New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy

Maciej Wilga, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317674535
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

EU foreign policy once existed in the form of the European Political Cooperation with only a limited political leverage and symbolic institutional underpinnings. In recent years rapid changes have occurred, including an expanding institutional apparatus, increased responsibility and growing demand for action.

This book examines new approaches to the EU's foreign policy that address its rapidly changing character, presenting the newest theoretical perspectives and dealing with novel empirical developments. Rather than simply considering structural variations and changes in the agency of the EU, it explores the new complexity in EU foreign policy. The authors offer new theoretical perspectives and new empirical studies dealing, among others, with issues such as:

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• Power delegation to the Commission.

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• EU diplomacy.

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• Parliamentarisation and constitutionalisation.

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• Committees' involvement in foreign policy process.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, European foreign policy and European integration.

Part I Internal perspectives on EU foreign policy

2 The EU’s ‘external action’ according to the Lisbon Treaty

Institutional choices and their explanations

Finn Laursen

DOI: 10.4324/9781315771151-2

Introduction¹

The Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the pillar structure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and gave the whole union legal personality. It contains a section on ‘external action’ in the part referred to as the Treaty on European Union (Title V, TEU). This part includes general provisions on ‘external action’, but is most specific on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also has a section on ‘External Action by the Union’ (Part Five TFEU). This section has general provisions as well as more specific provisions on common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid, restrictive measures, international agreements, and the Union’s relations with international organisations and third countries, as well as a solidarity clause. So it quickly appears that the old distinction between external economic relations (pillar 1) and CFSP (pillar 2) is still there despite the abolition of the pillars.

The treaty creates a new position of High Representative (HR) for Foreign and Security Policy who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and be Vice-President of the Commission (Art. 27 TEU). The HR will be assisted by a new European External Action Service (EEAS), a kind of diplomatic service. But there will still be Commissioners dealing with some important aspects of external action, such as trade, development and neighbourhood policies. How can such a mixed bag of institutional changes be explained?

It will be argued that the Lisbon Treaty is the outcome of a difficult interstate bargaining process, where power mattered. Various bargaining exchanges have created a very complex system. The state actors were constrained by previous decisions, including the outcome of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–3), but they made the final decisions, first at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 2003–4, which followed the Convention, and subsequently at the European Council meeting in June 2007 during the German Presidency, which outlined the mandate for the ensuing IGC that produced the final version of the Lisbon Treaty.

Despite novel provisions the Lisbon Treaty is in reality a relatively minor reform when it comes to CFSP. CFSP, including CSDP, was ring-fenced by the minimalist member states, Britain in particular. There was no breakthrough for a more communautaire foreign policy. Despite all the rhetoric about the EU playing a more efficient and coherent international role CFSP remains an intergovernmental setup based on consensus among the 27 member states.

Existing studies of EU treaties have tended to be legal (e.g. Piris, 2010) or based on specific political science approaches, such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998), rational choice institutionalism (e.g. Beach 2005) or social constructivism (e.g. Christiansen/Reh, 2009). This chapter argues that a fuller understanding of EU treaties requires a combination of different approaches using comparisons over time as well as across policy areas. On the latter point, the way CFSP has been treated differs fundamentally from external economic relations, and yet both are part of what the Lisbon Treaty calls ‘external action’.

After looking at the making of the Lisbon Treaty and its ‘external action’ provisions I shall discuss how we can explain the Lisbon Treaty by combining approaches in a novel way.

The making of Lisbon

The European Union (EU) is based on a number of treaties, some of which go back to the 1950s, especially the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, the EU was based on the treaty framework that emerged when the Treaty of Nice came into force in 2003 (European Union, 2003). The Constitutional Treaty – elaborated during the Convention on the Future of Europe, 2002–3, and finally negotiated during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2003–4 – proposed a number of changes in that framework (Council of the European Union, 2004a, 2004b; European Convention, 2003). But the treaty was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005, respectively (Laursen, 2008). After a period of reflection, it was decided that a so-called ‘reform treaty’ should be negotiated. The German presidency played an important role in securing agreement on a mandate for a new IGC in June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007a, 2007b). During the Portuguese presidency in the autumn of 2007, this IGC finalised a new treaty, the Lisbon Treaty (European Union, 2007). The first post-Lisbon consolidated version of the EU treaty was published in early 2008 (European Union, 2008).

The Lisbon Treaty mostly delineates a number of institutional changes. In the end the product must be evaluated against the standards established at the outset. Would the treaty improve the efficiency, democratic legitimacy ‘as well as the coherence of its external action’, as the mandate from June 2007 claimed it should (Council of the European Union, 2007a: 2)?

To explain the institutional choices of the Lisbon Treaty, we should study the institutional choice of the Constitutional Treaty (Laursen, 2008). If we were to fully explore the origin of the Lisbon Treaty we would have to go back to the post-Nice agenda established at the Nice meeting of the European Council in December 2000 (Laursen, 2006). This agenda included yet another reform process, which first produced the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty. If we focus on Lisbon as such, the decision by the European Council in June 2007 to abandon the Constitutional Treaty and go for a new treaty, initially referred to as the Reform Treaty, was the most important. It was in the run-up to this decision, which included a detailed mandate for a new IGC, that we saw the German presidency, Chancellor Angela Merkel in particular, taking a leadership role. The coming to power of Nicolas Sarkozy in France in May 2007 was also an important factor in the process.

