Homegrown Development in Africa

Chukwumerije Okereke, Patricia Agupusi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317505518
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Internationally driven development programmes have not been entirely successful in transforming the economic status of African countries. Since the late 1990s many African countries have started to take initiatives to develop an integrated framework that tackles poverty and promotes socio-economic development in their respective countries.

This book provides a critical evaluation of 'homegrown' development initiatives in Africa, set up as alternatives to externally sponsored development. Focusing specifically on Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, the book takes a qualitative and comparative approach to offer the first ever in-depth analysis of indigenous development programmes. It examines:

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• How far African states have moved towards more homegrown development strategies.

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• The effects of the shift towards African homegrown socio-economic development strategies and the conditions needed to enhance their success and sustainability.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of development studies, international politics, political economy, public policy and African politics, sociology and economics.

1 African homegrown development Renaissance or illusion?

DOI: 10.4324/9781315715940-1

Observed patterns of development processes across time and space show that no country has ever managed to achieve sustainable development through externally driven strategies. Countries may borrow and adapt ideas, money, and human resources. For a period of time they may need tutelage, technology and technical assistance. In the end, however, truly sustainable economic growth and development can only come through self-reliant homegrown strategies. The alternative is perpetual dependency and servitude.

One of the notable tragedies of much of African development efforts is that for far too long they have been based on externally invented strategies that are not compatible with local conditions and realities. Just how much these externally led and oriented strategies are imposed, as opposed to being self-inflicted, has been the subject of much vitriolic debate. What is hardly contested is that, regardless of where the bulk of the blame lies, a fundamental shift in the approach to ‘doing development’ is required for political independence in Africa to translate to economic freedom and self-reliance.

Meanwhile, in the first decade of independence, most African countries made great strides in development through homegrown strategies. The struggle for independence had in fact carried with it a promise not simply of political freedom but also crucially of economic decolonization (Adedeji, 1981; Ake, 1991). Such was the strength of the recognition that President Kaunda of Zambia forcefully declared in 1965: ‘Political independence without matching economic independence is meaningless. It is economic independence that brings in its wake social, cultural and scientific progress of man’ (Kaunda, 1968).

Julius Nyerere in his famous Arusha Declaration speech in 1967 made the point even more forcefully, saying:

It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid; indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. It is stupid for two reasons. Firstly, we shall not get the money. It is true that there are countries which can, and which would like to, help us. But there is no country in the world which is prepared to give us gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent that we would be able to achieve all our development targets … Secondly, even if it were possible for us to get enough money for our needs from external sources, is this what we really want? Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development.

(Nyerere, 1967)

Okoye (1980: 5) has aptly observed that slogans such as ‘boycott the boycottables’, ‘African Personality’, ‘Negritude’ and ‘cultural authenticity’ which provided the ideational thrust for independence struggle were all underpinned by, and expressive of the hope for African indigenous and self-reliant economic growth. It was with this mind-set – a desire to prove to the world that they were ripe for self-rule – that various governments at independence embarked on strategic development initiatives to accelerate the pace of socio-economic development.

For example, Ghana, inspired by the modernization theory, went for the ‘big push’ development based on rapid infrastructural growth – even though Nkrumah rather curiously called his approach ‘scientific socialism’ (Nkurumah, 1957a). Tanzania routed for a more ‘pure’ brand of African socialism based on Nyerere's famous concept of Ujamaa – with its emphasis on self-sufficient agriculture and local cooperative societies. Nigeria prioritized industrialization, taking the number of medium and large scale size plants in the industrial sector from 150 at independence (in 1960) to 380 by 1965. This was, as Iwuagwu, (2009: 157) rightly observed ‘the era of the pioneer mills for palm oil processing, palm kernel and groundnut crushing, cotton ginning, leather tanning, power driven saw mills, beer brewing, and oil seed milling’.

