to themselves the world at large other than in the terms of ‘the small social world in which they live’ (1897a:245/t.1951a:227). This small social world, as we shall see, is based on the collective representations of the society in which men live.

In Les Formes élémentaires Durkheim wrote that representations ‘are as necessary for the well working of our moral life as our food is for the maintenance of physical life’ (546/382).¹ Of course, it is not only in moral life that representations are necessary but in all areas where man uses his mind. Human beings are essentially representational, for ‘a man who did not think with concepts would not be a man, because he would not be a social being. If he were reduced to having only individual perceptions, he would be indistinguishable from beasts’ (626/438–9). Only through representations can human beings communicate with one another (1914a/t.1960c:336).

Going beyond the general, Durkheim asserted that representations are the chief components of individual minds and are at the basis of all social reality (see 1898b; Dennes 1924:32). Social institutions are founded on representations. Further, religion itself ‘appears to us as a system of representations’ (1913b:66/t.1984b:4). Indeed, society itself is a similar system (see below). Durkheim would argue that collective representations originated in religion, with its fundamental notions of gods and spirits (see, e.g., 1913a(ii)(6) and (7):35/t.1975a:171).

Further, Durkheim asserts that representations are what makes a human being human. In Les Formes élémentaires he said that a man who does not think in concepts (collective representations) ‘would not be a social being’ (626/ 439). ‘If reduced to having only individual perceptions, he would be indistinguishable from animals’ (ibid.) .

These diverse quotations are sufficient to demonstrate that for Durkheim representations in one form or another are of the greatest importance for both knowledge and social existence. Up to now we have presented a random selection of quotations. Something more specific is required and we must now look at the types of representations human beings have devised in their search for knowledge.

Types of representations

Classification is a necessary condition of all generalized knowledge. But classifications are frequently subdivided. According to Durkheim, representations can be so broken down. One way to classify them is according to the area of experience, culture or thought in which they are involved. There are, therefore, representations relating to science, morals, law, religion, the family, to name but some of the areas.

But more important is the major division between collective and individual representations. Collective representations relate to representations which can be said to be held by a group or a society as a whole. Durkheim wrote that they were made up of ‘mental states of a people or a social group which thinks in common’ (1955a:173/t.1983a:84). These are in contrast to individual representations which are ways of mentally dealing with experience but which are unique to the individual. A dichotomy Durkheim constantly used from the very beginning of his excursion into sociology was the rigid contrast between the individual and the social. Nevertheless both individual and collective life are made up of representations and both relate to a corresponding substratum, not very clearly defined (1898b/1924a:2/ t.1953b:2). In a relatively early work he maintained that collective representations were ‘of an altogether different nature to those of the individual’ (1897a:352/t.1951a:312). They express the way the group thinks about itself; whereas individual representations reflect only what an individual thinks.

Other types of representations can be found in Durkheim’s writings, for example empirical representations (1899a(ii):19/t.1975a:90). Another type of representation which Durkheim finds of little worth for his work is impressionable (sensibles) representations, which are open to rapid change and flux (618/433). Along another line of differentiation, some representations are obligatory for society, such as moral representations, and some are optional, for example scientific representations (1899a(ii):20/t.1975a:91).

Because of the central place that collective representations have in Durkheim’s work, we consider them in more detail and in connection with individual representations.

Individual and collective representations contrasted

There are many reasons why for Durkheim individual representations are of less importance than collective representations. Chief among them is that individual representations are imperfect reflections of collective representations. Each person has a particular set of representations which is never identical to that of society. The distinct personality of each individual modifies collective representations accordingly. Thus, the process of socialization is never perfect in that individuals completely accept the collective representations of their society. If this were so, it would deny the notion of autonomy which was so central to Durkheim’s thinking (1925a:ch. 7). Each person is differentiated from another, according endless variations. Thus, in the language of Parsons, individual representations make up the actor’s knowledge of external phenomena, which are independent of the existence of social relationships, of heredity and environment (1937:359).

In his article on representations, Durkheim maintained that individual representations are produced by the action and reaction of neurological elements but they are not in fact inherent in these elements (1898b/1924a:33/ t.1953b:24). In other words, representations are in some way determined by but transcend neurological elements. Thus, the neurological element forms a substratum of individual representations.

In studying individual representations practical difficulties present themselves on account of the infinite number and variety. Their extent is so great that they are beyond management, classification and therefore generalization.