Finding a solution to the constitutional impasse produced by the negative referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 was the most important point on the agenda of the German presidency in the first half of 2007. Seventeen of the 27 member states had ratified the Constitutional Treaty, and in Germany the parliamentary part of the ratification had been completed. The treaty had been rejected by referendums in France and the Netherlands. The remaining member states had put the ratification process on hold.

Those countries that had ratified the Constitutional Treaty wanted something as close as possible to that treaty. French presidential hopeful Sarkozy had suggested a ‘mini-treaty’, which would only include the essential elements of the Constitutional Treaty. The Netherlands and the UK also wanted some kind of minimal reform that would allow them to avoid a referendum. Sweden and Denmark had sympathy for such an approach. Poland had big problems with the new double majority, which meant that at least 55 per cent of the member states representing at least 65 per cent of the population would constitute a qualified majority vote (QMV) (Kurpas/Riecke, 2007; Seeger/Emmanouilidis, 2007).

In April Chancellor Merkel sent a letter to the member governments with 12 questions that implied a pragmatic approach. While wanting only to do what was absolutely necessary to satisfy the sceptical governments – especially the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic, but also France and the Netherlands – the questions suggested the possibility of reverting to the classical method of amending the existing treaties, doing away with the ‘foreign minister’ title and removing the various symbols of a constitution that had been included in the Constitutional Treaty (flag, hymn, and logo) (Mahony, 2007).

The German presidency adopted a strategy of bilateral negotiations behind closed doors, very different from the relatively open Constitutional Treaty approach. Heads of state or government were asked to appoint personal representatives (‘focal points’ or Sherpas). Through bilateral consultations, the presidency could get information about the bottom lines of the member states and consider possible solutions. The Chancellor had meetings with her counterparts, and the Sherpas were also involved in bilateral consultations. There was only one plenary meeting of the Sherpas on 15 May 2007; however, there were two additional meetings just prior to the European Council meeting in June and at that time there was also a meeting of foreign ministers. Interestingly enough, the whole process was controlled in Berlin, not Brussels. This also meant that the Council Secretariat was largely excluded at this point (Herma, 2008).

The only official report from the negotiations emerged on 14 June 2007. It claimed that all member states were united in the aim of agreeing on a new treaty before the European Parliament elections in 2009. Some issues were discussed: on one hand, there was a ‘need to preserve the substance of the innovations agreed upon in the 2004 IGC’ (Council of the European Union, 2007a: 3). On the other hand, it was felt necessary to ‘return to the traditional method of treaty change through an amending treaty’ (ibid.: 5). There was a ‘concern to underline the respect for the identity of the Member States’, and also ‘a clear demand from some delegations to further enhance the role of national parliaments’ (ibid.: 4). The report finished by listing six issues for further discussion, including ‘the specificity of the CFSP’ (ibid.).

Just prior to the June summit, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair made a statement outlining four British ‘red lines’: first, we would not accept a treaty that allows the charter of fundamental rights to change UK law in any way. Second, we would not agree to something that replaces the role of British foreign policy and our foreign minister. Third, we would not agree to give up our ability to control our common law and judicial and police system. And fourth, we would not agree to enable anything to be decided by qualified majority voting that could have a big say in our own tax and benefit system. We must have the right in those circumstances to determine it by unanimity (BBC News, 2007).

So retaining an autonomous British foreign policy was one clear bottom line for the UK. The Prime Minister added: ‘If we achieve those four objectives I defy people to say what it is that is supposed to be so fundamental that could require a referendum’ (ibid.).

After difficult negotiations the summit adopted a 16-page mandate for an IGC, which then started early during the Portuguese presidency, on 23 July 2007. Given the detail of the mandate for the IGC, it was possible to conclude the IGC quickly during the Portuguese presidency (Herma, 2008: 59).

The European Council met in Lisbon, on 17–18 October 2007. This was where the IGC settled the remaining issues. Poland was again a demandeur, then joined by Italy. Poland secured a stronger wording for the Ioannina compromise that deals with voting in the Council, as well as a permanent Polish advocate-general in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This was done by increasing the number of advocates-general from 8 to 11. Italy, moreover, secured an additional seat in the European Parliament, achieved by increasing the number of MEPs to 751 (Hans, 2007; Herma, 2008).² The treaty was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007.

‘External action' according to Lisbon

As mentioned earlier, the Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the pillar structure. CFSP, the old second pillar, however, will remain largely intergovernmental despit...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Halftitle Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• List of abbreviations
• PART I Internal perspectives on EU foreign policy
• PART II Challenges and choices in external perspectives on EU foreign policy
• PART III New approaches to EU foreign policy: conclusions
• Index