Kenya for its own part, through Harambee, favoured a delicate combination of self-reliant economic development and the importation of factor input such as capacity and equipment from abroad. The approaches were all qualitatively different which gave credence to their authenticity. The common denominator, however, was that each country made concerted efforts to articulate and manage their own development plan based on their national priorities and with sensitivity to their history, culture and economic advantages. While many of the post independent economic policies had serious flaws and produced mixed results, they were widely characterized by a determined effort towards self-reliant development. Accordingly, they galvanized the people and led to a sense of national pride. But the euphoria did not last as many of the countries badly stumbled before they had the chance to firmly stand on their feet.

The period between 1980 and 1999 has been widely described as the two lost decades in Africa with regards to economic development (Easterly, 2001; Noman, et al., 2012). During this period, Africa suffered real failure in economic development and much of the progress made in the years following independence was reversed. This era of woeful economic performance coincided with the time the Bretton Woods Institutions introduced and imposed the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). This was a set of conditionality stipulations on borrowing by developing countries in return for loans, debt reliefs and the financial aid they beggarly sought to help prop up their rapidly declining economies. The World Bank and the IMF's SAPs were introduced in over 40 African countries between 1980 and 1993 (Loewenson, 1993) and a total of 958 adjustment loans were made to developing countries from 1980 to 1998 (Easterly, 2001: 136).

Since the late 1990s, there have been renewed calls for African governments to (re)take responsibility for developing an integrated framework that tackles poverty and socio-economic development in their respective countries. The shift back towards African homegrown development (HGD) is based on a wide consensus (by scholars, African leaders and their development partners) that externally crafted and imposed development programmes have largely not been successful in transforming the socio-economic status of African countries. Across the spectrum, there is a widespread feeling that Africans must now (re) take full ownership of their development agendas and direct their own political social and economic destiny. Homegrown development for Africa has thus emerged as the new mantra in international development discourse.

‘African Solutions to African Problems’ is now the key refrain of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – a philosophy trumpeted with regards to economic development, peace and security and the management of the continent's environmental challenges (Beswick, 2012). Since the turn of the Millennium, a number of African leaders notably Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria have been talking up the idea of ‘African Renaissance’ and a ‘new partnership’ with the West based on self-management, policy autonomy, equality and mutual respect (UNECA, 2001; NEPAD, 2001). Hear them:

The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance, and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest.

(NEPAD, 2001: 15)

Continuing, they vowed: ‘Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstance. We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts’ (NEPAD, 2001: 15).

Meanwhile about the same period the mood of donor countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) about African development was also changing. The 2005 Paris declaration on aid effectiveness is often quoted as a turning point. Here, over 100 donor agencies and receipt countries affirmed that henceforth country ownership would become the key pillar of a new aid paradigm. In the same year the eight most industrialized countries (G8) expressed their exasperation with the failure of African leaders to step up and take the lead in defining their national development strategies. In a call for bolder leadership they declared:

It is up to developing countries themselves and their governments to take the lead on development. They need to decide, plan, and sequence their economic policies to fit with their own development strategies, for which they should be accountable to all their people.

(G8 Statement on Africa, 2005)

‘National ownership’ of strategies is now the keyword for international donors’ lending strategy as epitomized in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The PRSPs replaced SAP and currently guide the lending policy of the IMF and World Bank. They have provided the context for virtually all the aid-related national development strategies by African governments since 1999. HGD has also been rapidly acquiring a growing presence in the internet and blogosphere. A google search on the phrase ‘African solution to African problem’ shows 150,000 results in 0.2 seconds while ‘homegrown development in Africa’ search provides over a million hits.

It is curious, however, that despite rhetorical inflation within policy circles, there has so far been very little engagement with HGD strategies and their challenges in the academic scholarship. In fact, it is shocking to find, based on searches on Amazon, Google Scholar and Web of Knowledge, that the term ‘homegrown development’ does not appear to figure even once in the title of any book or journal article in print. By contrast, the term ‘ownership’ is much more widely used, if poorly defined and operationalized. The purpose of this book is to fill this gap.