By contrast, collective representations are of a much higher order. They are the summit of the psychic scale or hierarchy (Dennes 1924:37). They are superior to individual representations because of their wider scope in time and space, for they are not only social in origin, they are also social in form and in content (ibid.). Collective representations are exterior to individual minds, differing in quality, character and kind (ibid.:35). As Durkheim wrote: ‘The group thinks, feels, acts, quite differently from what its members would if they were isolated’ (1895a/1901c:128). Nowhere does Durkheim give greater evidence for their essential connection with society than in analysing representations relating to religion and morality. Just as society has an existence and reality over and above the individuals who constitute it, so collective representations have an existence beyond individual representations (see 1898b).

All this does not mean that individual representations or minds can be overlooked. Collective representations depend on them. There can be no society without individuals who stand at its base. Collective representations are to individual representations what individual representations are to brain cells (1898b/1924a:36/t.1953b:25–6; Dennes 1924:33).

But how do collective representations come into existence? The answer is through fusion or synthesis of individual representations (1898b/1924a:38/ t.1953b:27).

Durkheim demonstrates at least to his own satisfaction that collective representations exert force over individuals to a far greater extent than individual representations. This is demonstrated by the fact that they are backed by the authority of society and make individuals carry out actions and hold ideas which may be unpleasant (295/207). Opinion, which constitutes individual representations, carries no weight compared with that knowledge which is mediated by society (297/208).

Since collective representations exert force over the individual they constitute a controlling mechanism (ibid.:295/207). Just as important is the fact that collective representations are a means for expressing the feelings of individuals by symbolizing them externally to the person (1914a:218/ t.1960c:336). Through such means people communicate with one another and so create a sense of unity with one another (ibid.). Here once again Durkheim’s argument assumes that collective representations have an existence external to individuals who embrace them.

The importance of collective representations comes home in another way. Durkheim held that everything which is uniquely human, for example language, ideas and therefore the idea of the individual itself, is social in origin, and therefore related to collective representations (ibid.) .

But collective representations are qualitatively superior in another way. They carry in themselves the past. Near the end of his life he wrote that collective representations ‘add to that which we can learn by our own experience all that wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries’ (621/435). Nevertheless, he did not allow his readers to think that individual and collective representations were totally distinct. To the contrary he argued in The Rules, in the preface to the second edition, that they were indeed representations (1895a/1901c:xix/t.1938b:lii). Further, certain laws of combination affected both in much the same way (ibid.:xvii/ li). This allowed Durkheim to assume that formal individual psychology and sociology might have something of a common starting-point.²

Stability and change in collective representations

From what has already been said it is obvious that the main requirement of collective representations is that they are stable and not given to change. If they were perpetually changing, their value to mankind would be negated. Such necessary stability is in part determined by some form of restraint. Durkheim wrote towards the end of his life: ‘But a collective representation is necessarily submitted to a control that is repeated indefinitely; the men who accept it verify it by their own experience’ (625/438; Lévy-Bruhl maintains the same point in 1910/t.1926:13). As is so often the case, Durkheim found the best example for his argument in the realm of religion. He argued that the idea of gods, of mysterious forces, and so on, would have been passing phantasies had they been merely individually held. But ‘by becoming collective, impressions have become fixed, consolidated and crystallized’ (1910a(iii)(2)). This process was also acknowledged by the Viennese philosopher Jérusalem, who called it social condensation. All too obvious is the fact that individual representations tend to be unstable and are short-lived. DeGré sees Durkheim’s main thesis amply and indubitably demonstrated, namely, that collective representations transcend and constrain the particular thoughts of individuals (1985:91). Collective representations can only become stable if they are passed through society, for example handed on from generation to generation. That means they have to transcend the personal, the individual (Durkheim 1913a(ii)(6) and (7):36/ t.1975a:172).

But if collective representations are absolutes, permanent and unchangeable, they have affinities with Plato’s Ideas, which have an existence that transcends this world. Although he saw the need for stability in representations, Durkheim by no means accepted Plato’s concept of Ideas. Representations are both unchangeable and changeable. He saw the need for stability but also the possibility of modification. He visualized representations very much like language, which both changes and does not change. ‘Now language is something fixed: it changes but very slowly’ (619/433). These characteristics also relate to society, as well as to collective representations. Durkheim was constantly aware that societies change in matters which are not just peripheral: they relate to the ways in which social m...