The focus of the book

The general objective of the book is to contribute to the rapidly growing but poorly articulated HGD discourse in Africa. The specific aim is to provide a critical evaluation of a number of the development initiatives in Africa put in place between 1999 and 2009 to assess the extent of their indigeneity (how indigenous they are) as well as their effectiveness. In practice this is seen as a way of exploring the extent to which the clamour for HGD in Africa has resulted in truly self-reliant development. Focusing specifically on Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, the book takes a qualitative and comparative approach to offer an in-depth analysis of the ‘new wave’ of development programmes in Africa, which since the late 1990s have been presented as alternatives to externally driven development.

The book is concerned with two overarching questions. The first is to explore the extent to which these post-SAP developmental initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa could be truly described as homegrown. Fundamental to answering this question is a close and detailed exploration of various development programmes and the degree to which there has been a change in the aid relationship between African governments and donor countries and agencies. We are interested in knowing whether African governments have indeed extricated themselves from the paternalistic relationship with Western countries and donor institutions that characterized the era of colonialism as well as the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s and 1990s.

The second overarching question explored in the book is the extent to which these development initiatives have been effective and what factors account for their success, or lack of it. Here, we are interested in looking critically at these initiatives to see what works, what does not work and why? In other words, what makes these initiatives different from the previous externally prescribed programmes; what are the challenges that these programmes face; and what is needed to enhance the effectiveness of these initiatives?

The concept of HGD

A prior and critical requirement in analysing the quality of these strategies is a clear definition and robust conceptualization of HGD. This is necessary because while HGD and its cognates such as ‘country-led’, ‘country-owned’, ‘self-reliant’ and ‘indigenous’ growth have become emblems for new directions in the development process, precious little effort has so far been devoted to actually defining what these terms mean and how they may be conceptualized. Some of the many questions that have arisen about HGD in Africa, which give urgency to the need for a strong conceptualization of the concept relate to its relationship with existing development paradigms, its normative content (if it has any) and its utility as a vehicle for ushering in sustainable development (Apuuli, 2012; Beswick, 2010; Mays, 2003; Whitfield, 2009). Furthermore, does HGD include borrowing ideas from other successful countries or solely leveraging local knowledge and assets? Does it entail broad based participation that involves civil society organization in development planning or merely the more direct involvement of national parliaments?

Emerging scholarship on country ownership, aid politics and sustainable African development provide a discordant picture. There are some who appear to suggest that HGD for Africa implies going back to ancient cultures and institutions (see Oomen, 2000). Others however, suggest that the solution lies in generating ‘organizational and disciplinary techniques for blending the past with the present’ (Okoye, 1980: 5). Some scholars, notably Easterly (2006a; 2006b) have strongly linked HGD with ‘the dynamism of individuals and firms in free markets’ (Easterly, 2006a: 368) suggesting a very limited role for the state. On this account, HGD for Africa implies effective functioning free market capitalism as is the case in Western democracies. But this recipe for HGD has been criticized with strong arguments produced to indicate that HGD in Africa requires the effective role of the state (Stiglitz, 1998). Lastly, while some imply that embracing HGD warrants cessation of development aid to Africa (Easterly, 2006b; Moyo, 2009), others see increased aid flow as compatible with nurturing HGD (Kalinowski, 2009; Sachs et al., 2004; Whitfield and Fraser, 2009). Crucially, in the context of well-rehearsed technical and human capacity gaps in Africa, unequal relationship with donor agencies, institutional weakness and the ‘extraversion’ of African leaders (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009), there are questions about whether, and to what extent, Africans and their development partners can truly claim the existence of HGD development initiatives in the continent. And, if indeed HGD strategies are now taking root in Africa, what exactly do they look like and what results are they generating?

In this book, we have defined a HGD strategy as one that is initiated, crafted and implemented by a country without external control. By this definition, we suggest that the most important factor in HGD is policy ownership or autonomy. Our use of ownership is different from its common application in the mainstream aid discourse where it is often taken to mean the greater commitment of borrowing countries to implement polices agreed with or even forced upon them by donor agencies often in keeping with loan conditionality. We use ownership to mean absolute control by a country over its developm...